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ABSTRACT 
 
Translation, although often invisible in the field of politics, is actually an integral 
part of political activity. Which texts get translated, from and into which 
languages is itself already a political decision. 
(Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 13) 
Translation has recently shifted its focus from the notions of originality and equivalence to 
those of power and patronage. This has proven essential, especially in relation to the 
translation of political discourse. Samuel Butler maintains that every person’s production, 
whether literature, music, pictures, architecture, or anything else, is a portrait of themselves. 
Translation is no exception. The translator’s role is no longer perceived as a transparent means 
of communication that is expected to relay the exact message of the original producer of the 
discourse. This thesis will view translation as a rewriting of the original text, recognising the 
translator as an author who modifies and changes the ST according to his or her ideology, 
political stand, or general interests. The translator is also foremost a reader who brings his or 
her own judgments, imposing them upon the text, perhaps reshaping the entire political 
discourse. Media outlets employ certain strategies and techniques to superimpose the media 
outlet’s agenda and objectives onto translations, promoting certain ideological convictions and 
political views. 
This thesis examines the relationship between a number of issues in relation to ideology, 
media, political discourse, language, and translation. Illustrative examples are extracted from 
the political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring. It uses Critical Discourse 
Analysis and narrative theory as a theoretical framework. It also aims to detect political tools 
and strategies often used in political discourse production and media discourse to analyse the 
data circulated on the Arab Spring. It seeks to look for the ideological influence of both 
translator and patronage on the outcome of the translation process. The data used for analysis 
in this thesis is taken from the political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring, in 
particular the Syrian revolution. The data corpus consists of translated interviews, political 
articles, and political speeches. Examples of revolutionary discourse produced by protesters 
are also included, alongside their translations. This is a qualitative study that lists and analyses 
representative samples of the translated political discourse, drawing conclusions and findings 
conclusions that apply to most of the data found in the context of the Arab Spring.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A Background to the Study 
Political communication needs translation that enables political discourse to transcend 
national borders. Translation contributes to provoking conflict, while at the same time 
unfolding it. Without translation and interpreting, political discourse may not be 
communicated and understood among the different parties involved in conflict. Without it, 
revolutions would not gain momentum; they would not be heard of to gain international 
support. Translation is part of the institution of war and power struggle. It thus plays a major 
role in the management of conflict – by all parties, from the revolutionaries and human rights 
activists to the ruling elites and political regimes. Von Flotow (1997: 35) states, “[A]ttention 
has increasingly focused on politically aware and sometimes politically engaged translators, 
who are conscious of their influence” on the discourse and “may seek to impose it overtly.” 
Translation can serve as a political tool used by the translator to implement a certain political 
agenda (Alvarez and Vidal, 1996). 
Politics dominates all aspects of human thought and activities. Translation is one of these 
activities. The translator’s decisions are partially influenced by political agendas, especially 
when political discourse is concerned. Ideological motives are also essential in determining 
the outcome of the translation process. Translation and politics are inextricably linked; each 
one affects the other. This becomes increasingly obvious when the media is involved. The 
media is often used to communicate a political message to the public, sometimes even 
persuading the public to follow said message. Before political discourse is presented in media, 
it goes through an entirely considered process of translation wherein the ideological factor has 
a huge role to play. 
Translation has shifted its focus from the notions of originality and equivalence to factors of 
power and patronage. This has proven essential, especially in relation to the translation of 
political discourse. Every person’s production, whether it is literature, music, pictures, 
architecture, or anything else, is always a portrait of the self, and translation is not an 
exception. The translator is no longer perceived to be responsible for carrying a transparent 
means of communication, nor are they expected to even convey the original message 
expressed by the author of the discourse. According to Hatim and Munday (2004: 200), 
equivalence no longer governs the production and reception of translation. Translation is not 
merely an innocent transfer of ideas from one language into another. The process of translation 
14 
 
can be ideologically manipulated to influence perceptions and to undermine the target culture. 
The ideological influence on translation is as old as translation itself. Fawcett (1998: 107) 
states that “throughout the centuries, individuals and institutions applied their particular 
beliefs to the production of certain effect in translation.” 
Translations are often chosen and reviewed by agents following ideological, economic, social, 
or cultural considerations. Certain parameters and guidelines dictated by patrons such as 
publishers, editors, and state institutions govern the translator’s work. Therefore, the entire 
operation aims to implement the patrons’ scheme and to establish their legitimacy over the 
entire process (Haj Omar, 2011: 23). Therefore, for Lefèvere (1992b: 10), “translation needs 
to be studied in connection with power and patronage, ideology and poetics with emphasis on 
the various attempts to ... undermine an existing ideology.” This dissertation will view 
translation as a rewriting of the original text, treating the translator as an author who modifies 
and changes the ST according to his or her own ideology, political stand or personal interests. 
The translator is also first and foremost a reader who imposes his or her own judgments upon 
the text, perhaps reshaping the entire message embedded in it.  
This thesis will examine political discourse and its translation at the time of the Arab Spring 
revolutions. It will assess the role of various factors such as ideology, media and narrativity 
in shaping the discourse and influencing the translator’s decisions when translation is 
involved. The role of translation has been particularly crucial during these revolutions, as 
protestors and civil activists needed to pass on their demands to the international community 
to make their voices heard to gain support and sympathy from the outside world. Thousands 
of articles on the Arab Spring have been translated and the speeches have been interpreted 
into many languages. Translation, in fact, has been part of the on-going conflict between the 
revolutionary powers and ruling authorities.  
Each of the competing parties involved in the Arab Spring conflicts has produced its version 
of the narrative on the conflict. ‘Narrative’ in this study is to refer to the everyday stories 
people live. Narrative theory recognises that it is neither race nor colour that governs people’s 
behaviour, but rather the stories they hear and believe about events. These dynamic stories are 
open to change with any exposure to new experience. The role played by narratives is vital in 
conflict, as narrativity contributes to the normalisation of the stories it projects over a period 
of time. Thus, these stories come to “be perceived as self-evident, benign, incontestable and 
non-controversial” (Baker, 2006: 11), gradually taking control of “our consciousness” and 
becoming part of the daily “fabric of life” (ibid: 13). During the Syrian conflict, narratives 
have been promoted and naturalised by translation, enabling these stories to transcend 
linguistic barriers. Translators and interpreters participated in both circulating and resisting 
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narratives in a “conflict that starts and ends with constructing or deconstructing an enemy” 
(ibid). Furthermore, translators contribute to transforming the who into it as a major strategy 
to deconstruct the ‘other’. This is because “an other” is “so foreign and distant that who 
becomes it” (Nelson, 2002: 8). 
 
Research Scope and Statement of the Problem 
This research aims to analyse the political discourse and relevant translations communicated 
at the time of the Arab Spring revolutions. It will primarily explore the language of the 
revolution and the various forms of revolutionary discourse produced by the protestors, as 
well as how language was utilised to establish and express the demands and standpoints of the 
revolutionary activists during the Arab Spring. It will then highlight the influence of 
translators’ political affiliations and views on the outcome of the translation process. This 
study aims to expose the different roles played by the translator, both as a reader and 
interpreter of the source text, and also as an author (re-writer) of the target text. Thus, the 
question of ideology acquires special importance in this respect alongside the effect of the 
translator’s previous knowledge and experience on translation.  
Strategies and techniques employed by media outlets often contribute to shaping the political 
discourse at hand. The study will investigate these strategies and techniques and will expose 
the changes they bring about to political discourse. It will also explore the changes brought 
about to the translation in line with the publishing media outlet’s agenda, ideology, and 
interests. The concept of narrativity is central to this study, since competing parties adopted 
different versions of the narratives formed on the events of the Arab Spring. The Arab ruling 
elites and pro-regime media outlets have narrated the events of the conflict in a certain way, 
which contradicts the narrative produced by the revolutionaries and civil activists. This study 
aims to explore the manner in which competing narratives manifested themselves in 
translation during the Arab Spring revolutions. 
The first six chapters of this dissertation will focus on the role played by the following factors 
in shaping political discourse and its translation: political views, ideology, media, and 
narrativity. Illustrative examples will be extracted from the political discourse circulating 
during the Arab Spring that swept Tunisia (Dec 17, 2010), Egypt (Jan 25, 2011), Yemen (Feb 
3, 2011), Libya (Feb 17, 2011), and Syria (Mar 15, 2011). The data analysis chapter will be 
dedicated to the analysis of the translation of political discourse communicated during the 
Syrian conflict in particular. However, it will be thematically correspondent to the theories 
introduced in the previous chapters. It will aim to analyse the data corpus collected in the 
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context of the Syrian revolution. The analysis will be made in light of the theories explained 
in the previous chapters, such as Criticial Discourse Analysis and narrative theory.  
This study proposes that the translation of political discourse communicated during the Arab 
Spring has been largely influenced by the ideological and political views of the translators and 
publishing media outlets. It demonstrates the media outlets’ employment of various strategies 
and techniques to modify the messages embedded in the political discourse at hand. The 
translations are manipulated in line with certain agendas, ideologies, and interests. The study 
proposes the idea that conflicting parties used media outlets to promote their versions of the 
narrative of the conflict, through translation, for the purpose of legitimising self-actions, while 
delegitimising others in the context of the Arab Spring. Chapter Seven then explores the Syrian 
conflict as a case study. 
 
Research Questions 
This research study will attempt to address the following questions: 
1- How did various forms of revolutionary discourse contribute to establishing and 
expressing the demands of the protestors during the Arab Spring? 
2- From the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis, to what extent did translators’ 
political views and affiliations influence their performance in the context of the Arab 
Spring? 
3- To what extent did ideology shape the outcome of the translation process during the 
Arab Spring? What is the role played by patronage in this respect? 
4- What are the strategies and techniques adopted by media outlets to influence, or even 
manipulate the translation of political discourse communicated during the uprisings? 
5- From the perspective of narrative theory, how did competing narratives manifest 
themselves in translation during the conflicts that resulted from the Arab Spring? 
6- How did these issues apply to the Syrian Case in particular? 
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Significance of the Research 
Just as my master’s dissertation (Haj Omar, 2011) investigates translation of political 
discourse at times of conflict, this research study continues personal research in the field of 
translation of political discourse, particularly in relation to media, ideology, and conflict. This 
study will attempt to implement relevant theories concerning the relationship between 
translation and the factors of ideology, politics, media, and narrativity on original data derived 
from the Arab Spring revolutions and the Syrian conflict. This analytical study is unique in 
the sense that the data corpus under analysis has not been examined previously by any research 
work in light of the theories introduced in the first six chapters. The choice of the Arab Spring 
as the temporal setting of the research is significant as this event marks a political and social 
quantum leap in the Middle East and North Africa. 
The study establishes a link between five different uprisings that occurred subsequently across 
a geographical area that has shared many common cultural, social, and religious characteristics 
of nations living under similar political circumstances. The five Arab revolutions in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria share many qualities and features. They are thus combined 
in one illustrative case for this study. They are all, in essence, popular mass uprisings initiated 
against repressive Arab regimes that had ruled their countries for long periods of time. These 
revolutions started as peaceful mass uprisings, but the Arab regimes in these countries chose 
to crack down on the protests through the use of excessive force. Most importantly, these 
protests captured the attention of international public opinion, headlining the news around the 
world at the time. This, in turn, increased the activity of translation and news reporting from 
the region. 
 
Methodology and Data 
This thesis uses qualitative research – primarily exploratory – to gain a thorough 
understanding of the underlying reasons and motivations for the decisions taken by translators 
of political discourse. It offers insights into the decision-making process related to selection, 
translation, and editing of political items by publishing media outlets. The goal is to therefore 
uncover trends in thought and standpoints, carrying out an in-depth analysis to reach logical 
conclusions and findings.  
The data corpus used in the first six chapters consists of political articles published by media 
outlets and their translations. It also includes speeches by, and interviews with, key players 
during the five revolutions, such as rebel leaders, prominent activists, politicians, Presidents 
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and state officials and their accompanied translations. This is in addition to different genres of 
revolutionary discourse produced and communicated by the protestors during the Arab Spring. 
Examples include, but are not limited to, slogans, chants, songs, and other forms of 
revolutionary literature that served to sustain and transmit the messages and demands of 
protesters. The writings inscribed on signs and banners held up by the protestors will be 
subject to study alongside their translations. The data is in both Arabic and English, in written 
form or as audio-visual material. 
The data corpus studied in the data analysis chapter (Chapter Seven) includes material derived 
from the political discourse communicated with regard to the Syrian conflict in particular. It 
consists of news reports, articles, statements, interviews, videos, and banners held up by the 
protestors as well as their translations. These news items and material are published by a wide 
range of news websites, newspapers, and TV channels. The source texts are published 
primarily by international media outlets, such as The Wall Street Journal, The Independent, 
The Washington Post, The Daily Beast, The New York Times, The Guardian, The American 
Conservative, BBC Arabic, and CNN. Most of these media outlets are not directly involved in 
the Syrian conflict, but provide reports and press material which have been translated by local 
media outlets more politically and ideologically enganged in the conflict. The translations 
conducted by these local media outlets are in general ideologically steered and politically 
biased to one of the conflicting parties. They are provided by pro-regime outlets, such as 
Russia Today, al-Manar, JB News, Sama TV, and Syria Now as well as pro-revolutionary ones 
such as Sasa Post and Orient News. 
The data corpus in Chapter Seven also includes the work of Memri, which is a US media 
organisation that focuses on subtitling audio-visual items published on the Middle Eastern 
politics. Memri has been accused of being biased to Israel as well as distorting the image of 
the Arabs and Muslims. Moreover, this chapter will analyse the translations provided by Free 
Syrian Translators and Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office. Both bodies are classified as pro-
revolutionary; the former is composed of civil activists and independent translators who 
support the revolution, whereas the latter represents a prominent anti-Assad Islamist military 
faction, known as Jaish al-Islam. The data corpus also includes the Kafranbel banners 
produced and held up in demonstrations by civil activists from the Syrian city of Kafranbel. 
The criteria adopted for data selection will be elaborated on in Section 7.2 of Chapter Seven, 
which will also include a full list of the examples and the sources, and will show in what ways 
these items represent the data produced and circulated on the Syrian revolution, by all parties 
involved in the conflict. 
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Thesis Structure  
This thesis consists of an introduction followed by eight chapters. The first chapter provides 
political background that addresses the political situation in the Arab World before and after 
the Arab Spring. It consists of four main sections. The first examines the status of democracy 
in the Arab countries before the Arab Spring, investigating many relevant issues. The second 
analyses the environment that led to the Arab Spring as well as the factors that paved the way 
for the masses to take to the streets in the Arab World, demanding their rights without fear. 
The third discusses, in further detail, each revolution and the characteristics that make each 
one unique and different. The fourth and final section investigates the significance of the Arab 
Spring, analysing its general features and characteristics, examining its effects on international 
and regional politics, since the Arab Spring marks the end of post-colonialism and the start of 
a new era in the modern political history of the Middle East.  
The second chapter explores the different linguistic aspects of the Arab uprisings and their 
contributions to the political transition that has been achieved during and after the Arab Spring. 
It is divided into various sections, each of which examines a distinctive linguistic aspect or 
feature of the revolutionary action in the Arab World after 2011. Key concepts, such as taking 
a stance through language and mass protest-mobilising discourse, are covered alongside the 
role of the internet in forming the discourse of the Arab Spring. Thereafter, this chapter 
investigates different genres of revolutionary discourse, such as slogans, chants, and 
revolutionary humour. An attempt is made to decipher whether these genres were effective in 
establishing the protestors’ demands and aspirations. The discussion on the role of language 
in the Arab Spring is concluded by looking into the counter-revolutionary discourse adopted 
by regime supporters as a reaction to the discourse developed by the protestors. 
The third chapter examines the relationship between a number of issues pertaining to the 
subject of this research study: politics, political discourse, language, and translation, using 
illustrative and representative examples from political discourse communicated during and 
after the Arab Spring. It makes a clear distinction between key concepts such as text and 
discourse, and politics and political discourse, listing features and types of political discourse 
while examining revolutionary discourse that has particular significance for this thesis. It 
attempts to analyse political discourse on the basis of two methods: first, detecting political 
tools employed in political discourse; and second, critical discourse analysis. It also 
establishes a connection between political discourse analysis and translation at both micro and 
macro levels. 
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The fourth chapter sheds light on the influence of ideology on the production and structuring 
of political discourse and its translation. It defines the concept of ideology, and examines its 
relationship with politics, exploring the outcome of the connection between ideology and 
language, i.e. ideological discourse. It analyses ideological discourse, explaining van Dijk’s 
ideological discourse structures, using examples from the political discourse of the Arab 
Spring. This chapter also investigates the relationship between ideology and translation, 
highlighting the various roles taken by a translator as a text reader and a re-writer, discussing 
the approaches underlying these roles. It looks into the impact of patronage on the translation 
process, providing recent examples that demonstrate the influence of ideology on the political 
discourse communicated in the Middle East and North Africa. 
The fifth chapter examines the effect of the media institutions’ agendas, goals, and political 
affiliations on the translation process. It primarily looks into the relationship between the 
media and politics, delving into different ideological strategies and tools employed in media 
discourse. It also discusses the impact of decisions made by media outlets on the translation 
process, considering in detail the stages of news translation and the strategies often employed 
by news channels and newspapers in press translation. In addition to this, it points out a 
number of tools often exploited by the media to manipulate the outcome of the translation 
process, such as framing, hyperbole, and understatement. It then ends by specifically 
investigating and analysing newsroom translations. 
Competing popular narratives produced during the Arab Spring revolutions and subsequent 
military civil conflicts represent a typical example of discursive dispute at all political, 
ideological, and social levels. Translation is an integrated part of conflict; it plays a vital role 
in describing, shaping, and unfolding its events. The sixth chapter introduces narrative theory, 
explaining the way translation operates in this environment of conflicting narratives. It lists 
the types of narratives, discussing features of narrativity and the way narrative works. It also 
explores the concept of framing by examining the different modes of narrative framing in 
translation. It demonstrates how competing narratives have presented themselves through 
translation during the conflicts that resulted from the Arab Spring. 
The seventh chapter is the data analysis chapter devoted to analysing the translation of political 
discourse communicated during the Syrian conflict. It investigates the effect of the factors of 
ideology, politics, and media on translation during the Syrian revolution in particular. It also 
deals, in some respects, with the translations of the narratives produced and adopted by 
conflicting parties in the context of the Syrian revolution. The role of framing is significant in 
this regard. This study assumes that narratives of the Syrian conflict have been framed 
differently in translation during the process of reporting. This chapter consists of four sections 
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that correspond thematically to each of the four previous chapters (starting from Chapter 
Three, and ending with Chapter Six). The first looks into the influence of the translator’s 
political views on the translation. The second investigates the effect of ideology in the 
translation process and the roles played by the translator as a reader and re-writer of the target 
text in addition to the influence of patronage. The third examines the influence of media on 
translation and the various strategies and techniques employed by media outlets to steer the 
outcome of the translation process. The fourth analyses the data corpus from the perspective 
of narrative theory, exploring the ways whereby competing narratives have manifested 
themselves in translation during the Syrian conflict. 
The eighth chapter gives a general summary of this research study, listing the results and 
findings and explaining their significance in the field of translation studies. It also refers to the 
limitations of the study, putting forward recommendations for further research. 
 
Significance of the Structure 
This research study might follow an unusual structure, analysing the translation of political 
discourse from four different perspectives: political, ideological, media-related, and narrative. 
The study also contributes to three fields of knowledge: Political Science (Chapter 1), 
Linguistics (Chapter 2), and Translation Studies (Chapters 3-7). However, this combination 
of theories and approaches is necessary, taking into consideration the nature of the data at 
hand. The Arab Spring is a turning point in the modern history of the Arab World, which the 
factors of politics, ideology, media and narrativity have contributed to shaping as well as 
interpreting. Therefore, it is necessary to take the four factors into account to produce a 
comprehensive and meaningful analysis of the discourse and its translation. Chapter One is 
meant to provide the historical and political knowledge needed by the reader to comprehend 
the context of the events, the data, the analysis, and thereafter the significance of the results. 
It is also intended to constitute a valuable contribution to the studies tackling the Arab Spring 
in the field of Political Science. Chapter Two is meant to address the linguistic aspects of the 
Arab Spring, paving the way to investigating the translation of the political discourse 
communicated during the Arab revolutions in the following chapters. It, thus, attempts to 
substantially contribute to the study of the linguistic features of these events in the field of 
Linguistics. This chapter not only presents relevant theories, but also carries out an in-depth 
analysis, using examples derived from the political discourse of the Arab Spring. 
Chapters 3-6 lay the theoretical foundation of the analysis of the translation of political 
discourse circulating on the Arab Spring, which will be undertaken in Chapter Seven. They 
22 
 
separately discuss the factors of politics, ideology, media and narrativity in relation to 
translation. These four chapters have two functions. The first is to study the factors related to 
political discourse, namely politics, ideology, media and narrativity, using representative 
examples derived from the political discourse circulated during the Arab Spring to help the 
reader understand the nature of the data at hand. The second is to present the relationship 
between these factors and translation, paving the way for a detailed analysis of the translation 
performed in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, they also include some sections in which 
translations of political discourse from the aftermath of the Arab Spring are analysed, such as 
Section 3.4.1, and Section 4.3.4. Chapter Seven is the data analysis chapter, which constitutes 
by far the largest chapter in this study (24,000 words). It provides a case study of the 
translation of political discourse circulating on the Syrian conflict in particular. The Syrian 
conflict is thus regarded as a representative of the Arab Spring. The data is analysed 
accordingly in light of the theories explained in Chapters3-6. Chapter Seven consists of four 
sections that correspond thematically to each of the four previous chapters (starting with 
Chapter Three, and ending with Chapter Six). The following is a chart that illustrates the 
structure of this thesis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Q1: How did various forms of 
revolutionary discourse 
contribute to establishing and 
expressing the demands of the 
protestors during the Arab 
Spring? 
Q2: From the perspective of 
Critical Discourse Analysis, to 
what extent did translators’ 
political views and affiliations 
influence their performance in the 
context of the Arab Spring? 
 
Q3: To what extent did ideology 
shape the outcome of the 
translation process during the 
Arab Spring? What is the role 
played by patronage in this 
respect? 
 
Q4: From the perspective of narrative 
theory What are the strategies and 
techniques adopted by media outlets 
to influence, or even manipulate the 
translation of political discourse 
communicated during the uprisings? 
 
Q5: How did competing narratives 
manifest themselves in 
translation during the conflicts 
that resulted from the Arab 
Spring? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE STORY OF THE ARAB SPRING 
 
1.1 Introduction  
In order to meaningfully discuss the subject matter, the popular term ‘Arab World’ must be 
clarified and explained. The ‘Arab World’ consists of the land stretching from the Arabian 
Gulf in the East to the Atlantic Ocean in the West, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the 
North to the Indian Ocean and the African Sahara in the South. It encompasses twenty-one 
countries, holding a population of 350 million people. Until the outbreak of the Arab Spring, 
many Arab states had been governed by political systems that did not always maintain free 
electoral processes, or even observe basic human and political rights. They were completely 
void of freedom of press and the right of peaceful assembly. Some were more autocratic than 
others, with Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco containing some elements of democracy, 
while the likes of Syria, Libya, and Tunisia were autocratic to the core.  
On December 17, 2010, a minor incident triggered what is known now as the Arab Spring. 
Muhammad Bouazizi, a 26-year-old Tunisian man from the poor state of Sidi Bouzid set 
himself on fire in a self-mutilating protest against the police who confiscated his produce cart. 
Nobody in the world expected such a spontaneous individual act to initiate waves of 
revolutions throughout the Arab World, toppling long-standing regimes. 
Protests broke out on the same day in Sidi Bouzid, spreading rapidly to other cities. After one 
month of peaceful mass protests, Tunisian President Ben Ali, in a historic moment, fled the 
country under public pressure. ‘The Jasmine Revolution’ led to the overthrow of the regime 
in Tunisia. Within a few weeks, millions of Egyptians, Libyans, Yemenis, Syrians and people 
from other Arab nations were out on the streets in their countries protesting against the 
dictatorial regimes that had treated them unfairly and brutally oppressed them for decades. 
This chapter provides a political background that addresses the political situation in the Arab 
World before and after the Arab Spring. It consists of four main sections. The first examines 
the status of democracy in Arab countries before the Arab Spring and investigates many 
relevant issues such as democracy in Arab thought, Arab civil society, human rights, political 
opposition and the notion of liberalised autocracy in contrast to full autocracy. Furthermore, 
it lists a number of potential reasons behind the absence of democracy in the Arab world. It 
then addresses the connection between the lack of freedom and the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
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finally ends with the examination of the Islamic heritage of the region, the status of democracy 
in Islam as a religion and Islamism as a popular political trend in the Arab World.  
The second section analyses the environment that led to the Arab Spring as well as the factors 
that paved the way for the masses to take to the streets in the Arab World, demanding their 
rights without fear. It also highlights the defining role of the media and social networks 
coupled with a growing frustration caused by the socio-economic failure and lack of hope in 
political reform.  
The third section discusses in further detail each revolution and the characteristics that make 
each one unique and different. Five revolutions in five Arab countries are covered: the Jasmine 
Revolution in Tunisia, the Egyptian January 25th Revolution centred around Tahrir Square, 
the Youth Revolution in Yemen, the February 17th Revolution in Libya against Colonel 
Gaddafi, and the Syrian March 15th Revolution. 
The fourth section investigates the significance of the Arab Spring, analyses its general 
features and characteristics and examines its effects on international and regional politics, as 
the Arab Spring marks the end of post-colonialism and the start of a new era in modern 
political history. 
 
1.2 Democracy in the Arab World before the Arab Spring 
[T]he cheapest commodity in our crisis-ridden Arab homeland is its people ... [A man] is 
killed and nobody asks after him; he is jailed and his government and society forsake him 
... He is guilty until proven innocent ... At the same time ... the Arab mass media speak 
of Arab dignity, strength and of combating injustice, all of which belie reality ... There is 
no [Arab] excellence without democracy. 
Muhammad al-Rumayhi (1991) 
 
1.2.1 Democracy in Arab Thought 
Since the inception of independent nation-states in the Middle East, Arabs have endured 
oppression in the form of authoritarianism. Despite this, values like al-a͑dl (“justice”) and al-
ḥurriyah (“freedom”) have shown their importance in Arab thought and history. Abu al-Qasim 
al-Shabbi, the Tunisian poet, associates al-ḥurriyah (“freedom”) with al-ḥayāt (“life”) itself. 
Similarly, Naguib Mahfouz and Tawfiq al-Hakim, the Egyptian novelists, employed novel 
writing to promote democratic values and attack political oppression using metaphors and 
allegories. 
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Sadiki (2004: 200) notes that the advent of Islam in the seventh century, which remains “a 
humanist revolution in the first place,” is an important Arab historical landmark for the 
introduction of the values of freedom and justice; Islam was, in essence, “a revolution against 
al-jāhiliyyah (pagan ignorance) and the patriarchal political order in Arabia where a minority 
of tribal and merchant a’yān (notables) had a free hand to exploit and enslave” (ibid). Islam 
was thus introduced as a humanistic creed that promoted al-musāwāt (“equality”) as well as 
al-ʿadl (“freedom”), thereby establishing a new era wherein women had the right to live, 
inherit and learn. “It established al-shūrā (consultation) as the basis for decision-making,” 
Sadiki states, “and al-bay’ah (oath of allegiance) by populace, a recognition of the right of the 
ruled” to have a say in choosing the ruler (ibid).  
Al-Farabi (870-950) studied democracy as a system established by the Greeks, reading the 
works of Plato and Aristotle. The same is true of other Muslim intellectuals that received their 
education in Damascus and Baghdad. Although democracy is not mentioned by name in his 
works, al-Farabi’s notion of al-madīnatu aj-jamā’iyyah (“the collective city”) indicates that 
he was familiar with the concept itself (ibid: 209). According to Mahdi (1963: 50), al-Farabi 
sees al-madīnatu aj-jamā’iyyah (“the collective city”) as a place where citizens have the right 
to say and do what they wish; they are equal in the eyes of the law, and no one “has any claim 
to authority unless he works to enhance their freedom” (ibid). The rulers acquire their authority 
from those whom they rule; their wishes are to be respected and their will is to be fulfilled.  
In the late nineteenth century, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Rifa’a al-Tahtawi (1801-
1873), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), and other scholars launched an intellectual and 
political movement known as ͑Aṣr an-Nahḍa (“Renaissance”), or “the liberal age of Arabic 
thought” (Hourani, 1962). They raised the question of governance and concentrated on the 
need for political iṣlāḥ (“reform”). Setting the rules for good governance, the rejection of 
oppression and the call for freedom were the crux of the Nahḍa movement (Sadiki, 2004: 202). 
The Nahḍāwiyyūn (“the Renaissance scholars”), however, worked to achieve balance between 
reform and democracy. 
Al-Tahtawi, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, and al-Kawakibi found themselves between aṣālah 
(“originality”, i.e. commitment to deep-rooted fundamental principles), and tajdīd 
(“modernisation”). Due to their commitment to Islamic convictions, they advocated iṣlāḥ 
(“reform”) rather than democracy as a European conception; they promoted a model of 
political change within an Islamic framework (ibid: 218). All three nahḍāwiyyūn protested 
against one-man rule. Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi (1967: 94) argues: 
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It is never permissible that the affairs of the kingdom should be given over to a single 
man with both [its] happiness and [its] difficulties in his hands, even if he be the most 
perfect of men, the most balanced in intelligence, the widest in knowledge.  
Al-Kawakibi believes in justice and liberty as a basis for good governance. Freedom, for him, 
consists of many dimensions. Man should be free from ignorance, backwardness, materialism, 
militarism, and istibdād (“despotism”). The core of freedom, however, is justice and liberty, 
which cannot be achieved without undermining and fighting against despotism (al-Kawakibi, 
1986: 23-39). A despot, as al-Kawakibi puts it, is the “the absolute ruler and tyrant” (ibid: 31). 
The despot is thus the source of all inequities and evils. Al-Kawakibi’s aversion to despotism, 
as well as his emphasis on justice and liberty, “mirror[s] a sophisticated vision for a code of 
human, social, political and civil rights” (Sadiki, 2004: 227). Al-Kawakibi, in particular, and 
the Nahḍāwiyyūn, in general, countenance peaceful change and advocate civil (non-
militaristic) resistance to despotism.  
 
1.2.2 Reasons for the Absence of Democracy in the Arab World 
Fuller (2005: 41-42) lists seven factors that have hindered the development of genuine 
democratic systems in the Arab World: 
 Oil. Oil-producing states in the developing world have poor records in implementing 
democracy. The authorities in these states resort to distributing oil revenues 
generously to “the public that can make only limited demands on the paternalistic 
state in return” (ibid: 41). 
 Income Levels. Non-oil Arab states are relatively poor countries and have low per 
capita income, a less than suitable environment for developing democracy.  
 Nature of the Arab State. The “arbitrary” nature of the modern Arab state and its 
artificial borders drawn by colonial powers have undermined “the legitimacy and 
sovereignty of the individual Arab state”. This has indeed weakened the legitimacy of 
the Arab state as a governing institution as well as hindering the development of 
democracy in the Arab World (ibid). 
 Arab-Israeli Tensions. The creation of Israel in the heart of the Arab World occured 
when most Arab countries were struggling for their independence. Subsequent wars, 
and defeats, at the hands of the newly born Zionist entity helped create “military 
regimes and security-focused states that [were] … readily exploited by dictators,” 
effectively inhibiting the evolution of the democratic process (ibid: 42). 
 Geography. The geographical location of the Arab World and oil reserves have made 
it the focus of the colonial ambitions of the West, aimed at controlling oil and its 
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pricing. This led to continuous and unpredictable tensions between Arab states and 
colonial powers, often resulting in Western intervention. These conditions and 
regional struggles “have not been conductive to democratic development” (ibid). 
 Long-time Western Support for Friendly Tyrants in the Middle East. This support 
began in the Cold War; conflicts grew between the socialist camp and the West and 
continued with the Bush administration’s war on terrorism. Western governments 
chose to “favour the maintenance of ‘friendly’ authoritarian regimes” and tolerate the 
brutal acts of “cooperative dictators” who served Western policies on the international 
scene (ibid). This weakened the parties that believed in democracy in the region. 
 Islamism. The rise of Islamist movement, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Salafist organisations, as the primary opposition to the Arab autocracy, has 
discouraged the US from “pressing the democratic agenda” in the Arab World (ibid). 
 
1.2.3 Arab Civil Society and Democratisation  
Although the Middle East before the Arab Spring had experienced a significant, though 
limited, degree of taᶜaddudiyya (pluralism), there had been very little dīmuqrāṭiyya 
(democracy). According to Brynen, Korany, and Noble (1998: 268-9), the reform the Arab 
World witnessed was towards pluralism, rather than liberal democracy. The Egyptian regime 
allowed a “varied press and vibrant civil society” under various legal constraints, but practised 
repression and turned a blind eye to electoral irregularities, producing a weak and illegitimate 
parliament (ibid: 268).  
In Jordan, civil society was censored and the monarch enjoyed “a very substantial degree of 
prerogative and power” (ibid). Elsewhere in the region, the picture was darker. In Algeria, the 
old guard aborted the democratisation process and a civil war broke out. Syria witnessed a 
slight political opening with the advent of Bashar Assad; an attempt was made, but reversed 
one year later, with the government closing all political forums and arresting activists of the 
Damascus Declaration.  
The Arab World was excluded from the third wave of democratisation that swept through 
Eastern Europe and much of South America in the 1970s and 1980s. The secret lies in the 
implicit ‘ruling bargain’ between the state and society in the Arab World. According to this 
bargain, the governed “accessed certain rights and privileges to the government in return for 
the provision of most or some of the goods and services they need[ed]” (Kamrava, 2011: 355). 
Ruling bargains based on preserving national security in the first place enhanced the 
dominance of non-democratic state institutions over society, guaranteeing the continued 
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weakness of civil society organisations in the absence of international pressures for 
democratisation.  
Despite facing numerous constraints and restrictions, the last two decades in the Arab World 
has seen a relatively swift increase in the number of civil society organisations. These non-
governmental bodies included private voluntary organisations, community development 
associations, human rights organisations, political parties, and professional syndicates. The 
quantitative growth of civil society activities, as argued by Ibrahim (1995: 39), was enhanced 
by the “growing unmet needs of individuals and local communities by the Arab state” and the 
“expansion of educated Arab population.” The media revolution and the “state fatigue or 
incompetence in controlling society” created an increasing, although still restricted, margin of 
freedom that allowed civil society organisations to remain active in some Arab countries (ibid: 
40). Political parties had represented an important part of the rapid evolution of Arab civil 
society organisations for the last two decades before the Arab Spring. This does not imply, 
however, that they had all been effective. Most of them, in particular the new ones, had been 
“too small to be significant in the public life of their respective countries” (ibid: 41).  
Probably the most effective and independent non-governmental organisations in the Middle 
East have been professional syndicates; they were essential in leading the mass movement. 
During the Arab Spring, especially in Tunisia, they were capable of mobilising the masses and 
organising protests throughout the country. Syndicates are further “organized on the pan-Arab 
level as federations and are well-linked to their international counterparts” (ibid: 42). This has 
provided moral protection for them from outside their countries. Furthermore, the authorities 
cannot easily dissolve professional associations if they choose to challenge the autocratic 
system of the state since they are located in “the heart of production” (ibid).  
The Arab regimes, especially in Syria and Libya, feared the growth of civil organisations and 
worked to constrain their autonomy. They did this by employing a combination of 
exclusionary and inclusionary policies: exclusion through prohibition of “undesirable groups” 
and inclusion of other “unthreatening institutions” that would not challenge the dominance of 
the state-controlled associations and unions (Brynen, Korany, and Noble, 1998: 273).  
In other Arab countries such as Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia, a different model was 
implemented by the state elites. They were conscious of potential threats brought about by 
civil organisations, but were reluctant to use direct repressive procedures to deal with this 
challenge. According to Brynen, Korany, and Noble (1998: 273-4), an array of other policy 
instruments was utilised, often simultaneously, by the regimes: 
30 
 
 Legal and regulatory arrangements. The state can use law that is already designed to 
meet the state elites’ agenda to practise a sort of selective government intervention. 
The Egyptian authorities employed this instrument to manipulate the parliamentary 
elections in 2005 and 2010 blunting Islamist successes. 
 State Patronage. Such patronage aims to co-opt civil associations. This pattern has 
been particularly common in the Arab monarchies where state resources are 
overwhelming and royal patronage is dominant (ibid: 274).   
 Divide and Rule Strategies. This is another frequent tactic used by the state to weaken 
civil organisations, political parties in particular, by “encouraging their internal 
fragmentation or by promoting state-supported alternatives” (ibid). In Syria, the 
Ba’ath-led regime has always fostered and sponsored fragmentations and splits within 
political parties, even those loyal to the government. 
 Control of Information. Before the introduction of social media, widespread 
censorship and government ownership of media outlets had left civil organisations 
without access to media. This limited the ability of non-governmental organisations 
to influence public opinion and mobilise support (ibid). 
 Intimidation. In order to “stunt the growth of autonomous social organisations,” the 
Arab regimes adopted a policy of “intimidating [the] activists” who dared to 
“demonstrate too great a proclivity” to crossing red lines and questioning sensitive 
issues in the political situation (ibid).  
According to Kamrava (2011: 349), transition from authoritarianism to democracy can be 
achieved by following one of three patterns: first, “civil society taking a prominent role”; 
second, democracy “initiated by the state from above”; and third, democracy “resulted from a 
protected process of give-and-take between competing political groups and actors” belonging 
to the state elites and/or opposition.  
In civil society-driven transition, dictators often find themselves forced to comply with the 
popular will due to the rapid spiralling of uncontrollable and unpredictable events (ibid). The 
Arab World gave an unambiguous example in the 2011 Arab Spring, when civil organisations 
and youth groups, played an important role in leading the democratic transition. Examples of 
this are the General Labour Union inTunisia, and the Kifāya (“Enough”) and April 6 Youth 
movements in Egypt. 
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1.2.4 The Oppressive State and Human Rights in the Arab World 
International law defines human rights as those rights that ensure and guarantee “the protection 
of individuals and groups against violations by governments of their internationally 
guaranteed rights, and with the promotion of these rights” (Buergenthal, 1995: 1). Before the 
Arab Spring, the status of human rights in the Arab World was less than promising. In fact, 
given such a gloomy record of violations against freedoms, it was foreseeable that a change 
of some sort would come eventually.  
In theory, Egypt was a constitutional democracy with a system of checks against government 
violations of basic human rights. However, from 1952 until the January 25th Revolution, the 
country was in a permanent state of emergency. Amnesty International (1998a) in its annual 
report on Egypt depicts the situation of human rights in the country: 
Hundreds of opponents of a new agricultural law, including prisoners of conscience and 
possible prisoners of conscience, were detained without charge or trial ... Thousands of 
suspected members or sympathizers of banned Islamist groups, including possible 
prisoners of conscience, were held without charge or trial; others were serving sentences 
imposed after grossly unfair trials before military courts. Torture and ill-treatment of 
detainees continued to be systematic.  
Amnesty International (ibid) concluded that military courts were “the arm of the state to 
silence political opponents” and these systematically adopted procedures that violated the 
defendants’ rights. Human Rights Watch (1999a), in its world report on Egypt, also observed 
that political opposition activities in the country were restricted due to the curbs on freedom 
of association and assembly: “No steps were taken to address the grave human violations … 
including torture, deaths in detention, extrajudicial executions, and ‘disappearances.’” 
In Libya, human rights groups were harassed and political parties were banned (Ismael, 2001: 
89). Suspected members were prosecuted and civil organisations were banned. The press and 
electronic media were restricted. In fact, no criticism of the regime was tolerated at all. 
Amnesty International (1998b) monitors in its annual report on Libya government attempts to 
“deprive villages or tribes of subsidized food, petrol and public services ... [by] cutting off 
water and electricity supplies.” 
Citizens and foreign nationals were regularly detained for political and religious activities. 
“Over 100 professionals, including engineers and university lecturers, were arrested,” the 
report continues, “and their whereabouts remained undetermined a year later as their detention 
and arrest remained unacknowledged by the Libyan government” (ibid). Amnesty and Human 
Rights Watch published reports that political detainees were regularly tortured. Examples of 
torture include beating, electric shocks, and attacks with aggressive dogs (Ismael, 2001: 90). 
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Despite the death of former Syrian President Hafez Assad, who was responsible for the 
massacre of Hamah in 1982, Human Rights Watch (1999b) believed that the violations of 
human rights continued as before under the rule of his son, Bashar Assad. The state of 
emergency and exceptional laws “remained in effect and circumscribed basic rights as did 
special security courts, whose procedures did not meet international fair-trial standards” (ibid). 
In its annual report on Syria, Amnesty International (2000a) believed that civil society 
languished as “opposition activists remained outlawed and members of unauthorized political 
parties were at risk of detention ... [while] the work of human rights groups remained 
unauthorized.” Long-standing repressive actions against Islamist and communist activism 
continued and torture of detainees remained a constant policy followed in Syrian detention 
centres (Ismael, 2001: 99). 
Under the rule of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisian “human rights defenders and their families 
were increasingly targeted, as were other activists such as trade unionists and journalists, and 
government opponents and critics from across the political spectrum ... [and] reports of ill-
treatment during secret detention and in prisons continued to be received” (Amnesty 
International, 2000b). Torture and mistreatment included overcrowding, beating, and other 
disciplinary procedures. The media and press were strictly censored: “Private and 
governmental newspapers were virtually indistinguishable in their coverage of government 
policies. Foreign publications were plentiful on the news stand but did not appear whenever 
issues contained material deemed unfavorable about Tunisia” (Human Rights Watch, 1999b). 
The Yemeni government allowed the activities of human rights organisations. “The freedom 
of local monitors,” however, “was impaired by the restrictions on freedom of expression and 
a climate of intimidation surrounding criticism of government policy” (Human Rights Watch, 
1999c). Freedom of expression, amongst other basic freedoms, was restricted. This was 
especially the case with regard to sensitive issues such as the security relationship between the 
Yemeni government and U.S armed forces. Human Rights Watch (ibid) noted that “prisoners 
and detainees were held in unregulated detention centers operated by tribal leaders or branches 
of the security forces” (ibid). Concerns were voiced at the ill treatment of political and criminal 
prisoners, which included flogging and torture in detention centers. 
 
1.2.5 State and Political Opposition in the Arab World 
The most dictatorial of regimes in the Arab World had to deal with forms of political 
opposition. The Arab World was mostly ruled by single-party autocracies until the mid-1970s. 
The main function of the sole official party was to “foster controlled popular political 
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participation and to channel the ensuing mass energy into support for various state agendas” 
(Kamrava, 2011: 331). State repression had always been part of the state’s modus operandi to 
cling to the reins of power. In fact, all Arab governments adopted repression as a strategy to 
deal with political opposition at the time of decline in ideological popularity (ibid: 335). 
Since the 1970s and 1980s, some Arab states have permitted limited activities of handpicked 
political parties. Some of these parties were new to the political scene and others had a history 
of political activism. Those with histories had been previously banned and then subsequently 
re-registered due to political changes. Political opposition was led by an array of secularist, 
nationalist, pan-Arabist, socialist, communist, and Islamist parties and associations that were 
divided along two axes: “officially recognized versus clandestine”, and “secular versus 
religious” (ibid: 331). 
Despite ‘officially’ recognising particular parties and allowing a symbolic representation of 
formal opposition in parliament, the state’s popularity had not improved in the eyes of the 
people. In effect, this led to the marginalisation of the recognised opposition who in turn 
became obscure, semi-official “elite clubs” (ibid: 332). Kamrava (2011: 332-3) cites the 
reasons for the lack of meaningful popular support for officially recognised political parties in 
the Arab World: 
 To secure recognition from the authorities, parties had to modify their political 
discourse and tone down their ideologies. Legal status necessitated implicit 
cooperation with the autocratic system and recognition of the legitimacy of the existing 
regime. 
 Due to their social composition and/or ideological disposition, these parties were seen 
as elite clubs where like-minded elites meet and discuss politics. This resulted in the 
lack of a meaningful relationship with voters. 
 Because of the absence of a tradition of organisational evolution and a genuine 
institutional depth, many parties suffered from personalisation and squabbles over 
leadership leading to splits and a lack of internal cohesion. 
Following the decline in popularity of the officially recognised opposition, clandestine 
organisations gained more credibility and increased in both numbers and activism. The 
political opposition became more radicalised, and Islamism emerged as the major political 
opposition trend among the Arab middle class. This coincided with the decline of secular 
ideologies, partly due to oppression at the hands of the state. The same was the case for left-
wing parties. The likes of the Nasserist party in Egypt, and others, had even lost popularity 
among the masses (ibid: 342). 
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The growth of Islamism was preceded by the “rise of a new breed of Muslim intellectuals,” 
creating a “modern but not secularist alternative” to both the secular intellectuals and the 
traditional religious scholars. Previously, religious scholars who “cooperated with the state” 
had become mouthpieces of the authorities (ibid: 338). This Islamist generation included 
thinkers such as Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the 
Tunisian thinker Rashid al-Ghannouchi, the Sudanese political figure Hasan al-Turabi, and 
many others. In fact, many of these Muslim figures became politically active; some of them 
even founded Islamist parties and organisations, which were of course severely repressed by 
the Arab state later on. Although these parties were composed primarily as Islamist political 
parties, they varied in the “degree to which Islam informe[d] the ideologies of their overall 
platforms and in the precise role that they ascribe[d] to Islam in relation to political and 
socioeconomic questions” (ibid: 339). 
 
1.2.6 Full versus Liberalised Autocracy 
Before the uprisings, two types of autocracies ruled the Arab World: full autocracies and 
liberalised autocracies. Full autocracies and dictatorships, notably in Syria, Libya, and Tunisia, 
did not tolerate competitive politics. Any dissent would result in a prison sentence, or even 
execution. In contrast, liberalised autocracies in Egypt, Yemen, and Morocco for instance, 
provided a form of “virtual democracy” (Brumberg, 2005: 16). They allowed civil 
organisations to operate and adopted an electoral system that enabled opposition politicians to 
compete and enter parliament. The state elites in liberalised autocracies, however, did not 
develop genuine representative institutions or even effective party systems. The head of state 
had supreme authority and the state retained the upper hand as “it controlle[d] security 
establishment, dominate[d] the media, and role[d] out economic rewards to their favourite 
clients” (ibid).  
The full autocracies survived for so long by following two strategies: providing jobs and 
offering economic benefits in return for political support; and the use of intimidation and 
excessive force to silence, exclude, and repress all threatening forces outside the ruling circle 
(ibid: 17). As for the liberalised autocracies, they relied on four mechanisms: partial national 
reconciliation, partial reform of civil society laws and organisations, partial reform of 
economy, partial reform of parliaments and electoral systems. Change, for full autocracies, 
meant self-destruction and a threat to national security, while liberalised autocracies adopted 
a policy of state-controlled political change as a necessary tool for survival. That being said, 
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they, like full autocracies, used “money and intimidation to both co-opt and repress opponents” 
(ibid). 
Brumberg (2005: 17) explains why leaders of Arab full autocracies dreaded reform. First, due 
to the state’s direct or indirect control over economy, “the slightest opening might deprive the 
most powerful members of the ruling establishment of their earned booty.” Second, having 
failed to develop genuine representative parliaments, the leaders of full autocracies were not 
able to create effective alternatives to repression and despotism. Third, although ruling elites 
in full autocracies always claimed the constant loyalty of the people, they were often 
“controlled by tribal or clan bosses who hail[ed] from ethno-religious minorities, such as 
Alawites in Syria” (ibid).  
By oppressing the majority, the state planted the seeds of enmity between the differing classes; 
the ruling minority were resented and the ultimate aim of the majority was revenge. That is 
why Syria’s Bashar Assad first promised reform, but then swiftly retreated. A regime that 
massacred tens of thousands of Sunni Muslims in 1982 alone could hardly take the political 
risk to lead change and implement democracy. Full autocracies in the Arab World were 
“trapped by an either-me-or-you logic,” making “reform seem like suicide” (ibid). 
Liberalised autocracies in the Arab World also had security establishments whose survival 
partially relied on the state’s control over economy. However, unlike full autocracies that 
adopted a totally controlling and exclusionary policy, liberalised autocracies were built on an 
edifice of partial inclusion. They followed “development strategies that necessitate[d] the 
inclusion of competing economic forces” (ibid: 18). They tended to make different alliances 
in order to avoid becoming bound to one particular group. They therefore reached out to private 
businessmen, workers, bureaucrats, and professionals (ibid). 
In contrast to full autocracies that linked their political future to only a few economic 
establishments, liberalised autocracies were able to give way to various categories of 
merchants and economic groups. This was because they could afford, in part, to let go of the 
regime’s control over the economy “without losing all the economic benefits that accrued from 
autocracy” (ibid). They were therefore able to initiate partial market reforms. Full autocracies 
on the other hand, such as in Syria and Libya, had almost zero economic reform. In order to 
secure survival, liberalised autocracies had to “pursue a divide-and-rule strategy by which they 
play[ed] one group off against another” (ibid). 
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1.2.7 Democratisation and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Some argue that the Arab-Israeli conflict has prevented Arab governments from developing 
authentic democratic systems. However, for decades the Arab regimes inhibited political 
plurality and democratic change, manipulated elections, and restricted freedoms of speech, 
opinion, and assembly. All this was done to ensure that the governments in place were not 
challenged; the fear of challenge was not from Israel, but rather from the Arab people 
(Carothers and Ottaway, 2007: 16).  
When the Tunisian regime banned women from wearing headscarves, it did so in order to resist 
Islamist expansion and promote secularism in society, not out of fear that giving women the 
right to wear whatever they chose to wear would undermine national security. Similarly, fear 
of losing power, not of fear a “Zionist plot”, was what actually led Egyptian state elites to 
manipulate the parliamentary election in 2005 (ibid). The Zionist threat had always been a 
“convenient excuse” to curb democratic reform (ibid). 
Failure to put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, prevented the West, in particular 
the United States, “from gaining credibility as an advocate of democracy” in the Arab World 
(ibid). Unconditional Western support for Israel and the American indifference to the 
inhumane Israeli mistreatment of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories exposed Western 
hypocrisy in the eyes of the Arab people.  
The US pressure for democracy was not authentic, and remained confined to offering advice 
and instructions on how to develop a better democratic system. The United States needed the 
Arab oil and avoided provoking its allied Arab governments, who assisted in the war against 
terror while maintaining a good relationship with Israel. The Arab governments did not take 
the American demands for democracy seriously, as they were aware that “access to oil”, 
“assistance on counterterrorism”, and the security of Israel were Washington’s priorities in the 
Middle East (ibid: 17). This resulted in ordinary people in the Arab World losing trust in the 
American efforts to stimulate democracy in the region, leading to an unprecedented level of 
anti-American resentment among the Arabs.  
  
1.2.8 Islam, Islamism, and Democracy 
Some argue that democracy and Islam are not compatible. This proposition, though, is derived 
solely from a special focus on the thoughts of radical Islamists who believe that “in Islam 
sovereignty comes from God, whereas in democracy it comes from human beings,” and that 
“human beings cannot pass legislation that infringes on the moral principles of Islam and its 
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traditions (Fuller, 2005: 39). In short, human beings cannot “make law” (ibid). Rather than 
asking whether Islam is compatible with democracy, the more appropriate question is to be: Is 
any heavenly religion compatible with democracy? All heavenly religions lack democratic 
foundations and are dogmatic when it comes to what the Truth is (ibid). 
In their defence, modernist Islamists note that while all sovereignty is derived from God, God 
does not impose a certain form of state on people. Human beings are granted reason to choose 
the public policy that suits them, and to then formulate their state according to their 
understanding of how the teachings of Islam translate into practice. This is a process that is 
always open to interpretation (ibid: 40). 
To be able to understand the phenomenon of Islamism in the Arab World, it is necessary first 
to understand what the term Islamist refers to. Fuller (2005: 38) defines an ‘Islamist’ as 
“anyone who believes that Koran and the Hadith (traditions of the Prophet’s life, actions, and 
word) contain important principles about Muslim governance and society, and who tries to 
implement these principles in some way.” Islamists, however, vary in theory and practice. The 
definition given by Fuller may involve a wide range of Islamists that include both radical and 
moderate, traditional and modern, democratic and anti-democratic, Salafist (fundamentalist) 
and Ikhwanite (members of the Muslim Brotherhood) (ibid). 
In the early twentieth century, democracy was viewed as a Western concept that is alien to 
Islamic thought. Initially, it was promoted by a limited group of Westerners who were 
criticised of lacking credibility and acceptability among ordinary people. Democracy, 
therefore, was seen as a “colonial” importation that threatened Muslim values and heritage 
(ibid: 43). Political thought in Islam, however, has always appreciated justice and considered 
it a precondition for good and stable governance. Islamists in the twentieth century were the 
first to criticise the idea that oppression is preferable to anarchy – a principle that dates back 
to the Mongol invasion of Muslim lands. They started to ask rulers to be just and fight 
corruption. They believed that the “tyrannical state should be resisted” and that if a ruler was 
unjust, he would lose legitimacy to rule and should be overthrown, even by force (ibid: 44). In 
fact, Islamists have developed a parallel order to Western democracy – a system that includes 
some democratic values including checks and balances, establishing an intellectual mechanism 
to expel unjust and illegitimate rulers. 
Islamist acceptance of democratic values has been enforced by the realisation that Islamists 
themselves would benefit from the consolidation of democracy and human rights. After all, 
they are, like other political forces, “victims of arbitrary authoritarian rule and extralegal 
punishment by the state” (ibid). The Muslim World in the twentieth century was ruled by 
autocratic regimes that formulated a certain model for political life – a model aimed at 
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weakening and marginalising alternative political positions. Such a model included methods 
like holding presidential referendums instead of elections, dishonest elections, arbitrary 
banning of Islamic parties, frequent detention of leading Islamist politicians on the eve of 
elections, media censorship, and “government denial of airtime to opposition elements on 
government-controlled” channels (ibid: 46).  For Islamists to be part of the political game, they 
had to abide by the rules designed by the oppressive state. Some radical movements, however, 
rejected the methods imposed by the state and resorted to armed struggle against oppression. 
Many Islamist movements demonstrated a willingness to establish political parties in order to 
participate in the political process where permitted. Although they have always remained in 
opposition, Islamist parties since the 1940s have participated in parliamentary elections. They 
have formed coalitions with secular, pan-Arabist and left-wing parties, and have taken part in 
several governments in some Muslim countries such as Sudan, Jordan, and Yemen (Khanfar, 
2011). 
The oldest and most influential of all Islamist movements and parties is the Muslim 
Brotherhood. They have been cited as leading “the way with the establishment of political 
parties in most Arab countries, under a variety of different names” (Fuller, 2004: 49). In Egypt, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Yemen, and other Arab countries, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has shown interest in working with other parties. In order to reach their goals, 
they have shown interest in working with communist and socialist parties, regardless of 
disparity in ideology. 
Another important experience has been the political activity of the Turkish Justice and 
Development party (AKP) which has won every parliamentary election since 2002 onwards, 
managing to form the government. The AKP has been a source of inspiration for Islamic parties 
in the Arab World, leading a successful model based on three characteristics: “a general Islamic 
frame of reference; a multi-party democracy; and significant economic growth” (Khanfar, 
2011). Although they remained restricted, these participations by different Islamic parties have 
enriched the political experience of Islamists. They have had a profound impact on the 
flexibility of Islamism and its ability to play politics. 
Fuller (2005: 52) observed key developments within Islamist political thought in the Arab 
World: 
 Understanding the relevance of democracy and the benefits available to Islamists when 
they call for a democratic system 
 Readiness of many Islamist parties to cooperate with other parties to achieve “common 
goals”, regardless of ideological considerations. 
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 Growing awareness of political, social and economic realities as well as the realisation 
that Islamic slogans alone will not suffice in finding “concrete answers to concrete 
questions” 
 Greater intellectual, theoretical and ideological development within Islamist thought 
itself 
 An increased pragmatism and realism due to accumulation of experience 
 Renunciation of violence by the majority of Islamist parties 
Political Islam faced relentless pressure from dictatorships in the Arab World, resulting in 
profound bitterness felt by Islamist activists who were suppressed, imprisoned, and tortured. 
Despite this, some of those activists actually became members of parliament, ministers, and 
even presidents (as in the case of former Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi). Shortly after 
a promising, yet temporary, democratic transition was achieved in some countries of the Arab 
Spring, namely Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, Islamist parties made their way to parliament and 
government. With 42 female members, an-Nahda, the most prominent Tunisian Islamist party, 
represented a progressive model for women’s participation in the National Constituent 
Assembly. Its leaders reassured Tunisian citizens that the party “will not interfere in their 
personal lives and that it will respect their right to choose” (ibid). 
For any political process to have a meaningful impact in the Arab World, many argue that 
Islam should be included. Excluding Islamists will not lead to a fair and sustainable political 
process. The reality is that Islamism is widely popular among the Arab people. This was 
evidenced in the results of the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly election shortly after 
the revolution. An-Nahda won 41% of the seats in 2011, and then won the parliamentary 
elections of 2011 and 2014. Islamists even won the Egyptian parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2012. The region has suffered as a result of excluding Islamists and denying their 
right to participate in the public sphere. 
Although Islamist participation in governance has given “rise to a number of challenges” on 
both domestic and external levels, Islamists have shown willingness to make concessions 
(ibid). Arab societies need the participation of all political powers, regardless of their electoral 
weight. It is the “interplay” between Islamists and others that can “guarantee the maturation of 
the Arab democratic transition ... and stability that has been missing for decades” (ibid). 
Nevertheless, the Islamist participation in the democratic process unfortunately experienced a 
setback following what was labelled by many political forces in Egypt and the world as a 
military coup against the first freely elected President Muhammad Morsi. The coup was led by 
the then Minister of Defence Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Even the outbreak of a new civil war in 
Libya was a result of the deep-rooted conflict between the Islamists and secularist powers. 
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1.3 Towards an Arab Spring 
Although an Arab spring seemed unattainable in the early 2000s, it became inescapable ten 
years later. A number of factors influenced the peoples’ awareness in the region and changed 
popular attitudes: lack of political reform, socio-economic decline, and the media revolution. 
 
1.3.1 Lack of Political Reform 
While most of the Arab leaders before the Arab Spring came to power by promising democratic 
initiatives, they eventually fell back on the instruments of full or liberalised autocracies. For 
decades, they failed to develop genuine democratic systems. Their security forces and 
intelligence agencies widely and extensively violated human rights. Civil organisations were 
systematically undermined through inclusive and/or exclusive strategies. Although in some 
Arab countries, civil and Islamist organisations were allowed to play an active role in the 
political process, any participation remained under the control of the state. The Arab autocrats 
found themselves dealing with the negative consequences of partial political reform. 
Ideological confusion, weak legitimacy, increased civil conflict, and “transitions to nowhere” 
all developed as a result (Brumberg, 2005: 29). 
These Arab dictators, however, sustained their rule by manipulating different groups and 
adopting ever-changing ideologies. They played different roles: rich businessmen, liberal 
thinkers, army officers, tribal sheikhs, and imams (religious leaders). This confusion resulted 
in an “ideological mishmash” that had “no single direction” (ibid). In fact, all they sought was 
blind and absolute obedience by all the society’s components. They “demanded that all groups 
– secular, liberal, Islamist, leftist, or ethnic – accept the king or the president’s ultimate 
authority” (ibid).  
Mubarak’s regime in Egypt permitted the activism of Islamist Salafists and Sufis. At the same 
time, it paved the way for the control of businessmen by a number of pieces of legislation that 
facilitated their activities. The Alawite-dominated Assad regime in Syria has aligned itself 
strategically and politically with the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran, despite previously 
boasting its secular Arab nationalist ideology. At the same time, it has paradoxically favoured 
loyal Sufi Sunni scholars in Damascus and Aleppo.  
The Arab regimes repeatedly worked to nurture civil conflict within society. They generated 
weak parliaments that lacked political maturity and rarely represented the electorate. These 
institutions were thus not able to fairly represent existing ideologies and political forces, 
including Islamists. Instead, they followed the autocrats’ choices. The only way to solve the 
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dilemma was to “have a real democracy – one that would force the population to choose 
between competing identities,” or compel rulers to “offer a new vision of national unity” (ibid: 
30). The Arab autocrats, however, chose to hold onto the life raft of partial inclusion, or even 
worse, full exclusion. This was preferred over taking a bold move towards full democratisation. 
They failed to adopt a power-sharing pattern that would bring a measure of stability. As a 
result, they often de-liberalised political life by “using the many tools of repression at their 
disposal” (ibid). These choices, of course, only widened the gap between regime and 
opposition, further undermining the legitimacy of the Arab autocracies and paving the way for 
an Arab Spring. 
Lack of political reform led to “transitions to nowhere”, as argued by Brumberg (2005: 30). 
The Arab regimes went through an “unstable cycle of opening and closing, liberalization and 
deliberalization” (ibid). The bumpy progress of this cycle depended on the amount of external 
or domestic threats they received. Whenever their national security was under threat, they 
retreated and gave up all reform initiatives they had previously made. Bashar Assad’s advent 
in Syria was initially promising; he opened the door to political forums and allowed political 
opposition activists to hold assemblies and make statements in what was called Rabīᶜ Dimašq 
(“Damascus Spring”) which, according to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
(2015), was “characterized by the establishment of informal political forums that were held to 
encourage the open discussion of political and civil society issues and reforms.” 
These “salons” or muntadayāt (“forums”) “along with the formation of the Committees for the 
Revival of Civil Society in Syria demonstrated the popular demand for political and judicial 
reform” (ibid). However, once his rule was threatened following the American invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, Bashar Assad ended the Damascus Spring and arrested its members. This constituted 
a major setback for political and economic reform and a revival of the father’s repressive 
policies. 
In fact, the Arab regimes did not show a willingness to cooperate with the opposition to form 
a genuinely democratic system based on a common set of experiences and aspirations. The 
Arab regimes were snared in “marḥala intiqāliyya mustamirra (endless transition)” that 
eventually robbed the young Arab generation of all hope of a new era of reconciliation, 
openness, and real reform (Brumberg, 2005: 31). 
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1.3.2 Socio-Economic Decline 
For three decades before the Arab Spring, the Arab World distinguished itself by remaining 
largely authoritarian, spurning the global trend towards democracy. At the same time, it had 
languished in economic stagnation and lassitude. While global economies increasingly adopted 
the logic of “market-driven reform” and “export-oriented growth”, the Arab economies before 
the revolutions seemed unenthusiastic about enacting genuine reform. They excluded 
themselves from the benefits and advantages of economic globalisation, falling behind other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, South America, and East Asia with regard to economic 
growth (ibid: 131). 
Economic decline and recession have plagued the Arab World since the mid-1980s. The Arab 
economy has turned into a “global loser”, falling behind other economies that were previously 
classified as less developed in growth rates (ibid: 132). In most Arab countries, overall growth 
rates have stagnated and gross national products have hardly coped with population growth. 
Unemployment has continued to climb. The governments have failed to create enough jobs to 
cope with demographic demand. This has resulted in the unemployment rate exceeding 25 per 
cent region-wide (ibid). Investment levels have dramatically declined. Fiscally strapped 
economies have gradually returned to relying on the public sector, and private investments 
have not been sufficient to compensate for the shortfall.  
Capital flight has become a ceaseless chronic disease. Not feeling secure, Arabs held an 
estimated “$100-500 billion in savings abroad”. Governments have been unsuccessful in 
attracting foreign capital to invest in the region (ibid). Productivity levels have decreased. 
Lacking in motivation, Arab products and labour have become less competitive in the global 
market. This has resulted in “rising international indebtedness” and increasing debt overhang 
(ibid). Poverty has constituted a challenge. By the end of the twentieth century, above 30 per 
cent of the Arab population was estimated to live below the poverty line, despite the reputation 
of the Arab World for extensive family and state-sponsored social solidarity. In short, the Arab 
World before the uprisings was a “region of deteriorating living standards and persistent 
economic anemia” (ibid). 
The Arab regimes tried to carry out partial reforms that often exacted long-term costs. They 
opened the door to the private sector to make investments. They, however, left “public sector 
industries largely intact,” thus creating a “dualistic economy” whose arguably incompetent 
public sector employees and bureaucracies have continued to cost the state millions of dollars 
(ibid: 28). Bureaucrats were left in charge and the subsequent hike in administrative and 
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financial corruption hindered the private sector from investing more in productive forms of 
trade and industry. 
The Arab autocrats established and/or supported new private businesses that became the real 
money-makers. These businesses made quick profits from the real-estate sector, 
telecommunications industry, “import (or smuggling) of luxury and consumer goods, and 
currency speculation” (ibid). In most cases, they partially or completely owned these 
businesses. In fact, partial economic reform in the absence of democratisation cannot ensure 
transparency or even lead to economic development. The cronies of the Arab ruling elites 
denigrated capitalism.  
Such explicit profit making only fed the general public’s resentment, thus stoking the flames 
of revolution against repression and injustice. This provides an insight to the story behind a 
slogan that was inscribed on many banners held up by the Egyptian protests in al-Tahrir Square 
during the January 25th Revolution: ᶜ ayš (“bread”), ḥurriyah (“freedom”), ᶜ adālah ‘ijtimāᶜiyyah 
(“social justice”). 
The overwhelming feeling of social injustice was nurtured by nepotism in the case of Mubarak 
in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia. The fact that they had ruled for so long was a catalyst for the 
protests. Mubarak’s plans to follow in the footsteps of Syria and have his son Gamal become 
his successor was especially vexing. Social injustice, unemployment, and underemployment 
created masses of young, mostly educated, people prepared for action, moved by general 
frustration. The motivation behind the revolution had never been too clear or foreseeable. The 
initial act of self-mutilation in Tunisia was perhaps triggered by economic reasons, but the 
development into a popular uprising with political demands was an underlying social issue. 
The outcome of the Palestinian question, and the American invasion of Iraq, along with many 
other disappointments, swelled “the wave of dismay” and turned it into a strong “agent of 
change” (Pappé, 2005: 309). 
 
1.3.3 The Media Revolution  
Since the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century, it has been obvious that 
electronic media and its repeated innovations have been the sphere where Arab political 
activists, journalists, and even ordinary people could interact and express their views and 
opinions. Radio and television, however, were strictly controlled by government censorship. 
They were monitored carefully to not touch upon political and social sensitivities. With the 
“relative stabilisation” of the regimes in the region, these media outlets were permitted to 
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expand and allowed “satire and comedy in their programmes as well as more open debates on 
current issues” (Pappé, 2005: 295). 
In spite of widening the margins for more creativity, as well as the privatisation and 
capitalisation of channel ownership, government monopolies and state supervision over the 
news industry continued. While the Arab governments regarded the seizure of media outlets 
as a means to confront external and domestic security challenges and a necessity to protect 
national security, the opposition considered the media as “a tool in the hands of oppressive 
regimes” (ibid). 
The introduction of satellite TV in the 1990s was a quantum leap in the media industry that 
changed the face of the Arab World. By the end of the twentieth century, telecommunication 
technology invaded cities as well as the countryside in the Arab World; satellite dishes covered 
building rooftops, even entering local households in rural areas. Official media outlets were 
subject to strict state control as the state seemed unable to cope with a rapidly globalising Arab 
World. The media were restricted in their news coverage, presenting mostly official 
ceremonies and news bulletins that solely reflected government views (ibid: 296). In 1996, al-
Jazeera was launched in Qatar as the first twenty-four-hour news station. It hosted “forum 
debates on democracy and broadcast[s] from everywhere in the Arab World” (ibid: 297). Civil 
society and human rights organisations in the Middle East now had a platform. In his article 
published on the Guardian website on April 3, 2012, Ali Hashem (2012) says: 
In the Arab countries, where people are used to listening on a daily basis to speeches by 
their leaders or members of ruling families, the new channel introduced counter-fire talk 
shows and documentaries from hotspots with an emphasis on controversial issues. For 
the first time, people saw opposition figures from around the Arab world saying in Arabic 
what they had only dared to say before on western channels in English or French. Over 
the past 16 years al-Jazeera has emerged as the most credible news source in the region. 
Satellite TV has proved to be an essential factor in “the political struggles within, and against, 
the ruling elites,” becoming very important to promote everyone’s agenda (Pappé, 2005: 297). 
Israel, the Palestinian factions, Gaddafi and his enemies, Assad and his opponents, Egypt, Iran, 
Hezbollah, the Gulf States, and many others established and funded TV stations, employing 
these institutions for their own purposes.  
Over time, most Arab regimes stopped banning satellite dishes, giving up on their attempts to 
control what is received and viewed. Satellite TV challenged censorship procedures imposed 
by the Arab regimes over printed press, highlighted the lack of genuine political life, and 
provided a platform for human rights and civil society activists. It contributed to the success 
of the Arab Spring, perhaps not as the sole factor, but as a medium to mobilise the masses and 
guarantee that their demands were heard. Satellite television “transcends territorial and more 
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important[ly] ... jurisdictional boundaries and produces unexpected interpretations of reality 
that clash fiercely and directly with that dictated from above” (ibid: 298). The appearance of 
English-speaking Arab TV stations, such as al-Jazeera International, “brought to the World a 
new authentic voice” and moved the Arab World to the heart of international attention, 
especially at the time of the Arab Spring (ibid: 299). 
The introduction of the internet constituted an even bigger threat to oppressive state authorities 
in the Arab World. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, most Arab countries joined 
cyberspace. Although it was introduced as a “state-controlled service” (ibid), the internet has 
nonetheless created new meanings and possibilities. Although it had full control over the 
internet, the state could not ban it due to its inescapable necessity. The internet can be used to 
criticise the Arab regimes, but can equally be used to enhance business in the country, or to 
even create propaganda in favour of the regime (ibid: 302). Assad’s regime in Syria abstained 
from banning the internet with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and instead chose to use 
it to launch a counter cyber war against anti-regime activists on Facebook and Twitter. 
Online activism facilitated mass communication, paving the way for the Arab Spring 
revolutions that toppled dictators. It is true that unions and opposition groups used other 
methods, such as text messaging and satellite news stations to coordinate and express their 
demands during the Arab Spring, but “it is on the internet that a generation of activists has 
been credited with enabling the movement to take off” (Lewis, 2011). This activism managed 
to overcome the strict control of oppressive authorities that, even before the uprisings, were 
known for their online censorship. 
The Facebook generation decided to show the world how easy it is to topple a dictator; “young 
online dissidents” nimbly moved from the “real” to the “virtual” world where their blogs and 
Facebook updates, notes, and even tweets offered a self-expression (Eltahawy, 2011). Social 
media websites enabled activities to reach ordinary people and form coordinating groups, 
organising the protests that were seen on the streets of Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. Such 
widespread mass-communication enabled demonstrators from different backgrounds to gather 
and protest. Social media activism led to the formation of ‘youth’ organisations that jumped 
on the initial protests. In fact, these movements were confined to a particular stratum of the 
population who were disproportionately better educated and wealthier. They did not constitute 
the majority of Arab society, but represented the aspirations of the Arab people. 
A flow of protest videos, tweets, and revolutionary statements found its way onto the internet 
in different languages. Their role was to pass and share information, and spread the word: when 
and where it was happening. Once a demonstration took place, they would report it live on 
Twitter and Facebook through posts, photos, and videos. Most international news outlets had 
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no actual presence in the Arab countries during the revolutions. “Media posted online” by web 
activists were “some of the only material that has slipped through the blackout” (Ryan, 2011). 
The battle for freedom in the Arab Spring took place not only on the streets, but also on internet 
forums, blogs, Facebook pages, and Twitter feeds. The authorities carried out phishing 
operations, which included “stealing users’ passwords to spy on them and eradicate online 
criticism” (ibid). However, the Arab Internet activists “found an ally in [the online activist 
groups] Anonymous, whose international activists have turned their attention to overthrowing 
... regimes of web censorship” (ibid). 
As mentioned previously, recent information and communication technologies did indeed play 
a role in enabling Arab revolutions to succeed. They did not, however, cause them. It may be 
true that the WikiLeaks electronic revelations about the corruption of Arab regimes and leaders 
“did contribute something to the pot of misery boiling over,” but it is absurd to talk of a 
“WikiLeaks revolution” or even a “Twitter revolution” (Ash, 2011). The internet is merely a 
weapon for the oppressed. In fact, young Arab activists, motivated by feeling of oppression 
and injustice, used these weapons dynamically and more effectively than the Arab dictators. 
 
1.4 The People Demands the Overthrow of the Regime 
From before I was born, we Arabs have been caught between two forces that, seemingly, 
cannot be defeated: our ruthless dictators, who oppress and humiliate us, and the cynical 
western powers, who would rather see us ruled by criminals loyal to them than have 
democratically elected leaders accountable to us. We have been sliding towards the dark 
conclusion that we will forever remain trapped between two beasts. The men and women 
of Tunisia took us back from the brink of the precipice. 
Hisham Matar, Libyan novelist (2011) 
 
1.4.1 Tunisia: The Jasmine Revolution 
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali had ruled Tunisia for 23 years before he stepped down in January 
2011 amid an unprecedented popular uprising. He came to power in November 1987 after he 
toppled Habib Bourguiba, “the father of Tunisian independence” (Al-Jazeera English, Jan 
2011). Ben Ali’s non-violent coup was widely “hailed” by the Tunisians (ibid). Upon 
becoming president, he promised a gradual democratic transition. He was elected unopposed 
for his first two presidential terms – in 1989 and 1994, though their legitimacy is widely 
questioned. The first multi-party presidential election in 1999 lacked credibility as Ben Ali 
won with a huge majority of 99.44%. Thereafter, he changed the constitution on two occasions, 
47 
 
enabling himself to continue running for election. He won in his fifth presidential poll in 2009 
with 90% of the votes (BBC, June 2011). 
Although Tunisia experienced steady economic growth under Ben Ali’s rule, unemployment 
levels among young people remained high, and large groups of Tunisians in the rural areas 
remained poor. There was general hidden discontent against the unmistakably perceived 
corruption surrounding the ruling family. Towards the end of 2010, WikiLeaks published 
secret US diplomatic correspondence that revealed some aspects of this corruption. Like many 
Arab dictators, Ben Ali’s photos had a constant presence in Tunisia, “with giant posters of the 
president visible in public spaces across the country” (ibid).  
Ben Ali’s regime did not tolerate any form of political protest. Human rights organisations 
repeatedly accused his government of arbitrary detention and mistreatment of political 
activists. Nobody dared to talk about politics and everyone was suspected. The internet was 
censored, and any page with political opposition content was indicated as page not found (Ben 
Hassine, 2011). Western governments, which regarded Ben Ali as an enormous bulmark in 
the face of Islamism, turned a blind eye to frequent reports of human rights abuses carried out 
by Tunisian security agencies. In the absence of any substantial opposition, it was speculated 
that he intended to pass on power to one of his family members (BBC, June 2011). 
In January 2011, Ben Ali encountered an unprecedented mass uprising. Resentment over 
unemployment finally caught up with him and put an end to his 23-year iron-fisted reign. 
Muhammad Bouazizi, a young Tunisian graduate, set himself on fire when an officer 
prevented him from selling goods without a permit. The incident mobilised the masses, and 
protests that bagan in Sidi Bouzid spiralled throughout the country. Professional syndicates, 
labour unions, and opposition parties took part in mobilising as well as organising the masses. 
In the absence of the media, a generation of young activists on the internet took the 
responsibility to enable the movement to take off. Thousands of photos and videos for protests 
spread across the internet, along with tweets and Facebook status updates posted online by 
Tunisian web activists, creating public opinion against the regime (Lewis, 2011). 
And for the first time, we see the opportunity to rebel, to take revenge on the ‘royal’ 
family who has taken everything, to overturn the established order that has accompanied 
our youth. An educated youth, which is tired and ready to sacrifice all the symbols of the 
former autocratic Tunisia with a new revolution: the Jasmine revolution – the true one.  
Ben Hassine (2011) 
The violent response of the regime – with the police firing live bullets at protestors – increased 
anger and generated further demonstrations. “Large numbers of unemployed graduates, 
frustration with lack of freedoms, the excesses of the ruling class and anger at police brutality” 
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all came together to spark an irresistible wave of mass anger (BBC, Jan 2011). WikiLeaks’ 
revelations on Ben Ali’s corruption certainly aggravated the crisis. Initially, Ben Ali supported 
the security forces’ reaction, claiming that they were protecting public institutions against a 
“small number of terrorists” (ibid). All universities and schools were closed in an attempt to 
prevent the youth from taking part in the action. 
The President changed tactics as his long standing regime started to collapse in front of an 
astonished world. He started to offer concessions. On January 12, 2011, Ben Ali sacked his 
interior minister and released all those arrested during the crisis. He also gave orders to 
investigate corruption. He then promised to reduce food prices, allow media freedom, and 
“deepen democracy and to revitalise pluralism” (ibid). In his final speech, he vowed not to run 
for the next presidential election in 2014, announced the dismissal of the government, and 
called for a new parliamentary election. After he finished reading his speech, the dictator “fled 
to Saudi Arabia with his family – France reportedly rejected a request for his plane to land 
there” (ibid). 
About 300 people died during the Jasmine Revolution, which led to the overthrow of Ben Ali’s 
regime. In June 2012, Ben Ali was sentenced in absentia to life in jail for the killing of 
demonstrators. In October 2011, the first free democratic parliamentary elections were held 
with the participation of about 80 parties, most of which were newly registered. Upon winning 
the election, an-Nahda’s deputy leader, Hamadi Jebali, became prime minister and led a 
coalition government along with two other secular parties (BBC, Dec 2013). Having started 
the Arab Spring, Tunisia “has now led the region by holding a clean election with an 
enthusiastic turnout and highly encouraging results” (Steele, 2011). The democratic process 
then continued as stable and solid as it started with another parliamentary election held in 
2014. 
 
1.4.2 Egypt: The January 25th Revolution 
Hosni Mubarak was the president of Egypt for 30 years until he was forced to step down in 
February 2011 following a mass uprising. It was not expected that the little-known vice-
president who became president after al-Sadat’s assassination in 1981would hold on to the 
presidency for so long. Islamist militants assassinated Anwar al-Sadat at a military march-past 
in Cairo. Mubarak, who was sat next to him, survived. On October 14, 1981, eight days after 
the incident, Muhammad Hosni Mubarak was sworn in as the new president of Egypt. 
Mubarak kept Egypt under emergency law, giving the authorities full powers of detention, 
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effectively curbing basic freedoms. Since 1981, he had won three elections unopposed, but 
for his fourth poll in 2005 – after pressure from the US – he amended the system to allow rival 
candidates. The election, however, was manipulated in favour of Mubarak and his party, the 
National Democratic Party (NDP). He was accused of suppressing opposition groups, in 
particular the Muslim Brotherhood (BBC, May 2015). 
Mubarak’s regime did not observe civil liberties or tolerate any potential challenge to its 
absolute rule. Thousands of political activists were detained - some of them without trial. It 
was easy “to get arrested and tortured simply by calling the dictator names” (Rockwell, 2011). 
The press was censored, opposition parties were oppressed, and corruption ran rampant in 
state institutions. Mubarak’s will to power was limitless: he chose state officials, ministers, 
and assistants solely on the basis of loyalty, rather than competence. Elections were run for 
show only and opposition candidates ended up prosecuted for fabricated crimes. Democracy 
in Egypt was merely a mask for one-party rule. Mubarak’s main justification for keeping 
martial law running was an excuse “all-too-familiar to Americans: the war on terror” (ibid). 
There were speculations that Mubarak would pass power to his son Gamal. Although Gamal 
insisted that he was not looking to become president, he had been moving steadily to the top 
of the ruling party (NDP), presenting himself as an advocate of economic and political reform 
– a presentation that contradicted his reportedly corrupt behaviour. 
Egypt's revolution broke out on January 25, 2011 when tens of thousands of demonstrators 
marched and occupied Mīdān at-Taḥrīr (Tahrir Square) in the heart of Cairo to protest 
Mubarak’s regime. Parallel demonstrations were held in Ismailiya, Alexandria, Suez, and 
other major cities. January 28 was dubbed “the Friday of Rage” as clashes escalated. Police 
used live bullets to stop the angry protesters. A curfew was imposed, the army was deployed 
and the internet was completely blocked by the government. In a televised speech on February 
1, Mubarak declared he decided not to stand for re-election in September. Nevertheless, the 
second week of the revolution witnessed running battles in Cairo between the protestors and 
pro-regime groups of balṭajiyya (government-paid thugs). The army ordered the protestors to 
evacuate Mīdān at-Taḥrīr but protestors refused to leave, and instead set up camp and erected 
barricades. On February 4, the Friday of Departure, hundreds of thousands protested in Cairo, 
along with simultaneous demonstrators in Alexandria and elsewhere (BBC, Dec 2013). 
I found myself in the midst of thousands of young Egyptians, whose only point of 
similarity was their dazzling bravery and their determination to do one thing – change the 
regime. Most of them are university students who find themselves with no hope for the 
future. They are unable to find work, and hence unable to marry. And they are motivated 
by an untameable anger and a profound sense of injustice. 
Alaa al-Aswany, Egyptian writer (2011) 
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The demonstrations in Cairo grew during the third week, and on February 10, Mubarak 
appeared on state television, stating that he was “handing over powers to his vice-president, 
but would remain as president” (BBC, May 2015). The following evening, after the 
demonstrators marched on to the Presidential Palace, Vice-President Omar Suleiman made a 
brief statement saying Mubarak was handing over power to the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) who would run the country. 
Much of the anger in Egypt was caused by poverty, high prices, social exclusion, corruption, 
and personal enrichment among the ruling elite. These factors, coupled with the rise in 
joblessness amongst the young people, laid the foundations of the protests. The digital 
revolution and the internet were key factors in facilitating the revolution. Young Egyptians 
were connected to the world through social media networks and were introduced to the 
patterns of freedom that the rest of the world enjoyed. The revolution was being broadcast live 
around the world via Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and satellite news stations such as al-
Jazeera and the BBC (BBC, Dec 2013). The Kifāya movement and the April 6 Youth 
movement along with other key opposition groups and civil organisations took part in 
mobilising as well as organising the protests. 
After Mubarak stepped down on February 11, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) ran the country. At least 846 people were killed during the revolution. By May 24, 
judicial officials declared that Mubarak, along with his two sons, Alaa and Gamal, “would 
stand trial over the deaths of protesters” (BBC, May 2015). On June 2, he was convicted and 
jailed for life for complicity in the murder of the demonstrators who participated in the 
revolution. A promising initial transition to civilian governance began with parliamentary 
election that resulted in 73% of seats won mainly by Islamists. The elected parliament, 
however, was dissolved on June 14 when the Constitutional Court decided, “The vote in a 
third of seats had been unconstitutional” (BBC, Jan 2016). On June 25, the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi won the presidential election and became Egypt’s first 
freely elected president. On July 1, the SCAF formally handed over power to the new 
president, who cancelled most of the resolutions made by the SCAF, and reduced its power. 
Despite the above, influential Egyptian armed forces took advantage of a wave of protests that 
took place on June 30, 2013. Protests were organised mainly by anti-Islamist activists and 
secular parties. A coup led by the then Minister of Defence, Gen. Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, 
eventually overthrew elected President Morsi. A temporary transitional president was 
appointed while the army and security forces launched a bloody crackdown against ‘pro-
legitimacy’ protestors in Mīdān Rābᶜa al-ᶜAdawiyya (“the Rabaa al-Adawiya Square”) and 
Mīdān an-Nahḍa (“the An-Nahda Square”). Thousands were left dead or injured. Sadly, the 
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democratic transition has been reversed since. According to international reports, since Gen. 
al-Sisi was elected as President, severe restrictions have been imposed on public freedoms and 
key Egyptian parties have had their activities blocked. The crackdown has targeted Islamist 
parties such as the Freedom and Justice Party as well as civil activists and revolutionary youth 
activists such as April 6 Youth Movement. Mubarak and his sons were subsequently released 
along with dozens of former officials. 
 
1.4.3 Yemen: The Youth Revolution 
Modern Yemen is largely linked to Ali Abdullah Saleh. He began his career in the army where 
he fought for the republicans in North Yemen’s civil war. He remained in the military until 
1978 and then entered the political sphere. Saleh took over following the assassination of the 
then president, and never subsequently relinquished the presidency. Initially, it was not 
expected he would remain in office for long. The CIA estimated that he would not last for six 
months in the post. But he survived, “consolidating power within the ruling General People’s 
Congress (GPC)” and “buying the support of the country’s fractious tribes” (Carlstrom, 2011). 
He was re-elected twice, in 1982, and in 1988.  
Saleh presided over the unification of North Yemen with the Communist South. Frustrated by 
economic marginalisation by the North-dominated government, the south decided to secede 
in May 1994 and a civil war broke out. The secession lasted for only two months before the 
north prevailed over the Southern army, putting Saleh once again in the leadership of a unified 
Yemen. After the 9/11 attacks, Saleh strove to be a close ally to the United States; he allowed 
US aircrafts to target al-Qaeda on Yemeni soil. Yemen, in return, received tens of millions of 
dollars in American aid. 
Over three decades at the helm of Yemen, Saleh had used every possible legal loophole to 
protect his reign, promising to give up politics hoping to prolong his rule. He managed to stay 
in power by “creating confusion, crisis and sometimes fear among those who might challenge 
him” (BBC, Sep 2011). Saleh always presented himself as the only person “who could hold 
together a united Yemen” (Carlstrom, 2011).  In February 2011, in the early days of the 
revolution, he criticised the opposition for taking part in a conspiracy against the country – an 
accusation that he had repeated on many occasions during his decades in power. Critics 
accused his regime of corruption and mismanagement. By the end of his reign, Yemen had 
become one of the poorest countries in the world, with growing unemployment and constant 
inflation. Billions of dollars in oil revenues have been stolen, misappropriated, or wasted. 40% 
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of the Yemeni population lived below the poverty line, even before the recent post-revolution 
civil war (ibid). 
Saleh’s failures as president fuelled a mass uprising that first erupted in the capital, 
Sanaa, in January 2011. The uprising followed the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia. 
Thousands of people flowed into Sāḥat at-Taḥrīr (the Change Square) in the heart of Sanaa, 
protesting against government corruption, unemployment, and woeful economic deterioration. 
The wave of protests spread, bringing hundreds of thousands of people into the streets of most 
Yemeni cities calling for Saleh to step down. In a country known for its regional and tribal 
diversity, men and women from all walks of life and from all regions of Yemen, old and 
young, secularists and Islamists, civil activists and tribesmen, northerners and southerners, all 
expressed unity and started to speak without fear, “coming together in a campaign to get rid 
of the man who has ruled them for three decades” (ibid). 
This is a regime that carried out 33 years of rule through blood and corruption. We have 
brought it to its knees through our determination to remain in the squares for months if 
necessary, and through the steadfastness of our young people who have confronted the 
bullets of the regime with bared chests. With politicians and members of the army 
standing beside us, our success will go even further. 
Tawakkol Karman, Yemeni activist and Nobel Prize holder (2011) 
Saleh, however, tried to suppress these protests. He sent his security forces and snipers who 
were accompanied by mercenaries and thugs with sticks and knives. They cracked down on 
the protests and crushed the Change Square set-in. Activists accused security forces of 
deliberately targeting and killing demonstrators. Tens of people were shot dead (Bilal, 2011). 
Cracking down too hard is often counter-productive; this was found to be the case, as the 
number of demonstrators only increased. The president quickly stated that he would not stand 
for re-election in 2013 and he had no intention of passing power on to his son. Saleh tried to 
negotiate with the demonstrators, offering first to form a unity government, then offering 
to step down by the end of the year, “handing power to a civilian government” (Carlstrom, 
2011). Opposition groups rejected Saleh’s offer and affirmed that he just aimed to buy time.  
An army division led by General Ali Mohsin, along with militants loyal to the powerful al-
Ahmar family, declared support for the revolution. Heavy fighting took place in Sanaa, Ta‘iz, 
and Aden, between pro- and anti-Saleh fractions, leaving hundreds of people dead. In late 
April 2011, the General People’s Congress (GPC) party led by Saleh agreed to a Gulf 
Cooperation Council-brokered deal to transfer power in return for immunity from prosecution, 
but the president refused to sign (BBC, Oct 2015). 
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On June 3, 2011, Saleh was severely wounded by an attack on the presidential compound in 
the capital city. He had to travel to Saudi Arabia and then to the United States, to seek medical 
treatment. Yemenis thought that the attack would result in Saleh finally resigning, but in 
September he returned to Yemen amid a new wave of violence. In October 2011, the UN 
Security Council urged Saleh to sign the GCC-brokered deal. On November 23, Saleh agreed 
to sign the deal. Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, the then Vice-President, assumed presidential 
powers until February 25, 2012. He was sworn in as the President of Yemen after a presidential 
election in which he was the only candidate. Saleh officially ceded power two days later (ibid). 
President Hadi was meant to serve a two-year term and supervise new parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2014. The deal ended three decades of Saleh’s rule and marked 
another victory for the Arab Spring that swept the Arab World. Upon taking up the presidency, 
Hadi had to deal with widespread poverty and malnutrition, a secessionist movement in the 
south and al-Qaeda militants who exploited the unrest to temporarily seize control of many 
southern areas. Many Yemenis were not content that Saleh, his family, and his assistants had 
not been prosecuted for the deaths of hundreds of protestors during the revolution (ibid). 
Yemen’s struggle for change was internationally recognised when Yemeni civil 
activist Tawakkol Karman won the Nobel Peace Prize. Karman, who had led demonstrations 
calling for freedom in Sanaa, for years, “dedicated her victory in October to the ‘youth of the 
Arab Spring’ and the ‘memories of the martyrs’” (Bilal, 2011).  
Despite the progress made, Yemen recently experienced a new civil war when Houthi rebels 
attempted to overthrow the legitimate government of President Hadi. The rebels were 
reportedly funded and armed by Iran and were supported by Yemeni forces loyal to former 
president Saleh. They have since occupied many Yemeni provinces, including the capital 
Sanaa. The international community condemned the Houthi illegitimate actions while a 
military coalition has been formed, mainly led by Saudi Arabia. The coalition has launched 
military operations including air raids against the Houthi troops and Saleh’s forces. The anti-
Houthi resistance on ground claims to aim to liberate Yemen and restore democracy and 
legitimacy in the country. 
 
1.4.4 Libya: The February 17th Revolution 
From 1969 until 2011, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had ruled Libya. The Arab nationalist 
Gamal Abdul Nasser was Gaddafi’s inspiration throughout his youth. Despite being a young 
soldier, he planned to topple Libya’s monarchy. In September 1969, Gaddafi returned from 
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the UK, where he had received military training, to Libya to lead a coup against King Idris 
(BBC, Nov 2011). During his 42-year reign, he invented a personalised system of government, 
supported radical groups around the world, and led North Africa’s most “totalitarian, arbitrary, 
and brutal regime” (Kafala, 2011). In the beginning, his legitimacy relied on his anti-
colonialist ideology, and then on keeping the country in perpetual revolution. In 1977, Gaddafi 
declared the Libyan Jamāhīriyya (state of the masses). In theory, it “empowered ordinary 
citizens through local ‘people’s committees’”; in practice, however, it “centralised much of 
Libya’s decision-making in the hands of a few select officials” (Al-Jazeera English, May 
2012). His political philosophy was set out in his Green Book. The worst period for Libyans 
was the 1980s, when Gaddafi imposed his social theories on his people. 
As part of his ‘cultural revolution’, Gaddafi prohibited political activism and burned 
‘unsound’ publications. Gaddafi was a political manipulator, provoking different tribes against 
each other to ensure full control over the population. His regime was characterised by 
patronage and strict censorship of a police state. Political parties were forbidden and his 
opponents were imprisoned and tortured or even assassinated. He also sent intelligence agents 
to murder dissidents based abroad. Freedoms of speech and assembly were entirely restricted 
and there were countless examples of violent repression (Kafala, 2011). Human rights 
organisations and opposition groups were “harassed and banned”, and their activists were 
“prosecuted by the government” (Ismael, 2001: 90). In July 1996, political detainees led a riot 
in the Abu Salim Prison in an attempt to improve the treatment they received from the prison 
guards. The riot was squashed and ended with a massacre. 1,200 inmates and guards were 
killed “when the prison was stormed by security forces” (ibid: 91). 
For a city with a single main hospital and one university, Tripoli was well-equipped when 
it came to prisons. There was the infamous Abu Salim prison, where 1,200 inmates were 
killed in 1996; the military police prison; the criminal investigation prison. In the last 
days of the revolution, farms and company offices were converted into prisons and every 
military or security unit ran its own detention centre. 
Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, Guardian correspondent (2011) 
With a population of only six million people and annual oil revenues of 32 billion dollars in 
2010 alone, Libya’s potential was massive. Most Libyans, however, did not enjoy this wealth 
and the economic condition in the country was worse than that in far poorer countries. 
Unemployment was estimated to be over 30% and jobs outside the public sector were few. 
Indeed, Gaddafi’s major crime was wasting Libya’s fortune on foreign ventures. In the last 
years of his rule, Libya emerged from a decade of international isolation and sanctions that 
resulted from the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland in December 
1988. Due to its vast energy reserves and poor infrastructure, the country became the target of 
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Western investments and a centre of political attention of the US and the EU (Kafala, 2011). 
Two of Gaddafi’s sons seemed to be nominated for succession: Saif al-Islam, the elder son, 
who presented himself as a defender of media freedom and human rights, and al-Mu’tasim, 
who played a central role in the intelligence sector. 
Inspired by the wave of protests throughout the Middle East, Libyans launched their revolution 
in February 2011 with a protest calling for human rights in the eastern city of Benghazi. The 
families of the Abu Salim prison massacre victims initiated the protests which spread rapidly. 
Coinciding with the fifth anniversary of a major anti-Gaddafi protest in Benghazi, February 
17 was the official Day of Revolt. On this day in 2011, thousands of protesters marched on the 
streets. Gaddafi’s forces responded by firing live ammunition at the protest. More than a dozen 
protestors were shot dead. The protest in Benghazi developed and spread to other eastern 
towns before eventually reaching Tripoli. Major demonstrations were reported in Benghazi, 
Ajdabiya, Misrata, and Zintan, among others. Gaddafi then released large numbers of 
convicted prisoners, paying them to crush the demonstrators. Protests continued to escalate 
after February 17, and there were widespread reports that “Gaddafi had hired mercenaries,” 
mainly Africans from sub-Saharan countries, “to supplement his security forces and suppress 
the demonstrations” (Al-Jazeera English, Aug 2011). 
The revolt soon evolved into an armed conflict between Gaddafi’s forces and poorly armed 
rebels centred in the city of Benghazi. The rebels in the East formed the National Transitional 
Council (NTC), which led the revolt, and was immediately recognised by many Arab and 
Western governments as Libya’s legitimate ruling body. In March 2011, the UN Security 
Council passed a resolution that permitted the use of all means necessary – except troops on 
the ground – to protect civilians in Libya (BBC, Sep 2014). 
The civilian population, which is demanding nothing more than the right to choose their 
own destiny, is in mortal danger (BBC, Oct 2011). 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
NATO soon launched a military operation against Gaddafi’s regime. The campaign was solely 
confined to air attacks, primarily aimed at imposing a no-fly zone. It was later expanded to 
include bombing military targets on the ground. After six months of fighting, rebel forces 
managed to take the capital, Tripoli, in August 2011, after clearing vast territories in the west. 
After four decades in power, the leader was finally ousted. Gaddafi and his family were forced 
to escape the capital. On October 31, 2011, Gaddafi was captured and killed while trying to 
flee his hometown, Sirte. Eight months of heavy fighting for freedom have come to an end. 
Three weeks later, Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, was captured while also trying to flee the 
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country. He now “faces trial in Libya for financial corruption, murder and rape” (BBC, Sep 
2014). 
[T]he Libyan ‘Brother Leader of the Revolution’ Muammar Gaddafi would have sold the 
Mediterranean to the Americans and their European allies, if only he could have done, in 
order to stay in power. His trouble was that they were no longer buying – at least not from 
him. 
(Dabashi, 2012: 208) 
Almost 50 thousand people were killed and many more injured during the revolution. Three 
days after the death of Gaddafi, the NTC officially proclaimed the liberalisation of Libya. 
Although Libya has suffered from instability since the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, the first free 
national elections for a new parliament were held relatively peacefully in a democratic 
atmosphere in July 2012 (BBC, Sep 2014).  
The situation has changed, though, since the beginning of 2014. A civil conflict broke out 
between three rival factions seeking to rule Libya: the first group is the government of 
the Council of Deputies (also known as the Tobruk Government for being based in the Eastern 
city of Tobruk), which was elected in 2014, and is loyal to the Libyan National Army 
commanded by Khalifa Haftar. The second group is the rival Islamist government of the new 
General National Congress based in the capital Tripoli, dominated mainly by Islamists and 
backed by Libya’s Dawn Troops and the Islamist Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries. 
The third group is the Islamic State (IS), which mainly controls the central city of Sirte 
(Stephan, 2014). 
 
1.4.5 Syria: The March 15th Revolution 
The Ba’ath party was founded in Damascus in 1947 as a pan-Arabist secular party that was 
opposed to colonisation and imperialism. It seized power in Syria in March 1963. In 1970, the 
then Ba’ath government Minister of Defence Hafez Assad took over in a coup. He had ruled 
for three decades before his son, Bashar, inherited a regime led by the pan-Arabist Ba’ath 
party. The Alawites – a fringe Shiite sect that constitutes about 10% of the population of a 
Muslim country with a Sunni majority – has dominated his regime. 
Upon the death of his brother Basil, who was initially “groomed for the presidency” in 1994, 
Bashar Assad had to return to Damascus from London where he was studying medicine. 
Bashar Assad “inherited power” in July 2000, a month after the death of his father Hafez 
Assad (Al-Jazeera English, Oct 2011). He became the new secretary-general of the Ba’ath 
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party in June 2000. The parliament amended the constitution to reduce the minimum age limit 
for the president to 34 instead of 40, allowing the junior Assad to run for presidency. After a 
rigged presidential referendum, he was elected president, with more than 97% of the vote, and 
took office on July 11, 2000 (ibid). 
Under the rule of the senior Assad, thousands of political opposition members and civil 
activists were detained under emergency laws, which were implemented in 1963. According 
to the state of emergency, citizens were denied “the right to form associations, organisations 
or political parties in order to express or defend their opinions” (ibid). Almost 40,000 people 
were reportedly killed when the armed forces, commanded by the brother Rifaat Assad, 
attacked the city of Hama in 1982 to crush an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The Alawi clans around Asad, which dominate the security forces and have been 
transformed into a privileged political elite, have a special stake in the survival of the 
regime, and the massive 1982 repression at Hama shows the lengths to which they will 
go to defend it.  
(Hinnebusch, 1998: 116) 
Bashar was viewed as a moderniser and his arrival was greeted with optimism. He promised 
to observe basic freedoms and achieve economic openness. But the “package of reforms he 
began, known as the ‘Damascus Spring,’ proved short-lived” (Al-Jazeera English, Oct 2011), 
as members of the political opposition were detained and all forms of political opposition were 
banned. Power remained concentrated in the hands of the Assad family and other Alawites. 
His policies became more authoritarian and his rule more autocratic. Although Bashar had 
released some hundreds of prisoners upon becoming president, thousands more remained in 
prison. The secret police continued to detain opposition members and human rights activists, 
censor the internet and arrest dissident bloggers. Under Bashar’s reign, “[c]ritics are 
imprisoned, domestic media are tightly controlled, and economic policies often benefit the 
elite” (BBC, June 2012). According to Human Rights Watch, Syria’s “human rights record is 
‘among the worst in the world’” (ibid), as “exceptional laws ... remained in effect and 
circumscribed basic rights as did special security courts, whose procedures did not meet 
international fair-trial standards” (Ismael, 2001: 98).  
Assad insisted that his regime was immune to the uprisings that swept the Arab World 
and toppled the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011. However, in the southern city of 
Daraa an uprising against Assad began. In mid-March 2011, locals gathered to demand the 
release of 14 school children who had been detained and tortured for writing a well-known 
slogan of the mass revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, ‘The people demands the downfall of the 
regime’ on the school walls. The protesters also called for democracy, reforms, and greater 
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freedom. “The peaceful show of dissent was, however, too much” for the brutal regime to take 
and when the crowds marched through the city after Friday prayers on March 18, security 
forces fired live ammunition, killing four people (BBC, Apr 2012). 
Within weeks, the protest spread throughout the country. Major protests were reported in 
Lattakia, Jableh, Baniyas, Damascus, Homs, Duma, Idlib, Der Ezzor, amongst other Syrian 
cities. The city of Hama witnessed the biggest protest with half a million demonstrators. The 
security forces responded violently. The uprising seemed to get out of control. Assad deployed 
the army to crush the emboldened protesters. Hundreds of people were killed as the army 
besieged major cities and tanks shelled residential areas. The security forces stormed homes, 
rounding up those believed to have attended demonstrations. The government blamed “armed 
gangs and terrorists” for the unrest and said it was facing an international conspiracy (ibid). 
The protestors’ main goal had become the overthrow of Bashar Assad’s regime and the ruling 
Ba’ath party elite. 
Due to successive regime crackdowns, thousands of army officers and soldiers deserted from 
the Syrian army, eventually establishing the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Although it began 
peacefully, the revolution became increasingly militarised. Assad’s forces, eventually backed 
by Hezbollah and other Iranian and Iraqi Shiite militias, were on one side and the FSA, 
founded by Colonel Riad al-Asa’ad, alongside numerous Islamist factions were on the other 
side. Over time, the FSA and the Islamist factions grew in number and seized control of some 
pockets of territory in the North, East, and South of the country. On November 12, 2011, the 
Arab League suspended Syria from its ranks, and began to impose sanctions. After weeks of 
arduous negotiations with the Arab League, Assad finally agreed to allow an Arab observer 
mission to enter the country. The monitors, however, failed to stop the violence, and its work 
was subsequently suspended in January 2012 (BBC, Mar 2015). 
In November I returned to Homs after a two month absence. “The days of rocks 
are over,” said a friend of mine who used to throw rocks at security forces in 
demonstrations. “A new phase has begun of the Free Syrian Army defending 
demonstrations, and there are less demonstrations because security forces shoot 
more.” 
I last visited the city in January. Armed men surrounded Khaldiyeh neighbourhood 
to protect its nightly demonstration. When I attended a rally in Bab Dreib area, 
snipers positioned in a neighbouring Alawite area shot in our direction just to scare 
the protesters (Al-Jazeera English, Feb 2012). 
Nir Rosen, journalist 
For months, major cities like Hama, Homs, and Der Ezzor came under intense bombardment, 
leaving thousands of civilians killed. Kofi Annan was appointed envoy to Syria in March 2012 
by the UN and the Arab League and put forward a six-point peace plan. A ceasefire and a UN 
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observer mission were planned, but ultimately failed to end the bloody crackdown carried out 
by the regime. The mission also suspended its activity. The battles between the regime’s army 
and the armed opposition continued, and reached the capital, Damascus, as well as the biggest 
city in Syria, Aleppo. Meanwhile, armed pro-Assad plain-clothed thugs known as šabbīḥa 
carried out massacres and mass executions. On May 25, “reports emerged of the deadliest 
massacre in the crisis to date” (BBC, Mar 2015). UN observers confirmed, “108 people, most 
of them women and children, were shot or stabbed in the village of Taldou in the Houla region” 
(ibid). A few weeks later, another massacre in the village of Qubair left 78 people dead. 
Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia called on Assad to step down. The US and the EU 
imposed unilateral sanctions on him and members of the ruling elite. The UN Security Council 
has failed so far to pass a resolution condemning the Syrian regime or imposing sanctions on 
it due to the use of vetoes by Russia and China. In June 2012, a meeting of major powers in 
Geneva “called for a ‘transitional government,’” but again “Russia and China have blocked 
attempts by Western countries at the UN to put pressure on Mr Assad to leave” (ibid). Russia, 
Iran, and Hezbollah have largely backed Assad and supplied him with militants fighting on 
the ground.  
The conflict, so far, has reportedly left more than half a million dead and millions of Syrian 
refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and throughout Europe, with most cities and villages 
partially or completely devastated. The situation has become more complicated with the 
emergence of Islamic State (IS), an extremist organisation fighting against both the opposition 
forces and Assad’s troops. IS developed to be a major player, now controlling half of Syria’s 
terrority. Observers accuse Assad of contributing to the creation of Islamic State in order to 
establish legitimacy and gain Western support under the pretext of fighting against terror. With 
a regime determined to hold on to power, and a revolution that showed no sign of easing, 
resolution seemed unattainable. 
 
1.5 Thinking the Arab Spring 
Once the Arab nations dared to challenge their autocrats, marching in millions on the streets, 
it was obvious that the brutal Arab regimes had “lost their deterrence, their hegemony and 
their capacity to instil fear or command loyalty,” as Marwan Bishara (2011) puts it. The Arab 
uprisings in different Arab countries were, in fact, emotionally connected and had common 
aspects. A sign lifted by the Egyptian protestors in Tahrir Square addressing the Tunisian 
people offered the clearest expression of this unity: “antum as-sābiqūn, wa naḥnu al-lāḥiqūn 
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(you are the first, and we are to follow) (Dabashi, 2012: 29). No “one-size-fits-all template,” 
however, can be applied to all Arab uprisings. 
The Arab World does not tend to act as one homogenous body; it is a rich combination of 
diverse components with different characteristics. In Tunisia, for example, the military backed 
the revolution against the ruling elites. In Egypt, the army played a vital role in toppling 
Mubarak’s regime in response to the revolution; however, General Sisi, the then Minister of 
Defence, later led a coup against the first freely elected President Muhammad Morsi. In Syria 
and Libya, the army remained largely loyal to the regime (Gardner, 2011). Pro-regime thugs, 
Special Forces and Republican Guards in Libya, Yemen and Syria demonstrated greater 
loyalty to the regime. The dictators in these countries were largely in control of their national 
armies (Dabashi, 2012: 203). 
Nevertheless, the Arab Spring uprisings did share key characteristics. They have known no 
‘sole hero’ or ‘revolutionary leader.’ In fact, the young generation were the “anonymous 
heroes of these revolutions” (ibid: 239). Although their ultimate goal was political, these 
uprisings had a social basis and economic motivation. They started peacefully and 
demonstrated a nonviolent nature. They were “post-ideological”; they happened in the 
aftermath of the exhaustion of ideologies and cannot be classified accordingly as Islamist, 
socialist, or nationalist (ibid: 238). Islamists and socialists took part in these mass movements 
and in some cases attempted to impose their own agenda. However, the uprisings remained as 
social movements that were not appropriated by any particular ideology. 
It is true that the Arab Spring is not ideological, and that it has brought together different 
groups united by the demand for the overthrowing of autocracies. Islamism, however, has 
been part of the scene, and proved to be a key player in the politics of the Middle East. After 
the Arab Spring, Islamist parties and movements, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, have 
realised that they have a unique opportunity to enter the political arena. They speak “the 
language of democracy and national unity” and their faith in democracy has been put to test 
(Hardy, 2011). However, the military coup in Egypt led by Gen. Sisi has constituted a setback 
for this unique experience in Egypt at least. One can argue that of all the countries in question, 
only Tunisia has made a successful democratic transition. However, nothing remains 
guaranteed. 
The Arab Spring reshaped the international political map and started a new era beyond the 
post-colonial configuration. The old categorisation of ‘Islam and the West’ had disappeared 
for a while. However, the militarisation of the Libyan and Syrian revolutions led eventually 
to the rise of Islamic State (IS) along with various Islamist militant groups in Syria and Libya. 
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At the opposite end, pro-regime militias, mainly Shiite Islamists in Syria, Iraq, and even 
Yemen have been formed with the full support of Iran. The political and military conflict 
following the Arab Spring seems to be multi-faced; it is a conflict between revolutionary 
powers and the supporters of old regimes backed by military elites. It is also a confrontation 
between the Sunni and Shiite ideologies; the West and the Sunni Jihadists; the Arabs and the 
Iranians; and the secularist powers and Islamist groups. 
The Arab revolutions enjoy a “self-cleansing mechanism” that provides a protection from 
entering a “closed-circuit” of “corruption-revolt-corruption” (Dabashi, 2012: 239). The genius 
of these revolutions, according to Azmi Bishara, lies in their continuation and in the realisation 
that the action goes beyond a Friday of Anger, and that there is no turning back (ibid: 95). The 
significance of these uprisings is that they are not replacing one tyrant with another, one fake 
democracy with another. The Facebook generation has been able to understand that the 
disposing of Ben Ali, Mubarak or Saleh and the building of a democratic system are “two very 
different things” (Rosenberg, 2011). As long as the Tahrir and Change squares across the Arab 
World remain open for revolt, the revolution remains open-ended. The idea of “total, sudden, 
and final revolution” has disappeared, and a new pattern of transition emerged: aṯ-ṯawra 
mustamirra (the revolution is ongoing) – a “proposition suggested in a leading slogan of the 
Arab Spring” (Dabashi, 2012: 246).  
The civil conflicts experienced by most of the Arab Spring countries following the uprisings 
are in fact the legacy of the autocratic regimes that had ruled these countries for tens of years. 
These regimes undermined the civil peace of the Arab societies, taking advantage of the ethnic 
and religious diversity to create ethnic and sectarian conflicts. Conflicts were manufactured to 
keep the various minorities and groups under the control of the state, which had represented 
itself as the protector of each of those groups against the others. Once the Arab regimes had 
collapsed, these conflicts came to the surface once again. This highlights the significance of 
the concept of the permanent revolution, aimed not only at toppling the old regimes, but also 
overcoming all the challenges and solving the civil conflicts. The old regimes had created, 
nurtured, and sponsored these conflicts, but the people must work together to put an end to 
them. 
It is important to emphasise that the Western powers, especially the United States, have not 
been driving the Arab Spring; rather they have merely reacted to the events. In effect, the 
Obama administration has been slow to realise the limits of the action. In Yemen, for instance, 
the Americans initially supported Saleh, but then observing the anger and steadfastness of the 
Yemenis, they abandoned their ally. Even in Libya, where they intervened militarily to topple 
Gaddafi’s regime, the West seems unable to determine the outcome (Hardy, 2011). 
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These uprisings exposed the hypocrisy of the Arab ruling regimes that had always pretended 
to be resistant to Israel and Western imperialism. The reality was that they had been the 
greatest guarantee for the security of Israel for decades. They offered “no ‘resistance’ to 
domination; they [were] ... the condition of this domination” (Dabashi, 2012: 204). They 
accused the revolutionary powers of taking part in a conspiracy against their own countries 
while they were the ones who opened the door for international intervention by abusing and 
murdering their people. 
The Arab Spring was an uprising launched by millions of citizens who identified themselves 
as Arabs who rose up not only against oppressive dictators but also against the foreign interests 
that kept these autocrats in power against the popular will. “The winds of the Arab Spring 
have travelled way beyond the Arab World” and had a regional and international influence 
that has extended into the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa. The sense of dissatisfaction 
was similarly overwhelming due to socio-economic and political factors (ibid: 133-4). 
The counter-revolutionary forces, ranging from local elites, the US, Israel, Iran, Hezbollah, 
and what is left of the Arab autocracies tried from the very beginning to protect their interests 
from the consequences of the Arab Spring. This odd combination has come together to curb 
this wave of democratisation because in one way or another they are all threatened. Hassan 
Nasrallah and Benjamin Netanyahu both supported some uprisings, yet turned a blind eye to 
others. They both suffered from “one fundamental ailment”, which is the failure to adopt a 
principled position regarding all democratic revolutions (ibid: 111). 
The United States was troubled by the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen because they 
meant losing its allies in the region. The US administration had concerns about the Arab 
Spring turning into an Islamic uprising. The “custodians of fear and intimidation” in Iran 
quickly declared that the Arab Spring was an extension to the Islamic revolution in Iran. In 
effect, the Iranian regime “has spent thirty years repressing its own people” in the name of 
Islam and “manufacturing an image of legitimacy” for itself. The Arab Spring has presented 
a model of change that is not welcome in Tehran (ibid: 40). Since the outbreak of the Islamic 
revolution, Iran has been “the sole beneficiary of the politics of despair that has shaped the 
region, with the pains of Palestine the epicentre of that opportunism” (ibid: 134). The collapse 
of the Arab autocracies may pave the way for the Arabs to build democratic systems and to 
express their resistance to Western and Israeli interests at the same time. Iran can no longer 
use ‘the resistance of Israel and the Western powers’ as a pretext for repression and 
dictatorship, especially after signing the nuclear deal with the West. The oil-rich countries 
such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have also played their role in the counter-
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revolution, funding and supporting military coups and counter-revolutionary movements, 
especially in Egypt and Libya. 
Because the Arab Spring is genuine, bright, and sound, rising from the aspirations of repressed 
people, it has been able to “expose the otherwise hidden hypocrisies of old forces – left or 
right, pro- or anti-American” (ibid: 101). Hassan Nasrallah defended the Syrian regime, 
describing the Syrian revolution and the sacrifices of the Syrian people as a conspiracy by the 
US. He promised that Assad would make reforms and pleaded for time. He sounded eerily 
similar to the Shah of Iran “before his demise early in 1979: desperate, confused, and baffled 
by the unfolding drama, worriedly out of touch with what was happening around him” (ibid: 
102). 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
The Arab Spring that swept the Arab World starting from January 2011 did not spare any Arab 
country though the intensity of revolution differed from one country to another. Each one of 
these post-ideological uprisings had special significance. The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia 
was the first call for freedom in the Arab World. The Egyptian revolution was against domestic 
dictatorship as well as foreign domination. The NATO intervention in Libya did not guarantee 
the loyalty of the new Libya to the West, and the outcome remained obscure with Libya 
turning into a collapsed state with two rival governments and hundreds of warring militias. 
Any future change in Syria would affect the geopolitics of the Middle East, especially with 
the involvement of Iran, Hezbollah and IS in the conflict (ibid: 24). The Youth Revolution in 
Yemen had important consequences for the Gulf States. The military coup led by the Houthis 
against the legitimate government of President Hadi caused a military counter operation 
launched by ten Arab armies with a stated goal to support the legitimate government and 
undermine Iranian influence in Yemen represented by the Houthis. 
This chapter has attempted to draw a clear picture of the Arab World before and during the 
Arab Spring. It has addressed the issues of democratisation, civil activism, the status of human 
rights, political opposition, and Islam and Islamism. It has looked into the main factors that 
paved the way for the Arab Spring, starting from the lack of political reform and socio-
economic decline, ending with the media and social network revolution. This chapter has also 
investigated each Arab revolution separately, providing reasons behind the action, 
highlighting the course of the revolt as well as the outcome. Five Arab revolutions have been 
covered: the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia, the January 25th Revolution in Egypt, the Youth 
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Revolution in Yemen, the February 17th Revolution in Libya, and the March 15th Revolution 
in Syria. The chapter ended with the analysis of the Arab Spring regarding its nature, 
characteristics, and regional and international consequences. 
The next chapter will look into the linguistic features and characteristics of the political 
discourse communicated during the Arab Spring. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE ARAB SPRING: LANGUAGE INTO ACTION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A wide array of factors led to the formation of the Arab Spring, primarily ideology, politics, 
and media. However, it is vital to shed light on the often-overlooked role of language in 
shaping the Arab Spring. This chapter aims to explore the different linguistic aspects of the 
Arab uprisings and their contributions to the political transition that has been achieved during 
and after the Arab Spring. The chapter is divided into various sections, each of which examines 
a distinctive linguistic aspect or feature of the revolutionary action in the Arab World after 
2011. Key concepts, such as taking a stance through language, and mass protest mobilising 
discourse, are covered along with the role of the internet in forming the discourse of the Arab 
Spring. Thereafter, the chapter investigates different genres of revolutionary discourse such 
as slogans, chants, and revolutionary humour. An attempt is made to decipher whether these 
genres were effective in establishing the protestors’ demands and aspirations. The discussion 
on the role of language in the Arab Spring will be concluded by looking into the counter-
revolutionary discourse adopted by pro-regime forces as a reaction to the discourse developed 
by the protestors. 
 
2.2 Speaking as Stance-Taking at Time of Revolution 
The use of language during the Arab Spring has reflected a process of stance taking in which 
protestors and civil and political activists have expressed their political opinions and attitudes 
towards the Arab revolutions as well as the Arab authoritarian regimes and their repressive 
policies. Jaffe (2007: 56) refers to stance as a “‘contextualizing cue’ that informs interlocutors 
of the nature of the role the speaker aims to project in relation to the form and content of his 
or her utterance.” DuBois (2007: 220) seems to offer a more comprehensive definition of 
‘stance’ as “a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative 
means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects, and aligning with other 
subjects, with respect to any salient dimensions of the sociocultural field.” 
Accordingly, the notion of stance has social as well as linguistic implications and thus has to 
be viewed from a communicative perspective within a public environment; it is seen as “the 
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mediating path between linguistic forms and social identities,” as Ochs (1992) notes. Views 
must be presented in public in order to be perceived as stance-taking since stance-taking does 
not just simply imply holding an opinion on a certain issue; rather, it indicates employing this 
opinion to make alignments or misalignments with others.  
In the context of the Arab Spring, stance takers have utilised language as a tool to express 
their viewpoints. Attitudes on substantial political and human-rights issues are covered in 
order to achieve political transformation. In their conflict with pro-regime media outlets, the 
Arab revolutionaries acted as stance takers by using language to establish their identity as 
advocates for freedom. At the same time, they sought to impose an opposite identity on the 
anti-revolutionary forces, Bassiouney (2012: 109) asserts.  
The banner shown in Figure 1 (Associated Press, 2011) gives an example of this double-faced 
process. The statement on the banner, which says yasquṭ ᶜUmar Sulaymān, rajul Isrā’īl 
(“down with Omar Suleiman, Israel’s man”), reflects two stances. The first stance is a 
representation of the protestors’ deep contempt of the role played by Omar Suleiman as Vice-
President and former Head of Intelligence Services. The other is imposed by the protestors on 
Suleiman, accusing him of maintaining a stance in support of Israel, a historical enemy of the 
Egyptians. 
Figure 1 Image of Egyptian protestors holding up a banner that says “down with Omar Suleiman, 
Israel’s man” in a protest during the January 25th Revolution 
As part of this process of stance taking, activists have employed linguistic and structural 
resources in their revolutionary discourse, using Modern Standard Arabic, local dialects, and 
foreign languages (Bassiouney, 2012: 109). The banner held by citizens from the Syrian city 
of Kafranbel illustrated in Figure 2 provides an example. “De Mistura! Your initiatives can 
be considered only when they imply kicking Assad out of Syria,” the writing on the banner 
says (Kafranbel Banners, 7 Mar 2015). This statement represents a stance taken by 
revolutionary activists from the city of Kafranbel against the UN and Arab League envoy to 
Syria Staffan de Mistura’s initiative to institute a cease-fire in the Northern city of Aleppo. 
67 
 
Recognising the importance of addressing the world in a foreign language, activists have used 
English, which is the political lingua franca of today’s world, to declare their stance on de 
Mistura’s initiative. They make clear that they firmly reject the plan unless it clearly involves 
the resignation and expulsion of Assad. 
Figure 2 Image of a banner held by revolutionary activists from the Syrian city of Kafranbel 
Bassiouney (2012: 109) examines the language of the Arab Spring, viewing it as an indicator 
of political identity shaped by the different stances of political forces in the media war during 
the revolutions. He points to code-switching as a mechanism used by various actors to support 
their claims and thus contribute to establishing their political and ideological identities. 
DuBois (2007: 163) identifies three features of stance-taking: “In taking a stance, the stance-
taker 1) evaluates an object; 2) positions a subject (self and others); and 3) aligns with other 
subjects.” Speech participants and discourse producers adopt positions mainly through 
evaluating other individuals’ and groups’ stances.  
Bassiouney (2012: 109) explains these features describing them as achievements of stance 
taking as a linguistic act. Through evaluation, speakers or stance-takers determine the value 
of a linguistic code that expresses a certain political position or stance. After evaluation, a 
speaker tends to delineate their political stance, making claims supported by information and 
argument, reflecting a great degree of certainty and confidence. The third and final phase of 
stance taking is alignment by which a speaker judges other stances comparing them to his/her 
own, classifying them as either supportive or opposed. Bassiouney describes alignment as an 
act aimed at “standardizing or normalizing the relation between stances” (ibid). 
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Suleiman (2012: 349) associates speaking with action. In “the Arabic grammatical tradition,” 
speaking is also considered as “action” (ibid). During the Arab Spring, the demand for 
freedom and political change expressed by the Arab people through slogans, chants, and other 
forms of revolutionary linguistic expression, represented in itself an action that led to an actual 
change in the political reality in the Arab World. Bassiouney (2012: 122) affirms that 
“literally, by speaking up, Egyptians have already taken action.” Poets, singers, 
actors/actresses, journalists, footballers, and athletes expressed their opinions freely and 
firmly, demanding political change in support of the protestors in the streets. After 
participating in an anti-regime demonstration in al-Midan area in central Damascus in April 
2011, Syrian actor Fares al-Hilo (Zaman Alwasl, Jul 2011) stated: 
ةرم لولأ يتوص عمسأ ينأكو ،سرعك تناك ةرهاظتلا. 
[The demonstration was like a wedding party; it was as if I was listening to my voice for 
the first time in my life.]1 
Al-Hilo found out that he actually had a voice that can be heard. Articulating his speech 
constituted an action. In conjunction with millions of other voices, it contributed to making 
the most substantial change in the Arab region since the Second World War. Stance taking 
during the Arab Spring is also manifested through revolutionary poems aimed at establishing 
national identity. It has created a solid revolutionary position that rejects any compromises 
that lead to relinquishing the objectives of the revolution. The following is an excerpt from a 
poem entitled Maᶜlīš Darᶜā (“It is going to be fine, Daraa”) by Basem Amr, a local poet from 
the Southern Syrian city of Daraa, which witnessed the outbreak of the Syrian revolution: 
شيلعم اعرد شيلعم 
هعمس نم لك كتوص ىبل 
 شيجت ندملا لك تماق 
اعرد لهأ ـل.. ةعزفلا ..ةعزفلا  
شيلعم اعرد شيلعم 
ةعمتجم ايروس تماق 
...  
شيلعم اعرد شيلعم 
ةعمتجم ايروس تماق 
حرفي لاو.. عجرة شيف ام  
 ..ةعجر يف امةعجر يف ام  
  لصت ياج  و ؟ح  و ؟..شيإ دعب ك؟..شيإ دعب ك  
  و.ه عْق  رت يش اندنع ام ك  
[It is going to be fine, Daraa; it is going to be fine. 
All those who heard your call have responded. 
All cities have been mobilised, 
For the sake of the people of Daraa, fazah (“call for support”); fazah, 
It is going to be fine, Daraa; it is going to be fine. 
All of Syria has risen up.  
… 
                                                          
1 All back-translations are enclosed in square brackets and are produced by the researcher unless 
stated otherwise. 
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It is going to be fine, Daraa; it is going to be fine. 
All of Syria has risen up.  
He [Assad] should not be happy; there will be no return. 
There will be no return; no return. 
Are you [Assad] coming to make conciliation? After what? After what? 
We have nothing for you to amend.] 
(Amer, 2011) 
The poem is written in a local Southern Syrian dialect, which is spoken in some parts of 
Southern Syria. It also focuses on the sufferings of the province of Daraa. Nevertheless, the 
poet emphasises the unity of Syria and reinstates Syrian identity, demonstrating a spirit of 
solidarity against the regime’s brutality. Besides, the poet seems to adopt a hardline and 
uncompromising stance against Assad and his regime. Placing heavy emphasis on phrases 
such as “after what?” and “no return” reaffirms this stance. This poem can also serve as a 
representative example of the discourse that mobilises the masses. This will be the primary 
topic of following section. 
 
2.3 Mass Protest Mobilising Discourse 
One of the main features of the revolutionary discourse produced by the protestors of the Arab 
Spring is the use of words, phrases, and expressions to mobilise the people. Civil and political 
activists who led the protests often employed illocution, which is defined according to Oxford 
Dictionary as “an act of speaking or writing which in itself effects or constitutes the intended 
action” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015). The goal was to engage various social classes, segments, 
and sects in the revolutionary action. 
The Social Democratic Forum in their “Tahrir Documents” assert that the Egyptian working 
class’s participation in the revolution was prominent and essential. In fact, it “led the 
Egyptians’ struggle” against Mubarak’s regime though “sit-ins, strikes” and “demonstrations” 
(The Social Democratic Forum, 2011). The working class’s involvement in the revolutionary 
action was not new, dating back to the El-Mahalla incidents. Thousands of people, most of 
whom were workers at the Ghazl El-Mahalla factories, demonstrated against the regime’s 
policy on workers’ rights. They chanted slogans with social demands, such as ‘ūl yā bāšā, ‘ūl 
yā bīh, ir-riġīf bi rubᶜ jnῑh (“Oh pasha, Oh bey, a [bread] loaf costs a quarter of a pound”) 
(Egyptian Trade Unionist and Labor Observer, 2008). In fact, the main slogan of the Egyptian 
Revolution ᶜīš, ḥurriyya, ᶜadāla ‘ijtimāᶜiyya (“bread, freedom, social justice”) represents the 
involvement of the working class in the revolution. It symbolises the desire to approach 
millions of low-income Egyptian workers who had not yet joined the protests, trying to involve 
them in the revolutionary action. 
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Bassiouney (2009) states that “diglossic switching as part of code switching” can be “used to 
create an effect on the audience.” Protests employed code-switching by using a combination 
of formal (standard) and informal local dialectical expressions in their chants in order to appeal 
to wider segments of society. An example of this technique, which was used in almost all the 
Arab Spring revolutions, is a slogan chanted by the Yemeni protestors: bukrah aj-jumᶜah baᶜd 
al-ᶜaṣr, at-taxzīnah waṣṭ al-qaṣr (“tomorrow afternoon, at-taxzīnah will occur inside the 
palace”). The mention of the term at-taxzīnah, here, is highly significant as it refers to chewing 
qāt (a social custom that is popular among Yemenis and dates back hundreds of years). The 
slogan is apparently intended to encourage Yemenis to continue with their struggle, looking 
forward to ‘chewing qāt’ inside the presidential palace in a reference to the long-waited 
collapse of the Yemeni regime. 
Participation in pre-revolution protests had been restricted to a limited group of political 
activists. Upon the outbreak of the January 25th Revolution, the Egyptian protestors chanted 
slogans appealing to their family members and other ordinary people to join them on the streets 
of Cairo and other Egyptian cities: yā ahālīnā inḍammū līnā (“Oh our families, do join us”). 
Pleas were also made from the protestors of cities with intense revolutionary action to 
inhabitants of other areas to join the uprising and start revolting against the regime.  
The people of the Eastern part of Libya, where the revolution started, chanted slogans calling 
for the people of Tripoli and other Western cities to rise up: Ṭrāblus yā ḥurra, lizzi bū šafšūfa 
barra (“Oh free Tripoli, expel bu shafshufa [a reference to Gaddafi]”); yā šabāb az-Zāwiya 
nabū layla ḍāwiya, yā šabāb al-ᶜaṣma nabū layla ḥāsma (“Oh the young people of al-Zawiyah 
[a Western Libyan city], we want a bright night, oh the people of the Capital (Tripoli), we 
want a crucial night”). In Syria too, the people of Hama, a central city where a half million 
protestors demonstrated against the Assad regime, chanted slogans appealing to the people of 
Damascus to follow them: yā šabāb aš-Šām, yā šabāb aš-Šām, ᶜannā bi Ḥamāh saqaṭ an-
niẓām (“Oh the young people of Sham [Damascus], oh the young people of Sham [Damascus], 
here in Hamah, the regime has fallen”). 
The protestors were aware of the importance of the relationship between the people and the 
armed forces. That is why they wanted to gain the support of the army, or at least attempted 
to neutralise it. This was manifested in the slogans and chants of the Egyptian protestors: aš-
šaᶜb wa aj-jīš ‘īd waḥda (“the people and the army are one hand [i.e. united]”). Also in Yemen, 
the protestors chanted for the unity between the people on the one hand, and the army and 
police on the other hand: iḥna wa aš-šurṭah wa aj-jīš, yajmaᶜnā raġīf al-ᶜīš (“we, the police 
and the army share the loaf of bread [i.e. we are all partners]”). 
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Although some of the Arab Spring revolutions have sadly developed into what mey be seen 
as civil conflicts, the slogans chanted by the protestors, whether in Syria, Libya, or Yemen, 
have reflected a great deal of responsibility and tendency to appeal to minorities and all 
religious and racial groups with a discourse that is both tolerant and unifying. This was the 
case in Syria with the famous slogan wāḥid, wāḥid, wāḥid, aš-šaᶜb as-Sūrī wāḥid (“one, one, 
one, the Syria people is one [i.e. united]”) as well as in Yemen: lā šamāl wa lā janūb, wiḥdatnā 
wiḥdat qulūb (“no north, no south, our unity is a unity of hearts”). The aim was to encourage 
various religious, racial, and regional groups to join the revolution. 
This sense of unity was most manifested when a particular city suffered a deadly attack by the 
security forces, which was more frequent in Libya and Syria. The slogans reflected this sense 
of sympathy, whether in Libya where the protestors of the western part appealed to the city of 
Benghazi: bi ar-rūḥ, bi ad-dam, nafdīkī yā Binġāzī (“we would sacrifice soul and blood to 
Benghazi”), or in Syria where many cities chanted the slogan labbaykī yā darᶜā (“here we are 
for you, Daraa”). 
The overwhelming feeling of unity was not only shared by the people within the one country, 
but also brought together protestors from various Arab countries, creating a massive 
revolution across the Arab World. This was represented through slogans and chants, in support 
of the revolutions in other countries, encouraging them to continue with their action until their 
demands were met. The Yemenis chanted for Benghazi in Libya: yā Binġāzī ‘alf salām, 
ṯawrah, ṯawrah ᶜala aẓ-ẓullām (“Oh Benghazi, we salute you a thousand times, a revolution, 
a revolution against the oppressors”). The Egyptians also expressed solidarity with Libya, 
supporting its struggle against Gaddafi: yā Qaḏḏāfī ġūr, ġūr, xallī Lībya tšūf an-nūr (“Oh 
Gaddafi, get lost, get lost, allow Libya to see the light”). 
In fact, without social media and a dynamic online environment, it may not have been possible 
for such a mass protest mobilising discourse to be communicated. It may have been impossible 
to reach and thus mobilise large segments of the Arab people. The online discourse 
communicated on the internet, and social media networks in particular, will be examined in 
the following section. 
 
2.4 Online Discourse 
The Arab Spring has apparently marked a major transformation in collective action across the 
Middle East and North Africa. These major changes in mass movement and revolutionary 
action in the Arab World are substantially associated with the rapid and effective development 
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of information and communication technologies in the Arab region. With regards to civil 
activism and political mobility, other devices also proved to be instrumental in expressing 
political demands of democratic transformation and reform. Ben Moussa (2013: 58) asserts, 
“Social media … have only been effective because they operated in synergy and 
complementarity with a huge array of media, from placards, leaflets and graffiti to digital 
cameras and 3G mobile phones.”  
Garrett (2006: 204) argues that the link between technology and social movement is 
manifested through three sorts of mechanisms: “reduction of participation costs, promotion of 
collective identity, and creation of community.” Stein (2009: 757) also identifies six functions 
of the internet and social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter in the context of mass 
movement and revolutionary action: providing information; assisting action and mobilisation; 
promoting interaction and dialogue; making lateral linkages; serving as an outlet for creative 
expression; and promoting fundraising and resource generation. This section aims to examine 
the revolutionary discourse communicated through social media networks during the Arab 
Spring in light of these six functions. 
During the Arab Spring, conventional media outlets could not always keep pace with all the 
events developing in various cities and towns. Activists took responsibility for providing 
information and reporting news on different events occurring in different places across the 
country by using their accounts and pages on social media networks. The following is an 
example of this function carried out by social media activism (Syrian Revolution Network, 
2012): 
Figure 3 A post by Syrian Revolution 2011 Facebook page shared on September 20, 2012 
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 لجاع– ةقرلا 
 ةنيدم يف ًادج ةمخض ةرهاظماصعلا شيجو فلالآاب دادعلأا ةيبلأا ضيبأ لتو ةحيرجلا ىسيع نيعل ةرصن ةقرلا ةب
... نيرهاظتملا ىلع رانلا قلطي 
[Breaking news – al-Raqqa 
A massive demonstration in the city of al-Raqqa, supporting Ayn Issa and Tell Abyad; 
the numbers are in thousands and the thug army [a reference to Assad’s forces] are 
shooting the protestors.] 
Such reporting has often been aimed at encouraging protestors to support their fellows in other 
cities and areas. The aim is to start new waves of protest as well as exposing the crimes 
committed by the state security forces against demonstrators. In fact, on many occasions many 
of these pages have proven to be reliable sources of information on the rapidly developing 
revolution.  
Political activists also encountered difficulties in organising demonstrations due to the 
repressive measures adopted by the Arab regimes. As a result, they resorted to creating 
accounts and pages on Facebook and Twitter in order to assist the revolutionary action, 
organise protests, and mobilise the masses. The following is a ‘post’ shared by the well-known 
revolutionary Egyptian Facebook page Kullunā Xālid Saᶜīd (“We are All Khaled Said”), 
urging the Egyptians to participate in the demonstrations that would be held on the ‘Friday of 
Martyrs’, as illustrated in Figure 4 (Kullunā Xālid Saᶜīd, 2011): 
شلا ةعمج يف كراشت اهلك رصم نيزواع مهدلاو مد نإ اوفرعي اوتام يللا نم ديهش لك لهأ ناشع موي هد .. ءاده
.ًلااح يتقولد مهفرعي يللا نييرصملا لكل اهرشنيو ةوعدلا ةعاتب ةحفصلا ىلع لخدي دحاو لك تير اي .. رده شحارم 
[We want all Egypt to participate in the Friday of Martyrs. This day aims to prove to each 
family of the martyrs who died that their sons’ blood was not shed in vain. We wish 
everybody to check the invitation page and share it with all the Egyptians they know 
immediately.] 
Figure 4 A post by the Kullunā Xālid Saᶜīd Facebook page shared on February 9, 
2011, during the Egyptian Revolution  
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Facebook, along with other social media networks, has also provided a platform to promote 
interaction and dialogue between activists and internet users. Many of the Facebook pages 
concerned with the Arab Spring revolutions allowed users to give their opinions on various 
issues related to the revolutionary action. One of these pages is ‘Axbār aṯ-Ṯawra al-Yamaniyya 
– Šabāb aṣ-Ṣumūd “Sāḥat at-Taġyīr” al-Yaman (“The news of the Yemeni Revolution News 
– The Steadfastness Youth ‘The Change Square’ Yemen”), which, as illustrated in Figure 5, 
asked its subscribers on September 25, 2011 about their opinions following a speech given by 
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (‘Axbār aṯ-Ṯawra al-Yamaniyya, 2011): 
!!!!؟ةيجيلخلا ةردابملاب حلاص مزتلا نأ دعب نميلا يف عاضولأا ريغتتس لهو ؟حلاص يلع باطخب كيأر ام 
[What is your opinion on Ali Saleh’s speech? And will the situation in Yemen change 
after Saleh demonstrated commitment to the Gulf Initiative?] 
Figure 5 A post by the ‘Axbār aṯ-Ṯawra al-Yamaniyya – Šabāb aṣ-Ṣumūd “Sāḥat at-Taġyīr” al-
Yaman Facebook Page, shared on September 25, 2011 during the Yemeni Revolution 
Alongside its previous functions, social media websites served as literal linkers that were used 
by protest organisers to get in touch and coordinate their own activities with those of other 
groups. This was done to organise big demonstrations, exchange views and take up similar 
stances on current political events during the revolution. This was mainly achieved through 
creating Facebook groups and pages for what the Syrians call tansīqiyāt aṯ-ṯawra (“revolution 
coordinators”). They combined political and civil activists coordinating at both local and 
national levels.  
Online activists also used the internet and social media as an outlet for creative expression. 
Famous as well as young, nameless poets posted numerous poems, verses, and short stories 
on Facebook, praising and glorifying the revolution, condemning the repression of the regime. 
An example of Facebook pages concerned with the literary aspect of the Arab Spring is al-
Aᶜmāl al-Fanniyya li aṯ-Ṯawra as-Sūriyya (“the artworks of the Syrian Revolution”), which is 
regularly updated with the most recent artworks. They post poems, sketches, video clips, 
songs, and chants that tackle revolution-related issues and are produced by pro-revolutionary 
activists and groups (Al-Aᶜmāl al-Fanniyya li aṯ-Ṯawra as-Sūriyya, 2015). 
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Charity organisations have often used social media accounts for fundraising purposes in order 
to support legitimate causes. Many examples of this usage can be located in the context of the 
Arab Spring and the Syrian revolution in particular. Many charity bodies were established to 
relieve the sufferings resulting from the brutal repression carried out by the Syrian army and 
its allied Iranian and Iraqi militias. Charity organisations dealing with the Syrian crisis such 
as Humam Appeal International, Syria Relief, Khayr Charity Foundation, and Farīq Mulham 
at-Taṭawwuᶜī (“Mulham Volunteer Team”) all have used Facebook and Twitter accounts to 
raise money to support the Syrians in various ways and raise awareness of the Syrian cause. 
 
2.5 The History of Prominent Slogans of the Arab Revolutions 
The protestors’ demands during the Arab Spring can be summarised in one slogan: irḥal 
(“leave”). Tunisian protestors first chanted it in early January 2011, demanding the resignation 
and departure of the then President Ben Ali (Marzouki, 2011). Michel (2013: 29) points out a 
significant fact on the development of the slogan defining the key demand of the Arab Spring. 
He argues that the slogan irḥal was originally articulated in colloquial French, as “dégage” 
(ibid). The is manifested in Figure 6 (Menzel Bourguiba ex-Ferryville, 2011). The slogan was 
only rendered into Arabic by protestors when the Tunisian revolution started to capture the 
attention of the Arab media, and more importantly the Arab people. This seemingly aimed to 
gain the solidarity and sympathy of the wider population of the region, and emphasise the 
Arab identity of the Tunisians, exporting the revolutionary action to the rest of the Arab World. 
Figure 6 Image of a Tunisian protestor during the Tunisian Revolution 
On a different note, Arab blogger Suby Raman (2012) insists that the well-known slogan aš-
šaᶜb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām (“the people demand the overthrow of the regime”) is, “[w]ithout a 
doubt, the central slogan of the Arab Spring.” Its significance, according to Raman (ibid), lies 
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in the fact that “in its language it speaks to a broader Arab polity, and not local demands.” 
Michel (2013: 29) asserts that, in effect, this chant “has been developed and re-appropriated 
in MSA and local dialects across the Middle East and North Africa” to suit different contexts 
and serve the various demands of the protestors across the Arab World. In Syria, following a 
brutal crackdown launched by the Syrian regime on peaceful protestors, the slogan was altered 
to aš-šaᶜb yurīd ḥimāya duwaliyya (“the people demand international protection”), as 
illustrated in the banner help up by a Syrian protestor in Figure 7.  
In Iraq where the Sunni population was subjected to discriminatory sectarian policies followed 
by the Shia-dominated government led by the then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the people 
of six predominantly Sunni provinces in the North and West of Iraq started a popular uprising 
late in 2012 against the government, chanting: aš-šaᶜb yurīd isqāṭ al-Mālikī (“the people 
demand the overthrow of al-Maliki”). Finally, in Lebanon, which is governed through a 
sectarian quota system, the chant was modified during a wave of protests starting from 
February 27, 2011, to fulfill the Lebanese people’s aspirations to overcome the sectarian 
divisions in the country: aš-šaᶜb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām aṭ-ṭā’ifī (“the people demand the 
overthrow of the sectarian system”). 
Figure 7 A banner help up by a Syrian protestor in the northern city of al-Bab: aš-šaᶜb yurīd ḥimāya 
duwaliyya (“the people demand international protection”) 
 
Some of the popular slogans during the Arab Spring were in fact originally part of the pro-
regime discourse and were then re-allocated by protestors using different wording to serve 
their agenda. They were used to articulate their demands whilst simultaneously mocking and 
undermining the discourse and propaganda of the political elites that supported the ruling 
regimes in the region. The slogan that dominated the Syrian revolution from the very 
beginning Allah, Sūriyya, ḥurriyyih, ū-bass (“Allah [God], Syria, freedom, only”) was in fact 
the revolutionaries’ response to a phrase that had always been chanted by Assad’s supporters: 
Allah, Sūriyya, Baššār, ū-bass (“Allah [God], Syria, Bashar, only”). Similarly, the protestors 
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chose to demonstrate their contempt for a slogan adopted by Assad’s supporters during his 
electoral campaign, namely minḥibbak (“we love you”). A counter-slogan was thus coined: 
mā minḥibbak, mā minḥibbak, irḥal ᶜannā inta ū-ḥizbak (“we do not love you; we do not love 
you; leave us alongside your party [a reference to the ruling al-Ba’ath Party]”). 
Gaddafi, though his infamous expression, zanqā zanqā dār dār (“lane, lane, house, house”), 
urged his supporters to pursue the revolutionaries from one “lane” to another, and from one 
“house” to another in order to crush the revolution. In response, the protestors chanted: zanqā 
zanqā dār dār, yā Qaḏḏāfī jibt al-ᶜār (“lane, lane, house, house; oh Gaddafi, you have brought 
disgrace along”), and zanqā zanqā dār dār, al-Qaḏḏāfī yabī xanqā (“lane, lane, house, house; 
Gaddafi needs to be hanged”). The use of Gaddafi’s infamous expression was not limited to 
the Libyans. Syrians also quoted Gaddafi, promising their autocrat Bashar Assad a similar 
fate: zanqā zanqā dār dār, badnā nšīlak yā Bašār (“lane, lane, house, house; we will topple 
you, Bashar”). Moreover, the revolutionary slogan bi-ar-rūḥ bi-ad-dam nanfīka yā ᶜ Alī (“with 
soul, with blood, we expel you, Ali”) was coined by the Yemeni protestors by changing only 
one word in a phrase used to demonstrate loyalty to the then Yemeni President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh, namely bi-ar-rūḥ bi-ad-dam nafdīka yā ᶜAlī (“with soul, with blood, we sacrifice for 
you, Ali”), thus reversing the entire meaning of the statement. 
Although the Egyptians chanted the common slogans shared with other Arab Spring 
revolutions, they proved to be creative and coined their own in light of the conditions 
associated with the Egyptian revolution. The Egyptian protestors, for instance, were frustrated 
by the reports circulated on Mubarak’s fortune estimated at 70 billion Egyptian Pounds. They 
thus created a slogan questioning their president about the source of his enormous wealth, 
since he served only as a pilot before he came to power: Mubārak yā ṭayyār, jibt mnīn sabᶜīn 
milyār (“pilot Mubarak, from where did you earn seventy billion”). Inspired by the success of 
the Tunisian revolution and exile of Tunisian President Ben Ali, the Egyptians urged Mubarak 
to follow Ben Ali and flee to the city of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia: Bin ᶜAlī bīnādīk, findu’ jadda 
mistannīk (“Bin Ali is calling you, Jeddah Hotel is awaiting you”). 
 
 
2.6 Chanting as Action 
The slogans chanted by protestors during the Arab Spring uprisings were intended to establish 
specific social and political demands. The poetics of these slogans, which often constituted 
couplets with a musical rhythm, are in fact as significant as their content. Colla (2011) points 
out the criticality of the “prosody of the revolt” in the Arab Spring; the language of the Arab 
Spring, represented by these couplet-slogans, express the spirit of revolt as well as reflect the 
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goals of the revolutionaries across the Arab World. In the streets and squares of Cairo, Sanaa, 
Tunis, Damascus, Hama, Ramadi, and Benghazi, the messages of the protestors were carried 
from their mouths and lexicons into action.  
Colla adds that protestors chanted couplet-slogans that were “loud” and “sharp” at the same 
time (ibid). This poetry was not merely “an ornament” to the revolution, but rather a genuine 
“soundtrack” that composed a “significant part of the action itself” (ibid). Poets and chanters 
therefore acted as action makers who shaped the new political and social realisation of the 
Arab World. Colla (ibid) emphasises the illocutionary nature of the chants of the revolutions, 
arguing that they go beyond complaints and aspirations, carrying messages that serve to fulfill 
the protestors’ social and political objectives. They are articulated in an artistic form reflecting 
the spirit of the uprising. 
The impact of couplet chanting during the Arab Spring does not only stem from the semantic 
value of the slogans and songs. Chants in the Arab Spring are often colloquial rather than 
classical or standard in register. They are thus easier to catch, remember and sing (ibid). Some 
slogans do not rhyme, but Colla maintains, “They can be sung and shouted by thousands of 
people in a unified, clear cadence,” which reveals why they succeeded in exerting the desired 
effect upon participants as well as listeners (ibid).  
Moreover, these chants were typically sung collectively, creating a tangible “sense of 
community that had not existed before” (ibid). They often mocked and criticised “feared 
public figures” such as presidents and prominent security and army officers, leaving an 
“immediate impact that cannot be explained in terms of language, for learning to laugh at 
one’s oppressor is a key part of unlearning fear” (ibid). Therefore, Colla concludes, it seems 
difficult to tell “whether the crowd sustained the words, or the words the crowd” (ibid). 
In June 2011, a few months after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, hundreds of thousands 
of protestors gathered in al-Asi Square in the central city of Hama almost every day. Syrian 
activist Ibrahim Qashoush led the protests, chanting slogans demanding the overthrow of the 
Syrian regime. Qashoush was not a “pop superstar,” according to a report by The Telegrpah, 
but he wrote and sang “the stand-out song of the Syrian uprising” (The Telegraph, July 2011). 
On an evening in late June, “Qashoush’s voice had soared over one of the crowds as some of 
the biggest protests yet in the Arab world came to the boil,” the report continues (ibid). 
Thousands of protestors chanted and echoed Qashoush’s invective song, satirising Assad and 
his regime. “But the singer paid the price for his fleeting fame … on Monday, according to a 
video that has circulated the country online, his body was found floating in the River Orontes 
in his home-town, Hama. His throat had been cut; in the footage, his head lolls horribly,” the 
report concludes (ibid). The following is an excerpt of Qashoush’s (2011) prominent song: 
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لايو لحرا اي لايو ؛راشب لحرا اي راشب. 
راشب ايو كنام انم. 
دوخ رهام لحراو انع. 
كتيعرش يهو تطقس انع. 
 لايو ؛راشب اي لحرا لايوراشب اي لحرا. 
اي راشب ايو باذك، 
برضت تنأ باطخلاهو. 
ةيرحلا تراص ىلع بابلا. 
لايو لحرا اي راشب اي لحرا لايو ؛راشب. 
رهام ايو ايو نابج، 
ايو ليمع ناكيرملأا، 
بعشلا يروسلا ناهنيب ام. 
لايو لحرا اي راشب اي لحرا لايو ؛راشب. 
اندبو وليشن راشبل انتمهبو ةيوقلا. 
ايروس ادب ايروس ؛ةيرح ادب ةيرح. 
لابو رهام لابو راشب ةباصعلاهو ةيجمهلا. 
ايروس ادب ايروس ؛ةيرح ادب .ةيرح 
[Time to leave, Oh Bashar! Time to leave, oh Bashar! 
Oh Bashar, you are not one of us. 
Take Maher [Bashar’s brother] and leave us. 
Here, your legitimacy has ended. 
Time to leave, oh Bashar! Time to leave, oh Bashar! 
Oh Bashar, you are a liar. 
To hell with you and your speech. 
Freedom is now at the door. 
Time to leave, oh Bashar! Time to leave, oh Bashar! 
Maher, you are a coward. 
You are the Americans’ agent. 
The Syrian people cannot be humiliated.  
Time to leave, oh Bashar! Time to leave, oh Bashar! 
We will remove Bashar with our strong will. 
Syria wants freedom! Syria wants freedom! 
Without Maher, and without Bashar and this savage gang. 
Syria wants freedom! Syria wants freedom!] 
As noted from the extract, the song is written in Syrian Colloquial Arabic, which makes it 
easier for Syrian protestors to understand, sing and recall. It also follows the couplet-pattern 
pointed by Colla, has a musical rhythm, and consists of sections composed of three lines 
ending with the same syllable. Each section is followed by a fixed line yallā irḥal yā Baššār, 
yallā irḥal yā Baššār (“time to leave, oh Bashar! Time to leave, oh Bashar!”), which is meant 
to be chanted by the protestors while the rest of the song is to be sung by the singer leading 
the demonstration. Qashoush’s song establishes the prominent demand of the Syrian 
revolution, namely ousting Assad and his clique. It ruthlessly satirises Bashar Assad and his 
brother Maher, who is believed to be the actual commander of the Syrian army. The last 
section of the excerpt is significant as it asserts the Syrian people’s determination to dispose 
of Assad and acquire full freedom. 
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2.7 Revolutionary Humour  
One of the approaches that explore the mechanism of humour is incongruity theory, which 
places emphasis upon the object of humour, perceiving it as a reaction to an incongruity. The 
end result is ambiguity and inconsistency. Incongruity theory attaches importance to the factor 
of surprise, conceiving humour as a conflict “between what is expected and what actually 
occurs”. Ambiguity is created in the form of utterances or statements with double meanings, 
often used purposely to misguide the audience, followed shortly by a “punchline” (Hassan, 
2013: 552).  
Hassan points out three elements that often exist in a humorous discourse: first, a conflict 
between what the audience expect from a joke and what the joke actually attempts to say; 
second, a linguistic ambiguity with two dimensions of meaning, namely semantic and/or 
pragmatic meaning; and third, a punchline that concludes the joke and resolves the conflict 
(ibid). Hassan also draws a clear distinction between two types of humour: “While jokes are 
context-free and neutral forms of humor, irony is a context-bound and aggressive form of 
humor” (ibid).  
Semantic theory of humour is another approach, concerned with the semantic aspect of 
humour. According to Raskin (1985: 58) a joke is much more semantically effective in an 
environment where both humour producers and audience share not only a set of convictions 
about the mechanism through which language operates, but also a similar, even identical sense 
of humour. This cognitive approach to humour, which is referred to by Raskin as “a 
mechanical symbol-manipulation device” (ibid), which correlates with the principle of 
linguistic competence suggested by Chomsky, since it focuses on the significance of an ideal 
relationship between humour producers and receivers (Chomsky, 1965: 3). Jokes are typically 
open to two possible interpretations, thus creating a degree of incongruity. They need to be 
surprising, original and rule breaking in order to exert the desired impact. Hay (2001: 67) adds 
that humour is only effective when it can be recognised, understood, and thus appreciated. 
Mulkay (1988) identifies two modes of speech: the serious mode and humorous mode. In the 
serious mode, speech participants conceive the world from the same perspective and thus 
assume that others also share this view of the world. In this respect, participants sharply 
distinguish between what is real and what is not. Anything that contradicts this distinction is 
conceived as problematic and thus regarded as a “failure in communication” (Hassan, 2013: 
554). In the humorous mode, contradictions are not considered as problems since the resulting 
incongruity is intentional and serves a specific goal (Mulkay, 1988: 30). People resort to 
humour when they face a reality that contradicts what they expect.  
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In the political domain, humour is employed by activists, political actors or even regular 
citizens to highlight political changes or to foresee and demand further changes (Hassan, 2013: 
554). According to Sorensen (2008: 171) “humour changes the situation because however 
serious the message is, it has a hint of ‘Don’t take me seriously,’ and ‘I am not dangerous.’” 
During the Arab Spring, the protestors used humour to influence the rest of the nation by 
making political jokes that would make people laugh whilst simultaneously urging them to 
reflect upon their demands regarding the future of their country. In fact, humour can cause 
amusement due to lack of congruity, but may also turn things upside down and exert serious 
changes. Brigham (2005) maintains that through absurdity, new insights can be reached and 
vital discoveries about the surrounding reality can be made. 
Hobbes states that humour is typically perceived as a sort of mockery that takes the form of 
attacking others verbally; this usually aims to draw moral support from the audience who 
laugh at the jokes, thus maintaining power and status (cited in Ross, 1998: 53). Superiority 
theory views humour as a sort of attack within a conflict over power among groups in a given 
society (Hassan, 2013: 554), typically utilised by regular citizens to criticise political and 
economic elites. Ross (1998: 59) suggests that humour often targets men of authority, and 
influential individuals and institutions. In this context, it is employed by the victim to fight 
back and resist the oppressor, using language as their weapons against power, status, and 
money. The statement shown on the banner carried by an Egyptian protestor during the 
January 25th Revolution in Figure 8 reflects the humour employed by the Egyptians to mock 
Mubarak (Ghaleb, 2015). The sign fairly translates into English as “Hitler committed suicide 
– you can do it”. Dark humour is employed to urge Mubarak to kill himself as an exit from 
his critical situation following the outbreak of the revolution. 
Figure 8 A banner held up by an Egyptian protestor in Tahrir Square during the January 25th 
Revolution 
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In protests held in democratic countries, demonstrators have considerable freedom to express 
their demands without fear. By contrast, the protestors of the Arab Spring were subject to 
ruthless repression and, in fact, had only words to face the regime’s brutality. However, they 
developed creative methods to overcome their fear; humour liberated them from the fear that 
had developed inside for many years of suppression: “fear of the sacred, of prohibitions, of 
the past, of power” (Bakhtin, 1984: 94). According to Relief theory, which seeks to provide 
explanations for the role of laughter in fighting brutality, humour is a result of an inner conflict 
within an individual.  
Sigmund Freud and Herbert Spencer viewed humour expressed by a victim as a relieving 
mechanism that discharges inner power resulting from the “arrested feelings” generated by 
suppression. It is transformed into a verbal act carried out by “the muscular system” in the 
absence of any other possible outlets (Spencer, 1860/1987: 108-109). Freud (1960) believed 
that jokes could be used as an “aggressive” method to break down and cross social and 
political barriers to violate rigid taboos in a society. The humour contained in the revolutionary 
discourse produced and communicated by the protestors during the Arab Spring targeted the 
Arab autocrats and their regimes. Freud states that “by making our enemy small, inferior, 
despicable or comic, we achieve in a roundabout way the enjoyment of overcoming him” 
(Freud, 1960: 103). The protestors aimed to humiliate the Arab dictators by means of humour. 
The banner shown in Figure 9 is an apt example: 
Figure 9 An Egyptian protestor during the January 25th Revolution 
.)كرابم( مد سيك هليرتشن هينجب ولو عربتا 
[Donate one Egyptian pound to buy him (Mubarak) a blood bag.] 
The Egyptians demonstrated for three weeks asking for the overthrow of the regime without 
the slightest indication that Mubarak would yield to their legitimate demands. The Egyptian 
83 
 
protestor shown in Figure 9 implies that Mubarak is in urgent need of blood, a reference in 
the Arab culture to thick-headed, cold-blooded people who are slow and lack emotion.  
When freedom of expression and political opinion is prohibited under repressive regimes, 
political humour is adopted as a defence mechanism against people in power who practise 
authority and silence and suppress the nation. A single joke told by a protestor, Larsen (180: 
105) argues, turns to a “rebellion” against dictatorship, aimed at reclaiming public freedoms. 
Raskin (1985: 222–246) differentiates between two types of political jokes: denigration jokes 
and exposure jokes. The former aims to denigrate a certain politician or political party, 
representing them as corrupt, repressive, hated or unpopular. An example of this type is the 
banner shown in Figure 10, which portrays Syrian autocrat Assad and Russian President 
Vladimir Putin having an affair, pointing out that their relationship will only lead to the end 
of the Syrian regime (Kafranbel Banners, Dec 2012). The latter, on the other hand, seeks to 
expose the shortcomings and disadvantages of a certain politician or political regime by 
speaking out against the injustices they cause. They highlight arrests, lack of public freedoms, 
and collective punishment policy. The banner held up by Syrian protestors in Figure 11, for 
instance, criticises the UN mission in Syria and exposes its inability and failure to protect 
Syrian civilians from getting killed by the Assad regime (Kafranbel Banners, May 2012). 
Figure 10 Protestors from the Syrian city of Kafranbel carrying a banner that portrays the 
relationship between the Syrian regime and Russia 
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Figure 11 Protestors from the Syrian city of Kafranbel holding a banner with a picture suggesting 
that UN envoys in Syria are careless about civilian lives 
Dascal (1985: 96) stresses the significance of indirectness of humour and “the existence of 
socio-pragmatic devices that make it possible.” He points out three levels of meaning: first, 
sentence meaning, i.e. comprehending what the speaker says; second, utterance meaning, i.e. 
understanding what the speaker’s words mean in a given context; and third, speaker’s 
meaning, which refers to the speaker’s intention behind making a certain statement in that 
particular context (1985: 98).  For Dascal (1985), the speaker’s intended meaning is regarded 
as direct when it matches the utterance meaning. However, it is seen as indirect when it differs 
from the utterance meaning. In this case, the audience should rely on the cues found in the 
context to be able to form a pragmatic interpretation of the speaker’s words.  
This indirectness is often found in humorous discourse; a joke teller tends to implicitly refer 
to the intended meaning behind their words, as Dascal asserts (ibid); if the joke is made 
explicit, and thus the meaning direct, the speaker may be subject to undesired social or political 
pressure. In this case, the speaker’s words will be subject to the audience’s interpretation rather 
than the speaker’s: “The listener construes that interpretation in the course of hearing the joke, 
and expects the rest of the story will confirm … [their] interpretation. The comic effect arises 
when an alternative, non-favoured and therefore non-expected interpretation is revealed, at 
the punch line, as the correct one” (ibid: 97). 
To conclude, the humour produced by the protestors during the Arab Spring represented an 
act of resistance to the power exerted by the Arab autocrats. This sort of resistance, though 
verbal by nature and subject to cultural and social considerations, was as effective as physical 
resistance. When the Arab people realised that the conventional legal and political channels 
could not restore public freedoms or achieve the desired political change they resorted to 
protest through humour as one of the revolutionary tools. They utilised humour to claim and 
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demand democracy; they occupied the streets and made fun of those whom they had feared 
for years. 
 
2.8 Counter-Revolutionary Discourse 
The revolutionary discourse produced and communicated by protestors and activists during 
the Arab Spring was faced by a counter-revolutionary rhetoric adopted primarily by the ruling 
regimes and their intelligence services. This was widely circulated by official media outlets 
run by government. In some cases, businessmen who benefited from corruption and thus 
remained fiercely loyal to the regime, as in the case of Egypt, spread pro-regime propaganda. 
That being said, ordinary citizens who were misled by the narrative of the regime played their 
part too. 
In Syria, al-mu’ayyidīn (“Assad’s loyalists”) adopted the official political discourse of the 
Syrian regime. They aimed to defame the revolution, demonise the protestors and delegitimise 
the revolutionary action. The revolutionaries were described as mundassīn (“infiltrators”) who 
belonged to foreign countries or were funded and supported by international and regional 
intelligence services to create domestic conflicts in the country. They were called ᶜarāᶜīr 
(“Aroor-ists”), i.e. followers of Sheikh Adnan al-Aroor, a Saudi-based Syrian Salafist cleric 
who supported the Syrian revolution from the very beginning. The loyalists described the 
Syrian revolution as fawra, a sudden irrational uprising that would soon fade away, and ṯawra 
ṭa’ifiyya (“a sectarian revolution”) conducted by the Sunni majority, targeting minorities. The 
following is an extract from a song composed and performed by the pro-revolutionary music 
band, Firqat al-Mundassīn As-Suriyyīn al-Fanniyya (“Syrian Infiltrators Music Band”). The 
song mocks the regime’s counter-revolutionary discourse (Firqat al-Mundassīn As-Suriyyīn, 
2011): 
ني سدنم انع اولاق؛ 
نيبرخم انع اولاق؛ 
نيحلسم انع اولاق؛ 
نييفلس انع اولاق؛ 
..اولاق امايو انع اولاق 
 ..اولوقي ويسنو.نييروس 
[They have said we are infiltrators. 
They have said we are vandals. 
They have said we are gunmen. 
They have said we are Salafists. 
They have said that about us; they have always said that. 
Yet they have forgotten to say we are Syrians.] 
On many occasions, pro-regime media outlets used derogatory language to attack dissenting 
voices as well as anyone who dared to criticise the Syrian regime. In an interview aired on 
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Addounia TV, on June 29, 2011, Ali al-Shuaibi, a pro-regime political analyst and 
commentator, launched a scathing attack on the Arab media channels covering the news 
related to the Syrian revolution, accusing their owners and reporters of being ‘homosexuals’ 
(al-Shuaibi, 2011): 
.ةانقلا هذهب ثدحتي نمك ،يطول ةانقلا هذه كلمي نم نأ فرعأ ،ةقيقحلا فرعأ انأ 
[I know the truth; I know that the owner of that channel [al-Arabiya TV] is a sodomite 
(homosexual), just like all the people talking on this channel.] 
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in an interview broadcast on al-Jazeera TV on 
January 1, 2013, also described the slogans chanted by the Iraqi protestors in the Western 
governorate of al-Anbar as natinah (“rotten”), asserting that the uprising in Iraq is just a 
fuqāᶜah (“a bubble”) that would soon burst. He warned the demonstrators that the cabinet 
might decide to use force to put an end to the demonstrations (al-Maliki, Jan 2013): 
 نأ لبق اوهتنإ مهل لوقن نحنو ... يهتنتس ةعاقف هذه ... عفرت يتلا تاراعشلا ةنتن.ةموكحلا ةدارإب او هُنت 
[Rotten are the slogans that are used … This is a bubble and it will end … We say to 
them: Finish before you are finished by the government’s will.] 
The Arab regimes seemed to adopt the same helpless counter-discourse. They employed 
groundless accusations and false allegations to attack the protestors in an attempt to defend 
their legitimacy. In his first speech after the outbreak of the Libyan Revolution, Gaddafi (Feb 
2011) claimed that the protestors in his country were actually jurḏān (“rats”) acting under the 
influence of drugs which were given to them by foreign countries. Gaddafi affirmed that he 
was a global leader who had the support of millions around the world, including Allah 
(“God”), who granted him victory against super-powers in previous events. Those millions, 
he continued, would march and cross the deserts from inside and outside Libya to “purify” the 
country and dispose of his opponents (ibid). 
In fact, the factor that made the counter-revolutionary discourse weak, shallow, and irrational 
is that it did not really address the essence of the problem in the Arab countries, namely the 
absence of free democratic life and repression of public freedoms. The discourse did not focus 
on political issues or the status of public liberties, or even provide solutions to the economic 
problems suffered by citizens. Instead, it used derogatory language, sexual insinuations, and 
unfounded accusations of foreign support. 
Opposition parties, civil activists and protestors broke down the barrier of fear and 
demonstrated in the streets, calling for a better future in which they could have a decent life. 
In many cases, the counter-revolutionaries tried to legitimise the existence of the regime 
through the claim that it was the defender of minorities’ rights against extremists or that it was 
facing an international conspiracy made and led by the West and Israel. The discourse 
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represented a state of denial, reflecting the absence of a genuine willingness on the part of the 
regimes to make meaningful changes to the political and economic situation, improve the 
living conditions of the people, or fight corruption.  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
The Arab Spring showed that language can make change; words can sometimes replace 
weapons and protestors can act like soldiers in the field of political conflict on the path to 
democratic transition. The role of language in the Arab uprisings took different forms and was 
implemented in different ways. The internet was essential in shaping and communicating the 
revolutionary discourse produced by the protestors. The protestors proved to be highly 
creative in expressing their demands verbally through various genres of discourse, such as 
chants, slogans, banners and political jokes to criticise the Arab dictators. The following 
chapter aims to examine the relationship between language and politics as well as the influence 
of the political views of translators and patrons on the translation process, from the perspective 
of Critical Discourse Analysis. 
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CHAPTER THRHEE 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE: ANALYSIS AND TRANSLATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed, the various forms of revolutionary language used during the Arab Spring led to 
crucial change at political, social, and linguistic levels. It is now essential to examine the 
relationship between a number of issues pertaining to the subject of this research study, namely 
politics, political discourse, language, and translation. This chapter discusses these concepts 
in detail using illustrative and representative examples from political discourse communicated 
during the Arab Spring and its aftermath. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first investigates political discourse, 
differentiating between text and discourse, and politics and political discourse. It lists features 
and types of political discourse, concluding with discussions on revolutionary discourse, 
which has particular significance for this thesis. The second section attempts to analyse 
political discourse on the basis of two methods: first, detecting political tools employed in 
political discourse; and second, critical discourse analysis. The third section establishes a 
connection between political discourse analysis and translation at both micro and macro 
levels. The theories introduced and discussed in this chapter will be used to analyse the data 
derived from the Syrian revolution in Section 7.3 of Chapter Seven. 
 
3.2 Political Discourse 
This section makes a clear distinction between different concepts, namely text, discourse, 
politics, and political discourse. It also explores features and strategies of political discourse 
and examines its genres and types. The section concludes with introducing and studying 
‘revolutionary discourse’, listing various examples from the Arab politics since the outbreak 
of the Arab Spring. 
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3.2.1 Text and Discourse 
Discourse is a broad term that has a variety of definitions. It carries a wide range of meanings 
in various fields (Titscher et al., 2000: 42). In concrete terms, ‘discourse’ can refer to a 
particular concept in Linguistics, yet indicates a different notion in Sociology or Philosophy. 
In Linguistics, the term discourse is quite vague and does not seem to have a clear usage. 
Some linguists, such as van Dijk (1997a, 1997b), define discourse as a single spoken event, 
or several related utterances or texts communicated in one area of activity. Others perceive 
discourse from an ideological and political perspective. The discourse of socialism, for 
example, is not restricted to one single communicative interaction but rather indicates a list of 
connected concepts, beliefs, and ideologies (Trosborg, 1997: 4). On the other hand, a text, for 
Fairclough (2003: 24), is a single instance of language, while a group of texts that are 
employed in a specific situation to serve specific agenda are referred to as genre. 
Hatim and Mason (1990: 71) offer a simple definition of discourse as a mode of talking and 
thinking, whereas Fairclough (1989: 24) seems to give a more sophisticated and detailed 
definition of the term as “the whole process of interaction of which a text is just a part.” For 
his part, van Dijk sees “discourse” as “data that is liable for empiric analysis” (cited in Titscher 
et al, 2000: 44). Therefore, this term can be used to indicate the entire process of social 
interaction, while text constitutes only a component of this process. A discourse adopted by a 
particular political party thus includes all statements, press releases, and speeches produced 
by the party and its officials. A single statement issued by the party, on the other hand, is 
considered as a text. 
Bell (1991: 163) makes a clear distinction between text and discourse. On the one hand, he 
views “text” as “the formal product of selections of options from the theme systems of the 
grammar;” a unit that has the semantic sense of proposition through sentences that are 
coherently and cohesively connected (ibid). On the other hand, he defines “discourse” as a 
“communicative event that draws on the meaning potential of the language” (ibid). Along with 
other methods of communication, it carries “communicative value of speech act by means of 
utterances” that are coherently and cohesively connected (ibid). 
Governments, political parties, opposition forces, institutions, and even individuals use 
discourse in this sense to express themselves and convince audiences by means of language. 
Discourse is used for emphasising power and demonstrating knowledge, as well as resistance 
and critique. As part of their adopted discourse, a speaker conveys their intended message 
through texts that represent their ideology. Adopting a particular linguistic form is unlikely to 
be a live process for the speaker; they, however, reproduce a previously learned discourse by 
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using new texts. Texts are carefully chosen systemised syntactic forms whose “content-
structure” represents and serves the ideology and agenda of the speaker in the context of a 
previously approved discourse (Dellinger, 1995).  
From a semantic perspective, a text can constitute a specific unity of meaning, usually 
consisting of a number of sentences. Each sentence is considered a linguistic unity and so are 
morphemes, lexemes, syntagma, etc. However, all the unities that share and make one 
complete and cohesive meaning constitute what is called a text. M.A.K. Halliday (1987: 136) 
defines ‘text’ as a semantic unit that contains a group of textual elements that are mutually 
cohesive. They serve “as a whole as the relevant environment for the operation of the theme 
and information system” (ibid). According to Halliday, these textual elements define the 
“channels and modes” through which a message or meaning is conveyed. In other words, it 
can be said that the textual elements of a given text determine its nature and type (ibid). 
In this study, the term discourse will refer to a set of verbal and written events produced and 
communicated in the context of a specific area of social science. It will indicate the whole 
process of interaction, of which a text is just one part. 
 
3.2.2 Politics and Political Discourse 
Having defined both text and discourse, illustrating the differences between the two concepts 
in terms of implication and usage, it is important to draw a significant distinction between 
another pair of terms in relation to the subject of this thesis: politics and political discourse. 
Chilton (2004: 3) argues that politics can be seen in two ways. It can be a clash over power, 
between people who work to keep and enhance their authority and people who work to defend 
themselves against it. Alternatively, it can be a form of “cooperation” among institutions in a 
specific society to solve troubles that are manifested as a result of conflict over interests, 
money, authority, etc. Bassnett and Schäffner (2010: 2) agree with Chilton’s definition, further 
stating that studies related to politics have often established a link between politics and power. 
Politics is viewed as a struggle to gain power and impose a specific political, economic, or 
social agenda. For Beard (2000), politics refers to individuals as well as institutions and their 
efforts to take the lead in society, rather than merely activities carried out through political 
parties. 
Hudson (1978: 2) views politics from a passive and philosophical perspective, defining it as 
“the science and the art of government; the science” that deals with the “form, organization, 
and administration of a state or part of one, and with the regulation of its relation with other 
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states.” This is in addition to political principles, values, practices, convictions, and opinions 
of a party or individual. Roberts (1971) argues that the term ‘politics’ can describe both an 
activity and the study of that particular activity. Politics, as an activity, is a process that takes 
place in a social context that may exceed the national level. It aims to solve challenges and 
problems in the public domain by using political authority. It usually involves activities carried 
out by various groups that share their concerns on public issues related to society. Some of 
these groups are of a specifically political nature, such as political parties. 
Connolly (1983: 12-13) identifies a list of elements that are associated with politics:  
 Policies powered by the authority of law 
 Actions performed as a response to a specific decision 
 Factors that make individuals involved in a process, preferring one available option 
to others 
 Decisions that affect the interests of a certain group of the population, whether a 
majority or minority – if the consequences resulting from a decision are intended to, 
or already are, anticipated by decision makers, the action made is considered to be 
more political than if they are not. If the consequences affect a smaller number of 
people for a shorter time, then the action is said to have a less political nature. 
Burkhardt (1996) makes a distinction between “communicating about politics,” (referring to 
a conversation or random chat among ordinary people about a political issue or incident), 
political discourse communicated in media outlets, and “political communication” (i.e. 
discourse occurring in political institutions such as political parties, parliaments, and 
governments) (cited in Bassnett and Schäffner, 2010: 2-3). Burkhardt (1996) then makes a 
clear distinction between two genres of discourse occurring within political institutions: one 
that is originally produced by, and directed at, politicians and policy-makers, and another that 
is structured to demonstrate, explain, and justify political actions that are already carried out 
by policy-makers and directed at the general audience and public opinion (ibid). 
In order to understand the two notions of politics and political discourse, it is useful to define 
the relevant terms. The term political system is widely used by actors and theorists in the 
domain of politics and political discourse. Political systems are often based on one or more of 
the following political ideologies: communism, socialism, dictatorship, liberalism, 
democracy, fascism, or social democracy. Most nations are governed by one of these political 
systems. By definition, a political system may refer to “the organization and distribution of 
power and the principles of decision making” (ibid: 16). Having defined political system, it is 
essential to highlight a closely connected notion: political ideology. While a political system 
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represents the social and economic framework whereby power is exercised, a political 
ideology represents the socio-cognitive basis and intellectual grounds of this system. It is the 
basic beliefs, values, and dogmas that “underlie and organize the shared social representations 
of groups and their members” (ibid). In this sense, socialism, for instance, is the political 
ideology that provides the intellectual and dogmatic foundation of a socialist political system.  
Van Dijk (1997c: 17) also differentiates between three closely related, yet distinct, political 
notions: political institution, political organisation, and political group. While a political 
institution aims to analyse and organise political life, participants, and events (e.g. cabinet, 
Parliament, ministries, etc.), a political organisation aims to effectively structure political 
action (e.g. political parties, action groups, lobbies, etc.). However, a political group typically 
involves activists who work outside political organisations. It may be formed by a number of 
political activists and is usually a less formal, cohesive, and constant entity aimed at achieving 
a political objective or expressing an oppositional view, such as protestors, dissidents, 
coalitions, etc. 
Political relations and political process are two central terms used to describe politics and 
political discourse or any relevant notions. Political process is the umbrella term that underlies 
a complex history of political actions and activities. Aspects of political process involve ruling, 
legislation, opposition, and policy making. However, the notion that expresses relationships 
between different structural units in the domain of politics is referred to as political relations. 
Van Dijk (1997c: 17) maintains that political relations typically “define how the State relates 
to its citizens, or how certain political groups are positioned relative to others.” 
Van Dijk (1997c: 18) describes political discourse as a “prominent” way to perform politics. 
In addition to parliamentary debates, constitutional terms, laws, government and state 
regulations, and other institutional forms of ‘text and talk’, political discourse may involve 
propaganda campaigns, political manifestos, political speeches, news broadcasts, newspaper 
articles, and public political debates (ibid). Van Dijk (ibid) identifies political discourse 
through its actors or authors, namely, politicians. In fact, most research studies conducted on 
political discourse focus on the text and talk of professional actors in the field of politics and 
political institutions. These include presidents, ministers, high-ranking government officials, 
members of Parliament, and leaders of political parties, whether within the arena of internal 
politics or at the international level (ibid: 12). 
Van Dijk (ibid: 13) defines politicians as individuals who receive a salary for performing their 
political duties, and those elected or appointed to play central roles in the state. Although they 
are seen as creators and communicators of political discourse and other forms of political 
performance, politicians are not the sole agents in the political field. Many other participants 
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can take part in political activities in society, such as voters, citizens, demonstrators, and other 
public groups and social classes that take part in events occurring in the public sphere and 
political arena (ibid). 
Thus, it is not only government officials, ministers, leaders of political parties and other 
politicians and decision-makers who can take part in the political process. Political activity 
also includes people such as members of action groups and lobbies, human rights activists, 
and dissidents, along with their organisations and institutions. The political participation of 
such activists is often manifested through either making or commenting on political discourse 
(ibid). Hence, accurate definitions of both politics and political discourse should involve the 
performance of such participants in the political process. 
An additional method of identifying the nature of politics and thus political discourse is 
through the examination of political activities related to political text and talk. This is more 
accurate than simply focusing on the agents involved in the political process and production 
of political discourse. In other words, politicians are not always necessarily involved in 
political discourse; this also applies to other participants in the process, such as voters, or even 
members of lobbies and activist movements. However, these individuals and institutions are 
effectively involved in shaping the political discourse only when performing as political 
actors. Therefore, they contribute politically only when participating in events of a political 
nature, such as ruling, legislating, demonstrating, voting, debating, participating in opposition 
activities, and so on and so forth (ibid: 14). Accordingly, they are not classified as participants 
in political discourse when they carry out non-political activities related to other aspects of 
personal or public life. Similarly, van Dijk (ibid: 13) notes that any definition of political 
discourse should exclude the actions of politicians that are not of a political nature. At the 
same time, the discourse of all other non-political groups, organisations, or individuals should 
be included, as long as they tackle political issues. 
Chilton and Schäffner (1997) describe political discourse as “a complex form of human 
activity” that depends on the fact that politics cannot be performed without language. People 
employ language to communicate ideas to one another in order to share knowledge on 
different topics. People belong to different social classes and each social class or community 
has its own values and beliefs that are represented by a unique usage of language. Language 
is closely linked with culture, which is in turn associated with the game of politics in any given 
society (Chilton and Schäffner, 2002: 8).  
Language can therefore be seen as a political act that discloses people’s ideas and ideologies 
(Joseph, 2004: 348). It reflects social structure and gives a background to geographical and 
social classifications and political affiliations. This might be represented by linguistic 
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characteristics such as accent, dialect, and lexical and syntactic expressions. Nevertheless, 
language itself is neutral and does not have a political or social orientation, but the way it is 
used by speakers usually identifies certain ideas or beliefs.  
Chilton and Schäffner (1997: 206) associate politics with language, claiming that the former 
cannot be practised without the latter. Greek philosophers considered the art of rhetoric and 
verbal persuasion as a political activity that is to be employed in political practice. Chilton and 
Schäffner’s proposition that politics cannot be isolated from language was initially established 
by Thomas Hobbes, the founder of modern political science in the 17th century, and then 
developed by scholars like Orwell (1946), Wittgenstein (1953), and Searle (1969), who 
demonstrated that language itself has the power of action.  
In his article, ‘Politics and the English Language,’ George Orwell established a strong 
correlation between politics and language in terms of human behaviour: 
People dislike one thing and want to express solidarity with another, but they are not 
interested in the detail of what they are saying. You can shirk it by simply throwing your 
mind open and letting the ready-made phrases come crowding in. They will construct 
your sentences for you, even think your thoughts for you to a certain extent and at need 
they will perform the important service of partially concealing your meaning even from 
yourself. It is at this point that the special connection between politics and the debasement 
of language becomes clear. 
(Orwell, 1946: 160) 
Chilton (2004: 14) also links politics with language by describing language as war with words. 
Politicians always find themselves in a struggle with language. Whether the challenge lies in 
the choice of words or the choice of language, language has always proved instrumental in 
performing politics: from the very basic level of phrasing and wording to major issues of 
national language policy (ibid). Whether the aim of politics is the struggle over power, or 
cooperation to maintain peace and solve problems within society, ruling elites and opposition 
forces utilise language to achieve their goals and impose their agenda. Therefore, the study of 
language and politics aims at comprehending the role played by linguistic communication in 
social units’ mechanism of action. It also aims to analyse how social units influence, model, 
form, and delineate features of language itself (Joseph, 2004: 347). 
 
3.2.3 Features and Strategies of Political Discourse 
In order to develop a meaningful understanding of political discourse, three notions should be 
examined: space, time, and modality. These three notions are said to constitute the corner-
stone of human conceptualisation of the universe. Through them, people view and judge 
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objects, individuals and events around them. In other words, human beings tend to rely in their 
assessment of all events, people, behaviours, places, and phenomena that they come across on 
their closeness or remoteness to them. In this respect, the “Self” evaluates the “Other” 
according to their judgement of the distance between the two (Chilton, 2004). 
Space represents the most essential factor among the three as it contributes to the other two 
factors. The notion of space has two aspects: material and metaphorical. The material 
dimension can be manifested through the proposition that one of the main political concerns 
is the allocation and control of valuable resources, whether through cooperation or struggle 
(Chilton, 2004: 58). Disputes over natural resources such as oil and gas have triggered many 
wars throughout history; the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, the 1991 Second Gulf War, and the 
2003 American Invasion of Iraq are three examples.  
The strategic significance of the natural resources of the Gulf area has caused the 
aforementioned wars that have had extremely important geopolitical consequences for the 
region. However, intangible proximities can be much more significant than the physical ones. 
For example, to the Arab Kuwaitis, Qataris, and Saudis, Algeria may be closer than a 
neighbouring country like Iran due to sharing the same language, religion, and culture. This 
cultural closeness manifested itself in the example of the World Cup 2014 held in Brazil when 
many Saudis and Qataris supported the Algerian team and neglected the Iranian presence in 
the competition.  
Secondly, the notion of time is closely associated with the concept of “historical periodisation” 
(ibid: 56). In the context of political discourse, deictic terms such as yesterday, tomorrow, 
before the war, etc., work as an “anchoring point” according to which other events are 
evaluated and measured (ibid). While now or today mark the heart of the perception of the 
timeline, where the Self is located, others are considered close or remote depending on their 
distance from the centre – namely the Self (ibid: 58). This notion is manifested in political 
discourse through expressions such as the change is close, or the glorious past of the nation is 
still present. The latter expression, for example, illustrates the ideology of many Islamist 
parties and groups in the Arab World. In the context of the Syrian revolution, this concept 
explains political views/anticipations expressed mainly by opposition forces and anti-Assad 
regional and international powers. Examples include: The days of Assad are numbered, and 
the collapse of the Assad regime has become very close. 
Chilton (2004: 59) links the notion of modality with the concept of reality and morality, or 
what he calls “discourse ontologies.” Human beings’ views about the surrounding 
environment seem to range between certainty and doubt, possibility and necessity, vagueness 
and intelligibility. Fairclough (2003: 165) associates modality with binaries such as 
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“permission and obligation,” employing them in the field of politics by urging the ruling elites 
to be faithful to the people and “commit themselves to truth claims” regarding the 
conceptualisation of these binaries (ibid: 167). 
Chilton’s employment of the three notions of space, time and modality in the study of political 
discourse has proved extremely instrumental. It provides an explanation of the perspective 
whereby people tend to conceptualise and examine the surrounding environment, considering 
the Self as the centre of the universe. Meanwhile, more importance is attached to those events 
and things that are closer to the self. Politicians and other participants in political discourse 
can employ this concept. They can easily manipulate the discourse they adopt to persuade the 
audience of the policies and political decisions they take, making these views sound familiar 
to the public to avoid potential oppositional voices. Politicians can utilise these notions to 
create techniques and strategies to mislead and manipulate public opinion to guarantee general 
support in their quest to gain legitimacy. Meanwhile, those manipulated remain unaware of 
this lingua-political scheme. 
Political actors can take advantage of four strategic functions suggested by Chilton and 
Schäffner (1997): coercion, resistance, dissimulation, and legitimation/delegitimation. 
Research studies conducted on political discourse have shown that politicians tend to employ 
these functions in order to make their discourse more appealing and convincing to ordinary 
people.  
The first function of political text and talk, highlighted by analysts, is coercion. Coercion 
literally means forcing people to comply with imposed orders, leaving them with no option 
but to obey and cooperate. Politicians, especially those in power, such as ministers, presidents, 
and government officials, often use speech acts in a coercive manner to give the impression 
to the public that they have to accept the content of the discourse (ibid: 212). Ruling elites in 
some countries also use restrictive methods to limit access to information from international 
media outlets, conducting a sort of censorship and control over the press, the internet and 
media outlets run by the opposition. This is common in China, for instance, and in the Arab 
Spring countries where the state imposed strict censorship on the press. In such countries, the 
state closely control information exchanged through the internet, even blocking news websites 
and activists’ blogs, leaving the people with no choice but to listen to the official rhetoric 
communicated through media outlets owned and run by the state. 
In response to coercive procedures by regimes and governments, opposition forces and 
political activists make use of a function called resistance and protest. It is defined by Chilton 
and Schäffner (2007: 212) as a counter-strategy where opposition forces express their 
oppositional attitudes to government policies, and actions. This strategy manifests itself 
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through the use of appeals, petitions, graffiti drawings, and posters. In some cases, opposition 
forces mobilise the masses and organise protests and demonstrations by inventing slogans and 
carrying banners that express their demands and reflect their political opinions (ibid). This 
strategy was notably followed by the Arab activists, who used the internet and social media 
networks to incite the public to take part in demonstrations aimed at toppling the ruling 
regimes in the Arab Spring countries.  
Dissimulation is another strategy adopted by politicians and governments to control the flow 
of information. The aim is to deprive the public of certain sources of information that may 
constitute a threat to the politicians concerned. This strategy also involves denial, hiding 
evidence, secrecy, and lying in order to mislead public opinion and deceive the people (ibid: 
213). The ruling regimes in the Arab Spring countries often sought to deny potential corruption 
allegations against high-ranking officials in the state, blocking information on the fortunes 
enjoyed by the narrow circle surrounding a president. False reports would be made for fake 
military victories, achievements, and reform moves carried out by the government. 
Competition between political parties often leads to mutual endeavours of (de)legitimation in 
order to legitimise their own actions and policies, whilst undermining the legitimacy of rival 
powers and movements. Politicians use the tactic of legitimation, employing manipulative 
techniques to emphasise the needs and values of society (ibid). The Assad regime in Syria, for 
instance, has sought to legitimise its existence by claiming to be a secular political system and 
a protector of minorities in the face of extreme Islamists. The plan has always been to gain 
international support and legitimacy. On the other hand, delegitimation is used as a counter-
strategy, aimed at offering a negative presentation of rival movements to deprive them of 
public support (ibid). Former Egyptian President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak, for instance, 
accused the revolutionary activists during the January 25th Revolution of serving the agenda 
of the Muslims Brotherhood movement. Similarly, the Syrian regime claimed that the 
protestors that called for the overthrow of the regime, starting from March 2011, were in fact 
a group of mundassīn (“infiltrators”) serving foreign agenda. 
Kharma (1997: 274) lists two features of the discourse adopted by politicians as well as other 
actors involved in political activities. First, political discourse is often rich in “clichés” that 
serve the function of euphemism, and metaphors (ibid). Politicians tend to use soft expressions 
when referring to hot topics that might cause diplomatic crises and political embarrassment if 
talked about openly or mentioned by name. Second, political discourse can be made 
deliberately ambiguous, opening the door for multiple interpretations. This ambiguity is not 
arbitrary; rather it is intended to shuffle the cards or send different messages to different 
parties. These two features suggested by Kharma apply specifically to politicians’ speeches. 
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By contrast, other types of political discourse, such as agreements, treaties and other political 
texts communicated at the level of international relations require a high degree of clarity and 
accuracy to avoid misinterpretations that may lead to international conflicts and disputes. 
 
3.2.4 Genres and Types of Political Discourse 
Having examined features of political discourse as suggested by Kharma (1997), the question 
of political discourse typology arises. In fact, in order to investigate this issue, it is important 
first to look into text types in general. Texts can be viewed from various angles and thus can 
be classified into different types depending on the reader’s perspective. Based on the subject 
of a text, texts may fall into the following categories: political, economic, social, religious, 
business, literary, legal, legislative, research-related, administrative, educational, journalistic, 
scientific, and so on (Slype et al, 1984: 36). However, these categories may overlap, so a single 
text may fall into more than one of the categories indicated above. As such, a literary text 
might be tackling social issues, and a journalistic text may be examining an economic topic.  
Bühler (1934) adopts a different model based on the language function of a text. According 
to this classification, texts are either expressive (symptomatic), expressing the writer’s style 
and thoughts; representative (descriptive), aimed at providing information about a certain 
issue, exceeding the linguistic dimension of the text; or signalling (appeal), mainly concerned 
about the reader’s reaction (cited in Newmark, 1988: 40). Following a categorisation based on 
rhetorical purpose, Werlich (1975) also identifies three types of texts. First, expository texts 
aim at providing an explanation on a given topic. They fall into three sub-categories: 
descriptive, narrative and conceptualisational. Second, argumentative texts provide an 
argument to support or refute a proposition, and in turn fall into two sub-categories: overt and 
covert. Third, instructional texts aim at offering instructions and guidelines. They also fall 
into two sub-categories: optional and non-optional (cited in Hatim, 2001: 264). 
Under the label of institutional context, Baker (1992: 114) suggests a classification that neither 
corresponds to the subject-based typology nor matches Bühler’s model. She lists examples of 
institutional contexts as follows: newspaper editorial, science textbook, journal article, travel 
brochure, etc. As such, a journal article may focus on translation as a general framework, yet 
at the same time be related to a sociological theme or include linguistic aspects. The model of 
institutional context as suggested by Baker seems to be a mixture of a number of typology 
models. Like subject-based typology, institutional context tends to involve an open-ended 
sequence with no limited number of institutional contexts that can be identified. 
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According to a subject-based classification, political texts and even political discourse are 
considered a text type that involves texts tackling political concepts, beliefs, and performances 
in a given society. In this sense, political texts can involve a number of political categories 
such as treaties, speeches, statements, election campaign manifestos, parliamentary debates, 
editorials and newspaper articles, press conferences, political interviews, and so on (Lande, 
2010: 8). 
Schäffner (1997c: 121-133) assembled a typology model for political discourse, categorising 
political discourse into three types: diplomatic discourse communicated in multi-national 
institutions, which enjoys specific features in terms of lexicon and syntax; speeches and 
statements made by politicians, which in turn yields two sub-types: internal and external; and 
politics-related texts written by ordinary people who are not politicians, which are manifested 
in political articles commissioned by writers and intellectuals as well as political views 
expressed by public figures on specific events that leave a significant impact on society. Some 
of the data collected on the Arab Spring examined in this research study belongs to this 
category as it represents statements made by ordinary people contributing to the political 
discourse of the Arab Spring.  
Political discourse can also come under one of these two categories: internal political 
communication, referring to texts made by politicians and directed to politicians within 
international or national institutions; and external political communication, referring to texts 
made by politicians aimed at illustrating and justifying political actions to the audience 
(Trosborg, 1997: 128). The latter includes political genres resulting from the expansion of 
the role played by the media. This is the case whether it is in its printed form such as 
newspapers, audio-visual form such as news television channels, or even the form 
corresponding to Cyberspace such as websites, blogs and social media networks (Schäffner, 
2004: 118). Political interviews, political articles and public speeches delivered by presidents 
are examples of the second category. A different classification distinguishes between inner-
state and inter-state discourses (Schäffner, 1997a: 2). While the first should be communicated 
within the borders of a specific country, the latter crosses national borders, thus indicating 
political communication between two or more countries (ibid). 
Journalistic interviews may be one of the most important genres of political discourse. It is 
thus helpful to provide a more detailed definition of this genre. Political interviews constitute 
an opportunity for politicians to present and justify political actions to attract a wide audience 
for their ideology (Fetzer, 2009: 97). Political interviews often rely on question-and-answer 
formats, allowing politicians to reach out to a large audience through dialogue (Lande, 2010: 
8). Another political genre that constitutes a significant portion of the data analysed in this 
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research study is political speeches. Schäffner (1997c: 127) argues that public speeches 
delivered by politicians address a wide audience, and the language they use, as Newmark 
suggests, is often rich in stylistic features such as metaphors and euphemisms (cited in 
Schäffner, 2007: 142). Such features often reflect the personal style of the speaker (Schäffner, 
2001: 135). 
Moreover, the language of political speeches is often loaded with ideological elements, 
specifically manifested in the speaker’s choice of words and cultural references, e.g. to key 
historical events and prominent geographical places. It is rich in abbreviations of national and 
international institutions and organisations (ibid: 134). In addition, politicians tend to adopt 
diplomatic language when delivering public speeches, attempting to avoid sensitive 
expressions that could sound offensive to addressees. This sometimes leads to ambiguity and 
vagueness, especially when talking about foreign issues (ibid: 135). 
Other genres and types of political discourse that closely correspond to the material analysed 
in this thesis are related to a unique form of political discourse referred to in this study as 
revolutionary discourse. They range from slogans inscribed on banners carried by protestors 
and revolutionary humour to political literature and revolutionary chants.  
 
3.2.5 Revolutionary Discourse 
Revolutions usually occur in countries governed by oppressive political regimes that neither 
observe human rights nor allow freedom of expression. Such regimes tend to adopt repressive 
policies to supress oppositional voices and undermine activists’ efforts to gain fundamental 
freedoms. For decades, the peoples of the Arab Spring countries had suffered from strict 
restrictions imposed by the ruling regimes on political actors, civil society activists, and 
journalists. These policies impacted the discourse used by participants in the Arab Spring. 
When the Arab revolutions took place, the revolutionary discourse encountered a general 
lexical gap; the revolutionary action required new language and terminology to describe the 
post-revolutionary unprecedented political reality. To deal with the newly formulated political 
concepts, protestors and activists had to coin new words and redefine previously known ones. 
In his theory of naming needs, Bauer (2001) suggests that the need for new word formation in 
fact arises from an already existing lexical gap. Similarly, Stekauer’s onomasiological theory 
of English word formation (1998) stresses the notion of extra-linguistic reality to explain the 
reasons behind the need to find new terms. Political activists and protestors during the Arab 
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Spring had to operate outside existing linguistic reality, making up new terms in order to 
address the naming demand of the popular uprisings whose major weapon was words.  
An example of this phenomenon comes from the Syrian revolution. Pro-revolution activists 
coined two names to describe Assad’s supporters: šabbīḥa (plural of šabbīḥ) and 
minḥibbakjīyyih (plural of minḥibbakjī). Šabbīḥa has been used to describe Assad’s armed 
thugs. This term was derived from the word Šabaḥ (“ghost”), a local name of the Mercedes 
500s car that pro-regime thugs used to drive before the revolution. The other term, 
minḥibbakjiyyih (“lovers”), was derived from the slogan, minḥibbak (“we love you”), invented 
during Assad’s election campaign. Thereafter, the term minḥibbakjiyyih has been widely used 
to refer to those who blindly love and support Assad. 
Another impact of the revolutions on language was the semantic change they exerted. 
According to Joachim Grzega’s theory of semantic change (2004), a variety of forces may 
trigger a semantic change, affecting the way people perceive the world, concepts, and entities. 
These forces played an effective role in the perception of language and the constant unrest 
during the revolutions of the Arab Spring. Both the regimes and pro-revolution activists have 
changed the meanings of various terms, employing them in new, completely different, and 
often symbolic ways (Neggaz, 2013: 19). 
In the official Libyan discourse before, and during the February 17th Revolution in Libya, 
Gaddafi was referred to as al-‘Ax Qā’id aṯ-Ṯawra (“the Brother, the Leader of the 
Revolution”). However, the Libyans who supported the revolution gave him a different name: 
bū Šafšūfa which means, in the Libyan dialect, a person with curly bushy hair. In his speech 
after the outbreak of the revolution, Gaddafi described the rebels as jurḏān (“rats”) – a label 
that was extensively mocked by the Libyans (Gaddafi, Feb 2011). The ultimate irony was that 
Gaddafi himself was found hiding in sewage pipes (where rats are usually found) while he 
was seeking refuge after fleeing from his final shelter in the city of Sirte. In Egypt, activists 
named the silent majority during the January 25th Revolution ḥizb al-kanaba (“the sofa party”) 
in reference to their passive behaviour in the course of events during the revolution. 
A major aspect of the impact of revolution on the discourse communicated during the Arab 
Spring is the rise of popular slogans and revolutionary chants, mainly in colloquial dialects. 
These slogans and chants produced and sung by protestors and activists spread all over the 
world. They were exposed to a wider audience by virtue of social media networks such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. They were even covered extensively by regional and 
international news channels. Popular and humorous slogans and chants in Tunisian, Libyan, 
Yemeni, Egyptian, and Syrian dialects were sung to pass on the protestors’ demands for 
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political transformation and fundamental freedoms. The chants symbolised an awareness of 
the regimes’ tricks to undermine the revolutions and to mislead the public (ibid: 22). 
One of the many slogans chanted by Yemeni protestors, for instance, was ya ᶜ Alī sallim sallim, 
naštī ra’īs mutᶜallim (“Oh Ali, quit, quit, we seek an educated president”), referring to the 
near-illiteracy of the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, highlighting the crying need for 
an educated president to run the country. Another example comes from Libya: irḥal yaᶜnī ḥill, 
aš-šaᶜb minnak mall (“leave means get lost, the people are bored of you”). This slogan 
expresses the Libyans’ eagerness for change and the frustration and impatience of the Libyan 
people.  
A sense of boldness and dark humour marked revolutionary slogans during the Arab Spring, 
reflecting the widespread dissatisfaction among the Arab nations with the domestic political 
situation. These slogans were invented in colloquial Arabic and local dialects. In fact, they 
correspond to real events experienced by protestors and would indeed lose a great deal of their 
meanings if produced in Standard Arabic or translated into other languages. More 
interestingly, many of these slogans have found their way into international and Arab media 
outlets, thus exposing dialects and local Arab lifestyles and cultures to a wider global audience 
(ibid: 23). However, many slogans coined in formal Arabic also found their way to popularity. 
A good example is the much-quoted slogan aš-šaᶜb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām (“the people demand 
the overthrow of the regime”). 
The linguistic transformation process initiated by the revolutions during the Arab Spring 
involved proverbs and old sayings. Traditional proverbs and quotations were transformed into 
new ones referring to the revolution’s proceedings. The protestors made changes to already-
existing Arabic proverbs. New terms linked to the revolutions were added to these sayings, 
producing new meanings mainly formulated in a comic mould (ibid: 24). A typical example 
of this process in the context of the Syrian revolution is the transformation of the Quranic 
verse, innamā al-xamru wa al-maiysaru wa al-anṣābu wa al-azlāmu rijsun min ᶜamal aš-
Šaytān fa-ijtanibūh (“wine and games of chance, and altars and divining are only an 
abomination of the devil’s doing, so avoid it”), into innamā aṭ-ṭā‘ifiyya rijsun min ᶜamal an-
niẓām fa-jtanibūha (“sectarianism is an abomination of the regime’s doing, so avoid it”). This 
modified slogan warns the Syrian people of the threat of sectarianism and the Syrian regime’s 
scheme to destroy the unity of the Syrians by spreading sectarianism amongst them, drawing 
an analogy between the regime and the devil. 
Although the role played by political and civil activists in the Arab Spring revolutions remains 
undeniable, it is the ordinary people who started the protests and secured the popular support 
needed to achieve the desired change. In fact, the regular citizens who had not had a known 
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history of political participation were the most effective. Their simple words and statements 
would remain memorable and immortal. An example of such statements comes from a boy 
who was injured by the firing of Syrian security forces in the northern city of Aleppo. The boy 
who thought he was dying said to his father in a tragic scene: sāmiḥnī yūb (“forgive me, dad”).  
Another moving and deep statement was made by a Syrian citizen complaining against the 
degrading and humiliating treatment he and his fellow villagers received from the Syrian 
troops: anā ‘insān, mānī ḥayawān (“I am a human being, not an animal”). The third example 
is the final words of a young Syrian boy who was pronounced dead immediately afterwards 
due to a severe injury resulting from shooting by Syrian troops: sawfa ‘uxbiru Allāh bi kulli 
šay’ (“I will tell God everything”). 
During the Arab Spring, language became a field of combat between revolutionary powers 
and official media outlets owned and run by the state. Aiming to promote their own perception 
of reality, each party used names with negative implications to describe the agenda of the other 
group while assigning positive names to their own (ibid: 26). The political regimes’ narratives 
were based on the notion of mu’āmara xārijiyya (“a foreign conspiracy”), accusing the rebels 
and protestors of receiving foreign support to form terrorist militias and carry out terrorist 
attacks. Countering this, the revolutionaries accused official security forces of committing 
crimes against humanity: jarā’im ḍidda al-‘insāniyya. This phenomenon was shared by almost 
all Arab Spring revolutions, especially in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. 
 
3.3 Political Discourse Analysis 
This section aims to introduce two methods of analysing political discourse. The first relies 
on disclosing political tools employed by political actors; the study will draw conclusions on 
the purpose and outcome of this employment. The second method is based on critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) that links political discourse to the notion of power in a sociocultural context.  
 
3.3.1 Political Tools 
A principal method for analysing political discourse is the investigation of political tools used 
in a given discourse. For Beard (2000: 22), five main tools can be utilised by political actors 
contributing to the production of political discourse. Firstly, metaphors of war and contest are 
often employed by political leaders to refer to the idea of defiance. Identifying enemies and 
emphasising the concept of victory over them is the method used. In the constitutional oath 
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speech on July 16, 2014, the Syrian President Bashar Assad used this tool to identify the 
enemy as the countries that support terrorism. Apparently, he was referring to the supporters 
of the Syrian opposition, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the West: 
 نأ ىرنس ،ًابيرقو يتلا ةيبرغلاو ةيميلقلإاو ةيبرعلا لودلا لك.ًايلاغ ًانمث ىرخلأا يه عفدتس باهرلإا تمعد 
[Soon, we will see how all the Arab, regional and Western countries that supported 
terrorism will pay a heavy price.] 
(Assad, Jul 2014) 
Secondly, politicians may use metonymy in their discourse, substituting one word or phrase 
for another closely associated word or phrase, creating the same impact on the audience. In 
many of his statements, the then Yemeni President, Ali Abdullah Saleh stressed the concept 
of aš-šarᶜiyya ad-dustūriyya (“constitutional legitimacy”), which is an indication of his 
intention to stay in power. Thirdly, politicians tend to use intertextuality as a political tool by 
indicating past historical events or quoting old texts written by others. This is done to establish 
a connection between the past and the present (ibid: 27). In a speech to the Libyan people on 
April 30, 2011, Gaddafi mentioned Maᶜrakat al-Qurḍābiyya (“the Battle of Qurdabiyya”) in 
which one of his ancestors was allegedly killed, along with other Libyans fighting the Italian 
colonists in 1915 (Gaddafi, Apr 2011). Through this connection, Gaddafi was trying to retain 
the legitimacy of his position as the leader of the country. 
Fourthly, analogy can be very useful in political discourse; in fact, many politicians and 
political experts resort to this tool when producing and discussing political discourse (ibid: 
28). In a panel, moderated by Jon Stewart on April 4, 2014, and focused on the role of women 
after the Arab Spring, Nadia al-Sakkaf, a Yemeni activist drew an insightful analogy 
examining the progress of the Arab Spring since it started in Tunisia: “The Arab Spring … 
was seeded in Tunisia, germinated in Cairo, or Egypt, greened in Yemen, wilted in Libya and 
died in Syria” (al-Sakkaf, 2014). 
Lastly, contrastive pairs may be employed in political discourse, especially in social or 
religious contexts. In his article published on February 19, 2013, in the Egyptian electronic 
news journal al-Yawm Assabi, Najeh Ibrahim, an Egyptian writer, addresses the issue of 
takfirism (i.e. accusations of infidelity) in relation to the Arab Spring. He uses contrastive pairs 
of infidelity and faith, and infidel and Muslim (Ibrahim, 2013): 
 .. يريفكتلا ركفلا.  ،دحوي لاو قزميو ،عمجي لاو قرفيوه هباحصأ نيب فلاخ لكف ناميإو رفك امهدحأ حبصيل ..
 ًارفاك  رخلآاو ً املسم. 
[Takfirism ... divides and does not combine, separates and does not unite; every 
disagreement between its followers is either infidelity or faith. Therefore, one shall 
become an infidel and the other a Muslim.] 
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When it comes to the relationship between texts, Chilton and Schäffner (2002) differentiate 
between two political tools: recontextualisation and intertextuality. While intertextuality 
simply relates to the idea of linking one text to another, recontextualisation refers to the 
situation where a text includes some textual pieces of another genre for “strategic purposes” 
(ibid: 17). In his speech to the Security Council on the current events in Syria, on February 1, 
2012, Bashar al-Jaafari, the Syrian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, mentions 
part of a poem by the famous Syrian poet, Nizar Qabbani, to shed light on the stand made by 
many Arab states against the Assad regime, which he believed was shameful (al-Suhaimi, 
2012). 
يتحورمو يملاحأ زنك اي قشمدأ ؛  كل وكشأ مأ ةبورعلا وكش   برعلا. 
[Damascus, the treasure of my dreams and my fan; shall I bemoan to you Arabism or 
bemoan the Arabs?] 
Another useful tool in political discourse is implicitness, which, according to Chilton and 
Schäffner (2002), is of two types. Firstly, entailment means that the truthfulness of one 
sentence entails the truthfulness of another (ibid: 33). For instance, the statement that ‘Egypt’s 
elected president, Muhammad Morsi, stressed the strength of the relationship between both 
countries’ entails that ‘elections were actually organised in Egypt and a president was elected’. 
Secondly, presupposition means that a “negated presupposing sentence preserves its 
presupposition” (ibid: 34). For example, the statement that ‘the war did not last any longer’ 
presupposes the fact that ‘a war occurred’. 
Chilton (2004) explores an aspect of political discourse that is closely related to the subject of 
this thesis: the impact of religion on political text and talk. He argues that politicians are often 
keen on positive self-presentation and legitimisation of their actions and ideology. They stress 
the rightfulness of the Self, using forms of self-identification, self-praise, and self-justification. 
At the same time, they tend to delegitimise the opponent. The other is presented in a negative 
light. their humanity is questioned and they are often blamed and used as scapegoats. In the 
context of the Arab Spring, the revolutionary powers were presented negatively by the ruling 
elites. They were often accused of terrorism and violence, whereas the official discourse of the 
repressive Arab regimes was based on positive self-presentation as moderate secular 
governments aiming to fight terror and protect minorities (ibid: 47). To fulfil these strategies, 
Chilton (2004) suggests a number of political tools such as metaphors, passive constructions, 
implicatures, presuppositions, and antonymous lexical choices.  
Politicians use passive constructions to avoid explicit reference to the doer or the party that the 
message is directed to. They focus on the event, rather than the people involved in it. This is 
to avoid direct confrontation with opponents. For instance, in his constitutional oath speech on 
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July 17, 2014, Assad, avoided naming “the Arab, regional, and Western countries” that would 
“pay a heavy price” for supporting “terrorism” (Assad, July 2014). 
Politicians also often tend to employ implicatures by using intentional ambiguity, which can 
be useful in denying ill intentions to avoid diplomatic crises. In his speech upon signing the 
GCC Initiative in Riyadh on November 23, 2011, the then Yemeni President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh did not name the parties responsible for the failed assassination attempt on him. He 
created a form of intentional ambiguity to avoid causing unwanted tension among the audience 
when everyone was hoping that the Yemeni crisis had finally come to an end (Saleh, Nov 
2011): 
ءاعنص يف ةسائرلا راد عماج يف تثدح يتلا ةحيضفلا لوقأ نأ عيطتسأو ،ةريبكلا ةرماؤملاب ةمزلأا هذه تجوت.  دقل
 اننم نوهأ ةنياهصلا ناكةيملاسلإاو ةيبرعلا نادلبلا يف نحن  ... نيساي دمحأ خيشلا ةيفصت ىلع مزعلا اودقع امدنع
إ جرخ ىتح هوكرت.هلتق ىلع اومدقأف عماجلا جراخ ىل 
[This crisis culminated in the great plot, and I can say, the scandal that occurred in the 
mosque of the presidential palace in Sanaa. In fact, the Zionists were better than us in the 
Arab and Islamic countries when they decided to assassinate Sheikh Ahmed Yassin; 
they left him till he left the mosque and then they killed him.] 
Jones and Peccei (2004) also refer to two political tools frequently used in political text and 
talk: parallelism and euphemism. Parallelism refers to the expression of many concepts in 
similar language structures (ibid: 51), whereas euphemism refers to neutral, inoffensive, mild 
phrases often used by politicians to make a statement sound less provocative to the opponent 
or audience (ibid: 48). On March 19, 2013, the Lebanese news channel al-Aan TV reported the 
UN Secretary-General’s commentary on the news of the use of chemical weapons by the 
Syrian regime against unarmed civilians. Ban Ki-Moon used the word “concern”, an alleviated 
diplomatic expression of condemnation, to tackle the extremely serious issue of the use of 
chemical weapons (Ki-Moon, 2013): 
برعأ  ةيواميكلا ةحلسلأا رظح ةمظنمل ماعلا ريدملا عم يفتاه لاصتا للاخ نوم يك ناب ةدحتملا مملأل ماعلا نيملأا
 نعهقلق ختسا نم.ايروس يف ةيئايميكلا ةحلسلأا ماد 
[In a phone call with the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons OPCW, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General expressed his 
concern about the use of chemical weapons in Syria.] 
Lazar and Lazar (2004) undertook a comprehensive study on the discourse of the New World 
Order. They divided groups and people into two categories: in-groups (us) and out-groups 
(them), based on four micro-strategies. The first one is criminalisation; the enemy’s actions 
are criminalised and the opponent is accused of committing violent actions and terrorist acts 
against innocent people, violating international law (ibid: 231). In his second speech to the 
Tunisian people after the outbreak of the revolution, aired on January 10, 2011, Ben Ali sought 
to criminalise the protestors and demonstrators by accusing them of committing violent and 
terrorist acts (Ben Ali, Jan 2011): 
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 نم ةيلخادلا تاهجلا نم ددع يف ىرقلاو ندملا ضعب هتدهش ام رثإ ىلع مكيلإ مويلا هجوتأ شيوشتو بغش ثادحأ
..ةصاخلاو ةيمومعلا كلاملأاب رارضإو  لاجر نم ددع ةباصإو نييندم ةافو ىلإ تدأ ً انايحأ ةيماد ،ةفينع ثادحأ
 يف نينطاوم ىلع ىتحو ةيمومع تاسسؤم ىلع ًلايل ءادتعلإا ىلع تمدقأ ةمثلم تاباصع اهب تماق ثادحأ ..نملأا
يف ..مهلزانم .هنع توكسلا نكمي لا يباهرإ ٍلمع 
[I talk to you today following the events that some towns and villages in interior areas 
experienced, including riots and unrest, damaging public and private property – all 
violent, sometimes bloody, acts that led to the deaths of civilians and the injury of a 
number of security men, all carried out by masked thugs committing assaults at 
night against public institutions and even citizens in their homes – a terrorist act 
that cannot be tolerated.] 
According to the second micro-strategy, enemy construction, politicians tend to construct an 
enemy and sell the audience the idea that this enemy is working hard to break the nation’s 
values to destroy its civilised culture and peaceful society (ibid: 227). In the same speech, Ben 
Ali tried to intimidate the Tunisians, by accusing foreigners of fuelling the unrest to reverse 
the civilised Tunisian experience. Here, Ben Ali emphasises the Tunisian values of hard-work, 
scientific excellence and success, claiming that the protestors are in fact supported by outsiders 
who are willing to violate the Tunisian values (Ben Ali, Jan 2011): 
ئوانم اهريست يتلا باهرلإاو فرطتلا فارطأ فك ىلع مهرئامض ،نوروجأم نو ريخلا نكت لا فارطأ ..جراخلا نم
..ةرباثملاو لمعلا ىلع صيرح ٍدلبل .هتانبو هءانبأ ءاكذ هدراوم ٍدلب 
[Hired opponents, whose consciences follow powers of extremism and terrorism, 
directed from outside by parties which do not wish the best for a country that is 
keen on work and perseverance, a country whose only resources are the intelligence 
of its sons and daughters.] 
Politicians often employ the third strategy, orientalisation, to depict the matter as a struggle 
between the West and the East (non-Muslims against Arabs and Muslims in particular) (ibid: 
234). Vilification is also used in political discourse to describe everything linked to God as 
virtuous and right while the Other is linked with the Devil and is thus evil and wrong (ibid: 
236). In his sermon delivered on July 6, 2012, the prominent pro-Assad religious scholar 
Muhammad Said Ramadan al-Bouti identifies Assad, his government, and his army as 
believers, accusing all those who question this fact (referring to the revolutionaries) as 
disbelievers. In this respect, al-Bouti does not only act as a religious scholar, but also as a 
political actor. He uses vilification to associate the Syrian regime and all its elements to God, 
therefore linking the revolution to disbelief despite its “bright slogans” (al-Bouti, 2012): 
بعشبو اهتموكحبو اهشيجبو اهتداقبو اهسيئرب ةيروس نإلجو زع لله ةيدوبعلاب نيدت ةلود اه ًاعيمج اهدارفأ نمؤي ..
 رخلآا مويلاو هلسرو هتكئلامو لجو زع للهابري نم لك نإ ...يالله اهماقأ يتلا انتمأ ةيوه يف ككشي نأ د لجو زع 
ةكرابملا ضرلأا هذه قوف للهاب رفكلا يف طروتملا وه هنأ كش لا  ... ةقاربلا تاراعشلا يف ةربعلا تسيللاقت يتلا ،
هذه تحت ئبتخت ام رثكأ ام .رفكلا ةنوفع تاراعشلا 
[Syria with its president, leaders, army, government and people is a state which 
practises slavery to God Almighty. All of its members believe in God Almighty, His 
angels, His messengers and the Day of Judgement ... Anyone who wants to question 
the identity of our nation established by God Almighty on this blessed land is 
undoubtedly involved in disbelief in God ... Bright spoken slogans should not be 
taken into consideration; these slogans have always hidden the rottenness of disbelief.] 
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3.3.2 Critical Analysis of Political Discourse 
Van Dijk (1993: 131) does not view Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a homogenous 
model, school or paradigm. Rather, it is, for him, a shared theoretical perspective on 
conducting linguistic, semiotic, and social/political discourse analysis (ibid). CDA mainly 
aims to deal with language use from a social perspective. Language speakers are not isolated 
from cultural, psychological, or social factors and effects. CDA recognises this social 
dimension of language and accordingly investigates the relationship between textual 
structures. Taking this social dimension into consideration, CDA studies the interaction 
between textual structures and society. This kind of analysis can be complicated and in fact 
operates at several levels, given the difficulty of identification of direct correspondence 
between text structures and social factors. 
Fairclough (1995a: 135) describes CDA as a discourse analysis with an objective to 
systematically examine obscure relationships of causality and determination between 
“discursive practice, events and texts,” on the one hand and “wider social and cultural 
structures, relations and processes” on the other hand. The aim is to explore how these 
practices, events, and texts emerge from, and are ideologically influenced by, relations of 
power and conflict over authority. The claim is that the opacity of these links between 
discourse and society leads to holding power and maintaining hegemony. 
The relationship between language and social function in effect works in both directions. Not 
only is language use influenced by its connection with some cultural and social factors, but 
also the influence and impact of language on the social and cultural context are manifested in 
various ways. Discursive practices lay the foundation for social structures, which in turn 
contribute to the shaping of discursive practices. CDA is aware of this bi-directional process, 
and investigates the “tension” between these two aspects of language use – “the socially 
shaped and socially constitutive” (ibid: 134). Fairclough points out that language constitutes 
the basis for society in different forms, and shapes the social function at several levels: social 
identity, social relations, and systems of knowledge and belief (ibid: 134-136). As long as 
power is involved, all of these levels are influenced, perhaps to varying degrees. The issue of 
power and hegemony is essential when it comes to the study of Critical Discourse Analysis, 
constituting the core of this process. 
CDA can be distinguished from other patterns of discourse analysis by the attribute critical, 
which suggests the shedding of light on hidden relations, links, and issues. This is in addition 
to actual intervention to make change by “providing resources for those who may be 
disadvantaged through change” (Fairclough, 1992: 9). It is essential to highlight hidden 
109 
 
aspects of political and social situations, especially when they cannot be seen by those affected 
by them, and when they are not contended against. 
Meyer (2001: 18) points out two main streams of critical discourse analysis: the first is the 
school that investigates the interrelationship between society and power, and the second is the 
one that focuses on social cognition. Fairclough (1992: 86), who is in favour of the first trend, 
argues that critical discourse analysis is in fact conducted at two levels that operate 
complementarily: micro- and macro-analysis. Micro-analysis seeks to explain and comment 
on the process of text production. It also comments on the interpretation conducted by 
participants in political discourse based on “their members’ resources”. The main objective of 
macro-analysis, on the other hand, is the identification of these “resources” (ibid). 
Fairclough’s approach, which is based on the connection between both levels of discourse 
analysis, has been developed to account for the ways the triangle of social practice, text, and 
discursive practice operate.  
The concept of power has shifted since the beginning of the twentieth century. In this age of 
discoveries and technological advancements, power has become more dependent on 
technology and technical aspects of governance. It is an integral part of the performance of 
social institutions like governments, parties, councils, and parliaments. One of the main tools 
of what can be called soft power has been discourse. Discourse can exert a tremendous and 
serious impact, and “causal effects” on the balance of power in society. Discourse can 
influence individuals’ attitudes, feelings, views, and knowledge. It can shape their identities 
and ideologies, bringing about profound changes to various educational, economic, and 
political sectors (Fairclough, 2003: 8). 
For discourse to effectively exert the causal effects desired by its producers to impact 
individuals’ lives and beliefs, it needs to be accompanied and enhanced by a higher power. 
The more power seized and exercised, the more effective the discourse is. In this respect, it 
can be said that power is the “ability to make change by means of action, bearing in mind that 
this ability can take various political, financial, religious, social and professional forms” (al-
Taher, 2008: 35). Jones and Peccei (2004: 38) argue that governments, whether democratic or 
authoritarian, tend to secure power by convincing the public that the government and the 
general population actually share the same views and wishes. In a speech to pro-regime 
Muslim clerics on April 25, 2014, Assad strove to persuade Muslim clerics that the state in 
Syria has adopted Sharia (Islamic law) as the basis of governance. Despite the secular nature 
of the Syrian regime that Assad and other Syrian officials have always boasted when 
addressing the West, Assad, here, in front of many loyal Muslim religious scholars, sought to 
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present the Syrian regime as a political system that observed Islamic law, throwing away all 
previous claims of secularism (Assad, Apr 2014): 
 ىلع ،ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ىلع ؟يروسلا روتسدلا دنتسي اذام ىلع :مكلئسأ نأ ديرأ ... ًاملع رثكأ ًاملسم نوكأ نأ ديرأ
 ةيصخشلا لاوحلأا نيناوق لك دنتست اذام ىلع .ًامامت ،يملاسلإا هقفلا.ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ىلع ؟ايروس يف 
[I want to be a more knowledgeable Muslim ... I want to ask you a question: what are the 
foundations of the Syrian Constitution? Islamic Sharia (Islamic law); the Islamic 
jurisprudence – absolutely. What are the foundations of personal status laws in Syria? 
Islamic Sharia (Islamic law).] 
The authoritarian Arab regimes addressed their nations before and during the Arab Spring in 
a systematic way, using “prevailing ways of talking and writing” aimed at establishing their 
discourse as common sense in the people’s culture and consciousness (Thornborrow, 2004: 
65). They were aware that once they achieved this, it would be unlikely for the people to 
challenge that “presentation”, as Thornborrow (ibid) puts it, or adopt different narratives or 
views. This notion closely corresponds to naturalisation, which is a key ideological strategy 
of discourse. Fairclough (1989: 89) points out that it is easier for ruling elites to determine the 
“correctness” or “appropriateness” of linguistic elements, whether in written or audio-visual 
forms, found in newspaper articles, interviews, speeches, and even movies. Fairclough (ibid) 
stresses the notion of “power behind discourse” as an inseparable part of CDA. 
Fairclough (1995a: 97) believes that discourse analysis operates through three elements: 
language text, whether verbal or written, discursive practice, and sociocultural practice. In 
order to provide a comprehensive discourse analysis, Fairclough stresses that the examination 
has to take into account three dimensions: “the immediate situation”, “the wider institution”, 
and “the societal level” (ibid). Following a speech delivered by Assad in the Syrian Parliament 
on March 30, 2011, shortly after the outbreak of the Syrian Revolution, a Syrian Member of 
Parliament made a short statement that may sound absurd to some, but in fact is very 
representative of the official Syrian discourse adopted by the regime (Syrian Parliament, 
2011): 
 ،كيلع ليلق يبرعلا نطولالا تنأو.سيئرلا ةدايس اي ملاعلا دوقت مز 
[The Arab World is too little for you; you should lead the world, Mr. President.] 
This discourse, primarily representing the personal view of the Syrian Member of Parliament 
himself, can be also seen from the perspective of the operation environment of the Syrian 
Parliament, which tends to blindly support Assad regardless of his violent actions. This 
discourse is also made within the general political system of the Syrian Arab Republic, 
dominated by Assad. This is an example of Fairclough’s three-dimensional approach to 
critical analysis. 
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Additionally, Fairclough suggests another division that makes a clear distinction between 
linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis. Linguistic analysis operates at lexical, syntactical, 
phonological, semantic, and textual levels, whereas intertextual analysis follows traditional 
practices of genres, discourses, and narratives; it operates in specific social environments 
(ibid: 188), mediating between the textual element and the social factor (ibid: 189). 
Language, for O’Barr (1984: 264), operates at two levels: “mirroring the society” by reflecting 
society’s values and behaviour; and “influencing … and even transforming social relations” 
by affecting people’s attitudes and ideology. CDA aims to investigate and shed light on both 
levels, but more importantly, the impact of language on society. Van Dijk (1986: 4) stresses 
this role, pointing out that CDA explores social problems. It maintains the views of “those 
who suffer most,” while drawing critical analysis of the discourse produced by the ruling elites 
and those who are in a position of responsibility and who are capable of solving these 
problems.   
The message of CDA, for van Dijk (1993: 249), lies in the “(re)production and challenge of 
dominance.” Similarly, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 529) assert that the main objective of 
CDA is to support the dominated in the face of the dominant. It discloses the “emancipatory 
interests” that underlie the oppressor’s behaviour and the delusive methods followed by those 
in power. It then decodes ideologies, interpreting discourses for the benefit of oppressed 
people. Critical Discourse Analysis, for Wooffitt (2006: 139), should play a “moral” and 
sublime role in exposing unjust practices in society, aiming to improve the conditions of social 
segments suffering from them. Accordingly, critical analysis of the discourse communicated 
during the Arab Spring should aim to choose the perspective of the oppressed Arab people 
who revolted against the Arab autocrats in five Arab countries.  
However, this noble objective of CDA may not be as easy as it sounds because discourse 
analysts are not as well equipped as tyrannical regimes. Regimes have the ability to carry out 
oppressive policies, economic pressure, information monitoring, censorship, imposing 
restrictions on the flow of data, and more. Discourse analysts’ sole tool is their spoken and 
written words. Therefore, the duties of discourse analysts become more difficult under 
dictatorships, but are easier under democratic political systems where they can operate freely 
and efficiently (Fairclough, 1989: 89). Furthermore, a discourse analyst must bear in mind 
that the power of the ruling elites is not restricted to direct violent practices. It may take the 
shape of language manipulations, delusion, half-truths, and many other forms of manipulation 
that politicians are often known for (al-Taher, 2008: 39).  
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3.4 Political Discourse Analysis and Translation 
Translation, although often invisible in the field of politics, is actually an integral part of 
political activity. Which texts get translated, from and into which languages is itself 
already a political decision. 
(Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 13) 
 
3.4.1 Translation of Politics 
As illustrated in previous sections, language can be used as a weapon in the ongoing conflict 
over power between different political parties, in particular between the oppressor and the 
oppressed. Authoritarian regimes employ language to gain power, whereas democratic and 
civil activists use the very same tool to resist it. Translators of political discourse may 
encounter difficulties when trying to play the role of mediators between languages. By 
undertaking this role, a translator may find themselves obliged to be a part of the conflict. This 
might result in a loss and/or modification of the meaning intended in the original text.  
Schäffner (2007) argues that the universal properties of political discourse have 
“consequences for intercultural communication,” in general, and translation in particular. In 
fact, it is translation that enables political discourse to cross linguistically based national 
borders. It helps to fulfill the objectives of international political communication (ibid: 34). 
The relationship between politics and translation is actually bi-directional; it operates in both 
ways. On the one hand, political communication cannot be effective without the helping hand 
of translation. On the other hand, the political backgrounds of translators and agents seem to 
govern the translation process, leaving unmistakable traces of the translator’s political 
affiliations. This relationship based on mutual influence is mostly illustrated in the field of 
media where political discourse communicated and its accompanied translation seem to be 
dominated by a hidden power, directed to serve a specific political agenda. 
Alvarez and Vidal (1996) view translation as a “political act” in which political considerations 
govern translator’s decisions. This is especially the case with regards to the choice of the 
material that is translated and the way they run the translation process (Schäffner, 2007: 134). 
In this respect, political and ideological affiliations account for various practices connected to 
translation. Determining which text will be translated, choosing the target and source 
languages, deciding what media outlets will publish the translation, and determining the 
identity of the translators and proof-readers are all examples of this (ibid: 136). These 
procedures have the potential to distort the original message embedded in the source text. 
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An illustrative example of this process is the Iranian interpreter’s deliberate distortion of 
Muhammad Morsi’s speech during the Non-Aligned Summit, held in Tehran on August 30, 
2012 (al-Zahid, 2012). The interpreter deliberately inserted the mention of Bahrain, which had 
experienced major demonstrations reportedly encouraged and praised by the Iranian regime 
in early 2011, in the interpreting. Bahrain in fact was not mentioned in Morsi’s speech at all. 
The Persian translation of the speech, published in key Iranian news agencies such as Jehan 
News, also removed mention of the four Righteous Caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Othman, and 
Ali. This was done to ensure the speech is consistent with the official Shiite tradition of the 
Iranian Islamic Republic, which rejects the above figures except for Ali. 
The Persian interpretation of the speech was aired on the Iranian national channel and was 
expected to be heard by the Iranian people. The Iranian government was aware of the 
sensitivity of its involvement in the Syrian conflict and its unjustifiable support of the violent 
practices of the Syrian regime. They thus hoped to avoid an unwanted embarrassment in front 
of its own people. As a result, the Persian interpreter deliberately omitted some of Morsi’s 
words that condemned the violence carried out by the Syrian regime against Syrian civilians. 
The relationship between language and politics is illustrated through Schäffner’s (1997a) 
proposition on the impact of language on political behaviour. Van Dijk’s (2003) notion of the 
influence of different types of discourse on individuals’ political cognition by means of 
education and the mass media also adds to this. The strong connection between language and 
translation necessarily entails a similar influence of translation on political attitudes. The 
opposite is also true: translation is governed and dominated by those in power. 
Political texts, according to Schäffner (1997b: 131), fall under a very distinctive category of 
texts known as “sensitive texts”. She argues that when these texts are translated, they introduce 
numerous new expressions and genres to the target language; many SL phrases and words do 
not have direct equivalents in the TL. Therefore, there is a need for coinage and creation of 
new structures and phrases. That being said, these texts may pose a challenge for translators 
and may be confusing to the target reader. Although some may argue that the sensitivity of 
this category of texts is attributed to their linguistic characteristics, Schäffner (ibid) asserts 
that it is actually the cross-cultural aspect that makes these texts difficult to translate into other 
languages. She highlights three major factors responsible for the difficulties that translators 
encounter while dealing with sensitive texts.  
The first factor corresponds to an issue that is more culture-oriented than language-oriented, 
namely, function of the text. Translators sometimes find themselves obliged to change the 
function of the text under translation. This applies, for example, when the source text function 
is mainly persuasive or is full of elements that are closely connected to the source culture. 
114 
 
They may seem completely understandable for the source reader, but could be obscure for the 
target reader. In this case, the translator can decide to change the text function to an 
informative one, providing more information for the benefit of the target reader who does not 
share the same cultural background as the source reader (ibid: 132). 
The second factor provides translators with a lexical-semantic challenge related to 
terminology and interpretation. The disparity of ideologies between translators and readers 
might result in divergent interpretations of sensitive political terminology (ibid: 136). In other 
words, a translator may translate a specific term in line with personal political views, 
excluding other valid translations. For instance, supporters of the Arab Spring revolutions tend 
to adopt the Arabic translation ‘aṯ-ṯawra ‘at-Tūnisiyya (“the Tunisian revolution”) for the 
English “the Tunisian uprising”, instead of al-intifāḍa ‘at-Tūnisiyya which could attribute less 
political and historical value to the event. Similarly, supporters of the Syrian revolution resent 
the term “Syrian civil war”, often used by the Western and international media. Instead, they 
prefer the expression “the Syrian revolution” as a description of the ongoing military conflict 
in Syria. These views can influence the work of a translator who supports the Syrian revolution 
and opposes the Assad regime. The third factor relates more to international treaties and 
contracts, but is of less significance to this research study (ibid: 135). 
In order to overcome these challenges, translators of sensitive texts must be aware of the nature 
of their environment. This is especially the case for political text. They should also be well 
informed of the circumstances under which these texts have been produced. Translators should 
be informed of the context of the story as well as any specific additional information needed 
for a better understanding.  
 
3.4.2 Translation of Political Discourse at Macro-Level: Translation-Oriented 
Text Typology 
The study of translation at the micro-level, which investigates smaller linguistic units, will be 
discussed in detail in Section 3.4.3. Translation at the macro-level, on the other hand, is 
concerned with the general features of a text, namely translation-oriented text types and 
categories. As pointed out in Section 3.2.4, the political discourse examined by this research 
study is varied and diverse. It ranges from political statements and speeches made by 
politicians and political articles published in newspapers commenting on the events of the 
Arab Spring, to revolutionary discourse produced by political and civil activists as well as 
ordinary citizens taking part in revolutionary action during the Arab revolutions.  
115 
 
The fact that these categories can also fall into different text types affects the translation 
process. It determines the strategies that the translator follows. The translators, in turn, find 
themselves obliged to deal with cultural issues, as well as the linguistic aspects of the text. 
This is in addition to the need to familiarise themselves with the ideological and political 
background of the source text. Schmidt (1993: 348) asserts that translation is characterised by 
its communicative function, which in fact determines the translation method adopted by 
translators. It is often influenced by numerous political, ideological, and political factors 
related to the “communicative situation” of the translation process (ibid).  
Reiss (1971), later followed by Wills (1996), was the first to emphasise the need for a 
translation-oriented typology (cited in Schäffner, 2001: 11). Hatim and Mason (1997) point 
out a structured approach to text typology, first proposed by Werlich (1976). According to 
them, texts fall into three main types. First, expository texts can either describe, narrate, or 
conceptualise a situation through language. This type represents the rhetorical function of a 
great bulk of the political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring. This particularly 
applies to the political speeches of the Arab autocrats and the revolutionary discourse 
produced by the protestors and activists. Second, instructive texts give instructions and 
provide information. Third, argumentative texts, which can be either overt or covert, attempt 
to persuade the reader of a particular point of view. The political articles providing 
commentary on issues related to the Arab Spring fall under this category. This type is 
especially important since many of texts analysed in the data analysis chapter (Chapter Seven) 
are actually translations of political articles. 
This last type of text seems to manifest itself in two opposite models: through-argumentation 
whereby a standpoint is proposed and defended throughout the paper; and counter-
argumentation where a proposition is first presented, then rejected and disproved. The 
author’s alternative viewpoint is then presented, supported, and proven (Hatim and Mason, 
1997: 127). Hence, a translator is required to be familiar with both forms, and should be able 
to cope with the expected variations among different languages and cultures. For instance, in 
contrast to English writers, who tend to use the counter-argumentative model, Arabic 
columnists seem to favour through-argumentation. Hatim and Mason (ibid: 139) point out that 
the reason for this disparity lies in the question of power addressed previously. An Arabic 
reader expects a more powerful argument than a counter-arguer can provide by introducing 
both propositions even though they support one and reject the other. For the Arabic readership, 
this may be seen as “making concessions” and thus as a weak and “unconvincing” attitude 
(ibid). However, this establishes the credibility of the discourse producer from the perspective 
of English receivers (ibid). 
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The argumentative function proposed by Hatim and Mason corresponds to a main genre of the 
political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring: political articles and interviews. 
Since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011, many articles on the event have been 
published in Arabic and English newspapers. Numerous interviews have also been conducted, 
hosting political commenters to support or refute viewpoints in relation to the Arab 
revolutionary action. The outbreak of the Arab revolutions influenced writing style and 
journalistic work. It created an atmosphere of freedom and change, which enhanced the 
language of dialogue in political and cultural circles. This helped to violate long-lived and 
deep-seated taboos. The al-Jazeera political talk-show, al-Ittijāh al-Muᶜākis (“the Opposite 
Direction”), hosted by prominent Syrian presenter Faisal al-Qassim, is a typical example of 
talk show programs promoting freedom of speech and providing a platform to discuss issues 
related to the Arab Revolutions, using argumentative language and persuasive skills. 
According to Newmark’s (1988) approach to text typology based on language functions 
proposed by Bühler, texts can be expressive, informative, or vocative. When dealing with texts 
whose function is mainly expressive, i.e. focusing on the writer’s attitude and personal 
opinion, a translator is required to devote particular attention to the author’s personal style, as 
well as the dialectic aspect of the text. Therefore, a translator should put a great deal of effort 
into rendering metaphors, figures of speech, and syntactic structures (ibid: 40).  
If the text to be translated has a vocative function, which means that its main concern is the 
reader’s response, a translator should address the relationship between the writer and the 
reader. They should primarily focus on the persuasive aspect of the text, aimed at convincing 
the reader of a set of views and beliefs (ibid: 41). Thus, the language used in the target text is 
required to succeed in influencing the receiver’s mentality, opinion, and culture in order to 
fulfil the original author’s objectives. When it comes to translation of informative texts aimed 
at providing information and instructions, a translator is required to be faithful in rendering 
the information into the target language. Despite his efforts in forming this text-typology, 
Newmark is fully aware of the fact that there is no text that has only one of the aforementioned 
functions. On the contrary, most texts tend to include parts with different functions (ibid: 42).  
Among these three functions, the vocative function seems to be most connected to the data 
analysed in this study; the political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring was 
primarily concerned with gaining public support. Perhaps this was largely manifested in the 
language of the political statements produced by the Arab autocrats who strove to convince 
the public that the protest movements were in fact a foreign plot aimed at destabilising the 
country and undermining its successful social, economic, and political experience. This was 
done in the hope of persuading the majority of the population to adopt the offecial narratives 
117 
 
to support the existing regimes in the face of the winds of change. In his second speech to the 
Egyptian people aired on February 1, 2011, Mubarak used this language to warn the Egyptians 
of what he sees as a dangerous threat posed by the protestors (Mubarak, Feb 2011): 
 تيزلا بصو ديعصتلا ىلإ تعس ةيسايس ىوق اهيلع نميهتو اهكرحت ةفسؤم تاهجاوم ىلإ ... تارهاظتلا كلت تلوحت
 ،رانلا ىلع تاقرطلل عطقو قئارحلل لاعشإو بهنو ٍبلسو ضيرحتو ةراثإ لامعأب هرارقتساو نطولا نمأ تفدهتساو
.رصم ضرأ ىلع ةيسامولبدلا تاثعبلا ضعبل ماحتقاو ةصاخلاو ةماعلا تاكلتمملاو ةلودلا قفارم ىلع ءادتعاو 
[These demonstrations have turned ... into unfortunate confrontations directed and 
influenced by political forces that have sought to escalate and add fuel to the fire, 
targeting national security and stability by means of escalation, incitement, looting, arson, 
blocking of roads, carrying out assaults against state facilities and public and private 
property, and breaking into some of the diplomatic missions on the land of Egypt.] 
However, upon their failure to persuade the population of their narrative, Arab dictators tended 
to use expressive language in their speeches to gain public sympathy as a desperate strategy 
to stay in power. In the same speech as a bove, Mubarak seems to use expressive and emotional 
language to reflect on his experience in ruling Egypt. He pleads for a chance to finish his reign, 
promising he will not run for future elections: 
 نطولل هتمدق امو ،ةيلوؤسملا اهيف تلمحت يتلا ةبيصعلا فورظلا بعشلا ملعيو هاج وأ ةطلس بلاط ًاموي نكأ مل ينإ
 ... ً املاسو ًابرحصبو قدص لكب لوقأو ةيسائر ةرتفل حشرتلا يوتنأ نكأ مل يننأ نهارلا فرظلا نع رظنلا فر
 يفكي ام تيضق دقف .ةديدج يلمع متتخأ نأ ىلع صرحلا لك صيرح نلآا يننكلو اهبعشو رصم ةمدخ يف رمعلا نم
 ... روتسدلا مرتحيو ةيعرشلا ظفحي امبو ،ةرقتسم ةنمآ ةزيزع رصمو هتيارو هتنامأ ميلست نمضي امب نطولا لجأ نم
،هلجأ نم تبراحو تشع هيف ،ةيرصمو يرصم لك نطو وه املثم ينطو وه زيزعلا نطولا اذه  نإ  نع تعفادو
.تومأ هضرأ ىلعو ،هحلاصمو هتدايسو هضرأ 
[I have never sought authority or wealth, and the people know the difficult circumstances 
under which I took responsibility, and what I gave to the homeland in war and peace ... 
and I say in all sincerity, regardless of the current circumstances, that it was not in my 
intention to run for a new presidential term. I have spent enough years of my lifetime in 
the service of Egypt and its people, but I am now keen on concluding my work for the 
homeland by ensuring the handing over of its responsibility and banner while Egypt is 
still proud, secure and stable, so as to preserve legitimacy and respect the Constitution ... 
This dear country is my homeland, as it is the homeland of all Egyptians. It is the country 
which I have lived in and fought for; I have defended its land, sovereignty and interests, 
and on its soil I shall die.] 
(Mubarak, Feb 2011) 
 
3.4.3 Translation of Political Discourse at Micro-Level 
Having examined the translation of political discourse at the macro-textual level, this section 
investigates the problems encountered by a translator when dealing with smaller linguistic 
units included in a source text. Newmark (1991: 160) believes that translators should treat 
political texts as “sacred” documents. Thus, any intervention or distortion is forbidden and 
could lead to serious consequences unless it occurs in the form of footnotes or separate 
comments. He points out the problems posed by political terminology in the translation of 
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political text and talk (ibid: 147). The translation of basic terms such as ‘socialism’ and 
‘imperialism’ from one European language into another is generally simple because of the 
similarities between European languages. Most of these languages have the same Latin or 
Greek roots, and so at least some of their technical vocabulary shares certain features and 
characteristics. However, the translation of these terms into non-European languages can be 
more challenging in the absence of direct equivalents and thus need further investigation (ibid: 
148). 
Newmark (ibid: 149) argues that political terms possess four main attributes: They are culture-
bound, abstract, value-laden, and historically conditioned. This means that political terms are 
often deep-rooted in the source culture. They can therefore be obscure in terms of the meaning 
intended, indicate sophisticated concepts, and contain historical references. In fact, these 
features can be traced in the political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring. The 
Syrian revolution is marked by its slogans that reflect the political demands and the views of 
the protestors. Most of these political slogans possess the features of political language 
proposed by Newmark. For instance, the slogan qā’idnā li-al-abad, sayyidnā Muḥammad 
(“our leader forever is Prophet Muhammad”) nominates Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), not 
Assad, as the “leader” of the Syrians. It is culture-specific and has a historical aspect, 
containing an Islamic religious reference. Similarly, the slogan ibn al-ḥarām, bāᶜ aj-Jūlān 
(“the Bastard sold Golan”) gives strong hints about a historical event when the late Syrian 
President Hafez Assad, father of Bashar Assad, had lost the Syrian Golan Heights to Israel in 
the Six-Day War, 1967 whilst serving as minister of defence, following a coup led by the 
Ba’ath Party in 1963.  
The slogans of the Syrian revolution are also value-laden in the sense that they often carry 
strong connotations and are sometimes connected to ideology. For instance, the slogan ᶜaj-
jannih rāyḥīn, šuhadā’ bi-al-malāyīn (“to Paradise we are going, as martyrs in millions”) 
points out the Islamic ideology of many of the Syrian protestors and defines the revolution as 
a conflict between Good and Evil; whoever dies while struggling against the regime will be a 
martyr and thus enjoy eternal life in God’s Paradise. The translator of political discourse in 
general, and that of the Arab Spring in particular, is required to be aware of these attributes 
and features in order to produce translations that maintain the cultural and ideological value 
and reflect the historical background of the source texts.  
Newmark (1991: 157-160) points out some aspects of political discourse related to 
terminology that the translator should take special care of when tackling political text and talk. 
An example of this is the use of political jargon (words and phrases usually used by politicians 
and the media to refer to political issues in a coded way, for instance, dawāᶜiš “members and 
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supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria”). Another example would be acronyms, such 
as Dāᶜiš (“Isis”) for ad-Dawla al-Islāmiya fī al-ᶜIrāq wa aš-Šām (“the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria”). Other examples include: euphemisms, neologisms (the coinage of new terms, for 
example, minḥibbakjīyyih, referring to those who adore and support Assad), and the use of 
pronouns (such as “we” and “they”, which create a kind of ambiguity allowing different 
interpretations). Then there are collocations, for example, expressions such as masīrat at-
taṭwīr wa at-taḥdīṯ (“the march of development and modernisation”), which had been repeated 
excessively by the authoritarian Arab regimes prior to the Arab Spring until they turned into 
clichés, and therefore lost their impact. Finally, metaphors can be used. For example, the 
slogan, aj-Jayš al-Ḥurr li-al-abad, dāᶜis ᶜarās al-Asad (“the Free Syrian Army, forever, 
stepping on Assad’s head”), shows support for the Free Syrian Army, demonstrating that it is 
capable of “stepping on Assad’s head,” i.e. humiliating Assad. 
Connotations are believed to be one of the major challenges encountered by translators of 
political discourse. This is because political discourse uses passionate language that is rich in 
value-laden phrases and words. Hatim and Mason (1990: 112-3) emphasise the semiotic 
aspect of connotations, pointing out that a sign has two meanings: a denotative one, indicating 
the lexical meaning of a word, and a connotative one defined as a “self-renewing phenomenon 
that gradually establishes itself within the collective subconscious in a given culture.” The 
media are often influential in promoting specific connotations of a sign.  For instance, since 
the Muslim Brotherhood won legislative elections, and then the presidential elections in 
Egypt, the Egyptian mass media have tended to target the Islamist group and its supporters 
using offensive expressions. An example of such expressions is the term xirfān (“sheep”); the 
Egyptian media has used this term to describe the Muslim Brotherhood supporters, accusing 
them of being blindly obedient to their leadership just like sheep. A scathing attack against 
Islamists launched by the presenter of the program al-Qāhira al-Yawm (“Cairo Today”), Amr 
Adeeb, broadcast on al-Yawm TV, exemplifies this phenomenon (Adeeb, 2014): 
نافرخلا كئلامزو تنأ اب علطتب تنك تنإ ..مكانلمع يللا انحإ ..كيز يللا.شيع ونم لكاتبو هد دسافلا ملاعلإ 
[You and your fellow sheep that are just like you. It is we who have made you. You 
used to talk through this corrupt media and feed on it.] 
Connotations pose a challenge for translators who are required to be attentive towards both 
donative and connotative meanings of political expressions. This means that they should be 
informed about the identity of the discourse producer and the intended receiver as well as the 
environment in which the discourse is communicated. Connotations seem to develop 
following any changes occurring to discourse producers, receivers, and time of discourse 
communication. Thus, according to the Egyptian mass media, the expression xirfān (“sheep”) 
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refers now to Islamists, in general, and Muslim Brotherhood supporters in particular; however, 
the connotations may change within a few years’ time. 
Dickins, Hervey, and Higgins (2002: 66-72) approach connotations from a different 
perspective. They list five types of meaning: associative (hinting at a concept connected to the 
referent); allusive (hinting at a popular statement or quotation); attitudinal (hinting at an 
attitude to the referent); reflected (the reminiscence of a homonym or more basic meaning of 
the same word); and collocative (attaching a meaning to a word through collocation). 
Although these types are intended to remind the political discourse translator of the 
significance of connotations, a lot of words and expressions are in fact neutral. Therefore, the 
translator should not associate them with any implications that could change the meaning 
intended by the original author (Ingo, 1993: 134). 
The issue of connotations closely corresponds to the idea of vagueness of political terminology 
proposed by Newmark. The connotations associated with political terms tend to vary from one 
county to another and from one political trend to another. This is due to the clash of ideologies 
and disparity between cultures (Aziz and Lataiwish, 2000: 130). For instance, the concept of 
mu’āmara (“conspiracy”) can mean two different things in the context of Arab Spring political 
discourse. Official media outlets run by the government tended to use this term to refer to the 
foreign intervention in the country, whereas the protestors and revolutionary powers seemed 
to employ this term to indicate the desperate efforts made by the autocratic regimes to 
undermine the revolutions. They also highlight the international indifference towards the 
sufferings of the Arab masses. These variations can pose a problem for the translator who may 
not be aware of the differences in the use of specific political terms, and the nature of political 
conflict in both source and target societies. A translator of political discourse should also pay 
attention to the expected attempts by producers of political discourse to take advantage of the 
evaluative aspect of connotations. A translator should also note other possible linguistic 
aspects to legitimise the actions of discourse producers and delegitimise their opponents in the 
context of a broader conflict taking place in the field of language.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, politics and translation are closely related; both influence each other and affect 
the decisions taken by actors and participants in the political arena and the field of language. 
This reciprocal relationship between politics and translation is also governed by power 
relations that are determined by oppressive policies followed by governments, and strategies 
adopted by political discourse analysts. Ideology seems to be connected to, and contribute to, 
121 
 
this multi-faceted conflict. The relationship between ideology and translation will be 
examined in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IDEOLOGY AND TRANSLATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The development of the Arab Spring in the five Arab countries where it was most prominent 
has reflected a crucial engagement of ideology, whether Islamist or secular. This was most 
evident in the events, decision-making mechanisms, and political discourse production. This 
chapter aims to shed light on the influence of ideology on the production and structuring of 
political discourse as well as the translation process. It consists of two main sections. The first 
defines the concept of ideology, and examines its relationship with politics. It explores the 
outcome of the connection between ideology and language, i.e. ideological discourse. The 
section ends by analysing ideological discourse and explaining van Dijk’s ideological 
discourse structures, using examples from the political discourse of the Arab Spring. The 
second section investigates the relationship between ideology and translation, pointing out the 
various roles taken by a translator as a text reader and a re-writer, and discussing the 
approaches underlying these roles. The section also looks into the impact of patronage on the 
translation process and ends by providing recent examples that demonstrate the influence of 
ideology on the political discourse communicated in the region of the Middle East and North 
Africa. The theories introduced and discussed in this chapter will be used to analyse the data 
derived mainly from the Syrian revolution in Section 7.4 of Chapter Seven. 
 
4.2 Ideology in Discourse 
The relationship between ideology and discourse is substantial, and the link between the two 
concepts is indeed intrinsic. Ideology cannot function or be expressed without discourse, and 
discourse tends to be influenced by the ideologies of its producers, and is thus often rich in 
ideological structures. This section aims to introduce the concept of ideology, shedding light 
on its relation with politics and language. It also explores the notion of ideological discourse 
and examines van Dijk’s model of ideological structures. This is used to analyse ideological 
discourse by detecting the presence of ideology in socio-political discourse. Examples are 
provided from the political discourse communicated in the Middle Eastern context after the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring. 
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4.2.1 Concept of Ideology 
The concept of ideology was first introduced and defined by the French thinker Destutt de 
Tracy (1754-1836). He describes the term as the ‘science of ideas’ in contrast to the 
metaphysical world of philosophy (Yahiaoui, 2005: 2). Since then, the perception of ideology 
as a notion has evolved, acquiring different meanings and implications, the most important of 
which are the political and cultural ones. Raymond (1981) argues that ideology, in fact, refers 
to a specific constellation of beliefs and dispositions. Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1993) provides a broad definition of ideology that is linked to culture. Ideology is 
seen as a systematic scheme of concepts, specifically in relation to human life and culture. 
Hence, ideology indicates the way of thinking, or sets of ideas held by an individual, group, 
or culture. Ideologies constitute the underlying foundation of the belief systems or social 
perceptions of particular groups, van Dijk (2001) affirms. 
This description gives a positive or at least neutral image of ideology. However, when it comes 
to society, political hegemony, and conflict over power, ideology often carries negative 
implications. In this sense, it is defined as a form of “cognitive distortion” or a “false or 
illusionary representation of the real” (Beaton, 2007: 272). From this perspective, ideology is 
used to refer to the values and beliefs of “others”, rather than ourselves. Van Dijk asserts that 
“few of «us» (in the West or elsewhere) describe our own belief systems or convictions as 
«ideologies». On the contrary, Ours is the Truth, Theirs is the Ideology” (cited in Munday, 
2007: 196). 
Whether false or not, ideologies as a set of beliefs shared by a group of people are mostly 
rejected due to the fact that they are often imposed, whether by majority within a democratic 
system, by force under authoritarian systems, or even through the manipulation of media 
outlets owned by governments or political forces (Camelia, 2009: 94). Although it still seems 
appealing to millions of Arabs across the Arab World, the pan-Arabist ideology, for instance, 
has notably lost a great deal of its popularity in the Arab street. This is because it has been 
imposed, and even misused, by dictatorial regimes in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen. 
The same applies to the Islamist ideology in countries ruled by Islamist political systems, such 
Sudan. By rejecting ideology, people aim to resist dominance and hegemony, fight against 
manipulation and inequality, and refuse submission. 
Karl Marx also gives a negative description of ideology by affiliating it with capitalism. He 
describes it as a form of delusion, representing a fake version of reality limited to the ideals 
of the ruling class that will soon vanish when this class is overthrown in an inevitable socialist 
revolution (cited in Heywood, 2003: 7). In fact, the Marxist conception of ideology has 
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particularly influenced the approaches related to discourse analysis, such as CDA. Marx uses 
ideology as a counter strategy to expose the ruling material and intellectual force’s delusion 
about reality. He utilises ideology to reverse this process and unmask society. 
Heberman (1973) links ideology to power, describing it as a system of ideas that constitutes 
and steers power in society. Gramsci (1971) elaborates on the relationship between ideology 
and power, adding a third element to the process, namely hegemony. He asserts that ideology 
is the means through which hegemony is conducted. Conflict over power between various 
classes and social groups leads to constructing and sustaining alliances in order to achieve and 
maintain dominance. This process takes different political, economic and ideological shapes. 
Van Dijk (2006: 116) associates ideology with four main assumptions. The first assumption 
is that ideology, as a belief system, excludes “ideological practices or societal structures” such 
as churches and political institutions on which ideology is based (ibid). At the same time, it 
requires a cognitive element that is capable of explaining the concepts of belief and belief 
system. The second assumption links ideology to a social aspect, suggesting that there are no 
“personal ideologies”; ideologies are, by necessity, “socially shared by the members of a 
collectivity of social actors” (ibid). In this sense, the main function of a belief system is to 
identify the social identity of a given group through social representations and features. The 
third assumption restricts ideology to a particular type of socially shared fundamental beliefs 
that govern and steer other beliefs. For instance, an Islamist ideology may control attitudes 
towards women’s issues and relationships with non-Muslims. In contrast, a communist 
ideology may work to undermine the role of religion in public life, enhancing the atheist trends 
among the population.  
According to the fourth assumption, ideologies need time to be adopted by individuals, and 
thus cannot be acquired in a short space of time. However, “if ideologies can be gradually 
developed by (members of) a group, they also gradually disintegrate” (ibid: 117). Ideologies 
tend to change throughout one’s life. People may change their ideology with age due to the 
variability of experiences they encounter. Hence, members of a group may decide to leave the 
group when they lose faith in the shared values held by a given group. For instance, many pan-
Arabists lost faith in pan-Arabism after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution due to pro-regime 
attitudes expressed by several pan-Arabist parties and figures across the Arab World as well 
as the subsequent violent policies adopted by the pan-Arabist regime in Syria.  
Van Dijk (ibid) argues that ideologies lose their meanings and stop functioning as ideologies 
when they are so widely adopted in society that they become generally held values within the 
entire society. This arises when the ideology is seen as so obvious or expected that it becomes 
unquestioned. In conclusion, van Dijk (ibid) notes that ideologies are not personal; they are 
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not necessarily negative (ideologies vary from Islamist to secularist ideologies; from 
nationalist to communist). Van Dijk disagrees with the Marxist perception of ideology, 
asserting that they are not by any means a false representation of reality. Ideologies are 
distinguished from the discourses and other social forms that represent and promote them, 
certainly differing from other socially shared beliefs. 
 
4.2.2 Ideology and Politics 
Politics and ideology are closely related; ideologies, by nature, are political, and the political 
arena is the platform where various ideologies are manifested, interact, and are fiercely 
competed over (van Dijk, 2002: 22). Politics often operates to serve an ideological agenda, 
and at the same time ideologies are employed in the political domain in order to achieve 
political ends. Political actors act not only as politicians, but also as Islamists, pan-Arabists, 
communists, socialists, and so on (ibid). For instance, in an election campaign tour, the then 
Egyptian presidential candidate Muhammad Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood 
who later became the President of Egypt for one year, clearly expressed his Islamist ideology 
(Morsi, 2012): 
نآرقلا انروتسد لوسرلاو انميعز داهجلاو انليبس توملاو يف ليبس الله ىمسأ ،انينامأ قوفو لك كلذ الله انتياغ. 
[The Koran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our path; and death for 
the sake of Allah is our ultimate wish. Above all, Allah is our end.] 
Morsi, here, is speaking not only as a politician or presidential candidate, but also as an 
Islamist who believes in an Islamist ideology that is based not only on the teachings of Islam 
but also on the Islamic philosophy and trend established by specific Muslim scholars and 
thinkers, such as Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb.  
In many cases, the ideology embedded in a given political discourse produced by a political 
actor, party, or even a government may vary depending on the situation and the target 
audience. A politician might, for instance, emphasise Islamist values when addressing a 
conservative Muslim audience, yet express liberal ideas on economic issues when the target 
audience is businessmen. “[B]ased on their personal experiences and life situations, and 
diverse group memberships, individuals may share in (sometimes ‘incompatible’) ideologies. 
Political and ideological discourse analysis is usually based on individual discourses, so it will 
not be strange at all to find influences of various ideologies” (ibid: 23).  
The Saudi government often adopts a conservative Islamist discourse when it comes to 
domestic politics since this might contribute to gaining popular legitimacy and support. 
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However, the foreign discourse of the Kingdom seems to be quite liberal. This is primarily 
manifested in their strong alliances with Western countries and their troubled relationships 
with Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Van Dijk (ibid) argues that one of the 
many challenges encountered by analysts of political discourse is to spot these ideological 
variations in the same discourse and to examine the way they interact and are presented.  
In addition to the three commonly known broad system types of ideologies, political 
ideologies such as communism and nationalism, social ideologies such as feminism and 
racism, and religious ideologies such as Islamism and Jihadist Salafism, a different type of 
ideology plays a fundamental role in political practices: professional group ideology (ibid). 
Just like journalists, professors, and lawyers, politicians can act not only as socialists, 
feminists, or Islamists, but also as professional politicians (Geison, 1983) who focus on 
practising politics and representing citizens, aiming to govern a country, province, or city. 
They perform their tasks on the basis of their political values as democrats or even autocrats, 
deriving their authority from the political power of their position. Based on this understanding 
of ideology, van Dijk (2002: 23) proposes that “listening to the voice of the people” becomes 
an integral part of the professional group ideology of politicians, even if they actually fail to 
do so in practice. 
Among all types of ideologies operating in the political domain, the ideologies that are 
concerned with the organisation of the state and the method of governance, especially 
democracy seem to have particular political significance (ibid: 24). Hence, it is not a 
coincidence that many politicians, political parties, and political systems identify themselves 
as ‘democratic’. These claims can be easily verified by checking to see whether they observe 
equality of rights, as the most important characteristic of democracy, and whether they 
consider the power of the people as the main source of legitimacy. In fact, the ideology of 
democracy has become so popular that it cannot be considered as an ideology, but rather “a 
general, undisputed value that is part of what we have called the cultural common ground” 
(ibid). Therefore, lack of democracy is often associated with intellectual, civilisational, and 
political underdevelopment. The concept of democracy has special significance for the subject 
of this study because the Arab Spring revolutions took place in the first instance to establish 
democracy and to achieve equality of rights in the Arab countries. 
 
4.2.3 Ideology and Language: Ideological Discourse 
The relationship between language and ideology is so close that Joseph and Taylor (1990) 
believe that the essence of linguistic theory making is ideological. Language is seen as a 
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medium through which ideological forces seek to achieve their ends. Heberman (1973) argues 
that language can be utilised to legitimise relations of organised power. However, Schäffner 
(2003) asserts that the ability to detect the ideological elements found in a text relies on the 
topic of the text itself as well as its genre and communicative functions. Ideology for Belsey 
(1980: 5) is “inscribed in discourse … it is not a separate element which exists independently 
in some free-floating realm of ideas … but a way of thinking, speaking, experiencing.” 
According to post-structural theory, however unbiased and impartial the form and content of 
discourse seems to be, it is in essence filled with the biases, prejudices, opinions, and 
judgments of certain ideological or cultural groups. As Macdonnell (1986: 59) puts it, “All 
discourses are ideologically positioned; none are neutral.” 
Althusser (1972) views ideology as a process of language whereby people and groups, by 
forced, are interpellated as subjects that represent certain ideologies. Through this process of 
interpellation, individuals are recruited and eventually transformed into subjects who seem to 
create their own relationship with society. Although this relationship is real and natural, it is 
based on their own ideology and interpretation of the world (ibid). These subjects, by means 
of language, find themselves in charge of the meaning of their own discourse. They produce 
the meaning, instead of being subject to it; they are active rather than passive, dominant rather 
than submissive. Nevertheless, such a relationship for Weedon (1987) is imaginary and leads 
to a sort of misrecognition, given the fact that the individual presumes that they are the 
producer of the ideology that underlies their subjectivity  
The working environment of organisations, ideological structures, and discourses encourage 
managers to perceive and present themselves mainly as managers rather than “family 
members”, “employees” or “citizens”. This is based on their qualities of “responsibility” and 
“loyalty” and the values of “work morale” and “result orientation” (Alvesson and Willmott, 
1996: 173). This applies to the leaders of parties and political organisations, who tend to 
identify themselves primarily as leaders as well as policy and discourse-makers.  
One of the prominent theorists who examined the relationship between ideology and discourse 
is van Dijk. He affirms that this relationship is “complex and often quite indirect” (van Dijk, 
2006: 124). Such discourse can rely, in ideologically steered contexts, on ideological 
interpretations of events by participants who tend to shape this discourse according to 
“subjective mental models”, or more directly on ideologically dominated group beliefs (ibid). 
However, ideology is not always transparent in discourse. Speakers and/or discourse 
producers can decide to cover and conceal their ideological beliefs (ibid). On many occasions, 
Islamists before the Arab Spring, for instance, found themselves forced to hide their 
ideological affiliations and opinions to avoid expected repressive measures carried out by the 
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ruling Arab regimes. Thus, ideology is not always detectable in discourse, and speakers’ 
ideologies are not always deducible through discourse analysis. This always depends upon the 
nature of the communicative situation encountered by the participants, i.e. context. Therefore, 
van Dijk (ibid) maintains that the idea of ideology is “non-deterministic” as participants do 
not always express the beliefs they embrace or explicitly represent the ideological trends they 
are influenced by. Besides, ideological discourse may vary due to personal and contextual 
considerations. 
This typically applies to the context of international political negotiations and bargaining 
situations where the concealment of direct ideological expressions and opinions often prevails. 
This does not, by any means, imply that ideologies increasingly lose their role in a world that 
is advancing rapidly towards globalisation. It only means that in certain situations they are not 
expressed transparently, often in attempts to resolve some conflicts and prevent others from 
erupting (ibid). In fact, in the case of discourse communicated among the same group, or what 
van Dijk calls “ingroup talk” (ibid), ideological opinions may be presupposed. When it comes 
to discourse directed to outgroup members, ideological beliefs can be subject to considerable 
censorship and modification. In both cases, the relationship between ideology and discourse 
becomes indirect and unobtrusive. 
Van Dijk (2002) also views the relationship between ideology and discourse from a different 
angle – the speaker’s personal perspective. He admits that ideologies, among other social 
representations dominate and steer discourse. Nevertheless, they are capable of doing so only 
under a set of conditions and only when their natural and abstract properties “apply in specific 
situations, to specific actors, actions and events” (ibid: 17). Van Dijk (ibid) stresses the need 
to investigate the individual psychology of personal beliefs of social and political participants 
in discourse making. This is alongside the conventional study of the social psychology of 
group beliefs. Political discourse tends to articulate group ideologies, views and opinions, 
particularly in collective forms of discourse such as party programmes. However, individual 
actors may personalise the ideology that is supposed to be included in the discourse. This may 
slightly, but significantly, affect particular political characteristics of the discourse. Van Dijk 
(2002) therefore stresses the need for a cognitive interface to link ideologies and discourse 
and to represent personal beliefs, views, or experiences. 
People differ in their evaluations of an event that they participate in, witness, or just hear 
about. They tend to adopt different personal interpretations to form what van Dijk calls 
“models” (ibid). Not only do these models constitute personal knowledge about this particular 
event, but they also contribute to shaping personal opinions and beliefs. In fact, the 
“experiences” people go through, which are represented by their personal evaluations and 
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interpretations, influence the forming of their own perception of events (ibid: 18). In effect, 
they contribute to shaping, and are shaped by, general social beliefs, including ideologies. In 
other words, personal models can be socially and ideologically biased, such as when political 
activists disagreed on the nature of the Arab Spring, adopting different (Islamist or liberal) 
interpretations of the event. When individuals communicate about a specific event, they use 
their mental models as the cognitive basis of the processes of discourse making or perception. 
This means that during the process of production and semantic representation of discourse, a 
speaker includes (sometimes ideological) elements derived from their own mental model. 
“[T]he structure of this model” can, therefore, leave its impact and trace on the structure of 
the discourse (ibid). 
 
4.2.4 Ideological Discourse Analysis and Structures 
The relationship between ideology and language and its effect on shaping ideological 
discourse has been examined. Meanings are often manipulated and structures are employed to 
favour in-group ideology and interests. Out-group beliefs are derogated, which is common in 
social cognition and can be detected through analysis of ideologies (van Dijk, 1995b: 146). 
This section aims to provide the theoretical framework of ideological discourse analysis. 
Based on “group schema categories,” which suggest that ideologies are employed and 
structured in discourse to serve the agenda of the “ingroup”, against “outgroup” interests, van 
Dijk (1995b: 146) argues that discourse is often semantically steered by ideologies and is 
designed to provide answers for the following questions: 
- Who are We? Who do (do not) belong to Us? 
- What do We do? What are Our activities? What is expected of Us? 
- What are the goals of these activities? 
- What norms and values do We respect in such activities? 
- To which groups are We related: Who are Our friends and enemies? 
- What are the resources We typically have or do not have (privileged) access to? 
An ideological discourse analyst, therefore, needs to dig for answers to these questions in 
order to carry out an in-depth analysis of a discourse. It must be taking into consideration that 
in the process of analysing an ideologically influenced discourse, it is expected to locate 
meanings that express the modes of self-defence, positive self-presentation, legitimation, 
justification, and other self-serving expressions, as well as negative framing presentations of 
others (ibid: 147). Ideologies are often present in political discourse, even if indirectly. This 
is especially the case when political discourse aims to persuade and convince the audience, 
helping to shape and/or emphasise ideologies adopted by discourse producers and 
communicators. Van Dijk (1995a) identifies nine discourse structures that have efficient 
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expressive, persuasive, and communicative functions to convey the underlying ideological 
meanings assigned by discourse producers: surface structures, syntax, lexicon, local 
semantics, global semantics, topics, schematic structures, rhetoric, pragmatics, and dialogical 
interaction. 
 
Surface structures 
Van Dijk uses the term ‘surface structures’ of discourse to refer to “the variable forms of 
expression at the level of phonological and graphical ‘realisation’ of underlying syntactic, 
semantic, pragmatic, or other abstract discourse structures” (ibid: 23). Generally speaking, 
these surface structures found in discourse do not express explicit meanings on their own. 
They are, rather, only employed as representations of deep underlying meanings that reflect 
the ideology of the speaker. For example, special stress or volume, or words written with 
capital letters, can be a strategy to highlight and mark the significance or importance of certain 
meanings. They can also express irony or other semantic or interactional functions (ibid). The 
headline of an article by Peter Welby (2014) published on the Tony Blair Faith Foundation 
website serves as an example of this structure: “Muslim Scholars Denounce ISIS ‘Caliphate.’” 
The use of inverted commas to mark the word Caliphate represents a strategy used here by 
Welby to express irony. The writer, who apparently opposes the Jihadist ideology, seems to 
find it ironic that a so-called Jihadist organisation, which is globally recognised as a terrorist 
group, gives its top leader such a title that has significant Islamic historical and religious 
implications even though it adopts an ideology that is rejected by the majority of the Muslim 
scholars and population. 
 
Syntax 
This aspect of structure suggested by van Dijk highlights the ideological implications of 
syntactic structures found in political discourse. These implications seem to be primarily 
associated with a number of factors: for example, use of active or passive voice (i.e. the 
presence of grammatical subject), or word order, such giving specific items the initial position 
in a sentence and transactional structures of sentences. All of these can refer to underlying 
semantic (or indeed, cognitive) agency (Fowler and Hodge, 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1993). 
Ideologically influenced viewpoints regarding the responsibility for social actions or events, 
whether positive or negative, differ in the way they are expressed using different syntactic 
forms and structures. Negative qualities assigned to out-groups may be intensified by 
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highlighting their responsible agent (Hamilton and Trolier, 1986), i.e. using an active voice, 
thus providing a grammatical subject or naming the agent (the doer of the act) instead of using 
a subject pronoun. In this case, the out-group is meant to be the subject and topic of the 
sentence so that its negative properties are highlighted. The same applies to positive actions 
done by us (van Dijk, 1995a: 24). By contrast, “the agency of ingroup members who engage 
in negative actions will be syntactically played down by the use of passive sentences and their 
role may be wholly dissimulated by agentless passives or nominalizations” (ibid). 
In his interview with the BBC aired on February 10, 2015, Bashar Assad seemed to favour a 
particular structure in his answers with BBC’s Middle East Editor Jeremy Bowen (Assad, Feb 
2015). Bowen asked whether the Syrian government had indeed made mistakes in handling 
the demonstrations in the early days of the uprising, and whether Assad took responsibility for 
committing these mistakes that led to the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. The leader of the 
Syrian regime’s answer was: 
No, I never said we made mistakes in handling this. I always said that “anyone could 
make mistakes” (Assad, Feb 2015). 
Assad seems reluctant to use a grammatical subject referring to the Syrian government. 
Instead, he uses the word “anyone” to avoid taking personal responsibility for the mistakes. 
He also tried to evade any mention of “demonstrations”. Rather, he uses “this” to refer to the 
event or the unrest. Assad’s discourse is, in fact, consistent with the broad outline of the 
political discourse adopted by the Syrian regime which refuses to admit making any serious 
mistakes that caused the revolution in the country, or even acknowledge the revolution that 
erupted on March 15, 2011. 
 
Lexicon 
Lexicalisation is a major field of ideological expression that aims to persuade and positively 
present the self and provide a negative image of the other. Discourse producers tend to use 
different terms to refer to the same individuals, organisations, social relations, or social issues. 
Choices adopted by speakers depend on a variety of elements, such as “discourse genre, 
personal context (mood, opinion, perspective), social context (formality, familiarity, group 
membership, dominance relations), and sociocultural context (language variants, sociolect, 
norms and values)” (ibid: 25). Many of these contexts are influenced by ideologies, especially 
when it comes to political discourses communicated in conflict zones such as the Middle East 
during and after the Arab Spring. 
132 
 
Assad, for instance, in his interview with the BBC aired on February 9, 2015, adopts a 
discourse in which he plays the lexicon game very persistently. He says, “We took the decision 
to fight terrorism from the very beginning” (Assad, 2015). The political discourse of the 
Syrian regime has always been based on describing the mass uprising from the very beginning 
as a terrorist action. Assad thus places emphasis on the government taking it upon itself to 
“fight terrorism” since the first cry of freedom. This has become a well-known 
terrorism/terrorists versus revolution/revolutionaries binary opposition that is valid in mostly 
all the Arab Spring countries; the revolutionaries and opposition activists have been frequently 
labelled by the regimes as terrorists and their opposition activities as terrorism.  
 
Local semantics 
Van Dijk (1995a: 26) argues that what applies to lexicalisation in the previous section also 
applies in general terms to the management of meaning. The structure of local semantics 
introduced by van Dijk is essentially associated with ideologically dominated representations 
of the situation and biased explanations. This includes reasons and circumstances provided by 
a specific group to justify getting involved in negative actions. This also includes “positive 
self-presentations and negative presentation of outgroups” within a social-cognitive 
environment (ibid). Blaming the victim for violent actions that they are subject to serves as an 
example of situations of social inequality, racist behaviour, and political conflicts. In such 
cases, ideologies and attitudes are adopted to provide a self-serving explanation of negative 
social acts, political decisions and security and military procedures.  
Following the Rabaa Massacre in August 2013 in which hundreds of pro-Morsi protestors and 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood were killed, Nader Bakkar, Assistant Chief of the al-
Nour Party was one of the prominent supporters of the coup led by General Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi against Muhammad Morsi. He adopted a victim-blaming discourse (Al-Nahar: Apr 2014): 
عاسم ،راكب ردان لاقملاعلإا نوئشل رونلا بزح سيئر د  ...نثألع هل راوح ءاى دص ةانقى دلبلا  ... نأ] تادايق
ناوخلإا[ اق يجاتلبلا دمحم يناوخلإا يدايقلا ةلجن ءامسأ لتقم نعو .نوتومي ةهجاولا يف بابشلا اوكرتراكب ل،  اهنأ
 بابشلا ءلاؤه ةمئاق نمض نملأ تلتق و مهب جز نيذلا نيرومغملابابشلا ةيقب لثم اهلثم اهوبأ ةعدخ تقدص اهن. 
[Nader Bakkar, Assistant Chief of the al-Nour Party for Media Affairs said … during his 
interview on Sada al-Balad Channel … that [the Muslim Brotherhood leaders] left the 
young people on the frontline dying. Regarding the death of Asmaa, Muslim Brotherhood 
leader Muhammad al-Biltagy’s daughter, Bakkar said that she was among those nameless 
young people who were thrown away and killed because she believed her father’s 
deceptions like the rest of the young people.] 
It is evident in this excerpt that Bakkar blames the Muslims Brotherhood leaders for the 
murder of their members, sons, and daughters. He avoids any reference to the brutal actions 
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taken by the Egyptian security forces when attacking the protestors in the Rabaa sit-in or the 
coup authorities that actually made the decision to carry out the massacre.  
 
Global semantics: Topics 
Topics or semantic macro-propositions of a given discourse are typically used to define and 
give a brief description of the information that discourse producers believe to be most relevant, 
crucial, or significant. This implies that the process of topic determination can also be 
influenced by ideological considerations. “Ingroup speakers may be expected to detopicalize 
information that is inconsistent with their interests or positive self-image and conversely they 
will topicalize information that emphasizes negative outgroup properties” (van Dijk, 1995a: 
27). 
Al-Arabiya news channel is known for adopting an anti-Muslim-Brotherhood liberal editorial 
policy and expressing constant criticisms against different Islamist groups and parties in the 
region. They seem to have a particular dislike for the Turkish ruling party, the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) (AKP in Turkish), led by Erdogan. This technique is thus frequently 
used to distort the image of JDP, and the Muslim Brotherhood. In an article published on the 
al-Arabiya website, the Saudi funded news outlet seems to detopicalise the most important 
piece of information on the launching ceremony of the Turkish government initiative (al-
Arabiya News, Feb 2014). 100,000 iPads were handed to Turkish students across the country, 
an event attended and sponsored by Erdogan himself. The news outlet, however, chose a less 
convincing title: 
بابشلا وعدي ناغودرأ " اونوكي لاأ ىلإ".تنرتنلإل ًاديبع 
[Erdogan calls for young people not to be “slaves of the Internet.”] 
(al-Arabiya News, Feb 2014) 
This choice made by al-Arabiya of selecting this piece of news as a headline of the article, 
excluding more important information mentioned in the body of the article is consistent with 
what it seems to be an editorial policy, frequently attempting to present a negative image of 
Erdogan as a hardline Islamist leader who resists development, the spirit of new technology, 
and liberal voices.  
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Schematic structures 
Schematic structures refer to the way overall meanings are organised according to a specific 
schemata (superstructure). These superstructures are conventional and, like all formal 
structures, have the features of a specific genre such as a news report, narrative, or dialogue. 
They are not typically dominated by ideologies, but because they often adopt a “canonical” 
order, they may “signal importance of relevance” (van Dijk, 1995a: 28). The role of ideology 
is manifested through the link between the super-structural level and the macro-structural 
level, which is primarily concerned with expressing the general topic of a discourse. It is 
therefore the most crucial piece of information in a report (van Dijk, 1988), occupying the 
highest position in the hierarchy, such as initial summaries. 
A discourse producer may adopt a schema that allows subordinate topics or less important 
local information in the text to be upgraded and included in the overall headline. By doing 
this, they give more importance to these topics. Conversely, a news editor may decide that a 
main topic should “be downgraded to a lower level of the schema” as a subordinate topic on 
the sidelines of the news (van Dijk, 1995a: 29). Thus, in one report, van Dijk (ibid) affirms, 
the same incidents could be given the label of “circumstances” or “setting”, whereas in another 
report they are presented as the significant complication of the event. These differences in 
tackling the relevance and importance of a certain story are often governed by the ideology of 
discourse producers or news editors who can downgrade information that does not conform 
to their ideology and/or the interests of the powerful groups that sponsor or control them. At 
the same time, they attach more importance to information that represents outgroups in a 
negative way (ibid). This applies to the way political discourse, in particular, is produced and 
dealt with by news outlets that adopt a specific text schema reflecting ideology-based 
opinions. 
 
Rhetoric 
Specific rhetorical structures of discourse, such as rhyme, alliteration, or semantic figures of 
speech, could be used as an ideological tool to achieve dominance over discourse, serving the 
agendas of discourse producers. Rhetoric can be adopted in this case to downgrade 
information that is “unfavourable” to the speaker, attaching less importance and prominence 
to it. Negative information about the others is then marked and made significant (van Dijk, 
1995a: 29). Van Dijk points out many figures from classical rhetoric that can be used in this 
context, namely “over- and understatements, hyperbole (exaggeration), euphemism and 
mitigation, litotes and repetitions” (ibid). 
135 
 
Pragmatics 
According to ideological discourse theory proposed by van Dijk, “the social control of speech 
acts should operate through context models that represent the communicative situation and its 
participants, goals, and other relevant appropriateness conditions” (van Dijk, 1995a: 30). 
Commands and threats reflect feelings of dominance and power experienced by a speaker who 
could be targeting certain recipients only because they belong to a specific group of people, 
such as Muslims, blacks, women, and so on. These attitudes towards outgroups are manifested 
through impoliteness, rudeness, and other impression management modes as forms of verbal 
discrimination. The inferiorisation of others stemming from ideological beliefs normally result 
in inferiorisation of speech partners, which is manifested through breaking usual norms of 
respect and politeness (Brown and Levinson, 1987). 
 
Dialogical interaction 
Conflict of ideologies and ideologically influenced power relations can be reflected through 
interaction strategies in dialogues; speakers tend to verbally adopt a superior attitude towards 
speech partners who belong to a different group or adopt a rival ideology. This often occurs 
when the normal rules of conversation are violated by carrying out “irregular interruptions, 
not yielding the floor or taking very long turns, avoiding or changing undesirable topics, 
negative meta-comments about the other’s style (choice of words) or other attributed breaches 
of etiquette, using inegalitarian speech acts” (van Dijk, 1995a: 30). 
These aspects of discourse structure are essentially valid where there is a conflict of interest 
leading to different, and sometimes opposing interpretations and evaluations of events. The 
representation of these differences is mostly reflected through an “us versus them” pattern. 
According to this pattern, the members of one group typically adopt a discourse whereby 
positive terms are used to present their own group, and negative terms to describe the other 
group (ibid: 22). Thus, a discourse analyst should pay special attention to any ideological 
elements. They are represented by what van Dijk calls “discourse structures” that establish or 
emphasise any ingroup-oriented propositions that are expressed from a self-serving 
perspective or position within a socio-political conflict (ibid). Such discourse structures often 
function in a legitimising manner to justify dominance or hegemony, for instance when violent 
actions are carried out by a totalitarian Arab regime. 
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4.3 Ideology in Translation 
Having discussed the concept of ideology and its relationship with politics and language, this 
section aims to explore the role of ideology in shaping decisions made by the translator 
whether as reader of the source text or author of the target text. It will also shed light on the 
influence of patronage on the translation process in a world of ideological and cultural 
conflicts. It will thereafter endeavor to provide characteristic examples of the translation of 
political discourse communicated in the Middle East region after the Arab Spring, in particular 
those that illustrate deliberate distortion and manipulation carried out to serve ideological 
agendas.  
  
4.3.1 The Influence of Ideology on the translator as a Reader 
Examining the impact of ideology on translation requires an extensive investigation into the 
influence of a translator’s personal beliefs regarding their role as a reader first and foremost. 
The reading process is the first step towards the translation production. The examination of 
the process of reading cannot be carried out accurately without exploring the perspective 
through which the Structuralists viewed language. Language, for them, is system of symbols 
that operates within the linguistic realisation of the world, as well as contributes to shaping 
the social characterisation of the individual. The Structuralists studied the nature of language 
and concluded that “language is constructed as a system of signs, each sign being the result of 
conventional relation between word and meaning, between a signifier (a sound or sound-
image) and a signified (the referent, or concept represented by the signifier)” (Roman, 2002: 
309). 
The era of post-structuralism witnessed a leap in the perception of the relationship between 
signifiers and signifieds. Barthes argued that signifiers and signifieds are not fixed or 
unchangeable (cited in Roman, 2002: 310). Conversely, “they can make the sign itself 
signifying more complex mythical signs as intricate signifiers of the order of myth” (ibid). 
This new perspective had an immense impact on the field of Linguistics, leading to major 
changes in tackling issues associated with the processes of reading and writing. The most 
significant change was the development of the death of the author as a concept, which was 
later integrated into Translation Studies.  
On the basis of the new hypothesis that asserts that signifiers and signifieds are constantly 
changing, Barthes believes that the interpretation of a given text can no longer be dependent 
on raising speculations on the intention of the writer who creates the text in the first place 
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(Royle, 2003: 7). Barthes thinks of a text as a separate entity that is detached from the author’s 
control and dominance, asserting that “since writers only write within a system of language in 
which particularised authors are born and shaped, texts cannot be thought of in terms of their 
author’s intentions, but only in relationship with other texts: in intertextuality” (cited in 
Roman, 2002: 311). With the decline in the author’s role in determining the semantic 
interpretation of a text, readers, including translators, interpret texts in line with their existing 
knowledge and experiences that are inevitably based on their ideologies or beliefs. The 
meaning of a text can therefore be determined by the reader’s understanding, which varies 
from one individual to another, not by the author’s input. “The birth of the reader must be at 
the cost of the death of the Author,” Barthes concludes (cited in Hermans, 1999: 69). 
Derrida, who is also a poststructuralist, adopts the structure of sign developed by Saussure, 
but views it as “a fluid entity” whose meaning is not crucially determined. This is because 
“signifiers refer only to each other” and thus meaning is in continual transformation; every 
new signifier adds a different aspect to the meaning in an everlasting chain of signification 
(Roman, 2002: 311). The result is indeterminacy (or indefiniteness) of meaning, which has 
been referred to as différance, a new term coined by Derrida from the French word différence 
(derived from the French verb différer, which literally means to differ or to delay) (ibid).  
Post-Structuralists believe that a source text is in fact a translation itself, a constant process of 
transformation of a chain of signifiers into a univocal signified. The process becomes further 
complicated if a translation of the same chain into another language is conducted. In this case, 
the originality of both source and target texts is refuted. In fact, both are derivative semantic 
unities consisting of various linguistic and cultural elements that are open for different 
interpretations and acquisition of new meanings (Venuti, 1992: 7). Accordingly, neither the 
author nor the translator as a reader of the source text has the supreme authority over the text 
to unequivocally determine the meaning. Rather, the ability to do so will constantly belong to 
all the readers and thus remain open for a never-ending circle of interpretations.  
The concept of equivalence in Translation Studies is reshaped by the emergence of the 
poststructuralist notion of textuality. It suggests that the differential plurality in a given text 
prevents, and constitutes an obstacle against, adopting a single meaning, and thus “a ratio of 
loss and gain inextricably occurs during translation process” (ibid: 7–8). Correspondingly, 
Carbonell (1996: 98) emphasises the heterogeneous nature of the signification process in both 
the source and target cultures, adding that the constant transformation of the meaning cannot 
be evaded in the translation process. The disparity between the author’s intention and the 
translator’s choice is therefore inevitable. A translator, just like an author, is not only an 
individual, but also an agent involved in both processes of the source text decoding and the 
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target text production. However, both processes are governed by the ideology of this agent, 
who is a socially and historically shaped subject. They can be conducted differently by another 
agent who is differently culturally and ideologically constituted. The difference in the 
translator’s behaviour and performance is due to the difference in the knowledge they possess 
and the experiences they have undergone. 
Robinson (2001: 72) notes that translators tend to let their knowledge and previous experience, 
which is ultimately ideological and governed by ideological norms, control their performance. 
Those who intend to work as professional translators must be aware of the translator’s 
“submissive role” and thus “submit” to being steered and guided by what their ideological 
background imposes on their performance and decisions (ibid). In fact, what bridges the gap 
between the different individual interpretations of the source text, thus bringing the 
translations closer to each other, is the ideological background shared by the translators.  
Identifying the role of the translator’s socio-cultural background, which subconsciously 
influences the translator’s performance and reading of the source text is not simple. This is 
why Toury (1999: 18) prefers not to address the “question of how, or to what extent, the 
environment affects the workings of the brain,” or the socio-cultural factors that impact the 
cognition of the translator. Nevertheless, he admits the importance of these questions, which, 
if answered, would contribute immensely to the understanding of the translation process. The 
influence of ideology on the translator’s behaviour is not limited to the process of reading and 
interpretation of the source text. Ideology, among other socio-cultural factors, also governs 
the production process of the target text, i.e. re-writing of the text, which will be discussed in 
the following section. 
 
4.3.2 The Influence of Ideology on the Translator as a Re-Writer 
Poststructuralist theory succeeded in undermining the role of the author as a sole and sacred 
determiner of the source text meaning. The translator, as a reader of the source text, was given 
the authority to adopt a personal interpretation of the text. That being said, Functionalists then 
sought to undermine the source text itself by granting absolute power to the translator as a 
producer of the target text who can create it in line with a new purpose assigned to the text. 
Schäffner (1996: 2) defines functionalist theorists as those researchers who believe that the 
“purpose” of the target text is the most crucial factor that determines and influences the 
outcome of the translation process. The functionalist approach is regarded as a giant leap from 
viewing the translation process from the perspective of linguistic equivalence, to dealing with 
it from the angle of functional appropriateness. It is now viewed as a communicative act and 
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a process that is concerned with achieving intercultural communication, delivering a 
translation “capable of functioning appropriately in specific situations and context of use” 
(Schäffner, 1998a: 3). 
Vermeer’s (2000) Skopos theory suggests that every action must have a purpose or objective. 
It laid the solid foundation for viewing translation as a process that should be conducted to 
serve a specific end within a communicative environment between two cultures (Vermeer, 
2000). Accordingly, the translation process is no longer seen as a procedure of transcoding, 
i.e. merely converting a language from one form of coded representation to another, which 
was the viewpoint of previous non-functionalist theorists. Rather, it is a human action whose 
aim is determined by the translator, constituting the focal point of the entire intercultural 
process, Hönig (1998: 9) asserts. The Skopos of a translation constitutes the aim or purpose, 
which is determined by the nature of the commission and communicative context. It is 
influenced by the translator’s standpoints, cognition and ideology, and can thus be modified 
accordingly. Vermeer (2000: 229) defines commission as the “instruction” supplied by the 
self, or another person, to perform a specific action. In this context, that is translation. 
Skopos theory views a text as a linguistic entity that includes a set of information supplied by 
its creator (an author), and passed on to a recipient (a reader). Therefore, the target text is 
looked at as a subsequent offer of information derived from prior information. This offer was 
primarily provided in a different language within a different cultural communicative 
environment (Schäffner, 1998b: 236). According to Shuttleworth and Cowie (1997: 156), a 
translator’s job is to design, shape, and produce a target text that complies with the 
requirements of the target context. It must be consistent with the target culture and meet the 
expectations of the target reader. Schäffner (1998b: 236) asserts that translation, in accordance 
with this recent trend, can be defined as “the production of a functionally appropriate target 
text based on an existing source text”. However, the relationship between both texts, and thus 
the translation process, is steered in the service of the purpose of the translation within a target 
communicative context. The outcome of the translation process, then, is not solely governed 
by the source text, its expected impact on the (source) reader, or its author’s intention. Rather, 
it is primarily determined by the purpose of the target text, which often corresponds to the 
target readers’ expectations and requirements. These requirements, however, are currently 
anticipated and proposed by the translator, who is the author of the target text. They can 
therefore be subject to the translator’s ideology and can be subsequently decided based on 
their socio-political knowledge and experiences. 
Skopos theory allows the translator more freedom in forming and creating the target text, 
freeing them from the “restrictions” imposed by the principle of loyalty to the source text and 
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the intention of the author (Schäffner, 1998b: 238), thus allowing them to be visible (Hönig, 
1998: 12). However, it puts the translator in the position of a decision-maker who is 
responsible for determining the skopos of the target text (ibid: 13). They are therefore entitled 
to make crucial decisions to meet the expectations of the target reader, respect the norms of 
the target culture, and bear the consequences that follow from these decisions (Toury, 1999: 
19). 
Nord (2003: 11) maintains that the decision making process, whether conscious or 
subconscious, is, in fact, governed by ideological considerations. Lefèvere (1992: 13), who 
was the first to examine translation as rewriting of the original text, emphasises the role of 
ideology and patronage among other cultural and social norms to control and shape the 
decisions made by the translator. Translators can choose to manipulate the original discourse 
to be consistent with their ideology and beliefs, producing a target text that does not constitute 
a transparent representation of the source text or the author’s intention. This manipulation, 
which can also imply deliberate distortion, aims on some occasions to undermine the other’s 
ideology, culture, and norms. 
The previously mentioned ideological reasons, among numerous other socio-political 
cognitive factors, may make a translator force adjustments and modifications onto the source 
discourse to devise a product that fits into a desired model. Álvarez and Vidal (1996: 3) argue 
that a translator often makes changes to an exotic discourse in accordance with the target 
culture and norms. This is done in order to make it absorbable by the target reader, or even to 
choose to create imaginary geographical and temporal settings that comply with the social, 
ideological, cultural, or religious values of the target audience or readership. This is regardless 
of whether the created environment matches, or even is close to, the original in the source text. 
The misconceptions held by the target audience or translator regarding the source culture and 
language often result in adopting hostile, or arrogant religious, political or ideological attitudes 
towards the other. These misconceptions may then govern this deliberate manipulation of the 
text. 
The tendency to present a negative image of the other may be a result of (1) the translator’s 
feelings of superiority or inferiority towards the culture or language of the other; (2) the 
translator’s submission to a dominant ideology or political system, such as the authoritarian 
Arab regimes that urge them to adopt a certain linguistic behaviour; (3) the need to meet the 
expectations of the target audience to whom the translated discourse is directed (ibid: 6); 
and/or (4) the terms and ideology of the publisher and other patrons involved in the translation 
process. This is closely linked with the role of patronage in the translation process, which will 
be discussed in detail in the following section. 
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4.3.3 Ideology, Patronage, and Translation 
The translator is not the only agent who exerts their effect on the translation of political 
discourse, especially in the context of unrest. Ideology also influences the translation through 
the presence of patrons, such as publishers, editors, and regulatory bodies. These agents tend 
to censor, restrict, and impose their own agendas, ideology, and terms on the translation. It is 
essential to begin this section by defining the concept of patronage and its implications. 
Lefèvere (1992a: 15) defines patronage as “something like the powers (persons, institutions) 
that can further or hinder the reading, writing, and rewriting of literature.” The role of 
patronage is often more concerned with the ideological aspects of literature than with the 
literary part of the work itself.  Patronage is typically associated with the notions of power and 
authority, and thus should be examined accordingly. Patronage can be exerted by persons, 
groups, institutions, upper social classes, political parties and organisations, publishers, media 
and news outlets, and authoritarian political systems. Patrons often attempt to put pressure on 
the literary system to be consistent with specific social, cultural and ideological systems and 
thus respect their values. 
Two important elements, according to Lefèvere (ibid: 14-15), help to avoid an intellectual and 
ideological clash between the literary system and other subsystems in a given society. These 
are: professionals, such as tutors, critics, reviewers; and translators, who may repress the 
works that challenge dominant and prevalent beliefs and opinions (ibid). These professionals 
can still be tempted, possibly for ideological reasons, to produce or encourage such works. 
Therefore, there is always a need for the second element – patronage – which attempts to 
hinder these forms of works. 
Lefèvere (ibid: 16) identifies three aspects of patronage: ideological, economic, and patronage 
of status. Ideological patronage tends to impose restrictions on the decisions made by literary 
professionals, including translators. It contributes to the shaping of their work and product in 
terms of form and content. Economic patronage seeks to influence what literary professionals 
write and re-write (i.e. translate) by giving them financial rewards and pensions, or promising 
them promotions. The status aspect implies conferring prestige and recognition on the 
individuals who provide services that follow and defend the patrons’ ideology. Lefèvere (ibid: 
16-17) further argues that if the three aspects are all controlled and steered by one patron, as 
in the case of the totalitarian regimes in the Arab World, then it can be called undifferentiated 
patronage; otherwise it is called differentiated. Nevertheless, in both cases individuals and 
authorities with power can exert patronage through either encouraging or restricting 
translation activities.  
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Although Lefèvere (1984: 92) admits that ‘patrons’ as a term for participants in the literary 
system, including translation and its environment, “has both positive and negative 
connotations,” he seems to stress the “discouraging, censoring” and destructive aspects of the 
patrons’ mission. This affirms that patrons can be individuals, such as Bashar Assad, Gaddafi, 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Mubarak, Ben Ali, and other leaders of the totalitarian political systems 
in the Arab World, but can also be institutions, such as the Egyptian Military Council that took 
over in Egypt after Mubarak’s resignation, or even media outlets and organisations such as 
official or private news outlets in the Arab countries. Unlike Lefèvere, Foucault (1979) tends 
to focus on the productive, encouraging and supportive implications of patronage. For him, 
power is a productive element. This perspective contradicts the negative and radical Marxist 
view that perceives power as a “repressing, constraining, distorting” force (Philp, 1983: 35). 
Foucault (1979) believes that power, patrons’ most instrumental tool, has to be seen from a 
positive perspective. He urges people to stop blaming power for the acts of excluding, 
repressing, censoring, abstracting, masking and concealing. On the contrary, “power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth,” he argues 
(ibid: 194). 
The translation process is doomed to be governed by patronage. Translators find themselves 
with very little freedom when it comes to their relationship with patrons, “at least if they want 
to have their translations published,” Lefèvere (1992b: 19) asserts. Lefèvere (1992a: 10) 
further highlights the necessity to analyse translation “in connection with power and 
patronage, ideology and poetics,” in an attempt to expose the constant efforts devoted by 
patrons to use translation to promote their ideology and undermine the opponent’s. Translation 
can be used as part of a strategy to “maintain” specific cultures and identities to “deal with 
what lies outside their boundaries” (ibid). 
The patrons’ intervention in the translation process starts with the selection process of the texts 
that are translated. Upon accomplishment, the translation is often overseen and edited by 
agents who work for the patron to ensure the translation does not violate the cultural, 
ideological, social, or even religious values of the patron and/or target audience. In other 
words, the translator is allowed to perform only within certain boundaries; they are asked to 
fulfill the aims specified by the patron, giving up most of their authority as a re-writer of the 
target text. The patron occupies the supreme position over the entire process and has the 
ultimate power and authority to publish what is deemed to be acceptable or suitable, whilst 
rejecting what is not. In fact, some consider their cultures to be superior due to their political, 
cultural, or economic status. Lefèvere (1992a: 70) points out an illustrative example regarding 
the feelings of superiority enjoyed by the French towards the cultures and languages of the 
others, to the extent that even Homer, the famous Greek epic poet and the author of 
143 
 
the Iliad and the Odyssey, “must enter France a captive and dress according to their fashion 
so as not to offend their eyes.” 
As illustrated in the third and fourth chapters of this study, the translation process is interlinked 
with politics, ideology, and power. These three factors govern the decisions made by 
participants in the translation process at two levels: micro-level, where authors and translators 
operate and impose their ideology on the texts; and macro-level, where patrons, such as 
publishers, governments, media organisations, and political regimes, hold the actual and 
ultimate authority that allows them to impose their ideology on the authors and translators. 
Therefore, the translation industry can be seen as a battlefield for conflicting ideologies and 
political stands. Writers, translators, and editors do have a say, but patrons dominate the 
process and prove to have the upper hand. This will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, which 
investigates the role played by the media in steering the translation process. 
 
4.3.4 Translation and Manipulation: Illustrative Examples 
In the previous sections, it was established that it is frequently not possible for a translator to 
resist cultural, historical, social, or ideological forces. Translators, therefore, often work under 
the constant (possibly subconscious) pressure of these factors. As a result, the translator 
produces a translation that is influenced by their own reading of the source text (which is, in 
turn, governed by the translator’s previous knowledge and experience, as explained in Section 
4.3.1) as well as their cognitive socio-ideological background. A translator can also 
consciously choose to carry out deliberate manipulation of the translation, thereby forcing a 
certain ideology upon the translation. This can be due to certain ideological affiliations or 
instructions from the patron. Hatim and Mason (1997) concede that translation has never been 
perceived as a neutral activity. 
Al-Taher (2008: 82) identifies three circles that the decision-making mechanism in the 
translation process must go through. The creation of the source text, on the one hand, is 
governed by the source culture, the author’s ideology, and the way ideas are processed and 
issues are addressed by the author. The production of the target text, on the other hand, is 
carried out in line with three elements too: the target culture, the translator’s ideological 
background, and the way the translator comprehends and processes ideas. Among these three 
circles, the target culture and the translator’s ideology, added to the influence of the patron, 
are the circles which the manipulation process goes through before a modified and biased 
translation is produced.  
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Ghazala (2002: 147) stresses the notion of “biased” translation. He refutes the notion of the 
translator’s objectivity, asserting that a translator is ultimately a human creature that belongs 
to a society and thus holds its values, promotes its culture, and defends its beliefs. Therefore, 
a translator has no choice other than being a “biased translator” who holds a certain ideology 
and seeks to implement it through translation. Shunnaq (1994: 104) also criticises the view 
that a translator should observe the principle of objectivity when translating, irrespective of 
their ideological affiliations. The view that defends the notion of the translator’s neutrality has 
proven to be unrealistic. It is no longer possible to conceive translators as “invisible glass, pale 
reflections and echoes, neutral, faceless, etc.” (Newmark, 1991: 170). In fact, “they never 
were,” Newmark (ibid) concludes. 
The impact of power held by patrons on the translation process and the role of the translator 
as a writer of the target text also lead to the production of manipulated translations. Often, 
though, the manipulation is conducted against the will of the translator (Delisle and 
Woodsworth, 1995: 131). These assumptions regarding the manipulation of translation can 
also be extended to include the translation of political discourse communicated after the Arab 
Spring. There have been many cases of manipulation targeting the translation of political 
discourse produced in the Arab World since the outbreak of the Arab Spring from late 2010 
till today. The reasons behind this distortion of discourse when rendered into a different 
language have varied, but it seems that the translators’ ideological affiliations as well as the 
influence of patrons have played a crucial role in encouraging this form of manipulation.  
The following is an extract from an article by David D. Kirkpatrick published on October 7, 
2014, on the New York Times website under the title, “As Egyptians Grasp for Stability, Sisi 
Fortifies His Presidency” (Kirkpatrick, 2014). It comments on the new Egyptian President 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s speech in front of the UN General Assembly. The subsequent translation 
of the article is conducted and published in the form of a report on the website of al-Ahram, 
an Egyptian newspaper funded and run by the Egyptian government (al-Ahram, Oct 2014): 
The New York Times article 
With President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi back from his first visit to the United Nations, the 
Egyptian news media is hailing his performance there as a transformational moment, 
for the Egyptian president and even for the General Assembly. 
No longer tainted as a former general who ousted Egypt’s first democratically elected 
president, Mr. Sisi was finally recognized by the international community as a respected 
statesman and regional leader, Egyptian commentators say. Mr. Sisi even “changed the 
way presidents make speeches at the United Nations,” the talk show host Amr Adeeb 
proclaimed, showing a video clip of Mr. Sisi ending his speech late last month by 
chanting his nationalist campaign slogan. 
… 
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 saw detartsnomed tneve eht tahw ,revewoh ,daorba gnidnats sih ni egnahc yna naht eroM
 mih dnuora gnidliub era seilla s’isiS .rM taht ytilanosrep fo tluc eht fo htgnerts eht
 naht detcetorp dna detlaxe erom raf anosrep a — rewop sih setadilosnoc eh sa emoh ta
 s’aidem naitpygE eht tuB … rossecederp gnivres-gnol sih ,karabuM insoH fo taht neve
 rednu rewop fo noitaziloponom a gnizitamard ,suominanu dna deniatsus saw esualppa
 fo elur eht ecnis yrtnuoc siht ni derrucco ton sah yas stsylana ynam taht isiS .rM
 .etats naitpygE nredom eht fo rednuof yrutnec-ht91 ylrae eht ,ahsaP ilA demahoM
ئه هناك بأدا وسائل الإعلام المصريةعودة الرئيس عبد الفتاح السيسي من زيارته الأولى للأمم المتحدة، تشيد  عم]
 واصفة ًإياه بلحظة التحول، ليس فقط بالنسبة للرئيس المصري، بل وحتى بالنسبة للجمعية العامة.
الجنرال السابق الذي أطاح بأول رئيس منتخب ديمقراطيا ً وسوما ًبكونهن السيسي لم يعد مأ ويقول معلقون مصريون
في المنطقة. وقد غير السيسي في مصر، فقد اعترف بالسيسي أخيرا ًمن قبل المجتمع الدولي كرجل دولة محترم ورائد 
، أديب وفقا ً لما أعلنه المذيع التلفزيوني، عمرو دة،"ا الرؤساء خطبهم في الأمم المتحالطريقة التي يلقي به"حتى 
 .هاتفا ًبشعار حملته الانتخابية والذي أظهر مقطع فيديو للسيسي وهو ينهي خطابه في أواخر الشهر الماضي
 ...
قوة عبادة ورغم ذلك، وأكثر من إظهاره لحدوث تغيير في موقف الخارج بالنسبة له، ما أظهره هذا الحدث هو 
حيث إنه شخصية مفخمة ما يقوم هو بتعزيز سلطته، الشخصية التي يبنيها حلفاء السيسي حوله في الداخل بين
ولكن تصفيق  ... ي خدم في نفس المنصب لفترة طويلةومحمية أكثر بكثير حتى من حسني مبارك، وهو سلفه الذ
وسائل الإعلام المصرية استمر وبالإجماع، في تهويل لاحتكار السلطة في ظل السيسي، وهو الاحتكار الذي يقول 
ه لم يحدث في هذا البلد منذ حكم محمد علي باشا، مؤسس الدولة المصرية الحديثة في أوائل أنالعديد من المحللين 
 2 [.القرن التاسع عشر
 
 troper marhA-la ehT
إن الرئيس عبد الفتاح السيسي أكد صورته أمام الرأي العام الدولي كرجل دولة يحظى  قال الكاتب ديفيد كيركباتريك
 بالاحترام والتقدير في المنطقة من خلال خطابه في الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة.
تغيير الطريقة " الأمريكية، أمس، أن السيسي استطاع "نيويورك تايمز" في مقال نشرته صحيفة وأوضح كيركباتريك
 ".تحيا مصر" من خلال إنهاء خطابه، وهو يهتف ،"الرؤساء الخطب في الأمم المتحدة التي يلقي بها
 ...
ورأى كيركباتريك أن السيسي استطاَع أن يمحو صورة كانت في أذهان البعض أن ما حدث في مصر في يونيو 
 ورة.وليست ث "انقلاب" 3102
من خلال الدعم الذي  وذكر أن حكم السيسي أصبح يعتمد على قوة شخصيته وشعبيته الجارفة بشكل غير مسبوق،
 03ام به منذ اندلاع ثورة وتوج كل ما قيلقاه في الدولة المصرية ومن قبل حلفائه، وهو الأمر الذي عزز من سلطته 
 يونيو.
 egami sih demriffa isiS-la hattaF ledbA tnediserP taht dias kcirtapkriK divaD rohtuA[
 ni deruonoh dna detcepser si ohw namsetats a sa noinipo cilbup lanoitanretni fo tnorf ni
 .ylbmessA lareneG NU eht ni hceeps sih hguorht noiger eht
 weN ehT ,repapswen naciremA eht yb dehsilbup elcitra na ni denialpxe kcirtapkriK
 reviled stnediserp hcihw ni yaw eht egnahc“ ot deganam isiS-la taht yadretsey semiT kroY
 ”.tpygE evil gnoL“ gnituohs ,hceeps sih gnidne yb ”,snoitaN detinU eht ta sehceeps rieht
 ...
 eht ni tneserp saw taht egami eht esare ot elba saw isiS-la taht was kcirtapkriK
 saw 3102 enuJ ni tpygE ni deneppah tahw taht stseggus hcihw elpoep emos fo sdnim
 .noitulover a ton ”puoc“ a
 dna ytilanosrep sih fo htgnerts eht no tnedneped emaceb elur s’isiS-la taht detats eH
 eht yb seviecer eh troppus eht hguorht ytiralupop suodnemert yldetnedecerpnu
 denworc dna ytirohtua sih denehtgnerts taht rotcaf a – seilla sih dna etats naitpygE
 ].03 enuJ no noitulover eht fo kaerbtuo eht ecnis enod sah eh gnihtyreve
                                                          
 .esiwrehto detats sselnu rehcraeser eht yb decudorp era snoitalsnart-kcab llA 2
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Although the article (the English source text), clearly and undoubtedly expresses negative 
opinions about al-Sisi, portraying him as an oppressor who enjoys a “monopolization of power 
… that many analysts say has not occurred in this country since the rule of Mohamed Ali 
Pasha, the early 19th-century founder of the modern Egyptian state,” the translator manipulates 
the translation and inserts words and sentences that do not actually exist in the ST. An example 
is the following sentence from the al-Ahram’s report (back-translated), “Kirkpatrick saw that 
al-Sisi was able to erase the image that was present in the minds of some people which 
suggests that what happened in Egypt in June 2013 was a ‘coup’, not a revolution”. 
Meanwhile, the translation ignores other information that presents the coup leader negatively 
and is thus against the translator’s (or perhaps patron’s) best interest. 
In the beginning of the article, Kirkpatrick cites some opinions of key Egyptian commentators, 
such as Amr Adeeb. However, the deliberately distorted translation claims that these opinions 
belong to Kirkpatrick himself, ignoring any mention of Adeeb or other Egyptian media 
sources that the author quotes in the ST. Apparently, the entire article by Kirkpatrick aims to 
criticise the “strength of the cult of personality that Mr. Sisi’s allies are building around him 
at home as he consolidates his power.” Paradoxically, though, the al-Ahram article claims that 
the New York Times writer states, “Al-Sisi’s rule became dependent on the strength of his 
personality and unprecedentedly tremendous popularity through the support he receives by 
the Egyptian state and his allies.” Al-Ahram’s translation undermines the entire original 
(negative) discourse embedded in the ST, replacing it with a different discourse with a 
completely different (positive) content, which was invented by the translator and was steered 
to serve the ideology and agendas of the patron, namely the Egyptian regime led by al-Sisi. 
Another example comes from Algeria, a large Arab and North African nation that also 
witnessed limited, but significant, mass protests following the outbreak of the Arab Spring. 
During an official visit made to Algeria, the US Secretary of State John Kerry made 
controversial remarks on April 3, 2014, concerning the forthcoming Algerian presidential 
election (US Department of State, 2014). The Algerian National News Agency Algérie Presse 
Service translated the remarks into Arabic, and published them on its website in the form of a 
report (Algérie Presse Service, 3 Apr 2014). Thereafter, the US State Department released a 
statement in which it accused the Algerian News Agency of manipulating Kerry’s remarks. 
John Kerry’s Remarks 
Lastly, you have an election coming up here in Algeria two weeks from now. We look 
forward to elections that are transparent and in line with international standards, 
and the United States will work with the president that the people of Algeria choose in 
order to bring about the future that Algeria and its neighbors deserve. And that is a future 
where citizens can enjoy the free exercise of their civil, political, and human rights, and 
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where global companies, businesses, are confident in being able to invest for the long 
haul. 
]،ًاريخأ نلآا نم نيعوبسأ دعب رئازجلا يف انه تاباختنا مكيدل نوكتس ، ةفافش نوكت تاباختنا ءارجإ ىلإ علطتن نحنو
ةيلودلا فارعلأا عم ةقفاوتمو .فوسو  ينبي يكل يرئازجلا بعشلا هراتخي يذلا سيئرلا عم ةدحتملا تايلاولا لمعت
 ةيناسنلإاو ةيسايسلاو ةيندملا مهقوقح ةسراممب نونطاوملا هيف عتمتي لبقتسم ،اهناريجو رئازجلا هقحتست يذلا لبقتسملا
سلاا ىلع مهتردق نم نيقثاو لامعلأا لاجرو ةيملاعلا تاكرشلا نوكت ثيحو ،ةيرح  لكبليوطلا ىدملا ىلع رامثت.[ 
Algérie Presse Service’s report 
 يكيرملأا يرئازجلا يجيتارتسلاا راوحلل ةيناثلا ةرودلا لاغشأ حاتتفا ىدل اهاقلأ ةملك يف يريك ديسلا لاق و" اننإ
نوحاترم  نوكليف ةررقملا ةيسائرلا تاباختنلاا  17 ليربا ةيفافشلا راطإ يف يرجت". 
 نأ يريك ديسلا ىري و.نيدلبلا نيب نواعتلا و تاقلاعلا ريوطت ىلع بختنملا سيئرلا عم لمعتس ةدحتملا تايلاولا 
 نأ لائاق فاضأ ويندملا هعمتجم و هبعش روطت ىلع صيرح دلب رئازجلا"". 
[Mr. Kerry said in a speech at the opening of the second session of the Algerian American 
Strategic Dialogue, “We are satisfied with the fact that the presidential election 
scheduled on April 17 is held in line with the principles of transparency.” 
Mr. Kerry sees that the United States will work with the elected president on the 
development of the relations and cooperation between the two countries. 
And added that “Algeria is a country that is keen on the development of its people 
and civil society.”] 
The Algerian translation of Kerry’s remarks gives the impression that Washington has a 
positive prejudgment of the forthcoming Algerian election, giving it full political endorsement 
and recognising its transparency in advance. However, the US State Department regarded the 
translation as inaccurate and released a statement highlighting the distortions, pointing out the 
differences between the correct translation and the manipulated one. Although Algérie Presse 
Service later also released a statement denying any deliberate distortion (Algérie Presse 
Service, 5 Apr 2014), pointing out to technical reasons to justify these mistakes and explain 
the circumstances of the incident, the motive behind this manipulation is abundantly clear and 
understandable; the Algerian regime was desperate for international recognition in light of the 
forthcoming election, hence establishing its legitimacy to rule the country. In fact, the 
manipulation occurred as part of the domestic political conflict over power in Algeria, and this 
example illustrates how translators, journalists, editors, publishers, at one level, and patrons, 
such as Algérie Presse Service and the Algerian ruling regime, at a higher level, can be active 
and influential participants in this conflict.  
Such examples taken from translations of political texts illustrate the influence of ideological, 
and socio-political affiliations on the decisions made by translators and patrons to control the 
translation process and use it to serve specific agendas.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
The relationship between ideology and language in general, and translation, in particular, is 
substantial, yet complex. It can be manifested through the presence of translators, whether as 
readers of the source text or as producers of the target text, and patrons, whether productive 
or repressive. This relationship has governed, and will continue to govern the translation 
process, giving political and ideological conflicts a new dimension. Accordingly, translation 
can be viewed as a battlefield in which fighting is carried out by means of expressions and 
words, and the warriors are translators, reviewers, publishers, and patrons.  
In fact, the translation of political discourse communicated in a central region like the Middle 
East, which constitutes a scene for many ideological, cultural and political conflicts, is 
expected to be subject to many forms of intervention, whether ideological or political. In all 
conditions, the media remains a prominent field and sometimes the means of such 
interventions. The next chapter will examine the role of the media in the translation dilemma.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MEDIA AND TRANSLATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The media played a crucial role during the Arab Spring in circulating and translating the 
political discourse produced by the Arab leaders and officials or even protestors and civil 
activists. In fact, neither ideology nor politics can be effective in today’s world of rapidly 
developing technology and information exchange in the absence of mass media outlets. 
Therefore, there is a need for a close investigation into the role of the media in shaping, 
influencing, and even manipulating the translation of political discourse. This chapter 
examines the effect of the media institutions’ agendas, goals, and political affiliations on the 
translation process. It begins by looking into the relationship between the media and politics 
as well as the different ideological strategies and tools employed in media discourse. It also 
discusses the impact of decisions made by media outlets on the translation process, 
considering in detail the stages of news translation as well as the strategies often employed by 
news channels and newspapers in press translation. Furthermore, this chapter points out a 
number of tools often exploited by the media to manipulate the outcome of the translation 
process such as framing, hyperbole, and understatement, ending by investigating newsroom 
translations in particular. The theories introduced and discussed in this chapter will be used to 
analyse the data derived mainly from the Syrian revolution in Section 7.5 of Chapter Seven. 
 
5.2 Media and Politics: Media Discourse  
The mass media controls people by possessing the tools necessary to effectively mobilise the 
public for political, social, and economic causes. It is argued to have direct and unlimited 
access to the population, which no other medium has. The influence of the media on the public 
is exerted through a “hidden power”, which tends to cover any underlying ideological and 
political conflict of interests (Fairclough, 1989: 49). Fairclough agrees with Karl Marx that 
the political elites who possess power address the people through mass media using a repeated 
discourse, which is ultimately ideological and thus serves their own political agenda. This 
discourse, which is often politically and ideologically steered, is broadcast to the entire 
population and is repeated on numerous media outlets (ibid: 54).  
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Paul Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945), Adolf Hitler’s Propaganda Minister in Nazi Germany, 
said, “If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe 
it.” If included only in one text, however, the lie, according to Fairclough (1989: 54), will not 
make any change to public opinion. “The effects of the media power are cumulative, working 
through the repletion of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of 
positioning the reader, and so forth” (ibid). A political party, regime or institution aiming to 
promote their narrative often does so through creating a cumulative media effect on millions 
of readers and watchers. It is done through numerous newspaper articles, interviews with 
political commentators, movies, news reports, and talk shows, typically leading to serving the 
political and/or ideological agenda of this political organisation or government. This process 
often goes unnoticed by the audience who, in many cases, will not have the opportunity to 
discover the real agent that sponsors these activities. 
One of the most striking examples of this employment of the mass media cumulative effect 
after the Arab Spring is the constant attempts to demonise Islamist parties, especially the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Pro-Sisi Egyptian media outlets have associated the movement with al-
irhāb (“terror”), frequently accusing them of at-taxābur maᶜ Ḥamās (“collaborating with 
Hamas”) as well as talaqqī ad-daᶜm min Amrīkā (“receiving support from America”). 
Although the Egyptian authorities have failed to provide evidence on many occasions, the 
Egyptian media have kept repeating these allegations, giving the anti-Islamist voice a platform 
to spread Muslim-Brotherhood-phobia amongst the Egyptians. 
Fairclough (1989: 185) points out five voices that can be found in mass media outlets: 
politicians, political reporters, experts, representative of social movements, and ordinary 
people. Media outlets often allow these five categories of voices to be heard. However, they 
tend to give a specific voice a prominent position to serve a specific ideological or political 
agenda, giving it the upper hand and the last word. Political commentators who are often given 
the status of “experts” by media outlets, according to al-Taher (2008: 45), “have a great 
influence on the readership, especially when they, in a given newspaper, agree on directing 
the people to take a stance based on a certain ideological view.” Political institutions, 
governments, and lobbies often exert pressure on media outlets, subsequently affecting their 
decisions.  
Van Dijk (1998: 187) notes the “influential” and “pervasive” function of today’s global media. 
The media is becoming more important and effective than any other institution in society, 
whether religious, political, or social. News, movies, talk shows, documentaries, and other 
genres of information and analysis sources broadcast on the media are often produced and re-
produced in accordance with the values and agenda of political institutions in order to serve 
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certain ideological and political attitudes. In this sense, these sources of information are in fact 
colonised by political powers that heavily invest in the media to steer public opinion and 
dominate society (Fairclough, 1995b: 200). However, the relationship between politics and 
the media in the battle for control can also work the other way around. The media may ignore, 
and thus weaken, specific political groups, at the same time allowing more space and coverage 
to praise others (ibid). 
The media can also be used to crystalise support for a political leader by shedding light on his 
or her featured advantages, strengths, and achievements. This process is referred to by 
Fairclough (2000: 4) as making “media personalities” whose “communicative styles” are 
given all the attention needed to make them stars in the world of politics. An example of this 
phenomenon is the unpreceded attention given by the Egyptian media to the then Egyptian 
Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi before he was elected President with 96.91% of votes 
in the presidential election which took place between 26 and 28 May 2014. The concept of 
“media personality” can be compared to the notion of voices proposed by Fairclough (1989). 
In the field of journalism, the relationship between politics and the media seems to be essential 
since the majority of texts, including articles published in newspapers, tackle political issues, 
often occupying the “first pages of quality newspapers” (Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 4). 
Most editorials and newspapers seem to provide biased evaluations of political situations, 
adopting political stances that are far from neutral. By doing so, they influence the readers and 
dominate their judgement on various political events. They, therefore, contribute to the 
political decision-making process itself. Schäffner and Bassnett assert that in many cases “the 
publication of a text in a broadsheet, often as the result of investigative journalism, has made 
a politician resign” (ibid). 
According to Schäffner and Bassnett (ibid: 5), editorials resort to a process of 
recontextualisation of news stories in which the story is evaluated and subjected to a process 
of transformation. Some details may be deleted, the incidents can be rearranged, and some 
elements can be omitted or substituted with others that are more consistent with the editorial’s 
agenda. In line with this strategy, which can also be employed in news reports and interviews, 
some segments of political speeches may be ignored while others are highlighted. Similarly, 
some quotes are given a new context; i.e., preceded and followed by sentences that may alter 
the meaning of the original quote. The result may be the destruction of the message embedded 
in the original text. Blackledge (2005: 121) states that this process of transformation may not 
be restricted to simple linguistic changes; rather it often entails “filtering of some meaning 
potentials of a discourse.” 
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Intertextual references to other texts, written by either the same or different writers are a 
feature of political discourse in general, and political commentary in particular. These “pre-
existing texts may belong to a different genre and may have functioned in a different context” 
(Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 6). The outcome is a chain of texts that produces a new 
meaning since the updated version of the chain is placed within a new context, in a new text, 
with a different genre every time there is quoting. This cumulative process of textual chaining 
in media ultimately leads to semantic and syntactic transformation. The changes that occur as 
a result of this process of recontextualisation depend on “the goals, values, interests and [on] 
the context into which the discursive practice is being recontextualised” (Blackledge, 2005: 
122). 
Recontextualisation is more common in the case of reporting on political events taking place 
in foreign countries where different languages are spoken. In this situation, the political text 
concerned is probably produced in a different language. Therefore, the text will be subject to 
a process of translation whereby recontextualisation, and thus transformation, are most likely 
to occur. Section 5.5 dealing with translated media material will investigate the 
recontextualisation process as well as the underlying effect of ideology and politics om 
translation. 
 
5.3 Ideological Strategies in Media Discourse 
Media effect is exerted through employing strategies aimed at promoting certain ideologies 
and nurturing specific political trends. This systematic process of strategy employment is 
intended to be invisible, as ideological elements are often embedded in the background of the 
media material. The aim is to allow the audience to read and understand the text in line with 
the interpretation already set by the media institution (Fairclough, 1989: 85). In order for a 
given piece of media material to exert the intended effects on the audience, the ideologies 
embedded in it must be “least visible”, so that they attain a high degree of naturalisation. This 
allows the receiver to be subconsciously influenced, leading the ideologies to be perceived as 
“common sense” (ibid). For Fairclough, the greater the absence of “ideological content” and 
political orientations, the more effective the text becomes (ibid: 92); a successful and 
influential ideology is a disguised one that pretends to be something that it is not (ibid). This 
mechanism of effectiveness is explained by al-Taher (2008: 47) as an attempt to utilise “the 
human tendency to be most influenced” by the discourse that addresses “the spontaneity of 
the subconscious”. This is a strategy whereby embedded ideological and political assumptions 
become unquestionable for a normal receiver. 
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Hodge and Kress (1993) identify two ideological strategies employed in discourse production 
and media presentation. They argue that political events represented on the media are first 
subject to a process of manipulation where “reality” is manipulated in line with a pre-existing 
agenda (ibid: 157). The so-called political commentators tend to manipulate “the orientation 
to reality” through political analysis and then evaluate the events in a way that is consistent 
with the political beliefs of the media outlet or its sponsors and funders (ibid). For Fowler 
(1991: 1), a piece of media material is not based on mere ideas. Rather, it is composed of 
beliefs and propositions that are mainly ideological, commonly indicating the political 
affiliation of the media outlet. Before it is published or broadcast, such a media item is subject 
to a process of careful selection in accordance with a number of ideological and/or political 
considerations, regardless of its importance as a piece of news. The selection is followed by 
another process of transformation in an aim to present a news item that is a “value-laden” 
representation of the actual political or social event (ibid: 2). 
Al-Taher (2008: 48) highlights what he sees as a “discrepancy” between Hodge and Kress’s 
approach to the manipulation of reality carried out by the media and Fowler’s model of 
selection and transformation. Therefore, he suggests a new approach that can bridge the gap 
between the two above models, proposing that a news item often goes through three stages 
before publication or broadcasting. First, the item is selected in accordance with a set of 
standards and principles, most of which are ideological and/or political. Second, the media 
material is represented linguistically and technically in a certain way that serves the agenda 
of the media institution. Third, political commentators and analysts carry out an evaluation of 
the news, highlighting some details and ignoring others depending on the values of the media 
outlet. According to this model, a news report is considered a manifestation of the second 
stage (representation) even though it might carry a degree of subtle evaluation. Political 
commentary articles, on the other hand, represent the third stage of evaluation in which a news 
item is explicitly analysed. 
Another approach that offers an insight into the strategies employed in the media industry to 
empower certain ideologies whilst undermining others is Hatim and Mason’s (1990) model, 
which discloses the strategies employed mainly by print media: monitoring and managing. 
Shunnaq (1992: 36) explains monitoring as an act aimed at providing a description of the event 
offering any “evidence” available. Managing is defined as an act of “steering” undertaken by 
a media outlet to employ and use a given event in the service of a specific agenda (ibid). When 
an event is monitored, the media outlet producing the news item imitates a spectator but when 
the event goes through the managing stage, the media outlet gets involved in the event itself 
and becomes a participant (ibid: 40). 
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According to Shunnaq, the use of direct quoting indicates a form of monitoring since the 
situation is neutrally described. However, using indirect quoting, though, gives some space 
for transformation of the original message (ibid: 106). Reporting verbs like claimed, regretted, 
alleged, and confirmed reflect the personal stance and opinion of the reporter, while using 
more neutral reporting verbs like said or stated indicates a higher degree of objectivity (ibid: 
107). Fairclough (2003: 49) associates direct quoting with faithful exposition of news since it 
ensures reproducing the statement as it “was actually said or written.” This notion of 
faithfulness correlates with Hatim and Mason’s monitoring whereby a media outlet tends to 
use a more objective language. Nevertheless, attaining complete objectivity and neutrality is 
rather far-fetched in the sphere of mass media. 
Shunnaq (1994: 112) outlines a set of procedures that media outlets employ while managing 
news items prior to publication or broadcasting. The first procedure involves the choice of the 
events to be covered. Certain stories that correspond with the media institution’s goals are 
picked up, while those that do not are largely ignored. Secondly, general and vague 
expressions can be used to describe serious incidents to soften the effect on the receiver. 
Thirdly, in some cases, the agents of reported actions can be omitted to shed light on the act 
itself, rather than the doer. Fourthly, quotes, whether direct or indirect, can be framed using 
reporting verbs carrying negative or positive implications. Common examples are alleged and 
regretted. Fifthly, a reporter may decide to interfere in the original statement produced by the 
source in order to either intensify or alleviate the effect on the receivers (e.g. a terrorist act). 
Lastly, using phrases that carry appropriate connotations accentuate the emotiveness of the 
story. 
These strategies and procedures require suitable tools in order to be implemented effectively 
in media discourse that tackles political subjects. The following section investigates a number 
of devices employed in media discourse production and proposed by different discourse 
analysis scholars. 
 
5.4 Ideological Devices in Media Discourse 
The process of transformation that arises by employing the aforementioned strategies cannot 
be achieved without the use and development of certain devices that are aimed at steering the 
discourse and dominating the perception of the audience. According to Fowler (1991), four 
major devices can be utilised to ideologically influence the audience through a news item: 
promotion of ideological consensus, using terms of abuse and endearment, using 
conversational style, and employment of stereotypes. 
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Despite acknowledging that the ideological and political consensus is unattainable, media 
outlets resort to generalisation to convey an impression that the entire nation is united and 
maintains the same stance on a given cause. By doing this, the media tries to gain the support 
of the vast majority of the population, at the same time demonstrating that most of the people 
share the same views and beliefs as the media outlet (ibid: 48). The use of the pronouns “we” 
and “us” reinforces this tendency. The following is an excerpt from a news report published 
on the al-Wafd newspaper website, known for its support for al-Sisi in Egypt. The report cites 
and covers a statement by Mustafa Hijazi, Political Advisor to President (Farghali, 2013): 
ملا يمحتس ةلودلا نأ حضوأ،نييرص  موي اوجرخ نيذلا30 نيدلا مساب فنعلا نم ،وينوي فوس رصم نأ ادكؤم ،
 نييرصملا نلأ رصتنتم تقو يأ نم رثكأ نودحتم نلآا ىضباهرلإا وهو دحاو ودع دض،  نوفرعي مه ببسلا اذهلو
ودعلا هب نوفرعي يذلا ردقلا سفنب ملحلاو لملأا. 
[He explains that the State will protect the Egyptians who protested on June 30 from 
violence in the name of religion, stressing that Egypt will win because the Egyptians 
are united now more than ever before against one enemy which is terrorism. That is 
why they recognise hope and dreams as much as they recognise the enemy.] 
The extract reflects the speaker’s and the reporter’s desire to assert a form of consensus among 
the Egyptians against the “enemy”, as if the entire population approves the speaker’s 
proposition regarding the nature of the political conflict in Egypt. Such an implication is not 
exactly accurate, as one may conclude from the course of events in Egypt. Fowler (1991: 117) 
refers to the use of terms of abuse and endearment in media discourse. Media outlets tend to 
praise certain individuals or groups by using diminutives or honorifics or by highlighting their 
positive qualities and achievements. They may also resort to insults and criminalisation to 
distort the image of other individuals or groups. Using the term “enemy” in the above extract 
to refer to the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters exemplifies this ideological tool.  
Conversational style can even be used to enforce familiarity and stress commonalities between 
the media outlet and its audience, whether readers or watchers. This creates an atmosphere of 
informality and agreement between both parties (ibid: 57). The closer the media’s material 
style is to people’s daily life, the more effective it becomes. In addition, the use of stereotypes 
is a common tool in media discourse production; individuals or groups are cognitively framed 
and classified into “paradigms”, which are in turn placed in “pigeon-holes”. Media institutions 
reinforce them to create a particular image of these groups or individuals within a political and 
ideological conflict over power (ibid: 17).  
In the above extract, the speaker, Mustafa Hijazi, insists on stereotyping the behaviour of the 
Islamist parties in Egypt, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, who he labels as primary 
enemies of the Egyptian people. The Muslim Brotherhood is described as the main source of 
“terrorism” in Egypt and thus all Egyptians must stand and fight against them. In addition, 
Suleiman (2004: 166) underlines the significance of place naming in the context of conflicts. 
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In the context of the Arab Spring, some political commentators and reporters seem to 
implicitly express their support for the Arab Spring protests by adopting names such as Sāḥāt 
at-Taġyīr (“Change Squares”) (in Yemen), Sāḥāt at-Taḥrīr (“Tahrir Squares”) (in Egypt), and 
Sāḥāt al-Ḥurriya (“Freedom Squares”) (in Syria) for the squares in which the demonstrations 
were held. 
Fowler’s ideological tools employed in media discourse seem to overlap with Beard’s (2000) 
procedures that are utilised in political discourse production to legitimise or delegitimise the 
actions and behaviour of politicians and parties. The main difference lies in the identity of 
those who produce the relevant discourse; Fowler is more concerned with the analysis of the 
discourse produced by media outlets, i.e. news articles and reports, whereas Beard examines 
the discourse produced by politicians and political organisations. 
Editorials are the natural platform for political commentary and analysis, including the 
expression of ideologies, and beliefs or opinions on current events. “Newspaper comments”, 
al-Taher (2008: 54) asserts, “are argued to be one of the forms of pure ideology. They are 
expected to display maximum ideological attitude.” Fowler (1991: 110-5) points out two main 
characteristics related to the style and content of the articles published in this sort of 
newspaper: first, the use of evaluative adjectives and adverbs; and second, the use of 
intertextual elements such as proverbs and other forms of previously written texts. The 
following is an extract from an article by Richard Spencer published on the Telegraph website 
on January 6, 2013, comparing Assad’s statement to Gaddafi’s speeches directed at the 
crowds: 
Then there were the lapses into bizarre sentimentality, as when he announced: “I look 
at the eyes of Syria’s children and I don't see any happiness” – something that would 
hardly surprise anyone who had watched the news over the last two years. 
(Spencer, 2013) 
Throughout this extract, and most of the article, intertextual elements originally produced by 
Assad and Gaddafi can be traced. This is not the only feature pointed out by Fowler that can 
be found in this commentary article. The writer, in this extract, also seems to use what Fowler 
calls ‘evaluative adjectives’, which show here that the author is not impressed with Assad’s 
statement. The adjective “bizarre” is an example of the author’s dissatisfaction, contempt and 
skepticism, given that it is followed by the word “sentimentality”. 
Fowler’s reference to intertextuality as a key characteristic of political commentary articles 
can be linked to Achugar’s (2004: 311) proposition that intertextuality is found in editorials 
in two forms: comparison and reported speech. Political commenters often tend to compare 
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between events, situations, and statements. An example of this compared intertextuality can 
be found in the following extract taken from the aforementioned article by Spencer:  
There was more than a little of the Gaddafi about Bashar al-Assad’s appearance on 
Sunday, and not just the theatre of a personality cult … even the slogans were the same 
as the slain Libyan dictator: “God, Syria, Bashar, enough”.  
(Spencer, 2013) 
This extract and the previous one are good examples of articles that use the second form of 
intertextuality, referred to by Achugar as reported speech. In both extracts, the writer tries to 
support his argument using previous statements by the likes of Assad and Gaddafi. Other 
writers can also incorporate the views expressed by various authorised political analysts and 
politicians to support their analysis. In addition to intertextuality, Achugar (2004: 300) 
identifies three forms of emotions that authors, especially political commentators, tend to 
employ in their articles and other forms of political commentary to influence watchers/readers: 
(dis)satisfaction (e.g. expression of admiration, respect, etc.); (un)happiness (e.g. expression 
of excitement, sadness, frustration, etc.); and (in)security (e.g. expression of reassurance, fear, 
anxiety, etc.). However, in order to be effective, these emotions must not be exaggerated or 
used in the absence of convincing proofs and logical arguments. Otherwise, they fail to exert 
the desired effect on the audience. 
The objective behind the aforementioned ideological tools can be summarised as the 
implementation of the media outlet’s strategies aimed at positively presenting the in-group 
and distorting the image, beliefs, and values of the out-group. This process has to be 
undertaken without being noticed, so that it can exert the desired impact on the audience. It is 
worth mentioning here that the notion of neutrality seems to be an illusion. In fact, the big 
questions that need to be addressed are: To what extent is a media institution being subjective 
and biased? To what extent are news items managed in accordance to the media outlet’s 
criteria? And to what degree are the above ideological tools employed in the discourse 
produced and circulated by a given media outlet? 
 
5.5 Media and Translation 
Before investigating the relationship between the media and translation, it is very important 
to note that the work of a translator is often a hidden task in media reporting, even though 
politicians’ statements are constantly reported directly and indirectly in translation by the 
media. The word ‘translation’ is often avoided in the media industry and there are many 
examples of translators referred to as journalists (Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 9). Despite its 
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immeasurable importance and the constant need for it, the craft of translation remains invisible 
and translator training in the news and reporting sector in the media is still absent.  
The translation process is largely unnoticed and remains absent in an area where the primary 
concern is to deliver news to the audience even though it involves procedures that may affect 
the content and style of a news item. For instance, in order for an interview to reach the target 
audience, it has to undergo a long and complicated chain of textual transformations between 
two or more languages. These transformations are derived from a set of processes, which 
include initial editing, summarisation, translation into the target language, further editing, 
transferring into a media outlet, adaptation to the publisher’s textual style, and shortening to 
fit in the space allocated for it by the publisher (ibid). 
Schäffner and Bassnett (2010: 7) refer to “recontextualisation across linguistic boundaries” as 
part of the expected transformation process that a news item undergoes during translation. 
Typically, the reader does not have access to the full interview transcript; they can only read 
a few quotes and extracts carefully selected by the media outlet. Because the reader does not 
have the privilege to read an interview in full, it is not possible to estimate the amount of 
information excluded by the publisher. It is not possible even to check if the sequence of the 
original interview has been changed or even manipulated to produce a different meaning other 
than the original (ibid). In fact, the decisions made in these cases determine the outcome of all 
the processes including the translation process.  
Schäffner and Bassnett (ibid: 8) affirm that all forms of transformation that are associated with 
recontextualisation during the translation process are in fact consistent with the aims, 
principles, agenda, and interests of the media outlet broadcasting or publishing a news report, 
which may be, in turn, based on the ideology and political affiliation of this particular 
institution. These factors are manifested in the preferences demonstrated when “specific 
information” is privileged “at the expense of other information” (ibid). It is further witnessed 
when certain news is suppressed and prevented from being published or broadcast. 
Statements made at press conferences, political speeches (such as the ones made by the Arab 
autocrats during the Arab Spring), and interviews with the local and international media are 
often converted by media outlets into news reports that only include a few extracts from the 
actual text. In all these cases, the original political discourse is expressed in a language 
different from the one in which it was primarily produced. That being said, it is rarely pointed 
out that a significant part of the report (whether direct or indirect quotations) has been 
translated or interpreted. These excerpts are therefore subject to a complex process of textual 
transactions (ibid: 7).  
159 
 
When political interviews are conducted, they are typically interpreted and recorded. 
Thereafter, the recorded interpretation is converted into a transcript that is to be edited and 
corrected to match specific stylistic criteria (ibid). If the interview is not interpreted, the 
interviewee may have license to review the transcript and authorise it. This, however, becomes 
more complicated if the transcript is made in a different language to the interview since the 
interviewee may not understand or speak the target language. In this situation, “advisors or 
the interpreters themselves often fulfil this checking function” (ibid). This means that a news 
report may include extracts from a transcript that has not been checked or authorised by the 
interviewee, but rather by interpreters and journalists who often work for the same media 
outlet that publishes or broadcasts the interview. 
Fairclough (2006: 98) maintains that the form and meaning of stories are transformed in 
accordance with “the genre conventions of news narratives.” Furthermore, if no translation is 
conducted, the audience who is already familiar with the general subject being reported on 
can presuppose some information that the reporter may choose to omit since it can be easily 
inferred (Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 8). However, if a translation is made, the target 
audience may not necessarily share the background knowledge and culture of the interviewee 
and may thus misunderstand the news or statement if some details have been suppressed or 
ignored by the reporter.  
Schäffner and Bassnett (ibid) ask a number of questions regarding the circumstances 
surrounding the translation/interpretation of a piece of media material that needs to be 
addressed in order to determine the degree of transformation accompanying the information 
rendering process: What is the language of the actual text? Was an interpretation /translation 
conducted? Who carried out the interpretation/translation? Who provided the 
interpreter(s)/translator(s)? How many interpreters/translators were involved in the process? 
If it is an interpretation, who prepared the transcript, converting the interview into a text? And 
who translated it into the target language? What transformations developed as a result of these 
procedures? Who took the decision to publish and who selected the information to be included 
in the report? Who granted the approval for the final version of the report before it was sent 
for printing? Were all of these aforementioned procedures undertaken by journalists, or 
professional translators/interpreters? 
Bani (2006: 37) points out an important principle featuring print media translation, namely 
“the imperative of quickness”. According to her, this refers to two notions that the translator 
has to bear in mind when conducting media translation: firstly, speed in translation, which 
means that the translator has a limited time to conduct and finish the translation – normally a 
matter of a few hours for daily newspapers; and secondly, speed in translation exploitation, 
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which means that a translated news item is typically read quickly by the reader, given the fact 
that it is, by nature, a light text featuring instant information and “should offer immediate 
comprehension” (ibid). 
The factors explained above prompt Schäffner and Bassnett (2010: 9) to wonder if the 
characteristics of the craft of translation indeed apply to press translation “since what happens 
does not fit established models of interlingual translation activity and comes closer to what 
happens in interpreting, where the goal of the transaction is more important than any sense of 
equivalence.” In any case, the issues introduced in this section of the study shed light on the 
possible transformations that normally occur in media translation, affecting the content, style 
and genre of a news item published by a media outlet. They pave the way for a further 
investigation to be carried out on this topic in the following sections. 
  
5.6 Stages of News Translation 
Understanding the stages which the translation process undergoes allows us to understand the 
impact of the different agents involved in the translation process on the translation itself. For 
Vuorinen (1995), each of the translation process stages, starting with the choice of material to 
be translated and ending with the feedback provided by the readers of the target text, represent 
a gatekeeper that influences both the content and style of the text. Moreover, each of these 
stages involves decisions made by certain agents affecting the outcome of the translation 
process. Bani (2006) has conducted an interesting study on the various stages that a translated 
news item, especially articles published by the Italian newspaper Internazionale, passes 
through. It starts with “the selection of sources to be analysed,” which often represents 
“favoured sources” for “the Italian editorial board from the ideological and political point of 
view” (ibid: 38). Although the study is focused on the working environment and criteria 
established by Internazionale, its results and conclusions can represent a pattern and thus offer 
an insight into media translation in general. 
The first stage of the translation process is governed by the fact that the editorial board of a 
given newspaper is normally familiar with a limited set of languages (ibid). These languages 
are often international languages, such as English and French, or languages taking on an added 
importance for being spoken in neighboring countries, such as Turkish in the case of Syrian 
newspapers for instance. Subsequently, newspapers published in other than these particular 
languages do not represent possible sources; newspapers do not typically review the articles 
published in all the global newspapers, as many readers may think (ibid).  
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Typically, the editorial board that are responsible for selecting the articles for translation 
examine the leading global newspapers published in the range of languages known by the 
editors. They also search among a number of newspapers belonging to the “the most important 
countries,” (ibid) as well as those published in countries that have a special importance from 
a cultural, political or economic perspective. The editorial board is also keen on shedding light 
on original subjects and attitudes that can attract a reader’s attention (Venuti, 1998). Although 
Bani (2006) points out interesting criteria for topic selection in media translation, she seems 
to neglect the ideological and political motives that account for the preference of specific 
topics over others, especially at times of conflict. For instance, in the first days of the Syrian 
revolution, pro-Syrian regime media outlets tended to deliberately avoid presenting articles 
published in key international newspapers offering political commentary on the mass protests, 
preferring other subjects such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The next stage of media translation, according to Carbonell (1996), is associated with the 
selection of the actual text to be translated. The factors governing this selection may vary, but 
Bani (2006: 39-40) identifies four main factors. 
First, most newspapers seem keen on selecting articles by famous authors and/or initially 
published by prominent newspapers that have a high reputation worldwide. Bani (ibid: 39) 
asserts that “the source contributes to guarantee translations prestige.” For Ayala (1985), the 
status of the author is essential for attracting the global media attention to their articles. The 
authors can also be among those sailing against the wind and arguing against a dominant 
ideology. Nevertheless, newspapers seldom show interest in translating and re-publishing 
items that adopt a rival ideology or political stance unless they imply a sort of self-criticism. 
This eventually contributes to the justification and support of the newspaper’s own ideology. 
The second factor governing this process of selection is stylistic convenience. In other words, 
the article should fulfil, and adhere to, the stylistic requirements and guidelines set by the 
newspaper itself. This is a requirement to ensure stylistic consistency with other items 
published in the newspaper. However, Bani (2006: 40) asserts that, in many cases, “the 
information function prevails over the formal aspect: it does not matter whether an article is 
badly written or if its style hardly fits” with the newspaper’s; “what does matter is its subject,” 
simply because the style will be “manipulated” in line with the style desired by the editors 
(ibid). This reflects an aspect of manipulation undertaken in news translation, which affects 
not only the content, but also the style of the translated material.  
The aforementioned argument by Bani leads to the third factor that influences article selection 
in news translation: subject matter. Some items are selected because they address specific 
issues, which the rest of media outlets overlook for different ideological and political reasons 
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(ibid). However, this tendency towards presenting articles that address subjects neglected by 
other newspapers is, more often than not, ultimately driven by ideological and political 
considerations. 
The fourth factor is associated with the world’s perception pertaining to the country that the 
newspaper belongs to. Newspapers are especially keen on presenting articles that reflect the 
world’s opinion on the local affairs of the home country (ibid). In an era of armed conflict and 
political instability, many Middle-Eastern newspapers aim to translate and publish articles that 
discuss issues such as the Arab Spring, the Yemeni conflict, the war against Islamic State, and 
the armed revolution in Syria. This is due to the belief shared by most Arab readers as well as 
media outlets that the political decisions regarding the conflicts occurring in the region are 
actually made abroad in the West. Of course, when this is the case, translation acquires an 
added importance. 
After the selection process is completed, the translation process begins; the chosen material is 
sent to a translator, who may work either as a freelancer or full-time employee, in order to 
produce a target text. Bani (2006: 40-1) identifies two main characteristics of the translator’s 
role in news translation: invisibility and loyalty. 
The invisibility of the translator is manifested by both the little importance attached to the 
translator’s name (in comparison with the focus given to the author’s) and the efforts made by 
the translator to make the target text similar to a text originally produced in the target language. 
This usually allows the reader peace of mind, creating the illusion that the target text is 
identical to the source text (Venuti, 1995). They are thus unlikely to question the outcome of 
the translation process, not feeling the need to go back to the source text and try and detect 
any possible inaccuracies or manipulation. On the other hand, the loyalty of the translator, 
being the expert responsible for leading the translation process, is imperative, as in many cases 
editors are obliged to trust the translator’s choices due to their lack of relevant cultural and 
linguistic skills (Nord, 1997). 
After the translation is finished, the editors receive the first draft, which is then reviewed and 
checked by more than one person: an editor who reviews the quality of the translation and the 
translator’s decisions by comparing the target text to the source text; a proofreader whose sole 
responsibility is to check the target text alone; a copy editor who decides where the new text 
will be placed amongst other items published in the newspaper; and finally the director who 
manages the entire process (Bani, 2006: 41). Out of the four, only one editor accesses the 
source text. This shows that the perception of the target reader is a priority over other values 
such as sincerity, truthfulness of translation, and the translator’s faithfulness (ibid). 
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The successive processes conducted by translators and editors often result in various forms of 
manipulation, such as adjusting and modifying the target text in line with the target reader’s 
expectations and requirements; fully reorganising the text both conceptually and structurally; 
breaking up some paragraphs and merging others; changing the syntactic features of the text 
to adhere to the editors’ stylistic criteria; and adding explanations where needed (Vidal 
Claramonte, 1996). Playing with the headings and changing them in order to “guide” the 
“reader’s comprehension and interpretation” is another manifestation of the manipulation 
carried out throughout the translation process (Bani, 2006: 41). 
Bani (ibid) concludes the examination of news translation by shedding light on the reader’s 
reaction to the translated text. This is considered the final stage of the news translation process. 
Typically, readers’ reactions vary; some write to the newspapers to point out mistakes and 
inaccuracies, and others object to the newspaper’s partiality in selecting the items translated 
and published in the newspaper. Readers are often unable to understand that the selection 
process by nature is inherently biased, and the role of ideology and influence of politics often 
account for a newspaper’s practice (ibid). 
 
5.7 News Translation Strategies 
The previous section introduced the various processing stages that a news item undergoes 
before it reaches the reader: from locating a piece of media material written on an event in a 
foreign newspaper, news agency, or media outlet, to creating the news item in the target 
language and sending it to be printed. These sequential processes comprise both translation 
and editing, or what Hursti (2011) refers to as “transediting”. This process is aimed at 
transforming the source text both linguistically and structurally to match the expectations of 
the target reader and the norms of the target language. The underlying goal is consistency with 
the agenda and goals of the media outlet. This transformation is carried out through certain 
strategies such as re-organisation, deletion, addition, and substitution (ibid). These 
“gatekeeping” procedures, in fact, rely on the extent to which the editorial team is familiar 
with the news reported, including its context and historical background, as well as the identity 
of the editor assigned to each phase of the transediting process (Gambier, 2006: 13). 
According to Hajmohammadi (2005), the gatekeeping decisions are mainly imposed and 
influenced by the media institution in line with certain goals and ideologies as well as the 
standard requirements of speed, news style, and readability. Gambier (2006: 13) asserts that 
the final news product is aimed at pleasing the target reader as well as the media outlet. 
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Gambier (ibid: 14) then identifies four main strategies often employed to transform news items 
in line with the media outlet’s guidelines and criteria: reorganisation, deletion, addition, and 
substitution. In many cases, editors tend to re-organise and restructure the original news item 
by redistributing the information among the paragraphs and rearranging the order of the story 
details. This may entail “permutation of individual lexical items, but also extensive revamps 
of information at a higher textual level” (ibid). This re-organising procedure becomes 
necessary due to disparities between languages and varied linguistic norms and cultural 
conventions. It must comply with the expectations of the target reader and goals of the news 
organisation that publishes the target text.  
Translators and editors can omit some of the information embedded in the source text. The 
deleted content may involve words, sentences, and even paragraphs. The amount of lexical 
omission is totally dependent “on the number of facts, the degree of accuracy,” and “the 
redundancy of the source text” (ibid). Addition may occur in this complex process of 
transformation of content and style. This is often required when clarification is needed to 
provide more background explanations regarding the issue under investigation. Substitution 
can be used to generalise some details, alter the focus, provide summaries, or depersonalise 
certain figures (ibid).  
In some instances, the aforementioned strategies do not succeed in rendering a certain lexical 
item into the target language. According to Gambier (ibid), lexical borrowing therefore 
becomes necessary. Many theorists have pointed out the same strategies with different labels, 
while others identified other strategies and procedures employed in news translation, such as 
controlling, transforming, and supplementing (Akio, 1988). However, neither the number of 
strategies, nor the naming of said strategies, are important to Gambier (2006: 14). Rather, the 
realisation that news translation cannot be viewed as an honest and transparent medium of 
news reporting is the key. An analyst of news and discourse has to bear in mind the textual 
changes that arise from the recontextualisation and transformation processes and the 
implantation of the above strategies. Translators and editors working for news institutions 
ultimately determine these processes. 
In an article published on Correspondents.org online editorial, Mohammad Kheir, an Egyptian 
journalist, sheds light on an event “seen by the entire world during President Abdul Fattah al-
Sisi’s visit to the United Nations this past September” that proves that news reports can still 
be distorted and fabricated (Kheir, 2014). In October 2014, Kheir affirms that The New York 
Times accused al-Ahram, a pro-regime Egyptian newspaper known for its support for 
President Sisi, of carrying out a manipulated translation of an article originally written by 
David Kirkpatrick, which was published on October 7, 2014 under the title “As Egyptians 
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Grasp for Stability, Sisi Fortifies His Presidency” (see Section 4.3.4). In the original article, 
the writer mentions that Gen. al-Sisi’s speech was received with silence in the UN General 
Assembly meeting, yet the Egyptian media celebrated the event. Nonetheless, in its report, 
Kheir adds that al-Ahram manipulated the translation of the article, alleging that the audience 
in the meeting actually praised the speech. The al-Ahram report tried to demonstrate that The 
New York Times also praised Prisdent al-Sisi. The writer employed many strategies that were 
noted by Gambier (2006), namely deletion, addition, and substitution in line with al-Ahram’s 
political affiliation.  
Bani (2006: 42-3) makes a clear distinction between two kinds of strategies employed in media 
translation: textual strategies, concerning the operations tackling the text itself; and extra-
textual strategies, aimed at restoring the “visibility of cultural diversity” featuring the source 
text. 
According to Bani (ibid: 42), four types of textual translation strategies can be employed when 
dealing with cultural elements in news translation: cutting or summary, inclusion of 
explanations, generalisation, and substitution. Cutting or summary is where a cultural element 
is omitted if its presence is regarded as too insignificant to be worth including in the target 
text. Inclusion of explanations means the providing of further explanations (through 
paraphrasing and backgrounding) on a given cultural reference that already exists in the source 
text. This is employed to make the text comprehensible for the target reader. Generalisation 
is where a certain cultural reference “is made more generic” and substitution is utilised in case 
a given cultural element seems obscure to the target reader and is thus substituted by “another 
functionally equivalent element, but better known” to the target reader. 
Bani’s (2006) model of textual strategies can be compared to Gambier’s (2006) strategies 
employed in media to transform a news item in line with certain requirements. Both cutting 
(summary) and deletion refer to the omission of some information that is already existent in 
the source text. Moreover, both inclusion of explanation and the strategy of addition imply the 
providing of further explanations on certain obscure concepts; extra information is added to 
make the source content intelligible to the target reader. Finally, the strategy of substitution is 
in fact pointed out by both Bani and Gambier alike as a necessary procedure according to 
which an item in the source text is replaced by a culturally equivalent item in the target text. 
In addition to the textual strategies used to facilitate the comprehension process for the target 
reader, Bani (ibid: 43) identifies seven extra-textual strategies aimed at providing 
clarifications on the source text. These clarifications go beyond the actual text, assisting the 
reader to comprehend the information embedded in the text by contextualising the source 
content, making it more understandable for the target reader. Through subheading, an editor 
166 
 
can refer to certain concepts that would stay undiscovered if not stated in a prime position. 
Pictures can be used to clarify some ideas that become difficult for a target reader to 
understand if translated into a foreign language, as visual “communication makes textual 
comprehension easier without requiring effort from the reader” (ibid). Maps help a target 
reader visualise the text thereafter and thus place it in its appropriate geographical context. 
Chronologies contextualise a news material in a certain timeline, and glossaries refer to listing 
and explaining the words posing difficulties for the target reader’s comprehension, providing 
the reader with “a graphically clear reference where to find unknown words” (ibid). A subject-
related bibliography provides information on the source cited in the article, often referring to 
other books and articles for further reading on the topic discussed to help the reader reach out 
to other sources that investigate the same subject. Lastly, information about the author, in the 
form of a short biography, helps the reader to relate the source text to a convenient context. It 
also reminds the target reader that the text is actually rendered from a foreign language.  
 
5.8 Translation Strategies for Ideological Conflict 
Alongside the aforementioned strategies, Loupaki (2010) adopts a model based on three 
strategies and procedures that translators often employ when working on the translation of 
texts that contain ideological elements related to conflict. The first is reproducing ideological 
conflict in the target text, the second is erasing ideological conflict in the target text, and the 
third is introducing new conflicts in the target text. These strategies are aimed at increasing, 
toning down, or eliminating ideological content and elements related to conflict in the target 
text. 
Reproducing ideological conflict in the target text can be achieved by a literal importation of 
original lexical choices from the source text. Rendering ideological micro-textual units into 
the target language can ensure the preservation of a certain approach to ideological conflict 
and particular pattern established by the original author (ibid: 64). Furthermore, preserving 
original frames established by the author of the source text contributes to the reproduction of 
ideological conflict embedded in the source text. Such frames, in fact, reflect “internalized 
structures of expectation” within a given community or ideological group and are employed 
textually by using a number of framing devices (ibid: 65), such as interpretative naming, 
evaluative language, and modals. Interpretative naming refers to utterances used to depict a 
person, group or situation (Tannen and Wallat, 1993: 31). Evaluative language, such as 
adjectives and adverbs, reflects the author’s ideology and beliefs, while modals indicate the 
author’s personal judgement about individuals, concepts, and situations (ibid: 45). By re-
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employing these techniques, a translator can ensure the preservation of ideological conflict in 
the target text. 
The second strategy proposed by Loupaki (2010: 66) aims to remove micro-elements that refer 
to ideological conflict from the target text. This technique can be implemented by resorting to 
neutralisation and omission. Some strong and tense ideological terms can be neutralised by 
using more general and neutral words. Omission is considered by Loupaki (ibid: 67) to be a 
“very frequent” norm in news translation that is a wise choice when the source text item is 
either regarded as already known to the target reader, or classified as less important to the 
interests of the target reader. The translator may also deliberately follow this strategy along 
with its two aforementioned tools in order to avoid giving the target reader an undesired 
ideological shock, which may contribute to increasing the intensity of ideological conflict. 
Apparently, such a decision is ultimately made by the translator and/or their employer to serve 
their interests. 
The third strategy aims to present new aspects of ideological conflict in the target text. This 
can be achieved, according to Loupaki (ibid: 68), through either addition or omission of 
ideological elements. Addition is meant to attract the reader’s attention to a certain opinion, 
and the added text is thus often given a prominent position. For example, the first lines of an 
article constitute the lead in the text since people tend to take for granted any opinions 
presented in an authoritative manner. This procedure of addition may involve names and 
adjectives bearing negative or positive implications as well as the actual stating of the subject, 
i.e. the agent responsible for the action in the sentence (ibid: 70-71).  
However, addition can be implemented to meet readers’ expectations and for the article to be 
consistent with readers’ beliefs and opinions on a certain ideological conflict. In any case, 
choosing to add or delete specific information reflects “a clear one-sided position on behalf 
on the translator” (ibid: 68). Moreover, by introducing ideological conflict, the translator can 
resort to explicitation of what is made implicit in the source text (ibid: 70). This choice 
illustrates the translator’s awareness of the readers’ tendency towards “perceiving the world 
in terms of contrasts” (Sidiropoulou, 2004: 33). 
Alongside addition, omission of ideological textual units that do not adhere to, and serve, 
specific trends and beliefs held by the original author seems to be a norm frequently used by 
translators (Tannen and Wallat, 1993: 32). This device can operate in the target text at the 
macro level, establishing a new pattern of argumentation throughout the text; one opinion is 
promoted and the other is entirely eliminated. This necessarily results in undermining the 
objectivity of the article. 
168 
 
5.9 Tools of Manipulation: Hyperbole, Understatement and Framing 
Having examined various strategies employed in press translation in the previous sections, 
this section aims to discuss three tools often utilised by media outlets to manipulate news and 
translated media items: hyperbole, understatement, and framing.  
Gambier (2006: 10) defines hyperbole as “a rhetorical device used to highlight, intensify, and 
amplify selected elements of the image of reality,” often aimed at persuading the audience in 
a communicative environment. This tool is typically related to literary works, but can be 
employed as a linguistic device in non-literary texts, such as pieces of news, articles, 
interviews, and political speeches seeking to promote a political agenda and achieve specific 
political goals (ibid). According to the Literary Devices website, understatement is defined as 
“a figure of speech employed by writers or speakers to intentionally make a situation seem 
less important than it really is” (Literary Devices, 2015). In fact, the two tools are not equally 
present in all sorts of cultural, political and linguistic texts. However, whether dependent on 
information overtly or covertly stated, both devices significantly contribute to determining the 
reader’s perception of the text. 
In order to exert the desired effect on the receiver, neither device should be accompanied by 
successive exaggeration without providing logical evidence for the claims made. Otherwise, 
they would be considered as political propaganda (Gambier, 2006: 10). In many cases, 
politicians using tools such as hyperbole and understatement tend to succeed in persuading 
the public of the truthfulness of the claims embedded in their political discourse circulated by 
the media. However, they seem to fail in achieving the same outcome with a foreign audience 
speaking a different language. Gambier (ibid: 11) wonders if such failure is because the 
discourse employing such devices is not used “with the same frequency” and, in many cases, 
is literally translated into the target language. Therefore, these elements are regarded as false 
exaggerations and allegations that lack credibility. This is especially the case, given the fact 
that a target audience speaking a different language belongs to a remote culture, and therefore 
they more likely to take hyperbolic statements literally.  
In addition to the aforementioned tools, framing is employed in news production and 
translated news as a tool of manipulation to provide “frames of reference, or highly 
stereotyped representations of specific situations, to make the event accessible to the public” 
(ibid). These frames influence the way the recipients interpret the discourse and stories 
circulated by the media. According to Schank and Abelson (1997), these frames may take the 
shape of stereotypical scenarios and routines, reinforcing certain beliefs. They are consistent 
with certain expectations in a particular political context and are designed by media outlets to 
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determine the audience’s perception of events, allowing the audience to label and determine 
the nature of realities. 
By framing media discourse, reporters, alongside editors, produce a specific context for a 
given event or statement, according to which readers perceive and interpret the event, 
determining the meaning of a given statement. Through the employment of this device, media 
outlets aim to “shape the inferences made, reinforce stereotypes, determine judgments and 
decisions,” and “draw attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements” 
(Gambier, 2006: 11). For Baker (2006), this process of selection forces the audience to interact 
with the text in line with their comprehension of the news item as originally delineated by its 
producers.  
Stories produced and circulated by the media are often biased and subjective, framed to 
enhance and impose a certain narrative and interpretation of an event. The text is manipulated 
both semantically and stylistically to steer the audience’s perception and emotions. The study 
of the influence of translated frames becomes more significant in this age of globalisation, 
Gambier (2006: 12) affirms; news materials circulated by multi-media outlets, news websites, 
and social media networks are normally translated, reframed, and put in new contexts, thus 
acquiring new meanings. This process of reframing translated news often leads to a 
reconstructed reality that has already gone through a former process of recontextualisation 
when first reported in the source languages.  
In this process of double transformation, translators and editors are the main players 
responsible for the reproduction and adaptation of the frames (ibid). BBC news reports, for 
instance, by nature involve framing. Arabs in an Arab country watch them, and the Arab 
audience’s frames are unlikely to match the original frames embedded in the English material. 
This is due to many factors that are mainly associated with culture and familiarity with the 
topic of the report. This situation is equally applicable if an Arabic-speaking TV channel is 
watched in the UK. 
This gap between frames becomes wider when translation is involved. Valdeón (2005a) cites 
examples of media institutions that launched channels in foreign languages, but failed to 
attract a large enough audience or produce sufficiently high-quality media material and so had 
to close down. Foreign media channels seem to present translated news items that are 
ambivalent and intertextually incoherent towards sensitive and debatable topics. The problem 
is that translated media items seem to express so much loyalty to the source culture that they 
often adopt its narrative, thus creating obscurity and misunderstanding. Gambier (2006: 12) 
argues against the role of the translator as a mediator and translation being a transparent 
medium of information transfer: “The translated texts signal an ethnocentric position” (ibid). 
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Valdeón (2005b) notes another problem caused by the gap between frames: generally 
speaking, what was considered true and suitable at some point in the past may not be regarded 
likewise in the present or the future. Subsequently, closer to the main concern of this study, 
the frames produced before the Arab Spring, for instance, are no longer effective after 2011. 
Due to its importance to the subject of this dissertation, the notion of framing will be examined 
in further detail in Chapter Six. 
 
5.10 Newsroom Translation and Interpreting 
The relationship between the media and translation takes on an added importance in the 
broadcast newsroom where a translator is required to work under pressure and within tight 
spatial and temporal constraints. This becomes even more challenging when interpreting is 
involved. Gile (1995: 178-83) investigates the consecutive interpreting process, identifying 
two main tasks undertaken by a consecutive interpreter working for broadcast news media. 
First is the listening and analysis task, which also involves reading when the interpreter is 
provided with a transcript of the speech being interpreted. Second is the note-taking task, in 
which information received is processed, re-structured and re-expressed in the target language. 
The role of memory, which becomes almost minor in the case of simultaneous interpreting, is 
essential in the consecutive interpreting process.  
Tsai (2006: 60) attempts to implement Gile’ model on broadcast news translation in which the 
listening and analysis task transforms to a reading effort. A broadcast news translator at times 
has to deal with numerous large source texts that need to be reduced by third or even less; they 
rely on their own judgement to summarise the news material. They therefore often “flip 
through a range of copies, making almost instantaneous decisions as to what is relevant to the 
construction of the story and taking the liberty to drastically rule out anything repetitious and 
less relevant” (ibid). In the case of audio material, the translator, not having access to a 
transcript, is obliged to listen carefully to the story, analyse it, and come up with a sufficient 
and meaningful summary. According to Tsai (ibid), the second task pointed out by Gile, 
namely note-taking, is transformed into a re-writing effort; many procedures and strategies 
are employed to produce translations of news items originally written in a foreign language. 
Such procedures involve, but are not restricted to, the following: omission, addition, synthesis, 
generalisation, and reorganisation. 
According to van Dijk (1988: 14-15), concision represents a main quality of broadcast 
newswriting; news channels often resort to summarising broadcast stories before they are 
translated into the target languages. Unlike newspapers, which tend to publish full and detailed 
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stories, news channels use shortened and concise versions of the news. Brooks and Pinson 
(2005: 358) mark condensation as another characteristic of broadcast news; news item are 
often condensed since a TV or radio news broadcast is typically allowed a limited time to 
deliver a full day’s news stories (Cohler, 1990: 7). This, in fact, opens the door for news 
channels to use manipulative strategies, highlighting certain events of a story at the expense 
of other important details that may be hidden or dumbed down. This environment of rapid 
reporting and brief newswriting can pose a challenge for translators who find it difficult to 
ignore details, and as a result produce long, constantly refined translations (Tsai, 2006: 61). 
News broadcast translators and newsroom interpreters often deal with texts, speeches and 
news broadcasts that do not use “beautifying language” (Padilla and Martine, 1992: 201). The 
material is often rich in dialogue and has a conversational style similar to that used by ordinary 
people speaking everyday language (Gunter, 1987: 170). Therefore, Brooks et al. (2002: 411) 
find it necessary for translators to produce a target text that can be fluently spoken as part of 
an ordinary conversation. At the same time, it should be accurate and informative to fulfil the 
purpose of a news item. Since the target audience do not have access to the original news 
material and often have a limited knowledge of the source language, a broadcast news 
translator typically structures the story effectively, prioritising the values of clarity and 
accuracy in order to produce a precise target text that contains all the important details of the 
story. The least amount of speech should be used, bearing in mind that “the ultimate goal is to 
write to speak to people, not read to them” (Tsai, 2006: 61).  
Tsai (ibid: 62) stresses the factor of time, which seems to place constant pressure on translators 
working in a newsroom. Tsai argues that a news translator needs to undertake and record the 
translation of a given item within less than two hours. This process involves three main tasks: 
the translation production, voice-over recording, and film editing, all of which are required to 
be carried out within half an hour. This means that the translation process must be completed 
in 10 minutes (ibid).  
Seleskovitch (1994) stresses the importance of producing a meaningful target text regardless 
of the words used to express the meaning. This is because the news audience normally listen 
to words simply to capture the message behind the statement (Seleskovitch and Lederer, 1995: 
2-3). Analysis, therefore, constitutes the core of the understanding process. Only through 
analysis are messages successfully delivered and the meaning understood. Seleskovitch and 
Lederer (2003: 22) identify three stages for the interpreting process. First, understanding the 
linguistic units, i.e. words carrying the meaning, can be achieved through critical analysis and 
interpretation. Second, deverbalisation is where words are deliberately discarded and the 
interpreter becomes mentally aware of the message behind the statement. Third, the target 
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language utterances and structures are used to express the message embedded in the source 
text meaningfully. In the case of news broadcast translation, the stage of deverbalisation 
becomes more crucial in determining the outcome of the translation process since the source 
text is subject to a significant process of transformation and summarisation. In this process, 
the original wording is entirely discarded and the structures are reshaped before the news item 
is broadcast in the target language. 
 
5.11 Conclusion 
The media plays an important role in presenting political discourse as well as shaping public 
opinion on current political issues. Many examples derived from today’s mass media 
demonstrate that political affiliations and ideological views influence the strategies adopted 
by media outlets. More often than not, one needs to understand the underlying discourse and 
editorial policy to account for the decisions made by media institutions and news agencies. 
Since news items can cover various parts of the world and are therefore produced in different 
languages, translation becomes a crucial element in the media process. Newspapers, media 
channels, and news agencies all need translators and interpreters in order to address different 
audiences that speak different languages, and to make news stories originally produced in 
foreign languages understood by particular audiences. Translators working for media 
institutions, however, cannot be isolated from a range of social, ideological, and political 
factors. These factors govern translation choices and decisions made by news translators or 
their employers, and thus control the final product of the translation process. This chapter 
alongside the previous ones can be summarised as follows: Translation, politics, ideology, and 
media are interlinked and affect one another. The effectiveness of each is dependent on the 
others, and each element influences, and is also governed by, the others.  
The following chapter introduces an approach that is closely correlated to the subject of this 
research study: a narrative approach to the relationship between conflict and translation, 
examining the role of different – sometimes irreconcilable – translated narratives, effectively 
(re)shaping the image of conflict. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TRANSLATION AND NARRATION OF CONFLICT 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The last two chapters investigated the translation of political discourse while reflecting upon 
other factors that are interlinked with the translation of politics. Alongside ideology and media, 
conflict constitutes the third side of this triangle of political discourse-related concepts. 
Whatever roles people occupy in life and whatever activities they participate in, they remain 
part of a conflictive environment. They contribute to shaping this environment while it 
influences them accordingly. Today’s conflicts not only influence the geographical area in 
which the conflict occurs, they also transcend political and social boarders, exerting an instant 
impact on a larger regional or even global population. Therefore, translation, whose main 
function is to facilitate communication across linguistic boundaries, becomes substantially 
sought after by opponents and disputing parties to legitimise and promote their descriptions 
of the conflict while undermining the rival parties’ narratives. 
Competing popular narratives produced by revolutionaries and pro-regime elites during the 
Arab Spring revolutions and subsequent military conflicts represent a typical example of 
discursive dispute at all political, ideological, and social levels. Translation is an integral part 
of conflict, playing a vital role in describing, shaping, and unfolding its events. This chapter 
looks into narrative theory and the way translation operates in this environment of conflicting 
narratives. It aims to introduce narrative theory, list types of narrativity, and explain its 
features and the way narrative works. It also explores the concept of framing, examining the 
different modes of narrative framing in translation. The theories introduced and discussed in 
this chapter will be used to analyse the data derived from the Syrian revolution in Section 7.6 
of Chapter Seven. 
 
6.2 A Narrative Approach  
Offering a deep insight into narrative theory first requires providing a clear and comprehensive 
definition of the concept of narrative. Labov (1972: 359-60) provides a basic definition of 
‘narrative’ as a way to summarise personal experience by using linguistic and verbal 
utterances, i.e. words and sentences, to describe events that indeed took place. Fisher (1987: 
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193) suggests that through narration, all forms of communication are interpreted, assessed, 
and judged. Unlike discourse production which expresses a “deliberate” decision made by the 
producer, narration, for Fisher (ibid), is an act that reflects the background knowledge and 
experience of the narrator. Somers (1992: 600) emphasises the significance of narrativity in 
assessing the surrounding environment, comprehending concepts and events, and dealing with 
society, as well as constructing personal “social identities”.  
According to Baker (2006: 19), narratives can be the stories that people narrate to themselves, 
as well as to others. They may touch people’s personal lives or tackle public issues, ultimately 
governing people’s actions and influencing their beliefs. Although a micro- and macro-textual 
analysis of translated narratives is to be carried out in this research study, the emphasis will 
not be on textual or structural aspects of narrative. Instead, it will be, as Bennet and Edelman 
(1985: 159) suggest, on the ability of narratives to influence human behaviour, way of 
thinking, morals, values, principles, and the way people perceive themselves and the 
surrounding world (see Section 7.5). Thus, the significance of narratives does not lie in the 
way they are structured but rather the way they function as tools for changing attitudes and 
constructing reality (Bruner, 1991: 5-6). 
Narratives refer to stories that are produced and circulated, often by ordinary people on a daily 
basis, and thus develop dynamically and change subtly or radically when narrators encounter 
new experiences and hear fresh stories (Baker, 2006: 3). Baker draws a comparison between 
the three concepts of narrative, discourse, and myth. She asserts that concreteness and 
accessibility are two main characteristics of narrative along with its tendency to feature 
personal stories produced by normal individuals. In this sense, narrative is not limited to 
stories serving public interests and causes (ibid). Conversely, the idea of discourse seems 
much more abstract, while the concept of myth constitutes “an element in a second-order 
semiological system,” and both tend to tackle political, social, and cultural issues that interest 
the public as a whole, rather than individuals (ibid). Whitebrook (2001: 15) affirms that 
narratives allow the representation of personal identities with “singular sets of characteristics” 
that may not be consistent with any proposed political affiliations or “group identity”. 
Based on the aforementioned description of the concept of narrative, Baker (2006: 3) points 
out three main features of narrative theory. First, narrative theory suggests that people’s 
actions are steered and influenced by the stories they hear about, and conceive from, the 
outside world, forming their judgements accordingly. Second, narrative theory emphasises the 
dynamicity of narratives and their ability to change and constantly evolve. Therefore, people 
do not just choose the stories they circulate, yet they contribute to forming and developing 
these stories. Third, due to their tendency to change following new exposures and experiences, 
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narrative theory claims that narratives have a subversive nature. Narratives can be transformed 
and even reversed, and thus evolve into counter-narratives whose ultimate function is to 
challenge and undermine the original ones. The effectiveness of the Arab revolutions, on many 
occasions, was dependent on the ability of the revolutionaries to construct counter-narratives 
that can challenge and undermine those nurtured by the ruling elites and regime loyalists. This 
undoubtedly contributed to convincing millions of frustrated people to join the few thousands 
who started the early demonstrations across the Arab World. 
Unlike many linguistic and literary scholars, Baker (2006: 9) does not consider narrative as a 
separate genre since a narrative is not confined to political and social topics. Instead, it can 
refer to technical and scientific texts, as there is no text that does not benefit from, or constitute 
a part of, “the story of life” (Fisher, 1987: 85). Even a scientific paper leading to findings and 
conclusions represents an “organized sequence” of events that follows the regular pattern of a 
typical narrative, which includes a beginning, a middle, and an end (Landau, 1997: 104). 
Predictably, statistical figures are often employed to contribute to conflict between competing 
narratives by supporting one while undermining the other. In the context of the Arab Spring, 
Middle East Monitor reports on the use of allegedly fake statistical figures to support the 
legitimacy of the Egyptian opposition’s demands and the reportedly pre-planned military coup 
following large-scale anti-Morsi demonstrations on June 30, 2013:  
[T]he numbers game was played by the opposition and the military to orchestrate and 
justify the coup d’etat against President Mohamed Morsi. For whatever reason, several 
external parties also used the numbers claimed to validate their support for the military 
intervention … To give their statistics an air of respectability and credence, the anti-Morsi 
alliance claimed that their crowd statistics were obtained from coverage and analyses 
conducted by Google Earth. Though never confirmed by the satellite giant, the estimates 
given ranged from 14.3 million to 33 million demonstrators. A search of the net revealed 
no official statement by Google Earth to confirm these claims. Meanwhile, MEMO 
requested a comment from Google but has not received a reply. 
(Middle East Monitor, July 2013) 
Each set of statistical data cannot be isolated from the story itself, and thus “should be 
interpreted in a storied context” (Fisher, 1987: 48). In other words, they should be considered 
and assessed in light of the events of the story; first, they constitute an essential part of the 
story proceedings, and second, they are used to justify certain actions resulting from the event. 
Narrativity is often employed in political contexts to exert a long-term normalising effect on 
listeners (Baker, 2006: 11) in order to accept and believe the stories they hear about events 
without questioning or expressing any doubts with regards to the credibility and 
trustworthiness of the source. The Arab Spring has proved that narratives can be used by 
autocratic regimes as a propaganda weapon to justify brutal procedures against opponents, 
civil and political activists, and demonstrators.  
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The Houla Massacre took place in the Syrian village of Taldou, located in the Houla Region 
near Homs on May 25, 2012, and was reportedly carried out by pro-Assad militants. The 
National Review Online news outlet published an article by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi and 
Phillip Smyth, investigating the narrative that the Assad regime constructed, attempting not 
only to deny their responsibility for the massacre, but also to portray its loyalists to be the 
victims. The authors attempted to observe the reports undertaken by various newspapers on 
the event and Assad’s propaganda in general: “FAZ [German newspaper Frankfurt 
Allgemeine Zeitung] alleges that not only did opposition-group members carry out the Houla 
massacre, but the victims were principally Alawites – that is, part of Assad’s religious sect – 
along with some Sunni families that had converted to Shiism” (Tamimi and Smyth, 2012)  
FAZ does not seem to be the only Western newspaper that comes to believe the Assad 
regime’s propaganda and adopt their narrative: “Throughout the Syrian conflict, Western 
media sources have accepted bait provided by Bashar al-Assad’s most prodigious 
propagandists, who regularly weave tales of anti-Assad, al-Qaeda-style groups’ expelling or 
murdering members of minority groups” (ibid). These “tales” are the grounds of the regime’s 
political discourse, which turns to a form of narratives adopted and circulated by its supporters 
and loyalists (ibid). 
Translation as a mandatory medium of communication is essential in normalising and 
nourishing narratives across linguistic barriers (Baker, 2006: 14). Any conflict, whether 
political, military, or social, is necessarily a conflict of image in which all parties aim to 
construct and deconstruct an enemy by delegitimising its actions and distorting its image. 
Nelson (2002: 8) asserts that a conflict entails dehumanising the enemy and dealing with the 
enemy as a “foreign and distant” entity. This subsequently provides a pretext for torturing, 
maiming, and slaughtering the other. Translators and interpreters contribute to either 
facilitating or challenging this process of dehumanisation, which aims to transform the who 
into it whose misery and anguish become acceptable and tolerable (Baker, 2008: 14). Bassnett 
and Edelman (1985: 159) assert that political narratives often seek to promote a certain 
ideology, imposing it on people who normally choose to act passively and adopt towards 
events. This makes it easier for them to accept, circulate, and translate these narratives without 
investigating and inquiring into their implications, especially if they tackle people who are 
seen as alien to the set of norms, beliefs, and values in a given society. 
Another topic that has captured much attention from scholars interested in narrative theory is 
the connection between narrative and reality. Bruner (1991: 5) argues that only recently have 
scholars started to think of narrative not only as a representor of reality, but also as a 
contributor to constructing reality. According to this approach to narrative theory, which 
advocates the role of narratives in representing as well as shaping reality, there is no place for 
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an independent story, i.e. a story that is isolated from other stories (Baker, 2006: 17). Reality, 
according to this approach, is a chain of interlinked narratives that not only describe but also 
constitute experiences. Even history, in this sense, is not really about the past, but rather about 
our ability to construct cohesive and meaningful stories about the past out of “the scattered 
and profoundly meaningless debris” we encounter (Kellner, 1989: 10). Contemplation lies at 
the heart of this process as a substantial act in forming stories about what people observe and 
experience (ibid). 
Since narrative plays a vital role in forming reality, Baker (2006: 17) stresses the importance 
of validating and checking the veracity of narratives that substantially affect us and tackle the 
issues that are important to us, whether at the personal level as individuals, at the political 
level as citizens and voters, or at the social level as members of society. The fact that a given 
narrative is widely circulated and promoted by media outlets should not prevent the receiver 
from trying to verify the validity and credibility of the story as well as the source. The 
receiver’s endeavour to reason on a certain narrative is ultimately governed by the 
believability of the narrative, which is determined by whether the story is derived from, and 
backed by, some facts and thus linked in some way to reality. This, according to Baker (ibid: 
17-8), “brings in the whole question of the relationship between narrative and truth.” 
Zhang (2004: 400) advises not to take any historical event as an absolute and unquestionable 
truth. This is not a call for skepticism; he encourages us to study history, take the claims made 
by historians and subject these claims to careful examination and analysis. Only by doing so 
can people avoid falling into the trap of blindly believing in narratives that affect people’s 
perception of the world. In other words, no narrative can claim to depict the ultimate truth of 
any happening. That being said, it is necessary to understand that in real life, events do occur, 
but it is the receivers’ responsibility to follow reasoning methods that enable them to check 
the credibility of the narratives describing these events. It should be understood that these 
methods should be subject to constant “refinement and reassessment” (Baker, 2006: 18), as 
they do not necessarily lead to the truth either. The notion of constructedness thus can be 
summarised by four main pieces of advice for those seeking the truth: take claims embedded 
in narratives; validate their credibility; do not entirely reject the truthfulness of a certain 
narrative; and acknowledge the existence of multiple truths since “knowledge is socially and 
politically produced” (Ewick and Silbey, 1995: 199). 
In political terms, narratives are employed to steer public behaviour, legitimise certain 
political decisions, and challenge others. They can be used to both exert hegemonic effect and 
subvert counter narratives. All events, including the Arab Spring happenings, are depicted and 
reported differently by various sources. This results in multiple narratives tackling the same 
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event. They can be entirely contradictory. They can also meet at some level and part at another, 
sharing some aspects, and differing in the reporting of certain details (Baker, 2006: 20). One 
narrative may prevail over time, becoming more dominant due to military, political or social 
factors: Walter Benjamins once said that history is written by the victors. In any case, the 
differences between narratives, whether subtle or substantial, are what define these narratives 
and make their existence both meaningful and significant. Bennet and Edelman (1985: 160) 
affirm that by accepting a certain narrative, we reject another, and only this clash between 
narratives sustains their existence.  
This conflict between competing narratives is not confined to a certain period of time; rather 
it continues over time (Baker, 2006: 20). The Syrian revolution and Iraqi conflict have shown 
how narratives of the past can define present narratives; former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-
Maliki interpreted his political conflict with his opponents in light of historical events that 
took place hundreds of years ago between Husayn and Yazid (al-Maliki, Dec 2003): 
 راصنأ ةيؤر انيطعي اذهو ،ةدينع ةسرش ةهجاوم يف نومدطصي طخلا لوط ىلعو ،ىرخأ ةرم نيسحلا راصنأو ديزي
  هتنت مل نيسحلا قحب تبكترا يتلا ةميرجلا نأ. 
[Supporters of Yazid and supporters of Husayn, once again as always are engaged in a 
fierce and bitter confrontation, and this proves to us that the crime that Husayn was the 
victim of has still not ended.] 
Al-Maliki’s statement shows how a narrative on an ancient conflict between two figures in 
Islamic history is repacked after more than thirteen centuries, continuing to affect, explain, 
and shape present narratives which depict a completely different conflict. Baker (2006: 21) 
asserts that re-narrating stories of the past can be used as a tool of hegemony, since it 
“socializes individuals into an established social and political order and encourages them to 
interpret present events in terms of sanctioned narratives of the past.” When competing 
versions of a given narrative entirely contradict each other, it seems that there is no solution 
that can be reached (Liu, 1999: 299); people over time tend to stop trying to search for the 
truth, questioning any part of their version of the narrative, or validating the truthfulness of 
the other versions. They become so faithful to their version of the narrative that any new 
discovery may result in a tremendous, intolerable shock. They therefore end up isolating 
themselves within the boundaries of their “narrative communities” (Baker, 2006: 21), i.e. the 
people sharing the same convictions on the validity of a certain narrative and falseness of 
others.  
Thus, a narrative community should not exert tremendous effort to try and persuade other 
narrative communities to change their version of the narrative. They can, instead, invest in 
appealing to other audiences that are interested in, and affected by, the issue concerned, but 
have not adopted a certain version of the narrative yet (Fisher, 1997: 312). In the context of 
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the Arab Spring, these undecided circles of people come under the name of silent majority 
(ḥizb al-kanaba “the party of the sofa” in Egypt, and ar-ramādiyūn “the greys” in Syria). Both 
regime loyalists and revolutionaries endeavoured to convince this broad category of the 
population of their own version of the narrative regarding the political conflict and mass 
mobilisation during the Arab Spring. 
Translation is essential in this process, since most conflicts are not limited to communities that 
speak the same language. Rather, they cross linguistic borders and reach out to communities 
that speak different languages. In most cases, they are discussed in multi-lingual regional 
and/or international environments, such as the Security Council where competing narratives 
use translation as a weapon of persuasion as well as a method of communication (Baker, 2006: 
22). When a narrative is translated and re-told in a different language, it embraces new 
elements from other narratives floating in the new cultural and linguistic atmosphere. It thus 
develops into a new narrative modified by the new narrators. This constantly evolving 
narrative, in turn, influences and contributes to shaping other narratives that circulate within 
news linguistic communities (ibid). 
 
6.3 A Narrative Typology Model 
This study will adopt a typology model primarily suggested by Somers (1992, 1997) and 
Somers and Gibson (1994), and thereafter developed by Baker (2006). Based on their social 
effect and political significance, this model makes a clear distinction between four main types 
of narrative: ontological, public, conceptual, and meta-narratives.  
Baker (2006: 28) defines ontological narratives as “personal stories that we tell ourselves 
about our place in the world and our own personal history.” These stories shape and give the 
people’s lives their meanings. Even though they essentially tackle issues related to the self in 
the first place, they are also interpersonal and social since they are communicated to other 
people in a social environment (ibid). The existence of a social context is vital for the narrator 
to tell their story (Whitebrook, 2001: 24), allowing it to exist, function and develop. According 
to Ewick and Silbey (1995: 211-2), this surely implies that ontological narratives depend on, 
and appeal to, collective narratives using symbols, utterances, and expressions similar to those 
found in shared narratives by which personal ones are interpreted and made intelligible. This 
explains why translation faces challenges when rendering ontological narratives from one 
language into another: “The retelling is inevitably constrained by the shared linguistic and 
narrative resources available in the new setting” (Baker, 2006: 29). Thus, it is true that 
ontological narratives are contingent on and determined by the collective narratives that 
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circulate in the surrounding social environment, but they are also important in maintaining 
and elaborating collective narratives (ibid).  
Collective narratives therefore contribute to the forming as well as framing of personal stories 
produced by members of a given society, setting their meanings, implications, and effects 
(Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997: 121). The collectiveness of a narrative, one the other hand, 
cannot be achieved until supported and enhanced by many personal stories. Only then, can 
such a narrative be seen as collective and thus be accepted, widely circulated, and normalised 
into “self-evident accounts” of life in order to avoid critical examination (Baker, 2006: 30). A 
representative example of the need for personal narratives to enhance shared ones is the 
situation of Syria under the rule of the Ba’ath Party, where citizens were urged to perceive 
themselves as ultimately Arabs in political and social terms. As a result, this promoted, and 
contributed to, the collective narrative adopted by the pan-Arabist regime. Without the 
contribution of enough citizens to this process of creation and circulation of compatible 
personal stories, the collective narrative adopted by the government would not have gained 
any currency or achieved popularity. 
The following is an excerpt from a report including a field interview undertaken by Orient 
News reporter with a Syrian boy from Aleppo after a rocket reportedly fired by Assad’s troops 
hit his family house and killed many of his relatives in 2013 (Orient News, 2013): 
 .نيكراب اللهو انك !..انذقني ادح ملاع اي انحص اربل نوهل انعلط ... توص انعمس قوف .ةرشع ةعاسلا يلاوح نيميان
ني نيم اهدب يه ملاعلا يرات.يتاوخأ انعلاط اللهو انتف .اهذق أ يمع دلاودج تيب ؛اوحار دحاو نيعبري  لزن ؛اوحار
؛يتيبع خوراصلا   يف.. رجإ و؛اهوقل ام لأهل ةرياط يتلاخ ؛فقش عبرأ يتنان تعلط .  شيل ،مهفأ سب .فرعنم ام
؟فيعضلا ىلع يوقلا مكح ينعي ؟انبرضيمع 
[We were sleeping, at around 10 am. Above us, we heard a sound ... We went out and 
called on people to save us! Then, it seemed that there were people who needed to be 
saved. We went inside and took my siblings out; my cousins, forty of them, were gone; 
my grandparents were gone. The rocket hit my house. We found a human leg. My 
grandmother was torn to pieces. My aunt is still missing; they have not found her yet. We 
do not know. But I want to understand: why is he [Bashar Assad] bombing us? Is it 
because he is strong and we are weak?] 
These personal narratives about personal experiences in fact contributed to a collective anti-
regime narrative adopted by the Syrian opposition and the Free Syrian Army, allowing it to 
gain currency and acceptance, not only internally but also internationally. 
The second type of narrative according to the model adopted in this study is public narrative, 
which is similar, but not identical to the aforementioned collective (shared) narratives that 
refer to any sort of popular narrative circulating widely within a certain social environment 
(Baker, 2006: 33). Public narratives are best defined as stories produced and communicated 
at the level of communities and institutional bodies higher than an individual, such as the 
family, sect, school, university, political party, city, and country (ibid). Public narratives 
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dominating a given community may quickly evolve, develop, and witness changes within a 
few years or even less (Baker, 2006: 33). An example of competing public narratives depicting 
the outbreak and mobilisers of the Arab Spring is a speech by Saif al-Islam, Gaddafi’s son on 
February 20, 2011, in which he expressed the Libyan regime’s version of the narrative about 
how the mass uprising started in the Eastern part of the country and the parties responsible for 
starting the movement (Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, Feb 2011): 
 اومجاه ... ةيملاسإ تاميظنت ئجافم لكشب تاركسعم اولتحاو رزاجم اولمعو طابضو دونج اولتق شيجلل ركسعم
ةرامإ اونلعأو ... ةحلسلأا ىلع اورطيسو..  ..لافطلأا ... مهيب ةصاخ ةعاذإ اولمعو اضيبلا يف ةيملاسإ ةرامإب ىمسي ام
.مهلامعتسا ًاضيأ مت ةسوله بوبحو تاردخم اولوانتي اوناك ..فورعم ءيش اذهو ..ًاضيأ ..يللا سانلا ضعبو 
[Islamist organisations … attacked an army camp, killed officers and soldiers, carried out 
massacres, suddenly occupied camps and took control of the arms … and declared an 
emirate, something called an Islamic emirate in Bayda, establishing their own radio 
channel … Children and some people, who – and this is something known – were on 
drugs and hallucinogenic pills, have been used as well.] 
The Libyans had to either believe or reject Saif al-Islam’s version of the public narrative of 
the outset of the February 17th Revolution. This is dependent on whether this narrative, in all 
its aspects, is compatible with every Libyan’s “own story of identity” (Whitebrook, 2001: 
145). That is why we find that the Syrians are relatively divided in their acceptance or rejection 
of the official narrative of the Syrian regime depicting the Syrian conflict. Syrians, in fact, 
differ in the way they define their identity socially, nationally, religiously, and politically, and 
thus their stories of identity are varied. 
Translators participate actively in the process of spreading and circulating public narratives 
within their own communities, making sure that all social formations in these communities 
become familiar with the views embedded in these narratives that may have currency in 
foreign societies (Baker, 2006: 36). That being said, Tymoczko (2003: 201) suggests that 
translators can affiliate themselves with some ideologies or agendas, endeavouring to promote 
certain versions of a narrative, typically external to the target culture, at the expense of others. 
This may challenge, weaken, or even undermine domestic versions of the same narrative, 
creating controversy within society. Translators can also contribute to the promotion and 
circulation of domestic public narratives, giving them a chance to transcend political and 
linguistic borders. This is to achieve greater worldwide public recognition and acceptance or 
to be examined by a different readership with different sets of values and beliefs (Baker, 2006: 
37). This, in turn, could lead to the development of these narratives over time, considering the 
volume of criticism they may receive from foreign audiences when translated. 
Somers and Gibson (1994: 62-3) define conceptual narratives, the third type of narrative, as 
explanations and analyses that social researchers and scholars provide to demonstrate and 
illustrate the relationship between ontological and public narratives. They expound upon their 
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role in shaping social action and identity in a given society. According to Baker (2006: 39), 
this definition can be extended to include stories that researchers in any area of study develop 
“for themselves and others about their object of inquiry.” For Ewick and Silbey (1995: 201), 
this can also refer to representations produced by scholars of the topic under investigation. An 
example of conceptual narrative is the book, The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism, 
by Hamid Dabashi. The Washington Post describes the book as a leading cultural observer of 
the Arab Spring events. It provides a conceptual and intellectual account of the Arab Spring 
and its implications, factors and impact. It sheds further light on personal narratives associated 
with the event, linking them to mainstream public narratives circulating among the 
revolutionaries and the Arab people in general about the Arab Spring revolutions. A critical 
analysis of the implications of the event and its impact on the political and social future of the 
Middle East and North Africa is thereafter provided. 
As in the case of public narratives, translators have the liberty to support and enhance or reject 
and refute a certain conceptual narrative (Baker, 2006: 43). However, translators cannot ensure 
that their final product would not be eventually understood against their inclination and 
intention (ibid). Producers as well as receivers determine the meanings and implications of 
conceptual narratives. 
Somers and Gibson (1994: 61) provide a brief definition of the fourth type of narrative meta-
narratives as narratives “in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history.” 
Somers (1992: 605) also describes meta-narratives as “the epic dramas of our time,” which, 
according to Baker (2006: 44-5), can live and last for long time and can affect even ordinary 
people in the world. A possible example of a meta-narrative in present times is the public 
narrative of the war on terror, which has been extended recently to include the war on Islamic 
State, which has emerged, and eventually controlled a vast area in norther and western Iraq as 
well as half of Syria. Terrifying beheading narratives have circulated across the world and 
have been followed by a large-scale military operation carried out by numerous Western and 
Arab countries against IS. The military action would not have been possible if not preceded 
by circulation of a meta-narrative on the brutal and barbarous actions carried out by IS 
members. Baker (2006: 45) suggests that choosing the term terror instead of terrorism is 
suggestive since it provides an example of how careful choice of terminology used in public 
and meta-narratives is essential in generating desired public responses. Terrorism indicates 
one or more acts involving violence whose effect is relatively limited and minor, whereas 
terror is a frame of mind whose meanings and implications can go further beyond national 
and cultural boundaries and be grasped by people across the planet. 
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Baker (ibid) asserts that the principal factor that determines the continuance of a given meta-
narrative is normally political or economic. Another factor, as pointed out by Alexander (2002: 
5-29), is the representation of evil and reference to traumatic experience with a global impact 
involving all human kind. The Western media have striven to shed light on the horrible acts 
of IS, knowing that this can ensure the survival of the impact of such stories on the public, 
thus forming a meta-narrative that can last for a long time, justifying Western military 
involvement in the conflict ongoing in the Middle East. The decision-making and motivations, 
of course, are political in the first place. The absence of a political decision explains why no 
similar meta-narrative has been formed by the global media on the brutal actions carried out 
by Syrian regime. Despite the relative global silence, the consequences of such actions are 
manifested through half a million Syrian deaths, thousands arrested, millions of destroyed 
homes, and 12 million Syrians forced to flee their hometowns.  
The role of translators is unquestionably essential in allowing public narratives to transcend 
linguistic, national, and cultural borders. They facilitate their development into widespread 
meta-narratives, leaving a large-scale impact on humanity for generations. Nevertheless, the 
role of translators becomes even more effective in contributing to the formation of narratives 
that can compete and undermine public and meta-narratives produced and promoted by 
dictators and autocrats. These dictators have oppressed their people, forcing their own version 
of meta-narratives for decades (ibid: 48). 
 
6.4 Features of narrativity 
Having examined the different types of narrative, we move on to investigating the features of 
narrativity and the way narratives operate and shape what people see as reality. Baker (2006) 
points out eight different features of narrativity; the first four are formerly proposed by Somers 
and Gibson (1994) and Somers (1992, 1997), while the rest are originally suggested by Bruner 
(1991): temporality, relationality, causal emplotment, selective appropriation, particularity, 
genericness, normativeness/canonicity and breach, and narrative accrual.  
Temporality is seen, according to Baker (2006: 50), as an essential feature that constitutes the 
narrative, rather than as “an additional or separable layer of a ‘story’”. It does not imply, as 
many may expect, that events are arranged in the right sequence to represent, and be consistent 
with, the actual chronological order of the story events in reality. Rather, it means that the 
order in which the story details are arranged is significant (ibid: 50-1) and cannot be changed 
or replaced without resulting in a loss of meaning. Therefore, temporality has an organisational 
function that is important for the audience to interpret and comprehend the narrative; events 
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and characters included in the story are not considered as meaningful to the audience if they 
do not follow a sequential structure, both temporally and spatially (ibid: 51). 
Baker (ibid: 61) explains that relationality is an important feature of narrativity, as human 
beings by nature cannot make sense of events that are not logically connected. In other words, 
for a text to be perceived as narrative, there must be a degree of coherence. Bruner (1991: 8) 
asserts that composing a narrative requires more than merely choosing random events derived 
either from present reality, the past, or fiction, and then arranging them in a suitable sequence; 
story events need to be structured in line with the larger narrative. Therefore, when translating 
a narrative from one language into another, the translator may avoid importing source cultural 
or religious elements that do not relate to, or are not consistent with, the target culture. Baker 
(2006: 61) insists that the relationality of a narrative cannot tolerate such simple and direct 
rendering of some elements and aspects from other narratives.  
Most African churches, for instance, draw a picture of Jesus in their divine narratives as a 
black man, which is consistent with the expectations of African believers. A similar tendency 
is observed in Western churches, in Europe and North America, where Jesus is pictured as a 
white blonde man. Both versions of the narrative probably contradict the historical fact that 
Jesus is more likely to have looked like a Middle Eastern man, as he was born in Palestine. 
Baker (ibid: 64) argues that translators in many cases decide not to opt for equivalents which 
are differently or negatively employed in other narrative contexts in the target culture. For 
Baker (ibid), it is an aspect of maintaining relationality not to borrow an utterance or element 
from an alien narrative. 
According to Somers (1997: 82), causal emplotment “gives significance to independent 
instances, and overrides their chronological or categorical order.” The emplotment of events 
ensures the construction of a meaningful narrative, because this will shed light on their 
participation in, and contribution to, the overall meaning of the narrative (Polkinghorne, 1995: 
5). In concrete terms, causal emplotment makes it possible to evaluate and elaborate on events 
rather than merely state them. This is to make a coherent comprehensible sequence that the 
audience can pass a judgement on out of separate events (Baker, 2006: 67). It thus makes a 
set of events morally and ethically significant, carrying a semantic value that goes beyond 
abstract meanings embedded in the narrative.  
White (1987: 14) sees casual emplotment as an “impulse to moralize” real events. It is the link 
between events, rather than isolated representation of each event that gives them their 
meanings and moral implications. People may make a similar judgment on two different 
events, but express different opinions on the way these two events relate to each other and are 
interpreted in light of each other (Baker, 2006: 67). For example, one narrative of the Arab 
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Spring depicts the story of the outbreak of the revolutions in the Arab World, while another 
narrative describes the conflict between the Arab regimes and Israel. Supporters of the two 
narratives may admit that the events of each narrative did indeed occur and may even agree to 
the details of each narrative, but they disagree regarding the way each narrative is interpreted 
in relation to the other. One may believe that Israel in fact encouraged the Arabs to revolt 
against their governments to undermine Arab states, while another may suggest that Israel has 
actually helped the Arab regimes and supported them to suppress the Arab Spring as it would 
enjoy a greater sense of security in the presence of autocratic regimes in the region, oppressing 
their people and preventing them from carrying out any unexpected hostile action against what 
is seen as the enemy of the nation. Baker (ibid: 70) suggests that translators can make use of 
this function to link translated events differently, creating new meanings through “the choice 
of equivalents in translation and interpreting.” 
Baker (ibid: 71) agrees with Somers and Gibson that a narrative is formed in line with a set of 
standards that allow narrative producers to appropriately select, from a wide range of 
numerous events, only specific events to be included in the narrative, excluding many others. 
A narrative may seem complete and whole, yet it is in fact composed of a limited number of 
events to the exclusion of other events (White, 1987: 10). This exclusion and inclusion may 
be guided and influenced by factors related to certain ideologies, agendas, and cultural and 
political affiliations. A representation of this feature of selective appropriation in the field of 
translation is the tendency of translators and/or sponsoring media outlets to select certain 
materials (texts or videos) for translation.  
The selection process is undoubtedly governed by the patrons’ agendas and benefits as well 
as the translator’s ideology. In the context of the Syrian revolution, which has ultimately 
developed into a military conflict, materials chosen for translation by what are described as 
anti-Islamist Western media outlets such as Fox News and The Mirror often present a negative 
image of the opposition fighters, especially those fighting alongside Islamist factions. They 
tend to highlight some violations against locals in opposition-controlled areas, ignoring 
examples of efficient management, good treatment, and moderate ideology. 
Bruner (1991: 6-7) explains particularity as a feature of narrativity, which means that the 
reference to certain incidents and characters in narratives occurs on the basis of an overall 
frame of story typology or genres, making these events meaningful and intelligible. It is the 
role the events play within this general frame of genre and the position they occupy in this 
scheme of story types that enable the audience to fill in the narrative happenings in case they 
are missing from an account (ibid: 7). Bruner uses genre, here, in the sense of generic story 
186 
 
outline or plot combining an array of “raw elements” rather than conventional text type (such 
as novel, play and poem) (Baker, 2006: 78). 
However, when investigating genericness as a feature of narrativity, Bruner (1991: 14) adopts 
a different definition of genres as “recognizable” kinds of narrative such as tragedy, comedy, 
fiction, satire, news report, and interview. These genres serve as established models that enable 
both narrative producers and audiences to limit the interpretative task of rationalising the 
events that human beings encounter – the ones that people tell each other about and the ones 
that people hear others narrate (ibid). 
Bruner (ibid: 15) seems to value breaches of canonicity as a feature of narrativity which 
entitles a story to be narrated to others. In the absence of innovative gestures that represent 
breaches of canonicity, events embedded in a text do not technically constitute a narrative, 
Bruner (ibid) asserts. Since its tellability relies on “a breach of conventional expectation, a 
narrative is necessarily normative” (ibid). In translation, this feature is manifested mainly 
through the choice of equivalents in the target language. By observing normativeness, a 
translator opts for equivalents that make the narrative intelligible for the target reader. This 
can also be done through a process of recontextualisation to form a narrative with “moral 
resonances” for the target audience (Baker, 2006: 99). Translators of a narrative also tend to 
opt for translations that constitute a breach of conventional expectations and canonical scripts 
to challenge dominant narratives. In the context of the Arab Spring, these could be the 
narratives promoted by autocratic Arab regimes. A pro-revolutionary translator can adopt 
translations that emphasise the brutality of the Arab regimes and sacrifices made by the 
revolutionaries in their endeavour to obtain freedom and democracy. 
Bruner (1991: 18) describes narrative accrual as the way in which people “cobble stories 
together to make them into a whole of some sort.” This can be accomplished by imposing 
“bogus historical-causal entailment” (ibid: 19). An example of this feature is the constant 
claims that the Syrian revolution occurred as a result of Qatar’s scheme aiming to lay gas 
pipelines through Syria to Europe. The Syrian regime allegedly had not given its consent to 
the Qatari plan. Therefore, Qatar alongside other Middle Eastern countries benefitting from 
the Qatari scheme such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Jordan, pushed towards an uprising in 
Syria to topple the current Syrian regime. Another example from the context of the Arab 
Spring is the proposition that the Arab Spring revolutions would not have taken off if the 
Tunisian revolution had not happened in the first place. The five revolutions, according to this 
view, are interlinked narratives that cannot be assessed and interpreted in isolation. 
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6.5 Framing Narratives in Translation 
Features of narrativity listed and detailed in the previous section pave the way for the 
introduction of the central concept of framing. This is of particular importance for the subject 
of this research study, because through farming, features of narrativity were in fact 
renegotiated during the Arab Spring to form narratives loaded with political, social, and 
ideological implications and references in the target language. Translated texts and utterances 
can also be treated as frames, even beyond the basic interpretative sense of frames, which 
implies that a text is to be translated using direct equivalent utterances and codes from the 
target language (Baker, 2006: 107). Translation can be seen as an act of framing that can bring 
about changes in terms of the message as well as the style of the text translated. Five aspects 
of framing suggested by Baker (2006) are discussed in this section: frame ambiguity, temporal 
and spatial framing, selective appropriation, framing by labelling, and repositioning of 
participants. 
Frame ambiguity, according to Baker (2006: 107), occurs when a sequence of events is framed 
differently to foster rival narratives produced by different parties, which are aimed at 
legitimising their actions in the context of a given conflict. For instance, different parties can 
frame the Syrian conflict in different ways. Syrian regime loyalists and pro-Assad media 
outlets often refer to the conflict as azmah (“a crisis”). The Syrian opposition and the Free 
Syrian Army factions fighting on the ground, on the other hand, insist on describing the 
situation in Syria as ṯawrah (“a revolution”). Following the recent Russian intervention in 
Syria which mainly targeted the armed opposition factions, Turkish President Erdogan stated 
(al-Jazeera, Oct 2015): 
 ضوخي يروسلا بعشلاللاقتسا برح. 
[The Syrian people are fighting a war of independence.] 
This description of the Syrian conflict as a “war of independence” has thus gained wide 
acceptance from allied countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and the armed Syrian opposition, 
including the Free Syrian Army and Islamic factions. Islamic State, and to a less degree Jabhat 
al-Nusra (al-Qaeda in the Levant), normally describe the Syrian conflict as a phase of a larger 
international Jihad against the non-Muslim West and Russia. However, many international 
news outlets opt for terms like Syrian conflict or Syrian civil war. For Goffman (1974: 302), 
this represents a disagreement on the description of a certain situation, which often occurs 
when various parties to a conflict seek to justify their actions by adopting and promoting 
competing versions of a narrative.  
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Frame ambiguity can also be employed in translation (Baker, 2006: 108), as translators at 
times decide to change the definitions of certain situations embedded in the source text, opting 
for choices in the target language that match certain ideologies in line with their political 
affiliations and/or the patrons’ interests and agendas. 
Temporal and spatial framing denotes the process of choosing a specific text that depicts a 
certain narrative, placing it in a new temporal and spatial environment. Readers and listeners 
are encouraged to make a connection between this narrative and others that may be more up-
to-date even though its events actually belong to different temporal settings or take place in a 
different geographical area (ibid: 112). In an interview with Dr. Ragheb Elsergany, a Muslim 
cleric and historiographer, a link is established between the events of the Egyptian revolution 
and the Battle of Badr (between the Muslim army led by the Prophet Muhamad and the non-
believers of Quraysh) (Elsergany, 2011). Both the revolutionaries during the Egyptian 
revolution and the Muslims of the Battle of Badr, Elsergany (ibid) argues, were neither 
expecting the conflict to break out that soon, nor were they prepared enough to win when it 
did occur. However, in both events, the aforementioned parties managed to achieve victory 
(ibid). Elsergany, here, exploits a narrative derived from ancient Islamic history to forward a 
current narrative belonging to a completely different setting. This is an example of what Baker 
calls temporal and spatial framing.  
Selective appropriation, the third aspect of framing suggested by Baker (2006), is manifested 
through omitting and/or adding some elements of a narrative when it is told to a different 
audience or when rendered into a foreign language (ibid: 114). The omission and addition 
procedures aim to “suppress, accentuate or elaborate particular aspects” of the narrative 
“encoded in the source text or utterance, or aspects of the larger narrative(s) in which it is 
embedded” (ibid). This selective appropriation of textual items is observed in the media 
(mainly in reports and news broadcasts, even when translation is not involved), translation, 
and interpreting. This form of framing can sometimes result in a diversion of the message 
embedded in the source version of the narrative to make it consistent with certain ideologies 
and agendas.  
A representative example of this aspect of framing is the satirical news analysis show DNA, 
presented by Lebanese journalist and political analyst Nadim Koteich aired on Future TV on 
a daily basis (Future TV Nadim Koteich, 2013). Koteich analyses and comments on the latest 
political events in Lebanon, Syria and the Arab World using selected elements of statements 
and stories produced by politicians and political commentators. These excerpts, which are 
often subjected to numerous omission procedures, are exploited to criticise the same narratives 
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that these excerpts are derived from. The narratives criticised by Koteich are typically 
promoted by political opponents, namely Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian regime. 
Framing by labelling is described by Baker (2006: 122) as any “discursive process that 
involves using a lexical item, term or phrase to identify a person, place, group, event or any 
other key elements in a narrative.” An example of this form of framing is the controversy over 
the naming of the Islamic State organisation. The organisation refers to itself as Dawlat al-
Xilāfa (“the Caliphate State”) or ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya (“Islamic State”), while its opponents 
among the Syrian opposition factions prefer to call it Jamāᶜat al-Baġdādī (“al-Baghdadi’s 
Group”) in a reference to its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Dāᶜiš (“ISIS”) is an abbreviation 
of its previous official name, ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-ᶜIrāq wa aš-Šām (“Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria”), which is also a derogatory term used by IS’ opponents. The latter two labels 
framed by many parties and countries are aimed to mock, undervalue, and delegitimise IS’ 
claims of establishing an Islamic Caliphate. 
The aforementioned example brings about the question of rival systems of naming, proposed 
by Baker (ibid: 123), who admits that this proves to be challenging in translation. Competing 
parties and communities can adopt different names for an entity, situation, geographical area, 
and so on. This is done in order to promote their own narratives to legitimise social and 
political claims, refuting and undermining opposing claims (ibid: 124). Baker (ibid) suggests 
that adopting a name in this context automatically implies a denial of the other, subsequently 
undermining the other’s narratives and claims. The naming of the Northern Syrian city of Ain 
al-Arab or (Kobani, for the Kurds), in which the Kurds constitute a majority of population, is 
used by both the Arabs and Kurds as a racial and national identification for those sharing the 
same views and beliefs to justify their claims of authority over the city. 
Framing by labelling can also be manifested through titles of books, movies, and articles 
which can be employed to “(re)frame narratives in translation” (ibid: 129). Nevertheless, they 
are not considered part of a conflict of rival labelling in which competing parties seek to 
promote certain names for a particular entity, group, or place. The exploitation of titles in the 
narrative reframing process normally results in some changes affecting the texts themselves 
in consistency with the choices and views expressed in the new title chosen by the translator 
(ibid: 130). 
Relationality as a feature of narrativity elaborated in the previous section is related to “the way 
in which participants in any interaction are positioned, or position themselves, in relation to 
each other and to those outside the immediate event” (ibid: 132). Any changes to these 
positions redefine the roles played by the participants and their interrelationships as well as 
the dynamics of the narrative as a whole and even other interlinked narratives. The 
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repositioning of participants pointed out by Baker (ibid) can occur through the way language 
is utilised to manage time, space, register, tone, and other manners of identifying them and us. 
Subtle, paratextual, and/or expressive changes made by the narrator or translator in the 
representation of these elements are cumulated, leading to a reconfiguration of the 
relationships between participants, such as the narrator, translator, hearer, and reader. A 
significant transformation is thus achieved in the perception and presentation of the self and 
others. These reconfigurations and transformations result in an active reframing of the 
narrative as well as the overall narrative which it constitutes part of (ibid). Translators and 
narrators can utilise two principal areas to spatially and temporally realign themselves and 
other participants in relation to each other and to social and political issues exposed in the 
narrative: paratextual commentary, such as footnotes, endnotes, introduction, and glossaries 
(ibid: 133); and within the text itself (ibid: 135), i.e. the main body of the narrative. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
Narrativity and framing play a crucial role, not only in constructing reality, but also in shaping 
national, social and political identity. Personal, public and master narratives have proved to 
be an integral part of political conflict; they are exploited as accounts depicting happenings 
(typically in line with the agendas and ideology of the narrator) and to legitimise the actions 
of the self and delegitimise all what the other represents (values, beliefs, actions, decisions, 
etc.). Translation has always been part of this process; narratives need translation in order to 
circulate beyond national, cultural, and linguistic boundaries, and be effective in both 
constructing reality and defending the self against the other in political and social conflict. 
The previous chapters have striven to examine main factors contributing to the translation of 
political discourse, including language, politics, ideology, media, framing, and narrativity. 
Actual examples have been provided from the context of the contemporary politics of the 
Middle East, in particular the Arab Spring. Having studied the impact of these factors on the 
translation process, this study moves on in the next chapter to carry out a critical in-depth 
analysis of the political discourse communicated during the Syrian revolution. Representative 
examples are offered backed by direct references to the theories presented in the previous 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DATA ANALYSIS: SYRIA AS A CASE STUDY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The Syrian conflict has been a thriving arena for competing narratives, ideologies, and 
political views. This conflict also took place in the field of translation where pro-regime and 
pro-revolutionary translators as well as media outlets attempted, through translation, to 
promote certain ideologies, narratives, and political opinions. This study is proposing that 
translation is inevitably influenced by the political views and ideological beliefs of translators 
as well as media outlets publishing translated material. This influence may, at times, reach the 
level of manipulation. This chapter is the data analysis chapter devoted to analysing the 
translation of political discourse communicated during the Syrian conflict. It investigates the 
effect of politics, ideology, and media on translation during the Syrian revolution in particular. 
It also deals in some respects with the translations of the narratives produced and adopted by 
conflicting parties in the context of the Syrian revolution. The role of framing is significant in 
this regard. This study assumes that narratives of the Syrian conflict have been framed 
differently in translation during the process of reporting. 
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section explains the data corpus, lists the 
sources, and elaborates on the significance of the sources chosen, stating the criteria for the 
selection process. The rest four sections correspond thematically to each of the four previous 
chapters (starting with Chapter Three, and ending with Chapter Six). Section 7.3 looks into 
the influence of the translators’ political views on the translation. Section 7.4 investigates the 
effect of ideology on the translation process and the roles played by the translator as a text 
reader and re-writer of the target text as well as the influence of patronage. Section 7.5 
examines the influence of the media on translation and the various strategies and techniques 
employed by media outlets to steer the outcome of the translation process. Section 7.6 analyses 
the data corpus from the perspective of narrative theory, exploring the ways in which 
competing narratives have manifested themselves in translation during the Syrian conflict. 
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7.2 Data and Selection Criteria 
The data corpus consists of news reports, articles, statements, interviews, videos, and banners 
held up by protestors as well as their translations. These news items and materials are 
published by a wide range of news websites and newspapers, and TV channels. The source 
texts are published primarily via international media outlets, such as The Wall Street Journal, 
The Independent, The Washington Post, The Daily Beast, The New York Times, The Guardian, 
The American Conservative, BBC Arabic, and CNN. Most of these media outlets are not 
directly involved in the Syrian conflict, but nevertheless provide reports and press material 
that have been translated by local media outlets more involved in the conflict. The translations 
conducted by these local media outlets are, generally speaking, ideologically steered and/or 
politically biased to one of the conflicting parties. They are provided by pro-regime outlets, 
such as Russia Today, al-Manar, JB News, Sama TV, and Syria Now as well as pro-
revolutionary ones such as Sasa Post and Orient News. 
The data corpus also includes the work of Memri, which is a US media organisation interested 
in subtitling audio-visual items published on Middle Eastern politics. Memri’s work has been 
accused of being biased to Israel as well as distorting the image of the Arabs and Muslims. 
Moreover, this chapter will analyse the translations provided by Free Syrian Translators and 
Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office. Both bodies are classified as pro-revolutionary. The former is 
composed of civil activists and independent translators who support the revolution, whereas 
the latter represents a prominent anti-Assad Islamist military faction, known as Jaish al-Islam. 
The study will also examine the Kafranbel banners produced and held up in demonstrations 
by civil activists from the Syrian city of Kafranbel. 
The data corpus is meant to represent the translated political discourse circulating on the 
Syrian revolution, thus covering the range of various political affiliations of news agencies 
and media outlets interested and involved in the conflict. Accordingly, the translations 
analysed in this study are produced by sources falling into three main categories: 
1- Pro-regime forces: 
A- Pro-regime media outlets:  
 Russia Today (1 interview) 
 Syria Now (1 article) 
 Sama TV (1 article) 
 JB News (1 article) 
B- Media outlets ideologically affiliated with the Syrian regime: 
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 Al-Manar (1 interview and 6 articles) 
2- Pro-revolutionary forces: 
A- Pro-revolutionary media outlets and translation agencies: 
 Orient News (1 interview) 
 Sasa Post (1 article) 
 Free Syrian Translators (1 article and 2 videos subtitled) 
B- Pro-revolutionary discourse produced by activists and protestors: 
 Kafranbel Banners (12 banners) 
C- Press offices of armed revolutionary factions: 
 Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office (1 interview) 
3- Other forces interested in the Syrian conflict: 
A- Pro-Israeli media outlets: 
 Memri (3 videos subtitled) 
The data corpus is also meant to cover the translations of various genres of political discourse 
produced during the Syrian revolution. The translations analysed fall into the following 
genres: 
1- Political interviews (4 items) 
2- News reports and articles (11 items) 
3- Videos subtitled (5 items) 
4- Revolutionary discourse (banners carried by anti-regime protestors) (12 items) 
 
7.3 Political Data Analysis: Translator’s Standpoints 
This section is devoted to analysing the data corpus in light of the theories discussed in Chapter 
Three. The critical relationship between politics and translation explained in Section 3.4.1 has 
manifested itself at various levels during the Syrian revolution, from March 2011 until now. 
On many occasions, conflicting parties have treated translation as a political act whereby 
political considerations govern the translator’s choices pertaining to the material to be 
translated and the way the translation process is run (Alvarez and Vidal in Schäffner, 2007: 
134). In this respect, political and ideological affiliations account for various practices 
connected to translation, such as determination of the text to be translated; the choice of the 
target and source languages; in what media outlets the translation is intended to be published 
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or broadcast; and determination of the identity of the translators and proof-readers (ibid: 136). 
These lead to changes to, and sometimes deliberate distortion of, the original message 
embedded in the source text.  
An illustrative example of deliberate distortion of translation and the influence of political 
views on the translation process is the reports produced by pro-Assad news outlets on an 
interview conducted by The Wall Street Journal with Burhan Ghalioun on December 2, 2011. 
Ghalioun is a Syrian professor of sociology at the Sorbonne University in Paris, and served as 
chairman of the Syrian Opposition Transitional National Council (SNC). The interview was 
originally conducted in English, and thereafter translated into Arabic and published in the 
form of news reports by two media institutions known for their loyalty to the Syrian regime: 
namely al-Manar, a Lebanese channel run and funded by Hezbollah, and Russia Today 
(Arabic version). The news websites of both channels adopted a distorted translation of 
Ghalioun’s interview. Russia Today claimed that Ghalioun clearly stated that a ‘new Syria’ 
would cut military ties with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, whereas Nidal Hamadeh, a Lebanese 
journalist, published an article on the al-Manar website where he accused Ghalioun of 
distancing himself from all the resistance movements in the Arab World. He accused Ghalioun 
of abandoning all that was patriotic and nationalistic (referring to both Hamas and Hezbollah). 
The following is the excerpt from Ghalioun’s interview where he talks about the relationship 
with Iran and Hezbollah: 
The Wall Street Journal: Syria currently has a strategic relationship with Iran and 
Hezbollah. How would a new Syrian government position itself vis-à-vis these 
governments? What would relations be like? 
Mr. Ghalioun: Our relations with Iran will be revisited as any of the countries in the 
region, based on the exchange of economic and diplomatic interests, in the context of 
improving stability in the region and not that of a special relationship. There will be no 
special relationship with Iran. 
The Wall Street Journal: Is there a sense on how the support of Hamas and Hezbollah 
would change? 
Mr. Ghalioun: Our relationship with Lebanon will be of cooperation, and mutual 
recognition and exchange of interests and seeking with the Lebanese to improve stability 
in the region. As our relations with Iran change, so too will our relationship with 
Hezbollah. Hezbollah after the fall of the Syrian regime will not be the same. Lebanon 
should not be used as it was used in the Assad era as an arena to settle political scores. 
The Wall Street Journal: Do you have open communication with Hezbollah or Hamas? 
Mr. Ghalioun: Many opposition members wanted to meet with Hezbollah and Iran, and 
present their case and explain this wasn’t a foreign conspiracy. But the continued position 
of Hezbollah, and the negative role their media outlets played, closed this door. 
We do have channels with the PLO. 
(Ghalioun, 2011) 
The Russia Today report 
 عطقتس ةيروس :نويلغ ناهربالله بزحو سامحو ناريإ عم ةيركسعلا تاقلاعلا ]ناونع[ 
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 سلجملا نكمت اذإ هنا جراخلا يف ةيروسلا ةضراعملا لثمي يذلا يروسلا ينطولا سلجملا سيئر نويلغ ناهرب لاق
 ناريإ عم ةيركسعلا قشمد تاقلاع عطقيس هناف ،ةديدج ةموكح ليكشت نم بزحو سامحل ةحلسلأا تاديروت فقويو
الله. 
 ةفيحص عم ةلباقم يف نويلغ حضوأو" ةعمجلا موي ترشن ةيكيرملأا "لانروج تيرتس لوو2  ،لولأا نوناك/ربمسيد
تاقلاعلا عطق نا  ناريإ عمالله بزحو سامحو  ىوقلا عم فلاحتلا هاجت ةيروسلا ةسايسلا هيجوت ةداعإ راطإ يف يتأيس
ةيسيئرلا ةيبرعلا. 
[Title: Burhan Ghalioun: Syria would cut military ties with Iran, Hamas and 
Hezbollah. 
Burhan Ghalioun, Chairman of Syrian National Council, which represents the Syrian 
opposition abroad, said that if the Council managed to form a new government, it would 
cut Damascus’ military ties with Iran and stop arms supplies to Hamas and Hezbollah. 
Ghalioun explained in an interview with The Wall Street Journal American newspaper, 
published on Friday, December 2, that cutting the ties with Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah 
would come in the context of re-shaping the Syrian policy towards an alliance with the 
major Arab powers.]
3
 
(Russia Today, Dec 2011) 
The Al-Manar TV report 
أربت اهيف ]ةلباقملا[ لجرلا ]نويلغ[ نم لك تاكرح ةمواقملا يف ملاعلا يبرعلا لزانتو اهيف نع لك ام وه ينطو 
يموقو. 
[The man [Ghalioun] distanced himself in it [the interview] from all the resistance 
movements in the Arab World and abandoned all that was patriotic and nationalistic.] 
(Hamadeh, 2011) 
In the original interview (in English), Ghalioun does not state that Syria would cut military 
ties with Hamas or any other organisation after the collapse of the regime. In fact, he does not 
even mention Hamas or discuss the future of any “arms supplies” to Hamas and Hezbollah. 
On the contrary, Ghalioun explains that the opposition, on some occasions, expressed 
willingness to establish a good relationship with Hezbollah, providing that the Iranian-funded 
Lebanese organisation ceased to support the Syrian regime. The Russia Today report, 
however, seems keen on inserting Hamas’ name in Ghalioun’s statement, stressing – in both 
the title and the body of the report – the idea that after the fall of the regime, Syria would cut 
[military] ties with both Hezbollah and Hamas, associating this decision with the formation of 
an alliance with the major Arab powers. 
Similarly, al-Manar’s journalist affirms that Ghalioun in the interview distances himself from 
all resistance movements in the region. This is despite the fact that Ghalioun, in the source 
text, refers to Hezbollah only without mentioning any other Arab organisations or groups. It 
is clear from both reports that al-Manar and Russia Today deliberately inserted the name of 
Hamas in the text in order to reach certain political ends, distorting the image of the Syrian 
opposition as a patriotic political force seeking a better future for the country. The reference 
to Hamas, a known anti-Israel resistance movement widely supported by the Arab people, is 
                                                          
3 All back-translations are enclosed in square brackets and are produced by the researcher unless 
stated otherwise. 
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aimed at depriving the Syrian revolution of solid Arab public support and recognition. In 
addition to this, in the two reports produced by al-Manar and Russia Today, the reference to 
the “channels” that the Syrian opposition has with “the PLO” is omitted. This choice can be 
explained in the same context: an attempt by both pro-regime media outlets to present an 
image of the Syrian opposition as a pro-Israeli political force that opposes all the resistance 
movements in the region. 
Al-Manar’s pro-regime political views have manifested themselves in its Arabic translations 
of numerous English articles already published in international newspapers. The following is 
an excerpt from an article by the well-known British writer and journalist Robert Fisk, 
published on the Independent website on February 16, 2016. Al-Manar published a brief 
report, highlighting the main points illustrated in Fisk’s article after translating it into Arabic. 
The Independent report 
Syria conflict: Damascus remains a war zone - but some families are returning [in 
title] 
There are fewer checkpoints in Damascus, 100 women dancing the “dubkah” at a noisy 
hen party in one of the big hotels, convoys of trucks humming across the Lebanese border 
en-route to Jordan now that the Syrian army has re-opened the main road to Deraa. 
Syrians drive to Aleppo up the highway again. On Syrian television, there are action shots 
of Syrian paratroopers entering towns they had not seen for three years. And in al-
Qadam, its streets named after ancient Arab philosophers and travellers, they are also 
returning … There is even a “reconciliation committee” of elders who talk to both the 
army and the Free Syrian army … In the West – apart from the refugees – we see this 
conflict as a geopolitical struggle. But after the Aleppo battles, it can be written that – 
however temporarily, however fearfully, however few – in the streets of al-Qadam, the 
people are coming home. 
(Fisk, Feb 2016) 
The al-Manar report 
 ناونعب "كسيف تربور" ـل ًاريرقت تندنبدنلإا ةفيحص ترشن ةدوعلاب نوأدبي نوئجلالا :قشمد ىلإ ةدوعلا قيرط"
شه ملاس ققحت ءدب عم". 
 نم ةلفاق :ايروس يف عاضولأا ىلع ،ًافيفط ناك نإو ،ام رييغت ثودحب ئبنت يتلا دهاشملا ضعب كسيف فصي ثيح
 نأ دعب ندرلأا ىلإ ةهجتملا تانحاشلاررح  ،قشمد ةمصاعلا يف لقأ شيتفت طاقن ،اعرد ىلإ قيرطلا يروسلا شيجلا
يزفلتلا ةشاش ىلعو ،عيرسلا قيرطلا ربع بلح ىلإ نورفاسي باكر دارفلأ روص نوةموكحلل ةعبات تاوق  نولخدي
ةرتف ذنم اهوري مل ءايحأو اندم. 
 ىلإ ثدحتلا لواحت نسلا رابك نم اضيأ ةحلاصم ةنجل كانه نإ كسيف لوقيويموكحلا شيجلا  شيجلاو بأرل رحلا
ضعب نإو ،امهنيب عدصلا شيجلا ىلإ ةدوعلاب مهل حمس رحلا شيجلا رصانع. 
 لوقلاب هلاقم كسيف متخي" .اهرارسأ نع باقنلا فشكيو برحلا هذهل خيراتلا لوصف بتكت نأ لبق ةليوط تاونس رمتس
 نأ ةباتكلا نكمي بلح كراعم دعب نكل ،"يسايسويج" هنأ ىلع عازنلا ىلا نورظني برغلا يفةدوعلاب اوأدب سانلا ،
تقؤم لكشب ول ىتح. 
[The Independent newspaper has published a report by Robert Fisk entitled as “The 
return route to Damascus: the refugees start returning with the beginning of a 
fragile peace.” 
Fisk describes some testimonies that predict the occurrence of a change of some kind, 
albeit rather slight, on the situation in Syria: a convoy of trucks heading to Jordan after 
the Syrian army has liberated the road to Daraa; fewer checkpoints in the capital, 
Damascus; passengers traveling to Aleppo on the motorway; and on the TV screen, 
photos of members of government forces entering cities and neighbourhoods that they 
have not seen for some time.  
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Fisk says that there is a reconciliation committee of the elderly trying to talk to the 
government army and the Free Army to heal the rift between them, and that some 
members of the Free Army were allowed to return to the army. 
Fisk concludes his article by saying “there will be many years before the chapters of the 
history of this war are written and its secrets are revealed. In the West, they perceive the 
conflict as “geopolitical”, but after the battles of Aleppo, one can write that people are 
starting to come back, even if temporarily.] 
Manar, Feb 2016)-(Al 
Four main interventions in the message intended by Fisk can be monitored and marked in the 
translation provided by al-Manar. The first is the title; despite using inverted commas for the 
title, suggesting that this is the exact translation of the title of the original article, al-Manar 
uses a different statement as a title of the Arabic report with an entirely different message. 
Fisk stresses the fact that Damascus remains a warzone and points out the return of “some 
families” to the city. No mention was made with regards to the peace stated in al-Manar’s 
translation, whether fragile or permanent. However, the title used by al-Manar gives the 
impression that Damascus is living salām hašš (“a fragile peace”), which encourages al-
lāji’ūn (“the refugees”) (not only some families as stated in the source text) to return to the 
capital. The phrase Ṭarīq al-ᶜawda ‘ila Dimašq (“the return route to Damascus”), emphasised 
in the translation produced by al-Manar, is extremely suggestive and implies that the regime 
forces have secured the capital and the war there is almost over. These meanings simply exist 
neither in the title nor in the main body of the source text and thus represent a manipulation 
of the translation by al-Manar. 
Second, Fisk states that the Syrian army “has re-opened” the main road to Daraa. However, 
al-Manar has rendered the ST term “re-opened”, which is a neutral term, as ḥarrara 
(“liberated”), which refers in Arabic to regaining one’s own land. This significant translation 
decision can be interpreted as attaching legitimacy to the military operations carried out by 
pro-regime forces. Third, it is noted from the translation that “Syrian paratroopers” is defined 
as quwwāt tābiᶜa li-al-ḥukūma (“government forces”) and “the army” as aj-jayš al-ḥukūmī 
(“government army”). This tendency on the part of the al-Manar translator to add a reference 
to the “government” every time the Assad forces are mentioned reflects an attempt to 
legitimise the role of these forces on the ground. This is a technique widely used in political 
discourse introduced in previous chapters and known as ‘legitimisation’.  
Fourth, Fisk forms his opinion and shapes his views on the current military and security 
situation on the basis of his observations in the al-Qadam area; he refers to the al-Qadam 
quarter on several occasions throughout the article. However, the al-Manar translator seems 
to turn a blind eye to this important detail in the source text, avoiding reference to al-Qadam 
in the translation. In the conclusion of the original article, Fisk clearly states that “however 
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temporarily, however fearfully, however few – in the streets of al-Qadam, the people are 
coming home.” This reference is completely dropped by the al-Manar translator who also 
chooses not to render adverbs such as “temporarily” and “fearfully”. The message that the al-
Manar translator is trying to express is that the war is almost over, not only in al-Qadam, but 
also in Damascus and perhaps Syria as a whole, and that the Assad army is marching to victory 
confidently. This message, however, cannot be seen in the source text.  
A major lexical-semantic challenge faced by translators of political discourse, especially that 
communicated during the Syrian revolution is related to terminology and interpretation. As 
illustrated in Section 3.4.1, the disparity of political stances of translators as well as readers 
may result in divergent interpretations of sensitive political terminology (Schäffner, 1997b: 
136). Therefore, a translator of political rhetoric-related material may translate a specific term 
in line with their personal political views, excluding other valid translations. There are 
numerous examples in the context of the Syrian revolution where translators have favoured a 
certain equivalent for an ST term over another, simply because this choice reflects the political 
views of the translator and/or the media institution they work for. An example of this case is 
the translation of a TV news report by CNN on brutal torture in Syria, broadcast on September 
5, 2012. It was subtitled into Arabic by a group of pro-revolutionary Syrian translators known 
as ‘Free Syrian Translators’ (Sep 2011): 
The CNN report 
Torture victim accounts match those of former torturers like this former secret police 
officer. He defected months ago and joined the rebel Free Syrian Army. 
Arabic subtitles provided by Free Syrian Translators 
 ةداهشك ،نيقباس بيذعت يلوؤسمل تاداهشلا كلت قفاوت بيذعتلا اياحض تاداهش نإ تارباخملا طباض دقل .اذه قباسلا
 ىلإ مضناو رهشأ ةدع ذنم قشنارحلا شيجلا. 
[Torture victim accounts match those of former torturers, like this former mukhabarat 
officer’s account. He defected months ago and joined the Free Army.] 
The translator belongs to a pro-revolutionary group of translators that have devoted 
themselves to exposing the crimes committed by the Syrian regime against the Syrian people 
and civil activists. He uses in the example the infamous TL Arabic term dābiṭ muxābarāt 
(“intelligence officer”) as an equivalent for the ST term “secret police officer”. This choice 
reflects the translator’s desire to associate certain, mainly negative, connotations to the ST 
term. The term dābiṭ muxābarāt is widely recognised by the Syrians as someone with a brutal 
job typically associated with torture and abuse. Such connotations would not be present if the 
translator chose another equivalent, such as dābiṭ šurṭa sirriyya (“secret police officer”). 
Connotations, as illustrated in Section 3.4.1, are believed to be one of the major challenges 
encountered by translators of political discourse, since political discourse seems to use a 
language that is rich in value-laden phrases and words. The significance of connotations lies 
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in the fact that the way they are handled by translators discloses the translator’s hidden 
ideological views and political opinions.  
Figure 12 A CNN report on “brutal torture” in Syria subtitled by Free Syrian Translators 
The translator’s pro-revolutionary political views are manifested through the translation of the 
ST term “rebel Free Syrian Army”. The translator eliminates the word “rebel” entirely from 
the TT, and renders the ST term into Arabic as aj-Jayš al-Ḥurr (“the Free Army”). Deletion 
is a translation procedure used to avoid negative connotations of a particular word or idea, in 
this case the word “rebel” in Arabic. There are two reasons behind the translator’s choice. 
Firstly, unlike the English-speaking audience, the Arab audience, especially the Syrians, are 
familiar with the Free Syrian Army. Therefore, they do not need the word “rebel” as a 
definition of the FSA. Secondly, and more importantly, the translator seems reluctant to attach 
legitimacy to the Syrian regime by describing its military opponents as rebels. This example, 
in fact, highlights the importance of both terminology and connotations in translating the 
political discourse communicated during the Syrian revolution. 
Another example of the influence of the translator’s personal political views on translation in 
the context of the Syrian revolution also comes from the work of the pro-revolutionary Free 
Syrian Translators group. The following is an excerpt from an article by the writer Adam 
Taylor on the story of a newly married couple taking their wedding pictures amidst the ruins 
of the destroyed Syrian city of Homs. The article was published on the Washington Post 
website on February 8, 2016, and thereafter translated into Arabic by Free Syrian Translators: 
The Washington Post report 
Homs may be the clearest evidence of the destruction that the Syrian civil war has 
wrought upon the country. The city, which is about 100 miles north of the capital, 
Damascus, was once the country's third-largest, with a population of more than 600,000. 
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However, after Homs became a rebel stronghold in 2011, it was hit by a military assault 
by government forces. The ensuing battle nearly destroyed Homs and left it a husk of a 
city. 
(Taylor, 2016) 
The translation produced by Free Syrian Translators 
 وحن دعبت يتلا ةنيدملا كلت .دلابلا يف ةيروسلا ةيلهلأا برحلا هتثدحأ يذلا رامدلا ىلع ليلد حضوأ صمح نوكت دق
100  نع ديزي يناكس دادعتب ،ايروس يف ةنيدم ربكأ ثلاث ام ًاموي تناك ،قشمد ةمصاعلا يلامش ارتموليك600،000 
 لقعم صمح تحبصأ نأ دعب ،كلذ عمو .ةمسنراوثلا ماع يف 2011 لبق نم يركسع موجهل تضرعت ، ماظنلا تاوق
مكاحلاةنيدم اياقب لاإ اهنم كرتت ملو صمح ريمدتب ًابيرقت كلذ تبقعأ يتلا ةكرعملا تببست .. 
[Homs may be the most evident proof of the destruction which the Syrian civil war has 
brought upon the country. That city, which is about 100 miles away towards the north of 
the capital, Damascus, was once the third largest city in Syria, with a population of more 
than 600,000. Nevertheless, after Homs became a stronghold of the revolutionaries in 
2011, it was hit by a military assault by the ruling regime’s forces. The ensuring battle 
nearly destroyed Homs and left it a husk of a city.] 
Free Syrian Translators, Feb 2016)) 
The translator’s pro-revolutionary political stance is manifested in this example through two 
translation decisions. The first one is the use of maᶜqal li-aṯ-ṯuwwār (“a stronghold of the 
revolutionaries”) as an equivalent for the ST item “rebel stronghold”, which fairly literally 
translates into Arabic as maᶜqal li-al-mutamarridīn. Describing the Syrian opposition fighters 
as ṯuwwār (“revolutionaries”) instead of mutamarridīn (“rebels”) reflects a tendency on the 
part of the translator to present the opposition fighters in a positive light. The terminology 
used by Taylor, if rendered literally into Arabic, would imply that the Syrian revolution is a 
rebellion against what might be understood as a legitimate authority. This tendency shown by 
the translator is reinforced by their second intervention in the translation; the translator has 
rendered the term “government forces” (fairly literally translating into Arabic as al-quwwāt 
al-ḥukūmiyya) as quwwāt an-niẓām al-ḥākim (“ruling regime’s forces”). The translator 
chooses a term in the TL typically referring to non-democratic political systems, instead of 
using the direct equivalent for the ST term, which is a more neutral label and free of negative 
implications in Arabic.  
Accuracy is a very important quality that must be observed when producing, interpreting, and 
translating political discourse. The slightest change to the wording of a political text can bring 
about significant changes to the meaning of that text. The following is an example that 
illustrates this point and shows how translation choices made by translators can substantially 
affect the message embedded in the source text: 
The New York Times article 
For decades, Syria has refused to confirm that it has chemical weapons. Now, facing a 
limited strike, its position abruptly changed to: Oh! We do have them after all! And we 
want to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention! We want to show them to United Nations 
inspectors. 
Kristof, 2013)) 
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The translation produced by Free Syrian Translators 
 ضفر دقليروسلا ماظنلا  هجاوي هنأب هكرادإ دعبو نلأا امأ ةيواميكلا ةحلسلأل هكلاتمإب رارقلإا دوقع ىدم ىلعو
 نع حصفأ كلذ نم رثكأو لب ةحلسلأا هذهل هكلاتمإب فارتعلإل  عراسو ةأجف هفقوم ريغت دقف ةلمتحم ةيركسع ةبرض
لأا يشتفم مامأ هعقاوم حتفو ةيواميكلا ةحلسلأا عزن ةيقافتإ ىلع عيقوتلا هتينةدحتملا مم. 
[The Syrian regime, for decades, has refused to confirm that it possesses chemical 
weapons. Now, after it has realised that it is facing a potential military strike, its stance 
has changed suddenly and has rushed to confess that it possesses these weapons. Even 
more, it has expressed its intention to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention, and 
opened its locations for United Nations inspectors.] 
Free Syrian Translators, Sep 2013)) 
This example is an excerpt from an article by columnist Nicholas D. Kristof published on the 
New York Time website on September 11, 2013. It was thereafter translated into Arabic by 
Free Syrian Translators. The writer discusses the Syrian decision to scrap its chemical 
weapons to avoid potential US airstrikes. The translator makes a very significant change to 
the text by replacing the ST term “Syria” with an-niẓām as-Sūrī (“the Syrian regime”). By 
utilising the technique of substitution, the translator is attempting to hold the Syrian regime, 
not Syria as a country or state, responsible for any foolish policies adopted in the name of 
Syria, especially those related to possessing chemical weapons. This intervention again 
reflects the translator’s anti-Assad political views, mainly manifested through choosing a 
negative political term like an-niẓām as-Sūrī (“the Syrian regime”) rather than al-ḥukūma as-
Sūriyya (“the Syrian government”), or even ad-dawla as-Sūriyya (“the Syrian state”), to 
substitute for the ST term “Syria”. 
The revolutionary language used by the protestors across Syria during the revolution is rich in 
political terms that are typically culture-bound, abstract, value-laden, and historically 
conditioned – four characteristics introduced in Section 3.4.3. In line with Newmark (1991: 
149), this means that such political terms are often deep-rooted in the source (local Syrian) 
culture. They indicate sophisticated concepts and contain historical references that can be 
obscure in terms of meaning for the target audience. The translator should therefore not take 
advantage by isolating them from their original context to give them new implications in line 
with a certain political agenda. On the contrary, the translator in some situations may have to 
offer further explanations that provide the target audience with the historical and cultural 
background information they need to capture the real meaning embedded in the source text. 
The following is an excerpt from a video for a demonstration organised by Syrian protestors 
in the Southern province of Daraa. The video was subtitled into English and published by the 
Washington DC-based media monitoring and analysis institution Memri on December 26, 
2012 (Syrian Demonstration, 2012): 
.يباهرلإا وه راشب ،امابوأ 
.باهرإ يف ام ايروسب ،ملاع اي 
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 ،ةرصنلا اي.توملل يكاعام ا نح 
[Obama, Bashar is the terrorist. 
Oh World, in Syria there is no terrorism. 
Oh al-Nusra, we are with you to death.] 
English subtitles provided by Memri 
Obama, Bashar is the terrorist. 
Oh World, there is no terrorism in Syria. 
Oh (Jabhat) Al-Nusra, we love you to death. 
Figure 13 A video for Syrian protestors, subtitled and published by Memri 
Memri claims that it aims to explore “the Middle East and South Asia through their media” 
by bridging “the language gap between the West and the Middle East and South Asia, 
providing timely translations of Arabic, Farsi, Urdu-Pashtu, Dari, and Turkish media, as well 
as original analysis of political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends” 
(Memri, 2016). However, critics such as Brian Whitaker charge the former Israeli military 
intelligence officer-founded organisation of selecting certain stories for translation that 
“follow a familiar pattern: either they reflect badly on the character of Arabs or they in some 
way further the political agenda of Israel” (Whitaker, 2012). The biased and manipulated 
translations by Memri were also highlighted by Mona Baker (2006). 
By choosing this particular video for translation, Memri is trying to present a negative image 
of the Syrian revolution, highlighting what can be seen as a contradiction on the part of the 
demonstrators; on one hand they are denying all terrorism accusations, and on the other hand 
they are showing support for Jabhat al-Nusra, which is globally labelled a terrorist group. 
Memri selects for translation a demonstration that cannot be in any way representative of the 
vast majority of civil demonstrations across Syria, and goes further in using inaccurate 
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translations for the slogans chanted by the protestors, which serve its political agenda and 
underlying ideological ends. The protestors, in fact, do not express their “love” towards Jabhat 
al-Nusra as the translation suggests, but rather they show their solidarity with this Jihadist 
group, taking into consideration its joint struggle against pro-Assad troops during the 
revolution. 
The slogan chanted in the video ḥinnā māᶜākī l-al-mawt (“we are with you to death”) is a 
culture-bound, value-laden, and historically conditioned expression that may seem obscure 
and abstract for non-Syrians who may not be familiar with the historical and cultural 
background of this statement. According to the culture prevalent in the Southern province of 
Daraa in Syria, this expression is used to demonstrate solidarity and show sympathy. It has 
been actually widely used by Syrian protestors to express wholehearted support for the people 
of various Syrian cities attacked by pro-Assad forces. However, the translation produced by 
Memri alters this gesture of solidarity against Western accusations to a show of love and 
passion, an inaccurate gesture by any standards. This small yet significant intervention by the 
Memri translator seems to be aimed at distorting the positive image of the Syrian revolution 
by associating it with terrorism and extremism.  
Since the beginning of the revolution, Israel, along with pro-Israeli organisations in the West, 
such as Memri, have tried to exploit the sufferings of the Syrian people to achieve political 
agendas and legitimise the existence of Israel. Memri has been monitoring, translating, and 
publishing videos produced by feuding parties. The policy adopted by Memri is primarily 
aimed at achieving three main objectives: first, highlighting extremist ideological views 
expressed by a few military factions, and thus presenting Syrian opposition fighters in general 
as terrorists; second, distorting the image of the Syrian revolution as well as Arab Syrian 
identity; and third bringing to the surface any possible views that recognise, appreciate, or 
praise Israel’s existence and role in the region. On many occasions, Memri has resorted to 
manipulation of the original message embedded in the source material through translation in 
order to achieve the aforementioned objectives. The following is an excerpt from an interview 
with opposition activist Kamal al-Labwani carried out by Orient News TV on March 19, 2014, 
and thereafter subtitled into English and published by Memri on March 31, 2014 (al-Labwani, 
2014): 
 يه سب .يروسلا بعشلا عمقل ليئارسا ةليسو ناك دسلأا ماظن ،لاساسأ ىلع ةبكرم ةلداعملا  اذإ يروسلا بعشلا نأ
انعفر .فيسلاب سدقلا ىلع توفيو بكري حوري حر ،ةيروتاتكيدلا هنع 
[No, the Assad regime was Israel’s means to oppress the Syrian people. However, this 
equation is based on the [assumption] that if we freed the Syrian people from 
dictatorship, they would go and enter Jerusalem with a sword.] 
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English subtitles provided by Memri 
No, the Al-Assad regime was Israel’s means for oppressing the Syrian people. This was 
based on people’s belief that if Syria’s dictatorship was lifted, the Syrian people would 
storm Jerusalem with swords. 
Figure 14 Kamal al-Labwani’s interview with Orient News TV, subtitled by Memri 
In the video, al-Labwani openly encourages the Syrian opposition to normalise political 
relations with Israel. The main concern of Memri seems to highlight such a friendly attitude 
and positive gesture of a well-known Syrian opposition figure towards Israel, and more 
importantly to eliminate or at least elevate any indirect accusations of Israel made by al-
Labwani. He had made hints alluding to Israel’s support for the Syrian regime’s oppressive 
policies against the Syrian people in an endeavour to ensure Israeli national security. Al-
Labwani, here, implies that the Israelis (not people in general, as the Memri translator renders 
it) assume that if they helped to free the Syrian people from dictatorship, the Syrians would 
invade Jerusalem. However, the translator uses the word “people” to refer to those who adopt 
this assumption. By avoiding any reflection on the real intention of the speaker through 
translation, Memri is in fact trying to preserve a positive image of Israel that is not entirely 
approved by Mr. al-Labwani. The technique used by Memri is a political tool explained in 
Section 3.3.1. It is known in the field of political analysis as passive constructions, which is 
aimed at avoiding explicit reference to a particular party involved in a certain activity, creating 
a deliberate ambiguity to serve a hidden political agenda. 
In the same interview, al-Labwani calls for the reconstruction of the Syrian mentality, making 
historical reconciliations in the region, in particular with the Israelis (al-Labwani, 2014). He 
then asks the interviewer the following question (ibid): 
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وجإ همأو هوبأ ..ليئارسا ضرأ ىلع قلخ يللا مويلاا ودتعاو اورجاها هوبأ ةيلوؤسم هيلمحتب ..يش اولمعو ؟همأو 
[Today, who was born on the land of Israel and whose father and mother immigrated 
and aggressed and did things – do you hold him responsible for [the acts of] his father 
and mother?] 
English subtitles provided by Memri 
A person who was born in Israel and whose parents came and did all those things – are 
you going to hold him responsible for what his forefathers did? 
Figure 15 Kamal al-Labwani speaking to Orient News TV – subtitles provided by Memri 
Detailed investigation into the translation reveals that the Memri translator chose not to render 
two verbs that are already existent in the source material to English, namely hājarū (“[they] 
immigrated”) and ‘iᶜtadū (“[they] aggressed”). This was done simply because the statement 
made by al-Labwani condemns the acts of the first generations of the Israelis who in fact 
migrated from their original homeland to Palestine and reportedly committed crimes and 
aggressions against the native inhabitants of Palestine. Such a slight reference to self-evident 
facts could substantially undermine the legitimacy of the very existence of Israel. Here lies 
the translator’s decision to delete this reference entirely and only translate the third verb ᶜamlū 
šī as “[they] did things”. This is a representative example of how political stances and 
ideological views adopted by Memri can be easily traced through its translation of the material 
it selects for publishing and circulation.  
Despite Memri’s endeavours to present itself as a professional monitoring and production 
media institution, it fails to fulfil the minimum criteria of a professional press, such as 
objectivity and demonstration of substantial historical, cultural, and political knowledge 
related to current regional and international events. As illustrated in Chapter Five on media 
and translation, it is essential for media organisations dealing with translation of political 
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discourse, which is by nature rich in historical references and culture-specific elements, to be 
familiar with the historical background of the event covered and discussed. Memri has 
translated and published many videos from the context of the Syrian revolution. However, the 
Memri translator in the following example proves to be entirely ignorant when it comes to the 
modern history of Syrian politics. A representative example is a video of an interview with 
Syrian cartoonist Ali Farzat conducted by and aired on BBC Arabic TV on June 2, 2014. In 
the interview, which was subtitled into English and published by Memri on June 10, 2014, 
Farzat recounts the assassination attempt on him carried out by what are believed to be 
intelligence agents following criticism of President Assad (Farzat, 2014): 
فن ةرايسلا ينبرضتب نييوملأا ةحاس صنبعلطتب ..اهس  اهيف يه ةحاسلا .ةحاسلا صنب ينفقوتبو ينبرضتبو ييارو نم
23  ةدجاوتم نمأ ةيرود يف ثعبلا بزح ملتسا يللا تقو نم1963. 
[In the middle of the Umayyad Square, a car hits me. It comes from behind me, and hits 
me, and stops me in the middle of the square. This square has 23 security patrols in it 
since the Ba’ath Party took over in 1963.] 
English subtitles provided by Memri 
It was in the middle of Umayyad Square that a car hit me. In that square, there have 
always been 23 security patrols, ever since Hafez Al-Assad took over the Baath Party 
in 1963. 
Figure 16 Syrian cartoonist Ali Farzat in an interview with BBC Arabic TV, subtitled by Memri 
As evident from the subtitles provided by Memri, the late President Hafez al-Assad’s name 
has been inserted in the translation although his name is not mentioned in the source material. 
In his interview, Farzat only mentions the Ba’ath Party’s coup in 1963. This coup was not led 
by Hafez al-Assad, as one can understand from the inaccurate translation. In fact, not until 
1970 did Hafez al-Assad take over in Syria following a coup known as al-Ḥaraka at-
Taṣḥīḥiyya (“the Corrective Movement”). Such a dual mistake reflects the Memri translator’s 
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incompetence as well as a lack of the historical knowledge needed by a translator to tackle 
translation of political discourse communicated in the context of Syrian politics. It therefore 
exposes Memri’s strikingly poor professionalism and credibility. 
 
7.4 Ideological Data Analysis: Translator’s Role and Patronage 
This section is devoted to analysing the data corpus in light of the theories examined in 
Chapter Four. As demonstrated in Chapter Four, it is frequently not possible for a translator 
to resist cultural, historical, social, or ideological forces. Translators of the political discourse 
communicated during the Syrian revolution have often worked under the constant pressure of 
these factors, subconsciously sometimes, producing a translation that is influenced by their 
own reading of the source text (which is, in turn, governed by the translator’s previous 
knowledge and experience, as explained in Section 4.3.1) as well as their cognitive socio-
ideological background. On many occasions, translators have also consciously chosen to carry 
out deliberate manipulation of the translation, and hence forced a certain ideology upon the 
translation as a result of their ideological affiliations or the patron’s instructions. Translation 
can never be perceived as a neutral activity, as Hatim and Mason (1997) admit. 
This research study adopts what is perceived here as a valid proposition pointed out by al-
Taher (2008: 82): The decision-making mechanism in the translation process during a 
developing critical conflict like the Syrian revolution goes through three circles. The creation 
of the source text, on the one hand, is governed by the source culture, the author’s ideology, 
and the way ideas are processed and issues are addressed by the author. The production of the 
target text, on the other hand, is carried out in line with three different elements too: the target 
culture, the translator’s ideological background and the way the translator comprehends and 
processes ideas. These three factors, in addition to the patron’s influence, are the circles that 
the translation process goes through before a modified, biased and ideologically steered 
translation is produced. 
A representative example of the influence of ideology on translators and the leading role 
played by ideology in producing what can be considered as an ideologically steered translation 
in the context of the Syrian revolution is the Arabic translation of an interview conducted by 
The Daily Beast with Zahran Alloush. Alloush is the late commander of Jaish al-Islam (Army 
of Islam), a prominent military opposition faction fighting against both pro-Assad troops and 
IS (Islamic State). The interview was carried out in English and was published on the Daily 
Beast website on December 15, 2015, and thereafter translated into Arabic by Jaish al-Islam’s 
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Press Office and published on Orient Net at the same date. The following is a comprehensive 
analysis of six excerpts from the translation produced by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office: 
The Daily Beast script 
TDB: In one of your prior interviews, you said that you do not have any differences with 
Jabhat al Nusra, the al Qaeda franchise in Syria. You said that your sharia adviser does 
not disagree with the sharia adviser of al Nusra. Does that mean that you have no 
ideological differences with al Qaeda?  
(Alloush, 2015) 
The translation produced by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office 
 متلق ةهبج نيبو مكنيب فلاخلا نأ ينعي اذه له ،ةرصنلا ةهبج يعرش نع فلتخي لا مكييعرش نأ مكتلاباقم ىدحإ يف
 نيبو مكنيب ةيدئاقعلا تاقورفلا يه ام ؟يدئاقع فلاخ سيلو حلاصم فلاخ وه ةرصنلاةرصنلا ةهبج؟ 
[In one of your interviews, you said that your Sharia advisers are not different to the 
Sharia advisers of al-Nusra. Does this mean that the dispute between you and Jabhat al-
Nusra is a dispute of interests, rather than an ideology? What are the ideological 
differences between you and Jabhat al-Nusra?] 
(Orient Net, Dec 2015) 
The question asked by the Daily Beast journalist in the original (English) script of the 
interview focuses on the ideological differences between Jaish al-Islam and al-Qaeda in 
general, not the form of disagreement with Jabhat al-Nusra. The question is reshaped and 
modified by the translator of Jaish al-Islam in the Arabic script so that the extremist ideology 
of Jabhat al-Nusra, which is perceived by Jaish al-Islam as a rival faction with a different 
Islamist ideology, is highlighted and becomes the focal point of the question. Although al-
Qaeda is mentioned twice in the source text, there is not a single reference to al-Qaeda in the 
target text while al-Nusra is mentioned three times. This modification of the message 
embedded in the source text is closely related to a geographically restricted local ideological 
conflict between al-Nusra and Jaish al-Islam. The exclusion of any reference to al-Qaeda in 
general aims to focus on the shortcomings of al-Nusra in particular. This technique can be 
regarded as an aspect of local semantics, one of the structures identified by van Dijk (1995a: 
26), explained in Section 4.2.4. This structure is essentially associated with ideologically 
dominated representations of the situation as well as biased explanations provided by a 
specific group to legitimise the self and negatively present the others.  
The translation of Zahran Alloush’s answer to the previous question is significant as it reflects 
the translator’s awareness of the culture and ideology of the target audience (Jaish al-Islam’s 
members, supporters, and followers). It shows an attempt to modify the translation to match 
these expectations. Alloush’s answer to the previous question comes as follows: 
The Daily Beast script 
ZA: Back then, I was referring to Abu Maria al-Qahtani, one of [al Nusra’s] sharia 
advisers. We saw that Qahtani was showing a moderate face and we wanted to encourage 
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those efforts. Now al Nusra has different sharia advisers and ours have many 
disagreements with them, ideologically and intellectually.  
(Alloush, 2015) 
The translation produced by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office 
 ،يناطحقلا ةيرام وبأ وه ةرصنلا ةهبجل ماعلا يعرشلا ناك امدنع ردص حيرصتلا اذه للاخ نم انفشتكا يذلاو
 يف انويعرش هب عتمتي ام اذهو هلهأو ريفكتلل براحم ملع بلاط هنأ يعامتجلاا لصاوتلا عقاوم ىلع هتاحورطأ
 يعرشلا ةرصنلا ةهبج تلزَع مث ملاسلإا شيج" "ةيرام وبأ ريثك يف مهعم نيابتن نييعرش هنع ًاضوع تعضوو
ةيدقعلاو ةيركفلا لئاسملا نم. 
[This statement was made when Jabhat al-Nusra’s general Sharia advisor was Abu Maria 
al-Qahtani. We realised through his propositions on social media websites that he 
was a scholar and fighter against takfirism and its followers, and these are the 
qualities of our Sharia advisors in Jaish al-Islam. Then, Jabhat al-Nusra discharged 
Abu Maria and replaced him by Sharia advisors with whom we disagree on many 
intellectual and ideological issues.] 
(Orient Net, Dec 2015) 
The translator adds a full sentence to the target text, which does not exist in Alloush’s answer 
in the English script: “He [Abu Maria] was a scholar and fighter against takfirism and its 
followers, and these are the qualities of our Sharia advisors in Jaish al-Islam. Then, Jabhat al-
Nusra discharged Abu Maria.” The extra text added to Alloush’s answer in the Arabic 
translation serves a specific function and agenda set by the translator and/or their patron (Jaish 
al-Islam in this instance). It aims to provide Jaish al-Islam’s supporters with further reasons 
to disagree with Jabhat al-Nusra by praising and highlighting the good qualities of the 
discharged Sharia advisor of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Maria, as well as the Sharia advisors of 
Jaish al-Islam. This procedure of addition followed by the translator is also employed in the 
ideological conflict with Jabhat al-Nusra; the added text implies that al-Nusra’s new Sharia 
advisors do not have the same good qualities as Abu Maria as a scholar and fighter against 
takfirism (accusing other Muslims of apostasy). It thus provides Jaish al-Islam’s supporters 
and the Syrian population in general with a valid justification for Alloush’s answer and Jaish 
al-Islam’s attitude against al-Nusra.  
The Daily Beast script 
TDB: Erbin, a town in Ghouta, includes many Christians. How do you treat the 
Christians in your area? Is it true that the Christians prefer Assad to the rule of the 
opposition? 
(Alloush, 2015) 
The translation produced by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office 
 ةطوغلا يلاهلأ نيرواجم اوشاع نييحيسملا نم اهناكس نم ريبك ددع مكترطيس تحت ةعقاولا ةطوغلا يف نيبرع له
؟امئاد هقيبطتل نوعستسو يملسلا شياعتلاب نونمؤت مأ ماظنلا نم مكيلع اضورفم شياعتلا اذه ناك 
[Erbin is in al-Gouta, which is under your control. A large number of its population are 
Christians who have lived with the people of al-Ghouta. Was this co-existence imposed 
on you by the regime or do you believe in peaceful co-existence and will always seek 
to achieve it?] 
(Orient Net, Dec 2015) 
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The source text in this excerpt includes two questions: one is modified by the translator and 
the other is completely omitted from the target text. The first question, upon modification, 
carries with it its answer that reflects a positive image of Alloush and his faction. Although 
the original question is regarding the way the Christians are treated in the areas controlled by 
Jaish al-Islam, the translator adopts their own reading and interpretation of the question. The 
question is conveyed accordingly through the use of completely different wording as an 
inquiry as to whether Jaish al-Islam truly believes in, and will seek to, achieve at-taᶜayuš as-
silmī (“peaceful co-existence”) with the Christians. This is an example of a key concept 
discussed in Section 4.3.1, namely the role of the translator as a reader of the source text who 
tends to interpret the source text in line with their previous knowledge and experience, which 
are inevitably influenced by their ideology and beliefs. In line with this proposition, the 
meaning of a text can be determined by the reader’s understanding, which gives the translator 
more freedom in forming the target text without any “restrictions” imposed by the notion of 
loyalty to the source text and the intention of the author (Schäffner, 1998b: 238). The Jaish al-
Islam translator also chooses to delete the second question from the translation, perhaps 
because Alloush fails to provide a direct and comprehensive answer to the question. 
The Daily Beast script 
TDB: Why do many people call you a dictator? And what is the reason behind the 
demonstrations against you? 
(Alloush, 2015) 
The translation produced by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office 
 نارهز خيشلا نأ يعدي ضعبلا روتاتكيدهداقتناب رملأا قلعتي نيح  هل بلج اممنييناجم ءادعأ ملاكلا اذه له ،
 حيحصنيرهاظتملا مه نمو ؟ةطوغلا يف شولع نارهز دض  
[Some people allege that Sheikh Zahran is a dictator when it comes to criticising him, 
which has brought him crazy enemies. Is this correct? And who are the protestors 
against Zahran Alloush in al-Ghouta?] 
(Orient Net, Dec 2015) 
Five points that make this translation a striking example of a translator’s production of an 
ideologically-steered target text need to be highlighted. First, the translator renders “many 
people” as al-baᶜḍ (“some people”) and chooses to use the verb yaddaᶜī (“allege”) as an 
equivalent for the ST verb “call”. In this form, the translation suggests that only some people 
are making what the target reader would perceive as (false) allegations against the interviewee 
and hence the interviewer asks about the reasons behind these allegations. Second, inserting 
the interviewee’s name preceded by his religious title šayx (“Sheikh”) in the translation of the 
question attaches to the interviewee an added respect that is not found in the source text.  
Third, by adding the phrase ḥīna yataᶜallaq al-amr bi-intiqādihi (“when it comes to criticising 
him”), the translator seems to restrict the motivation behind people’s perception of Zahran 
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Alloush as a dictator to him being intolerant of criticism, excluding other qualities of dictators, 
such as brutality and corruption. Fourth, the translator describes those who call Alloush a 
dictator ‘aᶜdā’ majānīn (“crazy enemies”) even though this phrase does not have its root in 
the source text. Fifth, the interviewer asks Alloush in the original script about the reason 
behind the demonstrations against him, not about the identity of the protestors, as the target 
text implies. Asking about the identity of the demonstrators, instead of the reason behind their 
demonstrations, suggests that these protestors are a minority that does not represent a large 
segment of the people in al-Ghouta. This raises doubts as to who they are and where they come 
from, portraying them as intruders with hidden agendas.  
The Daily Beast script 
TDB: You fought ISIS in Ghouta, Qalamoun [a southern district in the Damascus region], 
and in northern Syria. You lost many of your men in the war against ISIS. But Western 
countries still do not back you or include you in any arming project. Why? 
(Alloush, 2015) 
The translation produced by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office 
 مكل طقسو شعاد لاتقل روهش ةدع متغرفتءادهش  يفريهطت برح  شعاد نم ةطوغلا طيحم ةمجهل مكضرع امم
.ىصقلأا دنجو ةدعاقلا ميظنت لثم لئاصف نم ةسرش  شعاد متلتاق اذاملةسارشلا هذهب  شيج ةبرجت متممعو ملاسلإا
هجهنمو  شعاد لاتق يفدسلأا لاتق رادقم سفنب  اذإ برغلا ناك اذإ نوملقلا طيحمو لامشلل ةقتوبلا سفن يف مكعضو
ىرخلأا ةيروسلا ةيملاسلإا لئاصفلا لك عم ؟حيلست وأ بيردت جمانرب يأب مكلمشي ملو 
[You spent many months fighting Isis and you lost martyrs in the cleansing war to clear 
the area around al-Ghouta from Isis, which has caused a fierce attack against you by 
factions like al-Qaeda and Jund al-Aqsa. Why did you fight Isis with such ferocity, 
generalising Jaish al-Islam’s experience and approach to fighting against Isis as 
much as against Assad to include the North and the area around al-Qalamoun even 
though the West put you in the same circle with all other Syrian Islamist factions and 
did not include you in any arming or training program?] 
(Orient Net, Dec 2015) 
Seven main interventions by the translator can be traced and highlighted in this excerpt. First, 
the translator used the TL term šuhadā’ (“martyrs”) to describe Jaish al-Islam’s fighters who 
were killed during the battles against IS, although the interviewer in the original script refers 
to them by the neutral word “men”. Needless to say, the Islamist ideology of the translator 
here has played a crucial role in this choice, aimed at dignifying the sacrifices of Jaish al-
Islam, giving the men whom the faction lost in the war a sublime Islamic status. Second, the 
translator describes “the war against Isis” as ḥarb taṭhīr (“a cleansing war”) despite the fact 
that this term does not have any trace in the ST. This choice is aimed at reflecting positive 
connotations on Jaish al-Islam’s military operations while presenting a negative image of the 
role played by IS in the region.  
Third, the translator in the TT inserts a relative clause that does not exist in the ST: “which 
has caused a fierce attack against you by factions like al-Qaeda and Jund al-Aqsa.” This 
addition aims at revealing the moderate face of Jaish al-Islam while exposing the extremist 
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views of the rival Islamist factions involved in the internal ideological conflict between the 
Syrian opposition groups. Fourth, the translator inserts a prepositional phrase bi haḏihi aš-
šarāsa (“with such ferocity”) in the TT to add credibility to the struggle of Jaish al-Islam 
against Islamic State (IS). 
Fifth, the translator also adds a clause to the TT that is not mentioned in the ST: “[you] 
generalized Jaish al-Islam’s experience and approach to fighting ISIS.” The purpose of this 
addition may be the translator’s desire to demonstrate that Jaish al-Islam is an effective 
established organisation that has a vision, rich experience in fighting extremist groups, and a 
method to implement its agendas; it is able to extend its struggle against IS institutionally to 
various areas across Syria. Sixth, the TT includes a reference to Jaish al-Islam’s war “against 
Assad”, which does not exist in the ST. The translator seemingly wants to remind Jaish al-
Islam’s members and supporters that its struggle against the Assad regime is not neglected or 
forgotten. This reference is deeply significant as it aims to preserve the popular support of the 
pro-revolutionary Syrians. Seventh, the translator again uses the procedure of addition to 
imply that the West has put Jaish al-Islam in the same circle as other Syrian Islamist factions. 
This addition has an ideological function; it is employed to demonstrate to Jaish al-Islam’s 
supporters, who are mostly Islamists, that it identifies with other Islamist factions in Syria. 
The Daily Beast script 
TDB: We have seen you going to Turkey though Ghouta is under siege. Is it true that you 
arrange that with the regime? 
(Alloush, 2015) 
The translation produced by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office 
 كارن .. شولع نارهزةطوغلا بابش ضعبو  ايكرت يف ىرخأو ةرتف نيبراصحلل نيقرتخم حيحص له ، هجورت ام
شعاد نم ةبرقملا تاميظنتلا ضعب ؟ماظنلا عم قيسنتب ايكرت ىلإ نوجرخت مكنأب 
[Zahran Alloush, we see you and some of the young men of al-Ghouta, from time to 
time, in Turkey, breaking the siege. Are [the stories] promoted by some of the 
organisations that are close to Isis true about you getting out to Turkey in coordination 
with the regime?] 
(Orient Net, Dec 2015) 
Through the translation, the translator is trying to suggest that Zahran was not alone when he 
exited the besieged area of al-Ghouta. Rather, he was accompanied by baᶜḍ šabāb al-Ġūṭa 
(“some of the al-Ghouta young men”). By referring to the al-Ghouta young men, the translator 
is trying to draw a picture of Zahran Alloush as an ordinary man surrounded by the people of 
al-Ghouta. The use of the expression muxtariqīn li-al-ḥiṣār (“breaking the siege”) in the target 
text is quite significant, as it implies that Alloush, in fact, broke the siege imposed on al-
Ghouta without making arrangements with the regime. The ideological conflict with IS arises 
again in this example; the interviewer asks Alloush about the truth behind certain claims about 
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his travels to Turkey but she does not identify the source of these claims. The translator, 
however, does specify the source of such claims: baᶜḍ at-tanẓīmāt al-muqarraba min Dāᶜiš 
(“some of the organisations which are close to Isis”). This intervention by the translator aims 
to challenge and undermine these claims, demonstrating to public opinion that such allegations 
are only fabricated by extremist organisations affiliated with IS, which is disliked by the 
majority of Syrians. 
One of the ideological structures identified by van Dijk (1995a), examined in Section 4.2.4, is 
the topics or semantic macro-propositions of a given discourse. They are typically used to 
define and provide a brief description of the information found in the discourse that discourse 
producers believe to be most relevant, crucial, and significant. The process of topic 
determination can be influenced by ideological considerations. “Ingroup speakers may be 
expected to detopicalize information that is inconsistent with their interests or positive self-
image and conversely they will topicalize information that emphasizes negative outgroup 
properties” (van Dijk, 1995a: 27). A representative example of this ideological structure is the 
determination of the title of the Arabic (translated) interview with Zahran Alloush published 
on Orient Net: 
The title of the original interview  
The Rebel Commander of Damascus: Zahran Alloush, head of the Army of Islam, talks 
to The Daily Beast about a four-year siege, the future of Syria, and accusations that he’s 
just another dictator in Islamic garb. 
(Alloush, 2015) 
The title of the translated interview 
 نع ثدحتي ةيكيرمأ ةفيحص عم ةلباقم يف شولعةيطارقميدلا ايروس لبقتسمو 
[Alloush, in an interview with an American newspaper, talks about democracy and the 
future of Syria.] 
(Orient Net, Dec 2015) 
It is important here to start by mentioning that the title of the article (target text) is chosen by 
Orient Net as a publishing media outlet. It is clear that title of the Arabic (translated) interview 
is significantly different from the title chosen for the original interview published by The Daily 
Beast. Orient Net tries to present Alloush as a moderate Islamist who is open about accepting 
democracy and discussing the future of Syria accordingly, while the title of the source text 
focuses on the siege imposed on al-Ghouta and the accusations that he is an Islamic dictator. 
The choice made by Orient Net to shift the focal point of the title and ignore the reference to 
the accusation of dictatorship is intentional and influenced by the ideology of the translator 
(Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office) and/or the media outlet that published the Arabic translation 
(Orient Net). This is also an illustrative example of the role of patronage (discussed in Section 
4.3.3), represented here by Orient Net, in determining the outcome of the translation process. 
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The influence of ideology during the Syrian revolution has been manifested through 
translations produced by pro-revolutionary outlets as well as translations produced by pro-
Assad media institutions, such as al-Manar. The following is an excerpt from an article by 
Patrick Cockburn published on the Independent website on February 23, 2014, and thereafter 
translated into Arabic and published as a report on the al-Manar website at the same date: 
The Independent article 
The two most important developments so far this year are the failure of the Geneva II 
peace talks and Saudi Arabia’s replacement of its intelligence chief, Prince Bandar bin 
Sultan, as director of Syrian policy, with a member of the royal family notably close to 
the US and hostile to al-Qa’ida. The reasons for the failure at Geneva are obvious enough 
and so are the consequences of that failure … What is not in doubt is that the rebels have 
failed to overthrow the government, though the government appears incapable of 
defeating them. This explains our second important development of the year which is the 
sidelining of Prince Bandar, who, as the head of Saudi intelligence, was in charge of 
directing, supplying and financing the rebels. 
(Cockburn, 2014) 
The al-Manar translation 
 وه رييغتلا اذه لئلاد نم" نأ ةيناطيربلا ةفيحصلا تركذو ةيدوعسلا يف تارباخملا ةداق عامتجا يف ىرج ام
هيف مت يذلاو ارخؤم ةدحتملا تايلاولاو  فلملا ةدايق ةمهم نع ناطلس نب ردنب ةيدوعسلا تارباخملا سيئر داعبإ
" نأ تحضواو ،"ةدعاقلل هءادعو ةدحتملا تايلاولل هتقادصب فورعملا ةيلخادلا ريزو ىلإ اهدانساو يروسلا ببس
ءيش يا زاجنا يف ردنبل عيرذلا لشفلا وه رييغتلا ،ةريخلأا فينج تاضوافم لشف يف لثمت ام وهو ك ثيح لاؤسلا نا
كلذل رطضم ريغ وهو تلازانت يروسلا ماظنلا مدقي اذامل وه". 
[The British newspaper mentioned that “one of the signs of this change is what happened 
in a recent meeting of the Saudi and US intelligence chiefs whereby Saudi Intelligence 
Chief Bandar bin Sultan has been discharged from the mission of directing the Syrian 
file; the mission was assigned to the Interior Minister, known for his friendship with the 
United States and hostility towards al-Qaeda,” and explained that “the reason for the 
change is Bandar’s abject failure to achieve anything. This was represented by the 
failure of the recent Geneva Negotiations where the question was why the Syrian 
regime would make concessions while it did not have to.”] 
(Al-Manar, Feb 2014) 
Before carrying out an in-depth analysis of the translation of this excerpt, it is worth 
mentioning that the al-Manar translator’s intervention in the translation of this article is a 
manifestation of an ideological conflict between the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah and the 
Saudis. Hezbollah follows a hard-line Shiite ideology and adheres to the orders of al-Walī al-
Faqīh (the Guardian Jurist) based in Iran whereas the Saudis adopt a hard-line Salafist Sunni 
ideology. The entire Syrian war is said to be merely an aspect of this ideological conflict. The 
effect of ideology on the translator can be traced in this excerpt in four main areas. First, the 
translator refers to a meeting of the Saudi and US intelligence chiefs even though there is no 
such reference in the source text. The author of the original article indicates that the 
replacement of Prince Bandar comes as a decision made solely by the Saudi authorities, rather 
than as a result of a meeting held between the Americans and the Saudis, which is not even 
mentioned in the source text in the first place. Second, while the author does imply that the 
215 
 
dismissal of Prince Bandar may be a result of the development of events in Syria, he does not 
speak of a failure of Prince Bandar in Syria and certainly does not state directly that Bandar’s 
“abject failure to achieve anything” (back-translated) is the reason for his dismissal as 
indicated in the target text.  
Third, the translator establishes a direct link between what it is inaccurately rendered into the 
target language as the failure of Prince Bandar to achieve anything and the failure of the 
Geneva Peace Talks, although this link is not quite clear in the target text. Fourth, the author 
states that the “reasons for the failure at Geneva are obvious enough,” yet his conclusion, as 
indicated by the translator, is that the Syrian regime was not obliged to make concessions. The 
translator is attempting through their biased and manipulated translation, which is primarily 
driven by their ideological views and political stances, to present the Syrian regime not only 
as strong, but also as victorious. This view does not accurately represent what the author is 
saying in the source text. The author does say that “the rebels have failed to overthrow the 
government,” but he also refers to the failure of the regime to defeat its opponents. This last 
reference is entirely ignored by the translator, simply because it contradicts their agenda and 
the message they attempt to pass on to the target reader through the translation. 
The translator paraphrases the source text despite using direct quotations, which technically 
implies that this should be a direct and accurate translation of the source text. New sentences 
are added in the target text; many other sentences and ideas are ignored and omitted; and the 
translator’s own interpretation of the source text is implemented and reflected by establishing 
links and making conclusions that do not have their root in the source text. All these changes 
to the original message are made in line with the translator’s ideology; they aime to achieve a 
certain agenda dictated by al-Manar as a media outlet governed by a hard-line Shiite ideology. 
This example supports a proposition expressed by Lefèvere (1992a: 10), introduced in Section 
4.3.3, on translation and patronage. Lefèvere (ibid) emphasises the necessity to analyse 
translation “in connection with power and patronage, ideology and poetics,” in an attempt to 
expose the constant efforts devoted by patrons to use translation to promote their own ideology 
and undermine the other’s. Translation can be employed in a strategy to “maintain” specific 
cultures and identities and “deal with what lies outside their boundaries” (ibid). 
Al-Manar, in this instance, seems to employ the strategy of subheading – one of the extra-
textual strategies pointed out by Bani (2006: 43). Information that goes beyond the actual text 
is offered in a bid to assist the reader in comprehending the information embedded in the text. 
The source content is contextualised in line with the media outlet’s agendas and goals. 
Through this strategy, the editor is able to refer to certain concepts that would stay 
unrecognisable if not stated in a prime position. In line with this proposition, al-Manar’s editor 
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has chosen for the translated report a subheading different to the one chosen for the original 
article. 
The Independent article subheading 
World View: Assad cannot deliver a knock-out blow, the rebels can’t unite, Moscow will 
not back down and the West lacks a strategy.  
(Cockburn, 2014) 
The al-Manar report subheading 
 تراشا ءدب ذنم قباس تقو يأ يف هنم عاضولأا ىلع ةرطيس رثكأ حبصأ يروسلا ماظنلا" نا ىلإ "تندنبدنلإا"
 تاضوافم ديعب ودبي ام ىلع ايلاح اههاجتا ريغت طسولأا قرشلا يف تأدب ىتلا رييغتلا حاير" نا ةحضوم ،"برحلا
ينج.ف 
[The Independent noted that “the Syrian regime has now become more in control over 
the situation than ever since the beginning of the war,” adding that “the winds of change 
that started in the Middle East are seemingly changing direction after the Geneva peace 
talks.”] 
(Al-Manar, Feb 2014) 
Substantial differences can be spotted between the two subheadings. The Independent article 
subheading genuinely reflects the content of the article, whereas the message embedded in the 
subheading chosen by al-Manar seems to be consistent with its ideological and political 
affiliations. The aim of this choice by al-Manar is to highlight the achievements made by the 
pro-Assad forces, portraying the Syrian regime as victorious in the Syrian war. However, 
although in the subheading The Independent does admit that the rebels are not in a very good 
position, it does not highlight any victories; in fact, it clearly states that Assad is not able to 
“deliver a knock-out blow” despite the lack of unity which the rebels suffer from. 
Another example of al-Manar’s biased and manipulated translations of the news reports on 
the Syrian revolution is the intervention made by the translator in the translation of the 
following text. It is an excerpt from an article by Adam Entous and Rima Abushakra, 
published on the Wall Street Journal website on December 11, 2013, and thereafter translated 
into Arabic and published as a report on the al-Manar website on December 12, 2013: 
The Wall Street Journal article 
The Islamic Front is a recently formed alliance of the largest Islamist rebel groups that 
excludes the two main al Qaeda-linked rebel groups—the Nusra Front and the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham—and is considered the more moderate faction among 
Islamist rebel groups. 
Entous and Abushakra, 2013)) 
The al-Manar translation 
 ،"رحلا شيجلا" رقم ىلع ترطيس يتلا "ةيملاسلإا ةهبجلا" نأ ناهذلأا ىلإ "لانروج تيرتس لوو" تداعأو تلكش
رصنلا ةهبج" يتعامج عم افلاتئا ارخؤمةةدعاقلا" ميظنتب نيتطبترملا "ماشلاو قارعلا يف ةيملاسلإا ةلودلا"و "". 
[The Wall Street Journal has reminded that the Islamic Front, which took over the Free 
Army’s headquarter, has recently formed a coalition with the two groups of Jabhat 
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al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, affiliated with al-Qaeda 
organisation.] 
Al-Manar, Dec 2013)) 
The al-Manar translator makes a significant intervention in the translation of the above 
excerpt. It is clearly indicated in the source text that the Islamic Front, which is an Islamist 
opposition coalition reportedly backed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar and fighting 
against pro-Assad forces, excludes both Jabhat al-Nusra and Isis. That being said, the 
translator states in the target text that the coalition actually includes these two al-Qaeda 
affiliated groups. This manipulation of the original message embedded in the source text is 
clearly consistent with the ideology of al-Manar, which strives to defame and denigrate the 
groups opposed to the Assad regime. This is especially the case for those that adopt a Salafist 
Sunni ideology, such as the Islamic Front and Jaish al-Islam, both of whom are often supported 
by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Al-Manar is aware that establishing a link between the Islamic 
Front and al-Qaeda could deprive the former of any possible international support, thus 
legitimising the rule of the Assad regime as a partner in the war against terror. 
Another manifestation of the ideological conflict between Hezbollah, represented by its media 
outlet al-Manar, and anti-Assad Syrian Islamist factions through translation is the translator’s 
choices adopted while rendering the following text into Arabic. This is an excerpt from a 
report by Ian Black, published on the Guardian website on November 7, 2013, and thereafter 
translated into Arabic and published in the form of a report on the al-Manar website on 
November 8, 2013: 
The Guardian report 
The force excludes al-Qaida affiliates such as Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham and 
Jabhat al-Nusra, but embraces more non-jihadi Islamist and Salafi units. 
Black, 2013))    
The al-Manar translation 
 مضي وهو ،يضاملا لوليأ/ربمتبس يف هليكشت مت "ملاسلاا شيج" نأ ركذي43  نم ةيملاسلاا ةحلسملا تاعومجملا
ةيفلسلاوةدعاقلا" ـب نيتطبترملا "ماشلاو قارعلا يف ةيملاسلاا ةلودلا"و "ةرصنلا ةهبج" مضي لا هنكل ،". 
[It is worth mentioning that Jaish al-Islam was formed last September, and it consists of 
43 armed Islamist and Salafist groups, excluding Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State 
in Iraq and al-Sham, affiliated with al-Qaeda.] 
Al-Manar, Nov 2013)) 
The importance of terminology in translation of political discourse is apparent in this example. 
The author of the original article discusses Saudi Arabia’s funding of anti-Assad Islamist 
formations, focusing on Jaish al-Islam functioning in al-Ghouta around Damascus. Black 
clearly states that this newly formed faction embraces “non-jihadi” Islamist and Salafi units. 
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By describing the components of Jaish al-Islam as non-jihadi, the author admits that this new 
formation does not follow a jihadi agenda, which is defined in the West as extremist and 
terrorist. However, the translator seems to deliberately drop the term “non-Jihadi” in the 
translation, rendering the phrase into the target language as al-majmūᶜāt al-musallaḥa al-
Islāmiyya wa as-Salafiyya (“armed Islamist and Salafist groups”). This omission is aimed by 
the translator at discrediting Assad’s opponents, removing any reference in the text that could 
present a positive image of the Islamist and revolutionary factions.  
The interventions made by the translators in all the aforementioned examples expose the 
influence of ideology on the translators’ performance. Whether or not they come in the form 
of deliberate manipulation of the source text, they highlight the role of ideology in determining 
the outcome of the translation process during the Syrian revolution and the subsequent armed 
conflict between revolutionary and Islamist factions and the pro-Assad forces backed by their 
allied Shiite militias. This is also done by preferring certain TL equivalents that serve the 
ideological agenda of the translator and/or the patron represented by the publishing media 
outlet to others. 
 
7.5 Media Discourse Analysis: Strategies and Techniques Used by Media 
Outlets 
This section is devoted to analysing the data corpus in light of the theories examined in 
Chapter Five. The influence of ideology on translation has been investigated and traces of the 
translator’s and/or publishing media outlet’s ideological views have been detected in excerpts 
from translated political discourse communicated during the Syrian revolution. It is 
nevertheless essential to highlight the role of the media in forcing certain political and 
ideological views on the translations during the revolution. Although the translation process 
may have gone unnoticed and remained absent in an area where the supreme concern is to 
deliver news to the audience, it involves procedures that may have affected the content and 
style of translated news items. Before a political statement, interview, or article reaches the 
target audience, i.e. the audience speaking a different language from the language of the media 
material, it often goes through a long and complicated chain of textual transformations 
between two or more languages. These transformations are a result of a set of processes that 
include initial editing, summarisation, translation into the target language, further editing, 
transferring into a media outlet, adaptation to the publisher’s textual style, and shortening to 
fit in the space allocated for it by the publisher (Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 9). 
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The role of the media in manipulating and influencing the translation of political discourse 
during the Syrian revolution, politically and ideologically, can be traced through the 
translations produced by pro-regime media outlets of political articles and reports primarily 
published in Western newspapers. An example of this is the work of a pro-regime news outlet 
called Syria Now. The following is an excerpt from an article by Patrick Cockburn published 
in English on the Independent website on February 13, 2016, and thereafter translated into 
Arabic and published in the form of a report by Syria Now on February 14, 2016: 
The Independent article 
Their success provoked Russian military intervention on 30 September which shifted the 
balance of power in the war in favour of Assad to a degree that could only be reversed 
by the direct intervention of the Turkish army … Saudi Arabia and Turkey no longer 
have the arm lock over Western policy in the war that they once had, when it was assumed 
that their Syrian allies and proxies would win and Assad would go … Regional powers 
such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar failed to overthrow Assad, and have achieved 
none of their war aims. Iran and the Shia coalition it leads have been much more 
successful. 
Cockburn, 2016)( 
The Syria Now report  
 حلاصل ايروس يف نيزاوملا بلق يسورلا لخدتلا نأ بتاكلا ىريويروسلا شيجلا  نود هرييغت نكمي لا اذه نأو
 ايكرت نأ بتاكلا ىريو ... يكرتلا شيجلل رشابملا لخدتلادوعس ينب تاطلسو  ىلع ةقباسلا ةرطيسلا امهل دعت مل
 نأ نيبت نأ دعب ايروس يف فقوملا نأشب ةيبرغلا ةسايسلاةيلاوملا تاوقلا امهل  ىلعو راصتنلاا ىلع ةرداق تسيل
 "طاقسإ"ةيروسلا ةموكحلا  تلشفو ...رطق ةخيشمو يكرتلا ماظنلاو دوعس ينب ةكلمم  ةحاطلإا يف ةموكحلاب
ةيروسلا دهأ نم يأ قيقحت وأاحاجن رثكأ اهؤافلحو ناريإ تناك امنيب ،ايروس يف مهفا. 
[The writer believes that the Russian intervention has shifted the balance of power in 
Syria in favour of the Syrian army and that this cannot be changed without the direct 
intervention of the Turkish army … and the writer sees that Turkey and the House of 
Saud’s authorities do not have the control they enjoyed previously over the Western 
policy in Syria after they have realised that their allied forces are not able to achieve 
victory and “topple” the Syrian government … the House of Saud’s Kingdom, along 
with the Turkish regime and the sheikhdom of Qatar, have failed to overthrow the 
Syrian government or achieve any of their goals in Syria, whereas Iran and its allies 
have been more successful.] 
(Syria Now, Feb 2016) 
Three main interventions can be spotted in the translation of this extract, which reflect the 
political views of the media outlet that conducted the translation. First, the translation choices 
made by the translator express a tendency to legitimise the rule of Assad in Syria and 
delegitimise the pro-opposition regional forces, in particular Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. 
On three occasions, the mention of “Assad” in the source text is rendered by the translator 
either as al-ḥukūma as-Sūriyya (“Syrian government”) or as aj-Jayš as-Sūrī (“Syrian army”). 
This aims to emphasise the legitimacy of Assad’s rule; the translator wants to say that Assad 
does not represent himself alone, or even a minority of the Syrians. Rather, he represents a 
legitimate government; his forces are in fact the official Syrian Army and must be termed and 
labelled accordingly in the text.  
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On the other hand, the translator seems keen on delegitimising the regional governments that 
support the opposition by indirectly questioning their legitimacy to rule their countries. 
“Turkey” is rendered as an-niẓām at-Turkī (“the Turkish regime”) – a label typically 
associated with dictatorships and authoritarian political systems. “Saudi Arabia”, in two 
different places, is also translated as suluṭāt banī Saᶜūd (“the House of Saud’s authorities”) 
and mamlakat banī Saᶜūd (“the House of Saud’s Kingdom”). This is to say that the Saudi 
policy only represents the Saudi royal family and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of 
the general population of the kingdom. The same applies to the translation of “Qatar” as 
mašyaxat Qaṭar (“the sheikhdom of Qatar”).  
Second, the translator chooses to omit the word “Syrian” from the ST phrase “their Syrian 
allies”, rendering it in the target text as al-quwwāt al-muwāliya lahumā (“their allied forces”) 
in reference to the opposition forces. This omission perhaps aims to question the identity of 
these forces, thus delegitimising the role they play in the Syrian war. This procedure adopted 
by the Syria Now translator is in fact one of the strategies identified by Gambier (2006: 14), 
illustrated in Section 5.7. They are employed to transform news items in line with the media 
outlet’s guidelines and criteria. Third, in line with another strategy pointed out by Gambier, 
substitution, the Syria Now translator chooses to render the ST phrase “Iran and the Shia 
coalition” as Iran wa ḥulafā’uha (“Iran and its allies), substituting “the Shia coalition” with 
ḥulafā’uha (“its allies”). This substitution is aimed at removing an important indication to the 
nature and ideology of pro-Assad troops on the ground from the text in order to maintain a 
positive image of Assad as a secular, non-sectarian leader. 
This third intervention by the translator represents one of the strategies and procedures pointed 
out by Loupaki (2010), explained in Section 5.8. They are often employed by translators 
working on the translation of texts that contain ideological elements related to conflict. This 
strategy aims to erase ideological conflict in the target text by removing or substituting 
microelements that refer to ideological conflict from the target text (ibid: 66). The translator 
has removed strong and tense ideological terms in the target text, neutralising them by using 
more general and neutral terminology. 
Syria Now primarily selected this article for translation in accordance with a set of standards 
and principles, most of which are ideological and political. It was then represented 
linguistically and technically in a certain way that served the agenda of the media institution. 
Throughout this translated report, the editor and/or translator employs a technique identified 
by Shunnaq (1992: 36) as ‘managing’: an act of “steering” undertaken by a media outlet to 
employ a given story or news item in the service of a specific agenda. In order to implement 
this technique, the Syria Now translator/editor has used indirect quotation, providing 
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additional space for transformation of the original message. These concepts are explained and 
richly illustrated in Section 5.3. 
Another example that highlights the effect of ideologies and agendas dedicated by media 
outlets on the translation of political discourse during the revolution is the work of the pro-
regime Syrian news channel, Sama TV. The following is an excerpt from a report by Daniel 
Larison, primarily published on the American Conservative website on January 4, 2016, and 
thereafter translated into Arabic and published on the Sama TV website on January 11, 2016: 
The American Conservative report 
The U.S. very mildly reproved the Saudis for their slew of executions, including the 
killing of the regime critic Nimr al-Nimr, but the Saudi government reportedly “doesn’t 
care” if it has upset Washington with its actions … The U.S. has spent most of the last 
year enabling a disastrous war to placate Riyadh and its allies, but our reckless client 
governments are unsurprisingly never satisfied no matter how much the U.S. supports 
them. 
Larison, 2016)( 
The Sama TV translation  
 خيشلا مادعإ اهرخآ ناك تامادعإ ةلسلس اهذيفنتل ةيدوعسلا ةدحتملا تايلاولا اهيف تخبو يتلا كلت ةليلق تارم ضراعملا
زربلأا  بضغت اهتافرصت تناك نإ لاصأ ةهبآ ريغ ةيدوعسلا ةموكحلا نأ رهظت ريراقتلا نأ ديب ،ةيدوعسلا ةموكحلل
لا مأ نطنشاو. 
لا ةيبلاغ ةدحتملا تايلاولا تضمأ( ةيضاملا ةنس2015 لواحت يهو ،)يدوعسلا نوبزلاو فيلحلا ءاضرتسا  تمعدف
 عور ةئدهت وأ ءاضرتساب لايفك نكي مل كلذ نكل ،دح ىصقأ ىلإ نميلا ىلع ةيثراكلا ةيدوعسلا برحةيدوعسلا ةموكحلا 
.ةروهتملا 
[Only on a few occasions, did the US reprove Saudi Arabia for carrying out a series of 
executions, the last of which is the execution of the most prominent Saudi government 
critic. However, the reports show that the Saudi government does not care whether its 
actions have upset Washington or not. 
The US has spent most of the last year (2015) attempting to placate the Saudi ally and 
client. It has therefore supported the disastrous Saudi war on Yemen to the maximum 
extent. However, this never satisfied the reckless Saudi government.] 
(Sama TV, Jan 2016) 
Due to the support provided by Saudi Arabia for the armed opposition in Syria, pro-regime 
media outlets have expressed a great hostility towards the kingdom. This hostility is 
manifested through two decisions made by the Sama TV translator in this example. First, the 
translator describes the Saudi government critic Nimr al-Nimr as al-abraz (“the most 
prominent”) even though this definition simply does not exist in the source text. The aim here 
is to attach more importance and added symbolic value to the character of al-Nimr as well as 
his execution. This is in order to intensify the crisis and justify and promote the anti-Saudi 
propaganda. This decision made by the translator is consistent with Fowler’s (1991: 110-5) 
proposition (illustrated in Section 5.4) that using evaluative adjectives and adverbs is one of 
the main characteristics of news articles. It is also a manifestation of a key tool of manipulation 
introduced in Section 5.9, primarily proposed by Gambier (2006: 10) – hyperbole as “a 
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rhetorical device used to highlight, intensify, and amplify selected elements of the image of 
reality,” which are often aimed at persuading the audience in a communicative environment. 
Although this device is typically related to literary works, there are numerous examples where 
it is employed by translators of political discourse during the Syrian revolution to promote an 
ideological agenda and/or achieve specific political goals. 
The second intervention made by the pro-regime media outlet in the translation of this excerpt 
is the substitution of the ST phrase, “Riyadh and its allies”, with al-ḥalīf wa az-zubūn as-
Saᶜūdī (“the Saudi ally and client”), and the ST phrase, “client governments”, with al-ḥukūma 
as-Saᶜūdiyya (“Saudi government”). This apparently aims to give the impression that the 
problem for the US is the government of Saudi Arabia in particular, excluding the rest of the 
allied governments in the region stated in the source text. These governments in fact include 
most of the Gulf countries as well as Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco, all of which have 
participated, alongside Saudi Arabia in the Arab military operation in Yemen. This choice 
made by Sama TV is consistent with the strategy of substitution introduced in Section 5.7, 
pointed out by both Gambier (2006: 14) and Bani (2006: 42). It is employed to transform news 
items in line with the media outlet’s guidelines and criteria. This strategy is used in this 
example to alter the focus and personalise the problem (ibid). 
Despite a few interventions, the translator of this article generally seems to follow the strategy 
of ‘monitoring’ identified by Hatim and Mason’s (1990) and Shunnaq (1992: 36), explained 
in Section 5.3. The translator seems to monitor, rather than manage, the message embedded 
in the source text, avoiding major changes to the translation. Nevertheless, the selection of this 
particular article for translation reflects a tendency to choose those news items that correspond 
with the media institution’s goals, ignoring those that contradict them. The concept of 
selection, primarily proposed by Shunnaq (1994: 112), is explained in Section 5.3. 
JB News is another pro-regime Syrian news website that conducts and publishes, in the form 
of news reports, Arabic translations of articles originally published by international 
newspapers in English or other languages. Like many other news outlets, JB News has 
employed various strategies and techniques in an attempt to influence the content of the 
translated news material in line with the media outlet’s political and ideological goals and 
agendas. The following are four excerpts from an article by Robert Ellis published on the 
Independent website on February 17, 2016, and thereafter translated into Arabic and published 
in the form of a report by JB News on February 18, 2017: 
The Independent article 
[I]t is three-dimensional chess with nine players and no rules, as one US strategic analyst 
said.  
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The latest ray of light - the accord reached by the International Syria Support Group 
(ISSG) last week in Munich, looks to be extinguished by Russia’s bombing of hospitals 
and schools in northern Syria, causing dozens of civilian casualties. 
(Ellis, 2016) 
The JB News report  
 ةيثلاثلا جنرطشلا ةلواطب ركذي ايروس يف عضولا نأ سيمخلا ةفيحصلا اهترشن يتلا هتلاقم يف سيليإ بتكو داعبلأا
 ًلائاق ،دعاوق نودب نوبعلالا اهب مكحتي يتلا  دح عضو يف ةدحتملا مملأا فارشإ تحت ايروس معد ةعومجم ةمهم نإ
 ببسب تابوعص ىقلت فنعللةرقنأ لبق نم يركسعلا ضيرحتلا. 
 [Ellis wrote in his article published in the newspaper on Thursday that the situation in 
Syria reminds of three-dimensional chess managed by players without rules. He said that 
the mission of the International Syria Support Group aimed at putting an end to violence 
was facing difficulties due to Ankara’s military incitement.] 
(JB News, Feb 2016) 
The JB News translator seems to make one main intervention in the translation of this excerpt. 
Although the source text clearly states that the efforts led by the International Syrian Support 
Group have been “extinguished” by the Russian operation, which targeted “hospitals and 
schools in northern Syria, causing dozens of civilian casualties,” the translator chooses to point 
out to at-taḥrīḍ al-ᶜaskarī min qibal Anqara (“Ankara’s military incitement”) as a key 
challenge facing the ISSG’s mission to bring about peace in Syria. This transformation in the 
target text is consistent with the pro-Assad political views adopted by JB News. It mainly aims 
to present anti-Assad governments and forces, exemplified here by the Turkish army, in a 
negative way. On the other hand, it strives to omit any negative reference to the role played 
by Russia in Syria.  
This technique employed by the media outlet in this example is in line with the strategy of 
substitution as a key strategy introduced in Section 5.7, primarily identified by Gambier (2006: 
14). It aims to transform news items according to the media outlet’s political views, agenda, 
and ideological beliefs. This choice made by the translator also reflects a tendency to eliminate 
a particular conflict from the text, introducing a new one. This is another strategy proposed by 
Loupaki (2010), explained in Section 5.8, aimed at presenting new aspects of political and/or 
ideological conflict in the target text (ibid: 68). This has been achieved in this instance through 
two procedures: omission of the reference to the negative effects of the Russian intervention, 
and addition of the reference to a potential Turkish military operation in Syria. This is done to 
neglect certain ideological/political textual units that do not adhere to or serve the media 
outlet’s objectives and agendas, attracting the reader’s attention to different opinions. A 
Russian-Western conflict has been eliminated in the target text while a Turkish-Western 
conflict has been introduced. The procedure of addition has involved a phrase bearing negative 
implications, at-taḥrīḍ al-ᶜaskarī (“military incitement”).  
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The choice made by the translator/editor of JB News also represents an aspect of framing – a 
concept illustrated in Section 5.9, identified by Gambier (2006: 11). This technique is widely 
employed in news production and translation as a tool of manipulation to provide “frames of 
reference, or highly stereotyped representations of specific situations, to make the event 
accessible to the public” (ibid). The frame used in this example aims to influence the way 
target readers interpret not only the target text, but also the political process and the military 
action in Syria as a whole. The potential Turkish operation has been framed in a new context, 
and is therefore given a new meaning: an action that constitutes an obstacle to the political 
efforts of the Western and international powers in Syria. 
The Independent article 
This is, in fact, President Erdogan’s last bite at the apple, as his strategy of overthrowing 
Bashar al-Assad’s Shia-backed regime has been thwarted by Russia’s intervention. 
Ellis, 2016)( 
The JB News report 
 ،ةيروسلا برحلا يف ام ءيش رييغتل ناغودرأ بيط بجر يكرتلا سيئرلل ةريخلأا ةصرفلا تناح هنأ يفحصلا ربتعاو
 طاقسإ يف هتيجيتارتسا نإ ذإةيروسلا ةموكحلا يسورلا لخدتلا دعب لشفلاب تءاب. 
[The journalist considered that this is the last chance for Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan to change something in the Syrian War. This is because his strategy to topple 
the Syrian government has failed after the Russian intervention.] 
(JB News, Feb 2016) 
The translator’s choice of rendering the ST phrase “Bashar al-Assad’s Shia-backed regime” 
as al-ḥukūma as-Sūriyya (“Syrian government”) is significant and seems to represent a general 
tendency on the part of the media outlet to legitimise the Syrian regime, presenting it as a 
legitimate, patriotic, and secular government despite its reportedly sectarian behaviour. 
Accordingly, the word “regime”, which is associated with dictatorships and repressive 
political systems, has been replaced by a neutral term, al-ḥukūma (“government”). In addition 
to this, the reference to the nature and identity of the regime’s allies, who are mostly Shiite, 
has been omitted in the target text in order to maintain the secular image of the regime and 
deny the ideological nature of its Shiite sectarian allied forces, such as Iran and Hezbollah. In 
fact, the translator’s decisions and choices are not isolated. Rather, they are systematically 
consistent with the general political discourse adopted by pro-Assad media outlets, which 
actually contradicts the regime’s actions and behaviour. 
The strategy of omission followed here by the translator is illustrated in Section 5.7. It is 
identified by Gambier (2006: 14) as one of four strategies often employed to transform news 
items in line with the media outlet’s guidelines and criteria. In this example, the 
translator/editor has chosen to omit a particular piece of information embedded in the source 
text, simply because it is not consistent with the political discourse adopted by JB News and 
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does not serve its pro-Assad political agenda. According to Bani (2006: 42), this strategy is 
called ‘cutting’, whereby a cultural element is omitted in line with political and ideological 
considerations. 
This omission also serves as part of another strategy that is pointed out by Loupaki (2010), 
alongside three strategies and techniques often employed by translators working on the 
translation of texts that contain ideological elements related to conflict (Section 5.8). By 
omitting the reference to the Shiite support for the Assad regime in the target text, the 
translator erases ideological conflict in the translation. The reference is neutralised by omitting 
terms that carry an ideological value, such as “Shia-backed regime”. Instead, more general 
and neutral words are used, such as al-ḥukūma as-Sūriyya (“Syrian government”). The 
translator erases a reference to a significant aspect of the on-going ideological conflict in Syria. 
The aim is to present a desired image of the conflict as a conflict between Syrians and 
terrorists, rather than sectarian Shiites and a Sunni majority, or even an oppressive regime and 
freedom fighters. 
The Independent article 
The most ominous threat is Turkey’s call for a cross-border operation, ostensibly directed 
at Isis, but which will forestall Kurdish plans for an autonomous administration along 
the Turkish border. Turkey’s plans are seconded by Saudi Arabia and its gung-ho 
minister of defence, King Salman’s son, Mohammed bin Salman, who is clearly not 
content with just the Saudis’ war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. 
Ellis, 2016)(  
The JB News report 
 نأ يفحصلا نيبو" ةبراحمل ايروس يف ةيرب ةيلمع ءدب ةيناكمإ نع نلاعلإا وه ايكرت هتقلطأ موؤشم ديدهت رثكأ
 ،شعاداهمعز بسح ،ايلعف ةهجوم اهنأ لاإ  ىقلت اميف .ةيكرتلا دودحلا برق يتاذ مكح ةماقإ ىلإ مهيعسو داركلأا دض
 قثاولا ،نامس نب دمحم اهعافد ريزوو ةيدوعسلا نم ادييأت ةيكرتلا ططخلا نكلو هسفن نم نع ايلعف يضارلا ريغ
نييثوحلا دض نميلا يف ةيدوعسلا برحلا". 
[The journalist explained that “the most ominous threat made by Turkey is the 
announcement of a possibility for launching a ground operation in Syria to fight against 
Isis, according to its allegation. However, it in fact targets the Kurds and their 
endeavours to establish an autonomous administration near the Turkish border. The 
Turkish plans are supported by Saudi and its minister of defence, Muhammad bin Salman, 
who is self-confident, yet not really content with the Saudi war in Yemen against the 
Houthis.”] 
(JB News, Feb 2016) 
The JB News translator has interfered in the translation of this excerpt in two different areas. 
First, the translator tries to question the real purpose of Turkey’s cross-border operation. 
Although the author himself raises these doubts in the source text, the translator seems to use 
extra linguistic tools to intensify this atmosphere of scepticism. The author forecasts that if 
the operation takes place, it will actually “forestall Kurdish plans for an autonomous 
administration.” However, the translator stresses that “it in fact targets” the Kurds and their 
endeavours to establish an autonomous administration. While the focus of the author’s 
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statement lies on the happening of the action in the future, the translator’s statement focuses 
on the purpose and target of the operation. These doubts are levelled up by the translator by 
adding the phrase ḥasab zaᶜmiha (“according to its allegation”). This added phrase suggests 
that the Turkish statement is in fact an allegation that is to be questioned and needs 
verification.  
Second, the translator in the last sentence of this excerpt makes a mistake in the translation, 
which may be seen as a deliberate manipulation of the message embedded in the source text. 
The ST sentence implies that Prince Mohammed bin Salman is not happy with only one war 
in Yemen, and that he seems willing to support the Turkish efforts to launch another one in 
Syria. However, the translator states in the target text that the Saudi minister of defence is not 
content with the Saudi war in Yemen. The inaccurate translation can be seen as an attempt by 
the translator to highlight what he presents as a hidden internal conflict within the Saudi 
government and royal family in which Prince Mohammed is not happy with the decisions 
made by his king regarding the situation in Yemen. 
The JB News report uses direct quotation in this excerpt, which according to Shunnaq (1992: 
36), indicates a form of monitoring where the situation is supposed to be neutrally described. 
However, the aforementioned interventions suggest otherwise. In Section 5.3, it is shown how 
the use of reporting verbs like claimed, regretted, alleged, and confirmed reflects the personal 
stance and opinion of the reporter (ibid: 107). In line with this proposition, the use of the 
phrase ḥasab zaᶜmiha (“according to its allegation”) reflects the translator’s personal 
standpoint and desire to impose certain meanings on the translation. 
By reinforcing the Kurdish-Turkish conflict, which is already present in the source text, the 
translator seems to reproduce ideological conflict in the target text – a strategy identified by 
Loupaki (2010) as explained in Section 5.8. This has been achieved by literal importation of 
original lexical choices from the source text. However, the translator has attempted to intensify 
the conflict by using extra linguistic tools as previously illustrated. The translator also uses an 
interpretative language; the source text is not only translated, but also interpreted according 
to the translator’s agenda, ideology, and political views. This is represented by using an 
evaluative language, such as ḥasab zaᶜmiha (“according to its allegation”) reflecting the 
translator’s interpretation of the text, which is ultimately influenced by their political stance. 
The Independent article 
Consequently, Prime Minister Davutoglu announced Turkey had “no immediate 
plans” for such an operation despite a military build-up on the Syrian border. 
(Ellis, 2016) 
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The JB News report 
 هنأ فاضأو رظنلا ضغب كلمت لا" ةرقنأ نأب قباس تقو يف ولغوأ دوواد دمحأ يكرتلا ءارزولا سيئر حيرصت نع
"ةيروف اططخ ايروس يف ةيرب ةيلمع ذيفنتلةحضاو ،ايروس عم دودحلا دنع ةيكرتلا ةيركسعلا تازيزعتلا نأ لاإ ،. 
[He added that regardless of Turkish Prime Minister Davutoglu’s previous statement 
that Ankara “had no immediate plans” to carry out a ground operation in Syria, the 
Turkish military reinforcements on the border with Syria are clear.] 
(JB News, Feb 2016) 
The translator here makes a subtle, yet significant, change to the text by adding biġaḍḍ an-
naẓar (“regardless of”) to the TT. This stylistically minor change brings about a fundamental 
transformation in the semantics of the sentence. It alters the focus from one piece of 
information to another. In the source text, the focal point in the sentence is the Turkish prime 
minister’s announcement that Turkey has no plans for a military operation. However, starting 
this part of the sentence with biġaḍḍ an-naẓar (“regardless of”) shifts the emphasis to the 
second part as if the translator wants to attract the target reader’s attention to the Turkish 
military build-up on the Syrian border. Less importance is attached to Davutoglu’s statement, 
which rules out any “immediate plans” to carry out a military offensive. This reverses the 
pattern of foregrounding and backgrounding in the TT. 
The semantic transformation in this respect can be seen as an employment of ‘understatement’ 
by the translator as a figure of speech to “intentionally make a situation seem less important 
than it really is” (Literary Devices, 2015). The understated information here is of course the 
Turkish prime minister’s announcement. The translator uses biġaḍḍ an-naẓar (“regardless 
of”) as a tool to implement this technique. The same tool is used to apply another technique – 
hyperbole, which is defined by Gambier (2006: 10) as “a rhetorical device used to highlight, 
intensify, and amplify selected elements of the image of reality.” It is often aimed at 
persuading the audience in a communicative environment. Hyperbole is used in this context 
to place an increased emphasis on the presence of Turkish military forces on the border with 
Syria. The employment of both understatement and hyperbole, which are introduced and 
explained in Section 5.9, aims to promote a certain political agenda, portraying Turkey as a 
threat to regional and international peace. By using understatement and exaggeration, media 
outlets seek to persuade the public of the truthfulness of certain claims embedded in their 
political discourse, urging the reader to adopt the media outlet’s political views. 
A comprehensive overview of the translation of the Independent article provided by JB News 
suggests that the text has been fundamentally recontextualised and syntactically and 
semantically transformed during the translation process. Since most target readers do not have 
access to the full article in its original English version due to obvious linguistic boundaries, 
they can only read a few quotes and extracts selected carefully and intentionally by JB News 
to be included in the translated report. Therefore, it is not possible for target readers to estimate 
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the amount of information excluded by the publishing media outlet. They do not have the 
privilege to read the original content in full to find out that the following two sentences, for 
instance, are in fact missing and have not been included in the JB News report (Ellis, 2016): 
 The cornerstone of the accord is UN Security Council Resolution 2254 of 18 
December 2015, which also demands that all parties immediately cease attacks 
against all civilian objects, including medical facilities and personnel. 
 Foreign Minister Lavrov has stated that the main result of the accord is the 
confirmation of this resolution and has expressed a common determination to help 
alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. Unfortunately, these good intentions are 
undermined by actions on the ground. 
These sentences have been excluded because they imply information that challenges what the 
media outlet is trying to achieve, contradicting the message that JB News is trying to pass on 
to the target reader. The target text is seemingly meant to expose the expected Turkish military 
operation as the main threat to peace endeavours in Syria. However, the first sentence 
emphasises the need for a ceasefire in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, 
whereas the Assad-allied Russian forces were carrying out deadly airstrikes against civilians 
and medical facilities. The second sentence also highlights the contradictions between Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statements and the Russian troops’ offensive on the ground: “these 
good intentions are undermined by actions on the ground.” Therefore, both sentences, 
alongside others, are not included in the JB News translated report. 
The target reader cannot check if the sequence of the original article has been changed or even 
manipulated to produce a different meaning other than the meaning intended by the author of 
the original article (Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 7). The decisions made by JB News whilst 
translating and editing the Independent article are consistent with the strategy of 
recontextualisation pointed out by Schäffner and Bassnett (2010) as well as the strategy of 
reorganisation identified by Gambier (2006: 14). Both strategies, which are introduced in 
Chapter Five, are employed to transform news items in line with the media outlet’s guidelines 
and criteria. 
The content of the original article has been reorganised and restructured by JB News by 
redistributing the information. Certain sentences have been omitted, others have been 
modified, and the sequence of the story details has been reshaped. This may entail 
“permutation of individual lexical items, but also extensive revamps of information at a higher 
textual level” (ibid). The employment of this re-organising procedure aims to comply with the 
goals of the news organisation publishing the target text. 
The three previous sections were dedicated to exposing the influence of ideological 
convictions and political views on the translator’s decisions. They also highlighted, through 
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illustrative examples, the role of patronage in determining the outcome of the translation 
process as well as the various strategies and techniques adopted by media outlets involved in 
the translation of political discourse communicated during the Syrian revolution. The 
following section will demonstrate how competing narratives have manifested themselves in 
translation during the Syrian conflict.  
 
7.6 Narrative Analysis: Manifestations of Conflicting Narratives 
This section is devoted to analysing the data corpus in light of the theories introduced in 
Chapter Six. Whatever roles people occupy in life, and whatever activities they participate in, 
they remain part of a conflictive environment, which they are influenced by and concurrently 
contribute to shaping. The Syrian revolution is considered one of the biggest conflicts in the 
Middle East and even the wider world. This is with regards to the number of people affected, 
the nations involved, and minor conflicts resulting in neighbouring countries. It has not only 
influenced the geographical area in which it occurs, and does not only concern itself with a 
certain nation, but it has also crossed political and social boarders, exerting a profound impact 
on a larger regional, or even the global population. 
The main function of translation is to facilitate communication across linguistic boundaries. 
It therefore becomes an imperative aspect of the conflict, needed by opponents and disputing 
parties to legitimise and promote their descriptions of the conflict, while undermining the 
narratives adopted by rival parties. Competing popular narratives produced by the 
revolutionary and pro-regime forces during the conflict represent a typical example of 
discursive dispute at all political, ideological, and social levels. Translation has proved an 
integrated part of the Syrian conflict, playing a vital role in describing, shaping, and unfolding 
its events. 
This section attempts to apply narrative theory on the discursive dispute during the Syrian 
revolution, examining the way translation operates in this environment of conflicting 
narratives. It aims to present representative examples highlighting the role of translation in 
shaping conflicting narratives during the revolution in light of the various types and features 
of narrativity. It also seeks to implement the concept of framing, discussed in Chapter Six, on 
the data corpus, examining the different modes of narrative framing in translation. 
The narrativity of the Syrian revolution is frequently manifested in a series of banners 
produced and carried by a group of civil activists from the Syrian city of Kafranbel. The 
writings on these banners represent the demands of the Syrian revolution, reflecting anti-
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Assad revolutionary views almost since the outbreak of the uprising in March, 2011. Arabic, 
English, and sometimes other languages, such as Russian and Turkish, are used to criticise 
standpoints and stances adopted by various international, regional, and local parties regarding 
the Syrian conflict.  
The significance of these banners is that they express the Syrian revolutionary discourse, 
constituting a rich multi-lingual record of the intellectual aspect of the revolution. They reflect 
the attitudes taken by anti-Assad protestors towards the events of the Syrian uprising over five 
years of conflict. The English banners are not exact translations of the Arabic ones. Rather, 
they are meant to address an English-speaking audience in the West, thus expressing ideas and 
conveying messages that concern this particular audience. However, while both types of 
banners (English and Arabic) are manifestations of the same revolutionary discourse, they are 
merely formed, worded, presented, and employed differently to fulfil certain agendas in line 
with the interests of the Syrian revolution. 
Temporal and spatial framing is one of the main aspects of framing identified by Baker 
(2006), expounded upon in Section 6.5. In the context of the Syrian revolution, the protestors 
of Kafranbel employed this form of temporal and spatial framing, choosing specific texts that 
depict a certain narrative, and placing them in new temporal and spatial environments. The 
audience is thus encouraged to make a connection between this narrative and others that may 
be more up-to-date even though its events actually belong to different temporal settings or 
take place in a different geographical area (Baker, 2006: 112). 
The following are four examples of the employment of this aspect of framing by the Kafranbel 
activists: 
Example (1) (Figure 17) 
The world foolishly makes another Hitler from Putin who is going to make it bleed to 
death. 
(Kafranbel Banners, Jan 2016) 
Example (2) (Figure 18)  
We had a dream but Assad turned it into nightmare, the world was watching but never 
ever tried to wake us up. 
(Kafranbel Banners, 28 Nov 2015) 
Example (3) (Figure 19) 
We have a dream: No fly zone – we want to live. 
(Kafranbel Banners, 21 Mar 2015) 
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Example (4) (Figure 20) 
The white House is not white anymore due to Obama’s policy in Syria. It needs new 
Lincoln to whiten it again. 
(Kafranbel Banners, Jul 2014) 
In the first example, the reader is encouraged to establish a connection between the narrative 
of Nazi dictator Hitler and the narrative of Russian President Putin. The narrative of Hitler, 
which belongs to a different geographical and temporal setting, is framed in a contemporary 
context. This framing is aimed at warning the West, which suffered from Hitler’s brutal 
actions during the Second World War, of the consequences of tolerating Putin’s expansionist 
policy in Syria and Eastern Europe. The Kafranbel activists seem to be aware of the effect of 
Hitler’s narrative on an English-speaking audience. Therefore, they have utilised this 
particular narrative to draw their attention towards the Russian intervention in Syria and its 
dangers to American, European and global security. 
Figure 17 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on January 2, 2016 
In the second and third examples, the narrative of Martin Luther King is framed to shed light 
on the suffering of the Syrian people. The narrative of Luther King is particularly significant 
to the American audience, especially with regards to the issues of equality, public freedoms, 
and human rights. The framing of this narrative is achieved by using Luther King’s famous 
quote “I have a dream” to refer to the aspirations of the Syrian people for a free and secure 
future. This can only be achieved, according to the banners, through defending the Syrians 
against Assad and renforcing a “No fly zone” that would stop the regime’s fighter jets from 
targeting the Syrian people. 
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Figure 18 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on November 28, 2015 
Figure 19 A banner carried by children from the city of Kafranbel 
The framing employed in the fourth example recalls the narrative of late US President 
Abraham Lincoln, a great advocate of liberation and public freedoms in American history. 
Faming Lincoln in today’s American politics is done to expose the reluctance of current US 
President, Barack Obama, to defend the freedom of the Syrian people. Obama is indirectly 
accused of lacking in his support for their endeavours to topple the Assad regime and establish 
a new political system based on human rights and free political participation. The mention of 
Lincoln here is highly significant as it is meant to encourage the American people to put more 
pressure on Obama to follow the legacy of his predecessor and respect the ideals of American 
democracy. This could be only achieved by taking action against Assad and his regime.  
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Figure 20 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on July 11, 2014 
Although the previous statements are not considered to be exact translations of the Arabic 
banners, they constitute the English version of the same revolutionary discourse that the 
Arabic banners attempt to express in Arabic. Of course, there are differences in terms of 
wording, theme, style, and emphasis. While the Arabic banners appeal to the Syrians and other 
Arab nations, the themes and wordings chosen for the English banners are meant to interest 
an English-speaking audience and attract their attention to the Syrian cause. Narratives that 
are particularly significant and meaningful for the Americans and Europeans are framed 
differently to fulfil the agenda and objectives of the discourse producer (the Kafranbel 
activists). 
One of the main features of narrativity introduced in Section 6.4 is narrative accrual. The 
Kafranbel banners present numerous examples of stories cobbled together to form a whole of 
some sort – a new narrative that sheds light on new aspects of interpretation. This allows the 
audience to make new discoveries regarding the perception of the stories that constitute the 
overall narrative. The following are four examples from the Kafranbel banners that represent 
cases of narrative accrual: 
Example (1) (Figure 21) 
World! The less support to Syrian Free Police Forces you offer, the more power of 
terrorist organizations you allow. 
(Kafranbel Banners, Feb 2015) 
Example (2) (Figure 22) 
Killing civilians in Paris is terrorism; but what about killing civilians in Syria by Assad 
and Russia? 
(Kafranbel Banners, 14 Nov 2015) 
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Example (3) (Figure 23) 
Charleston shootings are the other face of Assad massacres. Terrorism has no nationality, 
or religion. 
(Kafranbel Banners, Jun 2015) 
Example (4) (Figure 24) 
A No fly zone is a must and possible where oil is, but it is a fantasy where it is to protect 
the Syrians for free. 
(Kafranbel Banners, May 2015) 
In the first example, two stories are combined to form one narrative with new implications: If 
the international community provides more support to the armed Syrian opposition, terrorist 
activities will necessarily decrease. A greater degree of support offered to the Free Syrian 
Army leads to a growth in the power of the moderate opposition factions in Syria. This means 
that the FSA will become able to establish more effective control over its territories, which 
would limit the potentials of terrorist organisations and undermine their ability to carry out 
terrorist attacks.  
Figure 21 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on February 21, 2015 
The banner in the second example establishes a connection between two narratives: The Paris 
terrorist attack and the killing of civilians by Assad’s troops and their allied Russian forces. 
The aim is to define the latter in light of the former, as well as to interpret the former in line 
with the latter. The amalgamation of both narratives is highly suggestive as it implies that the 
killing of civilians should be described as an act of terrorism, whether it takes place in Paris 
or in Syria, regardless of whether it is at the hands of Islamist extremists or Assad’s forces and 
their allies. 
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Figure 22 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on November 14, 2015 
Similarly, in the third example, a narrative is used to help define the narrative of the Syrian 
revolution. The Charleston shooting is a mass shooting that occurred at the Emanuel African 
Methodist Episcopal Church in the town of Charleston in South Carolina, United States, on 
June 17, 2015. A gunman, later identified as Dylann Roof, killed nine people. Roof later 
admitted that he hoped that his shooting would ignite a race war in the US. This narrative is 
combined with the narrative of Assad’s massacres against Syrians. By doing so, the latter 
narrative has acquired new meanings and implications for the English-speaking audience, in 
particular those from the United States. This in turn helps the Kafranbel activists promote their 
revolutionary approach while circulating the anti-Assad narrative, thus appealing for more 
international support for the Syrian revolution. 
Figure 23 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on June 20, 2015 
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The fourth example brings together two narratives that both belong to the overall story of the 
Arab Spring: The Syrian revolution and the Libyan revolution. However, by cobbling these 
two narratives together, the Kafranbel activists aim to highlight the hypocrisy of the Western 
powers and withdraw legitimacy from the Assad regime. The Western powers demonstrated 
genuine willingness to intervene in Libya to enforce a no fly zone, leading eventually to 
overthrowing Gaddafi. However, the very same powers have shown considerable reluctance 
to follow the same procedure in Syria. The banner suggests that the reason for the disparity 
between the two cases is that Libya is rich in oil, whereas Syria is not; the West intervenes 
only when oil is involved. 
Figure 24 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on May 9, 2015 
The previous banners are meant to address the English-speaking audience in Europe, North 
America, and the rest of the world. Therefore, the combining of the aforementioned narratives 
with the narrative of the Syrian revolution is due to their particular significance to the Western 
nations. They mark certain historical events that made a difference in public life, thus 
influencing the cultural and political awareness of these nations. The same narratives chosen 
for the Arabic version of the Kafranbel banners have the same quality. The only difference is 
that they are meant to be familiar to, and sufficiently important to be worthy of the attention 
for, an Arabic-speaking audience. Both English and Arabic banners are in fact representations 
of the same revolutionary discourse adopted by the Kafranbel activists. Each version of the 
banners addresses its respective audience using the language they understand and the 
narratives they are familiar with. The following are two examples of narrative accrual in the 
Arabic banners: 
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Example (1) (Figure 25)  
.نوفصقي هءافلحو دسلأاو ..ررحملا ىلع متبلاكت ةازغ لكلا !تيقبو ،اولحرو ةازغ مكلبق ناك ةازغلل لق !بلح لامش 
[Northern Aleppo! Say to the conquerors, before you, conquerors came and left, and I 
stayed! All are conquerors who cooperated against the liberated [territories], while Assad 
and his allies are shelling.]  
(Kafranbel Banners, Feb 2016) 
Example (2) (Figure 26) 
لخنلا عذجب كيلإ يزهو".اولقعاف يوهيو هنايك زهيس انتوصو ،ًاينج بطرلا طقاستف ت  زه ،"ة 
[“And shake towards thyself the trunk of the palm-tree.” She did, so fresh ripe dates fell 
upon her. Our voice will shake its entity, so that it falls. Be wise!] 
(Kafranbel Banners, Mar 2016) 
The banner in the first example refers to the ancient narratives of various armies that 
conquered the northern countryside of Aleppo. Over the ages, Greeks, Romans, Mongols, 
Crusaders, Ottomans, and many other nations have invaded this area, yet they failed to settle 
permanently. They eventually had to retreat, leaving the land to its inhabitants. These old 
narratives of conquerors are cobbled with contemporary narratives of others trying to take 
over Northern Aleppo at the present time.  
The Assad allied forces, IS troops, and a Kurdish militia known as YPG have been fighting 
the Syrian opposition factions, trying to occupy the northern countryside of Aleppo. The old 
and new narratives of conquerors are merged together to put the current conflict in a historical 
context, stressing the inevitable defeat of invaders. This link ensures the redefining of the 
current conflict in northern Aleppo, determining its results in line with similar stories from 
different historical settings. 
Figure 25 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on February 13, 2016 
The second example unites the Quranic story of the Virgin Mary, who is, according to the 
Quran, asked by Allah to shake “the trunk of the palm-tree” to get fresh ripe dates for herself, 
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with the current narrative of the Syrian revolution. This analogy serves the concept of 
narrativity in this respect, allowing the narrator (the Kafranbel activists) to relate to a different 
narrative derived from the Quran to draw attention to certain messages directed at the Assad 
regime in the context of the narrative of the Syrian revolution. This sentence implies a threat 
made by the revolutionaries against the Assad regime; the voice of the revolution will shake 
the entity of the Assad regime, eventually leading it to fall. Comparing this to the Virgin Mary 
shaking the trunk is meant to attach as sense of holiness and credibility to the message passed 
on by the Kafranbel activists. 
Figure 26 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on March 25, 2016 
Another feature of narrativity investigated in Section 6.4 is causal emplotment. This feature, 
which “gives significance to independent instances,” overriding their “chronological or 
categorical order” (Somers, 1997: 82), is found in the Kafranbel banners. Specific events are 
linked to ensure the construction of an overall narrative. This aims to shed light on “their 
participation in, and contribution to, the overall meaning of the narrative” (Polkinghorne, 
1995: 5). The Kafranbel activists evaluate and elaborate on events by implementing causal 
emplotment, rather than merely stating them. This is to make a coherent comprehensible 
sequence that the audience can pass a judgement on out of separate events (Baker, 2006: 67). 
It therefore makes a set of events morally and ethically significant, carrying a semantic value 
that goes beyond abstract meanings embedded in the narrative.  
The Kafranbel banners represent a significant source for a bilingual analytic study in this 
regard, even though the English version of the Kafranbel banners is not an actual translation 
of the Arabic one. The events forming an overall narrative for a banner are often chosen to be 
particularly significant for the target audience. An overall narrative, therefore, is meant to 
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convince the target audience, endorsing certain political and ideological views that the 
Kafranbel activists strongly believe in. The following are two examples of causal emplotment 
in the Kafranbel banners:  
Example (1) (Figure 27) 
لملأاو مللأا لاإ انعمجي دعي مل.ٌتوم ةايحلا نم انبسح و ًاتوم توملا رطمأ و انطبرفك تحان و احيرأ تكب ، 
[We only share the same pain and hope. Ariha cried, and Kafr Batna lamented. Death has 
generated death. Death is all that is left in life.] 
(Kafranbel Banners, Dec 2015) 
Example (2) (Figure 28) 
USA to Assad: Your weapon is guilty (a chemical weapon is shown next to Assad). 
USA to ISIS: You are guilty (a knife is shown in next to the ISIS chief). 
(Kafranbel Banners, Oct 2014) 
In the first example, two massacres that were carried out by the Assad regime’s forces during 
the Syrian revolution are selected to form an overall narrative of tragedy and lack of hope. 
Both events selected are familiar to the Arab Syrian audience, and are linked together to draw 
an overall image of the narrative of the Syrian conflict. The aim is to send a message of 
solidarity; Syrians are facing the same tragedy, and thus they must stand united, whether in 
Ariha (in northern Syria) or Kafr Batna (in southern Syria), whilst suffering the brutality of 
the regime. The choice of these particular events to form the overall narrative presented in this 
banner is highly suggestive. Each of these towns belongs to a different area; combining them 
both together symbolises the common destiny of the Syrians. 
Figure 27 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on December 5, 2015 
The second example highlights two events in the context of the Syrian conflict. The first is the 
use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime against civilians in al-Ghouta in Damascus 
countryside, which reportedly resulted in 1400 deaths. The US abandoned its plan to launch 
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air strikes against the Assad regime as a punishment, accepting its offer to surrender and 
destroy its chemical weapons. The second event is the decapitations of Western captives by 
IS, which resulted in the US launching major military operations against the organisation in 
Iraq and Syria. By bringing the two events together, the Kafranbel activists are trying to expose 
the hypocrisy of the US towards the overall narrative of the Syrian conflict. They also 
encourage the English-speaking audience, who are mostly Westerners, to interpret the overall 
narrative of the Syrian conflict in light of what is seen as hypocritical stances taken by the US 
towards the two events.  
Figure 28 A banner carried by the Kafranbel activists on October 14, 2014 
One of the main forms of framing introduced in Section 6.5 is framing by labelling, which is 
described by Baker (2006: 122) as any “discursive process that involves using a lexical item, 
term or phrase to identify a person, place, group, event or any other key elements in a 
narrative.” Framing by labelling can be traced in the translations of narratives circulating 
during the Syrian revolution. The Guardian has combined, in one report by Mona Mahmood 
(2015), six stories of people from across the divide, from rebel officers to regime supporters. 
The report has been translated and published in Arabic by Sasa Post, a news website that gives 
voice to anti-regime views (Sasa Post, Mar 2015). The following are five excerpts from the 
report and the translation that illustrate the translator’s employment of framing by labelling: 
(1) War in Syria: how my life has changed.  
 :نايدراجلا6  نم تاياكحةيروسلا ةروثلا؟يتايح ترَّيغت فيك : 
[The Guardian: 6 stories from the Syrian revolution: how has my life changed?] 
(2) We had been together since first demo in Damascus.  
 تايادب ذنم ًاعم انكةروثلا قشمد يف. 
[We had been together since the beginning of the revolution in Damascus.] 
(3) Um Naji, 45, supporter of the Syrian government. 
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 :يجان مأ45  ةديؤم ،اًماعيروسلا ماظنلل. 
[Um Naji, 45, supporter of the Syrian regime.] 
(4) There were other neighbourhoods where people were starving, but the FSA did not 
help them because they supported the government. 
 نويديؤي اوناك مهنلأ معدلا مهل مدقي مل رحلا شيجلا نكل ،اعوج روضتت ىرخأ ءايحأ كانه تناكماظنلا. 
[There were other neighbourhoods where people were starving, but the FSA did not 
help them because they supported the regime.] 
(5) At home, our hatred towards the Syrian sectarian regime was escalating. 
 هاجت انتيهارك ،لزنملا يفيولعلا يفئاطلا ماظنلا ة دح ديزت تناك. 
[At home, our hatred towards the Alawite sectarian regime was escalating.] 
The six stories presented in the report can serve as examples of ontological narratives, defined 
in Section 6.3 as “personal stories that we tell ourselves about our place in the world and our 
own personal history” (Baker, 2006: 28). These stories shape and give meaning to people’s 
lives. Even though they essentially tackle issues related to the self in the first place, they are 
also interpersonal and social since they are communicated to other people in a social 
environment (ibid). Here, they provide detailed eyewitness accounts and represent personal 
observations of the events of the Syrian revolution, contributing to the shaping of the 
mainstream public narratives adopted by competing parties involved in the Syrian conflict. 
Both “war in Syria” and “demo” in the first and second examples respectively are framed as 
aṯ-ṯawra [as-Sūriyya] (“the [Syrian] revolution”). In the third and fourth examples, the Syrian 
“government” is labelled as an-niẓām [as-Sūrī] (“the [Syrian] regime”). The translator used 
an-niẓām aṭ-ṭā’ifī al-ᶜAlawī (“the Alawite sectarian regime”) as a label for the Syrian regime 
in the target text in the fifth example. The word “Syrian” is replaced by “Alawite”. These 
examples of labelling mainly reflect the translator’s ideology and political views; they show 
that the translator views the Syrian leadership as a regime rather than a legitimate government, 
and the conflict in Syria as a popular revolution, rather than a civil war.  
These examples bring about the question of rival systems of naming, proposed by Baker 
(2006: 123), who admits that this proves to be challenging in translation. Competing parties 
and communities can adopt different names for an entity, situation, geographical area, and so 
on. This is done in order to promote their own narratives to legitimise social and political 
claims, refuting and undermining opposing claims (ibid: 124). Baker (ibid) suggests that 
adopting a name in this context automatically implies a denial of the other, subsequently 
undermining the other’s narratives and claims. 
One of the most common forms of framing is selective appropriation, suggested by Baker 
(2006), and explained in Section 6.5. This aspect of framing is often found in news reports 
and is manifested through omitting and/or adding some elements of a given narrative. This 
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often occurs when it is told to a different audience or when rendered into a foreign language 
(ibid: 114). The omission and addition procedures aim to “suppress, accentuate or elaborate 
particular aspects” of the narrative “encoded in the source text or utterance, or aspects of the 
larger narrative(s) in which it is embedded” (ibid). This selective appropriation of textual items 
has been widely used by media outlets covering the Syrian conflict, especially when 
(re)publishing translated news. There are many examples where this has resulted in a diversion 
of the message embedded in the source version of the narrative in an attempt by media outlets 
to follow certain ideologies and agendas. An example of this process is a translated report 
published on the al-Manar Arabic website on May 29, 2013 (al-Manar, May 2013). The report 
combines translated extracts taken from a report in English by Simon Jenkins originally 
published on the Guardian website on May 28, 2013 (Jenkins, 2013). The following are a few 
illustrative excerpts from the report and the translation: 
(1) For two years pundits have proclaimed the imminent fall of Syria’s President Bashar 
al-Assad … Assad has not fallen. He is still there, locked in the lethal Muslim schism 
that resurfaced with the demise of the region’s secularist dictators. These have now 
almost all gone: the shah in Iran, Najibullah in Afghanistan, Saddam in Iraq, 
Mubarak in Egypt, Gaddafi in Libya. They had faults in abundance, but they 
succeeded in suppressing religious discord, instilling rudimentary tolerance and 
keeping the region mostly in order. This was in the west's interest, and the rulers, 
like those in the Gulf, were supported accordingly. 
اشب يروسلا سيئرلا ماظنل كيشو طوقسب ءاربخ نهكت ،نيماع ىدم ىلعو ،طقسي مل نلآا ىتح هنكلو دسلأا ر
 كرابم ينسح :نييناملعلا نييروتاتكيدلا ليحر ذنم ةقطنملا هيف توه يذلا عارصلا يف ةقلاع ايروس تلاز امو
لاقملا يف ءاج امبسح ،ايبيل يف يفاذقلاو ،قارعلا نيسح مادصو ،سنوت يف يلع نب نيدباعلا نيزو ،رصم يف. 
لا ىري امك ،تايروتاتكيدلا هذه يف ةيفئاطلا تاعارصلا يشفت نيب تلاح اهنكلو ةحداف ءاطخأ اهل ناك ،بتاك
اهنادلب. 
[For two years, experts have proclaimed the imminent fall of Syrian President Bashar 
Assad’s regime, but he has not fallen yet, and Syria is still stuck in the conflict that 
has struck the region since the departure of the secular dictators: Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and Gaddafi in 
Libya, according to the article. 
These dictatorships, as the writer sees, had their huge mistakes but prevented 
sectarian conflicts in their countries.] 
(2) Prior to the Iraq war, Saddam persecuted the Shias, but their shrines were safe and 
intermarriage was common.  
(3) These upheavals might have occurred without western intervention. The revolutions 
in Tunisia and Egypt were largely self-starting. Islamist parties often came to power, 
because they offered an alternative discipline to the existing regimes.  
(4) Syria is at present certainly a claim on the world’s humanitarian resources, to be 
honoured by supporting the refugee camps and aid agencies active in the area. 
Assad's suppression of revolt has been appallingly brutal, but he was Britain’s friend, 
as was Saddam, long after his regime began its brutality. That is how things are in 
this part of the world.  
(5) Pouring arms into Syria will no more topple Assad or “drive him to the negotiating 
table” than did two years of blood-curdling sanctions. Hague knows this perfectly 
well, as he knows there is no way arms can be sent to “good” rebels and not to bad 
ones.  
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 ،"تاضوافملا ةلواط ىلإ هب عفدي وأ دسلأا طقسي نل" حلاسلا نم ديزملاب ايروس دادمإ نأ زنيكنيج نومياس ىريو
ةددشملا تابوقعلا نم ناتنس تقفخأ امك هداعبإ يف قفخيس" اذه نأ لب". 
ريزو نأب هداقتعا نع زنيكنيج برعأو  نأ نم "نقيتلل ةليسو دجوت لا هنأ ملعي" غيه مايلو يناطيربلا ةيجراخلا
رارشلأا" نيضراعملا يديأ يف طقسي نلو "نيبيطلا" نيحلسملا نيضراعملا يديأ ىلإ لصيس حلاسلا". 
[Simon Jenkins thinks that supplying Syria with more weapons “will not topple 
Assad or drive him to the negotiating table.” Instead, this “will fail to expel him as 
the two years of strict sanctions did.” 
Jenkins believes that British foreign minister William Hague “knows that there is no 
way to ensure that the weapons will reach the “good” armed opponents, and will not 
fall into the hand of “bad” ones.] 
Such a report falls under the category of conceptual narratives introduced in Section 6.3. 
Somers and Gibson (1994: 62-3) describe it as a type of narrative that offers explanations and 
analyses provided by social researchers and scholars to demonstrate and illustrate the 
relationship between ontological and public narratives. They expound upon the role played by 
these narratives in shaping social action and identity in society. 
This narrative originally told by the author of the source text has not been rendered as one 
piece into the target language. Rather, the translator has selected certain parts to be included 
in the report published by al-Manar. This process of selection seems to serve a specific 
agenda, aiming to promote the pro-regime version of the narrative of the Syrian conflict at the 
expense of other versions. Some parts have been neglected while others modified in line with 
al-Manar’s political views. This process of selective appropriation is manifested through a 
number of choices made by the translator/editor of the al-Manar report. 
The reference to Iran’s former Shah in Excerpt (1) has been excluded from the Arabic 
translation. This may have occurred in order to avoid portraying the current Islamic regime, 
which took over in Iran after toppling the Shah, as part of the sectarian conflict that the Shah, 
according to the ST, was preventing, alongside other secular dictators named in the report, 
before they were all expelled. This also erases any undesired implicit praise for the role played 
by the Shah in Iran and the region prior to the Khomeini revolution. Al-Manar’s ideological 
and political affiliation to the al-Wali al-Faqih regime in Iran is apparent in this instance. This 
seems to be the motivation behind the translator/editor’s choice to exclude the reference to the 
Shah from the translation.  
In the same paragraph, Jenkins implies that the Gulf rulers, despite being dictators, have in 
fact contributed to preventing sectarian conflicts in their countries and the region. However, 
this reference has also been omitted by the translator. This may be because al-Manar has 
frequently accused the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, of adopting anti-Shiite sectarian 
foreign and internal policies. Al-Manar’s translator is trying to deliver a translation that is 
consistent with al-Manar’s Shiite ideology and editorial policy.  
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Selective appropriation is also manifested through omitting the reference to Saddam, who, 
according to the source text, ensured that the Shiite “shrines were safe and intermarriage was 
common,” prior to the US invasion. Any positive reference to Saddam has been erased in the 
target text. The omission of Excerpt (2), which includes the reference to Saddam is significant 
and in fact matches the ideological attitudes and political standpoints of post-revolution Iran 
and its regional Shiite allies, including Hezbollah, who perceived Saddam Hussein as a 
prominent enemy. 
In Excerpt (3), the author admits that the Arab Spring revolutions were spontaneous and were 
“self-starting” uprisings that “might have occurred without western intervention.” He also 
seems to legitimise the advent of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt, since “they offered an 
alternative discipline to the existing regimes.” The omission of this section of the narrative 
offered by Jenkins has occurred most likely because these views are incompatible with the 
overall narrative adopted by al-Manar. This discourse is based on the proposition that the 
Arab Spring, especially with regards to Syria, is a result of a Western conspiracy against the 
Arab World. The al-Manar translator might also have wanted to erase the implicit recognition 
of legitimacy attached to the rival Sunni Islamist parties. Therefore, they omitted this implicit 
recognition embedded in the source text. 
Excerpt (4) includes two concepts that are inconsistent with al-Manar’s editorial policy, which 
were thereafter omitted. The excerpt refers clearly to “Assad’s suppression of revolt” and the 
“brutal” behaviour of his regime, hinting at his affiliation to the British. This would completely 
undermine Hezbollah’s public narrative on the Syrian conflict, as al-Manar has insisted on 
portraying Assad as a legitimate president who is engaged in a war against terrorism. The 
mentions of Assad’s “brutality” and “suppression” of the Syrian people’s “revolt” would 
distort, if rendered into Arabic, the positive image of Assad that al-Manar tries to maintain. 
In addition, speaking of Assad having a special relationship with Britain contradicts the claims 
of Western conspiracy promoted by pro-regime media outlets. 
The al-Manar translator selected sections of the text that suit the public narrative adopted by 
Hezbollah, the Syrian regime, and their allies. Only these sections that serve the media outlet’s 
agenda have been translated and included in the translated report, while other (incompatible) 
parts have been excluded.  Examples of the favoured parts are Excerpt (5) and most of Excerpt 
(1). The translator also employs another aspect of framing introduced in Section 6.5, known 
as frame ambiguity. This occurs when a sequence of events is framed differently to foster rival 
narratives produced by different parties (Baker, 2006: 107). It is aimed at legitimising certain 
actions in the context of a given conflict. The details of the narrative embedded in the source 
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text are re-framed and re-arranged to suit the agenda of al-Manar. The effect of frame 
ambiguity is most clearly manifested in the title of the translated report: 
The title of the Guardian report 
Syria and the Middle East: our greatest miscalculation since the rise of fascism  
(Jenkins, 2013) 
The title of the al-Manar report 
 :نايدراغلاةيشافلا ذنم أطخ حدفا حلاسلاب ةيروسلا ةضراعملا ديوزت  
 
[The Guardian: supplying the Syrian opposition with weapons is the hugest mistake since 
fascism] 
(Manar, May 2013-Al) 
The al-Manar translator here has changed the definition of the situation embedded in the 
source text, opting for choices in the target language that match the ideology of the media 
outlet in line with its political affiliation, interests, and agendas. The title of the Guardian 
report (the source text) does not specify what exactly the “greatest miscalculation” of the West 
“since the rise of fascism” is. The author leaves it open for the reader’s interpretation after 
reading the body of the article. He only names the geographical context in which the 
miscalculation occurs: Syria and the Middle East. The translator exploits this ambiguity 
created by the author, framing the situation differently. The supplying of the Syrian opposition 
with weapons becomes in the target text the hugest mistake of the West since fascism. This 
framing of course serves the al-Manar agenda, reflecting its pro-regime stance.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
When the Syrian revolution first erupted, the protestors’ strongest weapon was language. 
Translation has played a major role in establishing and making the protestors’ demands heard 
by the international community. Translation has ensured that the voice of the revolution has 
echoed through the silence of suppression. The Kafranbel banners show that the protestors 
have realised the importance of reaching out to the outside world to address foreign audiences 
in foreign languages, expressing the demands and stances of the revolutionaries. During the 
Syrian conflict, competing parties utilised translation to legitimise their actions, distorting the 
image of their enemies. This utilisation, at times, has reached the level of manipulation of the 
message embedded in the source texts.  
The effect of political views and affiliations on the choices made by translators is apparent in 
the context of the Syrian conflict. This is reflected though the translations provided by anti-
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regime translation agencies such as Free Syrian Translators, as well as pro-Assad outlets such 
as al-Manar and Russia Today, even pro-Israeli media organisations such as Memri.  
The translators’ ideologies have manifested themselves throughout the translation process. 
The translator cannot be seen as a transparent mediator whose sole concern is to faithfully 
pass on the original author’s message to the target reader. This study has shown that the 
translator is primarily a reader of the source text and ultimately an author (re-writer) of the 
target text. They shape the outcome of the translation process according to their ideology, pre-
existing knowledge, and political and cultural views. The role of patronage is essential in this 
regard, as media outlets often have the upper hand in the translation process, thus lying down 
the grounds and conditions of the entire process. The influence of ideology and patronage is 
manifested in this study through the translations provided by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office, 
representing the views of an anti-Assad Sunni Islamist faction. It can also be traced in the 
translations provided by al-Manar as a pro-regime news outlet representing Hezbollah, who 
adopts a hard-line Shiite ideology.  
Media outlets employ different techniques and strategies to ideologically and politically steer 
the translations of reports, interviews, and statements. The translations are aimed at serving 
the agenda of the publishing media outlet, presenting certain parties positively while 
delegitimising others. In the context of the Syrian revolution, this study has shown examples 
of the strategies and techniques employed particularly by pro-Assad media outlets, such as 
Syria Now, Sama TV, and JB News. The translations of international newspaper reports and 
articles have been manipulated to positively present the Assad regime, distorting the image of 
the Syrian revolution. 
The role of narrativity is particularly significant in the case of the Syrian conflict; each party 
has pursued it to promote their own version of the conflict. Each of the conflicting parties has 
utilised translation to frame certain situations in their favour. This study has given examples 
of various forms of framing employed by revolutionary groups, such as the Kafranbel activists 
as well as pro-Assad media outlets like al-Manar. The English writings inscribed on the 
Kafranbel banners have represented the English version of the narrative of the Syrian 
revolution, establishing the vision of the protestors as well as their stances towards the events 
of the conflict. It has been demonstrated through illustrative examples and thorough analysis 
how the narratives embedded in these banners have incorporated prominent features of 
narrativity, as explained in previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes an in-depth research study into the linguistic aspects of the Arab 
Spring, focusing on the role of language in expressing the demands of the protestors during 
this period, and the manifestation of translators’ political and ideological views in the 
translation of political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring. The study assessed 
the influence of ideology, media, and narrativity on the translator of political discourse. This 
chapter gives a general summary of this research study, listing the results and findings, and 
explaining their significance in the field of Translation Studies. It also refers to the limitations 
of the study, putting forward recommendations for further research. 
 
8.2 General Summary of the Study 
Although this study primarily focused on translation-related aspects of the Arab Spring, it 
began by investigating the role of language in establishing and conveying the demands of the 
protestors during the Arab Spring. It addressed the issues of stance-taking through speaking, 
mass protest mobilising discourse, and online revolution. It also examined various genres of 
revolutionary discourse, such as slogans, chants, and humour as well as the counter-
revolutionary discourse adopted by regime supporters. Examination of the language of the 
revolution has paved the way to a profound analysis of the translation of political discourse 
communicated during the Arab revolutions. 
This thesis attempted to investigate the role played by translators’ political views in shaping 
the translation choices, thus controlling the translation process. This investigation was carried 
out at micro- and macro-textual levels. Different political tools often employed in political 
discourse and its translation were covered. Critical Discourse Analysis constituted the 
theoretical framework of the study in this context. This study also discussed the influence of 
ideology on the translation process, resulting in potential modifications and manipulations of 
the message embedded in the source texts. It highlighted the different roles played by the 
translator as a reader who tends to interpret the source text according to their previously 
acquired knowledge, and also as an author who re-writes the text in line with their ideology 
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and agenda. The role of patronage is essential in this regard, as patrons often have the upper 
hand over the entire process of translation, editing, and publication.  
The effect of media in manipulating the translations was also a focal point in this research; 
many media outlets employ different strategies and tools to ideologically and politically steer 
the political discourse at hand and its translation. These media strategies and tools were 
demonstrated through examples derived from the political discourse communicated during the 
Arab Spring, and the Syrian conflict in particular. In addition to the influence of political 
views, ideology, and media on translation, narrativity was covered. Competing narratives 
manifested themselves in translation at the time of the revolutions. The data corpus included 
numerous examples of different features of narrativity. The study showed how these features, 
alongside various forms of framing, were employed by conflicting parties to promote certain 
versions of the narrative of the conflict.  
Within the theoretical framework offered in previous chapters, the data analysis chapter 
attempted to analyse the data corpus derived from the political discourse communicated in the 
context of the Syrian conflict specifically.  
 
8.3 Results and Findings 
In the following sub-sections, I will look at five groups of results which emerged from the 
thematic approaches to analysis, which are developed in Chapters 2-6, and then applied to data 
from the Syrian revolution in Chapter 7. 
 
8.3.1 Language into Action: Main Findings 
This section aims to draw conclusions from the theoretical discussions in Chapter Two, 
centred on the linguistic aspects of the Arab Spring. The use of language during the Arab 
Spring has reflected a state of stance-taking in which protestors and civil and political activists 
have expressed political opinions and attitudes. These opinions are spedifically related to the 
Arab revolutions and the Arab authoritarian regimes and their repressive policies. In their 
conflict with pro-regime media outlets, the Arab revolutionaries acted as stance-takers by 
using language to establish their identity as advocates for freedom. 
The discourse produced by the protestors of the Arab Spring was primaily a mass mobilising 
discourse, using language to mobilise the people. Civil and political activists who led the 
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protests often employed illocution, which is defined according to Oxford Dictionary as “an 
act of speaking or writing which in itself effects or constitutes the intended action” (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2015). The goal was to engage various social classes, segments, and sects in the 
revolutionary action. The protestors employed code-switching by using a combination of 
formal (standard) and informal local dialectical expressions in their chants in order to appeal 
to wider segments of society. Pleas were also made from the protestors in cities with intense 
revolutionary action to inhabitants of other areas to join the uprising and start revolting against 
the regime. The slogans chanted by the protestors, whether in Syria, Libya or Yemen, have 
reflected a great deal of responsibility and tendency to appeal to minorities and all religious 
and racial groups with a discourse that is both tolerant and unifying. The feeling of unity was 
not only shared by the people within the one country, but also brought together protestors from 
various Arab countries, creating a massive revolution across the Arab World.  
During the Arab Spring, activists took the responsibility of providing information and 
reporting news on different events occurring in different places across the country. That was 
done by using their accounts and pages on social media networks. Due to the repressive 
measures adopted by the Arab regimes, activists used their personal social media accounts, 
crearting public pages to assist the revolutionary action, organise protests, and mobilise the 
masses. Social media networks provided a platform to promote interaction and dialogue 
between activists and internet users, allowing interested users to give their opinions on various 
issues related to the revolutionary action. Online activists also used the internet and social 
media as an outlet for creative expression. Young, nameless poets shared numerous poems, 
verses, and short stories on Facebook and YouTube.  
The protestors coined certain slogans that established and expressed their demands for 
political change and aspirations for democratic transformation. Examples included the famous 
slogan irḥal (“leave” or “go out”) and the well-known slogan aš-šaᶜb yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām 
(“the people demand the overthrow of the regime”), which, according to Arab blogger Suby 
Raman (2012), is “the central slogan of the Arab Spring”. Such slogans have been “developed 
and re-appropriated in MSA and local dialects” in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and other countries 
to suit different contexts and serve the various demands of the protestors across the Arab 
World (Michel, 2013: 29).  
The protestors chanted couplet-slogans which expressed the feeling of revolt, reflecting the 
goals of the revolutionaries across the Arab World. These couplet-slogans were “loud” and 
“sharp” at the same time (Colla, 2011). This poetry was not merely “an ornament” to the 
revolution, but rather a genuine “soundtrack” that composed a “significant part of the action 
itself” (ibid). Poets and chanters therefore acted as action-makers who shaped the new political 
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and social realisation of the Arab World. The chants were often colloquial rather than classical 
or standard in register. They were sung and repeated collectively by thousands of people in a 
unified, clear cadence,” creating a tangible “sense of community that had not existed before” 
(ibid). They often mocked and criticised “feared public figures” such as presidents and 
prominent security and army officers, leaving an “immediate impact that cannot be explained 
in terms of language, for learning to laugh at one’s oppressor is a key part of unlearning fear” 
(ibid).  
Due to the restrictions imposed on freedom of expression and political opinion under the 
repressive Arab regimes, political humour was adopted during the Arab Spring as a defence 
mechanism against people in power who practised authority, and silenced and suppressed the 
nation. Humour was employed by the protestors to demand political change and criticise the 
ruling elites (Hassan, 2013: 554). Three elements existed in humorous discourse during the 
revolutions: first, a conflict between what the audience expected from a joke and what the joke 
actually attempted to say; second, a linguistic ambiguity with two dimensions of meaning, 
namely semantic and/or pragmatic meaning; and third, a punchline that concluded the joke 
and resolved the conflict (ibid: 552).  
Protestors and activists of the Arab Spring produced and communicated revolutionary 
discourse but were faced with the counter-revolutionary rhetoric of the ruling regimes and 
their supporters. This was widely circulated by official media outlets run by the government. 
In some cases, businessmen who benefited from corruption and thus remained fiercely loyal 
to the regime, as in the case of Egypt, spread such propaganda. This counter-revolutionary 
discourse aimed to defame the revolution, demonise the protestors, and delegitimise the 
revolutionary action. However, it did not really address the essence of the problem in the Arab 
countries, namely the absence of free democratic life and repression of public freedoms. It did 
not focus on political issues or the status of public liberties, or even provide solutions to the 
economic problems suffered by the citizens. Instead, it employed derogatory language, sexual 
overtones, and unfounded accusations of receiving international support. 
 
8.3.2 Political Discourse Analysis and Translation: Main Findings 
This section aims to draw conclusions from the theoretical discussions in Chapter Three and 
the data analysis carried out in Section 7.3 of Chapter Seven, centred on the influence of the 
translator’s political views on the translation process. To deal with the newly formulated 
political concepts generated after the outbreak of the revolutions, protestors and activists 
coined new words and redefined old ones. Both the regimes and pro-revolution activists have 
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changed the meanings of various terms, employing them in new, completely different, and 
often symbolic ways (Neggaz, 2013: 19). Traditional proverbs and quotations were 
transformed into new ones referring to the revolution’s proceedings. Aiming to promote their 
own perception of reality, each of the conflicting parties used names with negative 
implications to describe the agenda of the other group while assigning positive names to their 
own (ibid: 26). Simple words and statements used by regular protestors circulated widely, 
tuning into memorable and immortal words; they defined the revolutionary action against the 
repressive Arab regimes and represented the protestors’ aspirations for political change. 
On many occasions, conflicting parties have treated translation as a political act. Political 
considerations have governed the translators’ choices pertaining to the material to be 
translated and the way the translation process is run (Alvarez and Vidal in Schäffner, 2007: 
134). In this respect, political and ideological affiliations account for various practices 
connected to translation. Examples include the determination of the text to be translated, the 
choice of the target and source languages, in what media outlets the translation is intended to 
be published or broadcast, and determination of the identity of the translators and proof-
readers (ibid: 136). These lead to changes to and sometimes deliberate distortion of the original 
message embedded in the source text. This distortion is manifested in translations provided 
by pro-Syrian regime media outlets such as al-Manar and Russia Today. 
A major lexical-semantic challenge faced by translators of political discourse, especially that 
communicated during the Syrian revolution is related to terminology and interpretation. The 
disparity of the political stances of both translators and readers may result in divergent 
interpretations of sensitive political terminology (Schäffner, 1997b: 136). Therefore, a 
translator of political rhetoric-related material may translate a specific term in line with their 
personal political views, excluding other valid translations. This study has presented numerous 
examples in the context of the Arab Spring and the Syrian revolution, where translators have 
favoured a certain equivalent for an ST term over another, simply because this choice reflects 
the political views of the translator and/or the media institution they work for. The work of 
the anti-Assad translation agency known as ‘Free Syrian Translators’ is such an example. This 
study has highlighted the importance of accuracy in translation through excerpts from 
translations conducted by Free Syrian Translators. They have demonstrated that translation 
choices made by translators can substantially affect the message embedded in the source text; 
the slightest change to the wording of a political text can bring about significant changes to 
the meaning of that text. 
Since the beginning of the revolution, Israel, alongside pro-Israeli organisations in the West 
such as Memri, have tried to exploit the sufferings of the Syrian people to achieve political 
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agendas and legitimise the actions of Israel. Memri has been monitoring, translating, and 
publishing videos produced by feuding parties. The policy adopted by Memri is primarily 
aimed at achieving three main objectives: first, highlighting extremist ideological views 
expressed by some military factions, thus presenting Syrian opposition fighters in general as 
terrorists; second, distorting the image of the Syrian revolution as well as Arab Syrian identity; 
and third, bringing to the surface any possible views that recognise, appreciate, or praise Israel 
and its role in the region. On many occasions, Memri has resorted to manipulation of the 
original message embedded in the source material through translation in order to achieve the 
aforementioned objectives. 
Brian Whitaker (2012) accused the former Israeli military intelligence officer-founded 
organisation of selecting certain stories for translation that “follow a familiar pattern: either 
they reflect badly on the character of Arabs or they in some way further the political agenda 
of Israel.” By choosing particular videos for translation while excluding others, Memri has 
attempted to present a negative image of the Syrian revolution. 
The revolutionary language used by the protestors across Syria during the revolution is rich in 
political terms that are typically culture-bound, abstract, value-laden, and historically 
conditioned. Memri’s translators seem to have taken advantage of these qualities when 
rendering political terms embedded in political discourse communicated during the Syrian 
revolution. On many occasions, they isolated ST terms from their original contexts, giving 
them new implications in line with a certain political agenda. They did not offer any 
explanations that would provide the target audience with the historical and cultural 
background information they needed to capture the real meaning embedded in the source text. 
Despite Memri’s endeavours to present itself as a professional monitoring and production 
media institution, it failed to fulfil the minimum criteria of a professional press, such as 
objectivity and demonstration of substantial historical, cultural, and political knowledge 
related to current regional and international events. As illustrated in Chapter Five on media 
and translation, it is essential for media organisations dealing with translation of political 
discourse, which is by nature rich in historical references and culture-specific elements, to be 
familiar with the historical background of the event covered and discussed. Memri has 
translated and published many videos circulating in the context of the Syrian revolution. 
However, this study has presented examples where Memri’s translators proved to be 
unfamiliar with the topic they were dealing with and the historical and political context of the 
source text. 
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8.3.3 Ideology and Translation: Main Findings 
This section aims to draw conclusions from the theoretical discussions in Chapter Four and 
the data analysis carried out in Section 7.4 of Chapter Seven, centred on the influence of 
ideology on the translation process. This research study has shown that it is not frequently 
possible for a translator to resist cultural, historical, social, or ideological forces. Translators 
of the political discourse communicated during the Arab Spring have often worked under the 
constant pressure of these factors. They have produced, sometimes subconsciously, 
translations that are influenced by their own reading of the source texts (which is, in turn, 
governed by the translator’s previous knowledge and experience) as well as their cognitive 
socio-ideological background. On many occasions, translators seem to have also chosen to 
carry out what can be seen as deliberate manipulations of the translation, forcing a certain 
ideology upon the translation as a result of their ideological affiliations or the patron’s 
instructions. Translation can never be perceived as a neutral activity, as Hatim and Mason 
(1997) concede. 
This research study has adopted what is perceived here as a valid proposition pointed out by 
al-Taher (2008: 82): The decision-making mechanism in the translation process during a 
developing critical conflict like the Arab Spring goes through three circles. The creation of 
the source text, on the one hand, is governed by the source culture, the author’s ideology, and 
the way ideas are processed and issues are addressed by the author. The production of the 
target text, on the other hand, is carried out in line with three different elements too: the target 
culture, the translator’s ideological background, and the way the translator comprehends and 
processes ideas. These three factors, in addition to the patron’s influence, are the circles that 
the translation process goes through before a modified, biased, and ideologically steered 
translation is produced. 
The influence of ideology on translation is strongly manifested in the translation produced by 
Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office of Zahran Alloush’s interview with The Daily Beast. Many of 
van Dijk’s (1995a) ideological structures such as local semantics and semantic macro-
propositions (topics) were employed in the translation. In addition, the analysis of the 
translations made by Jaish al-Islam’s Press Office has highlighted the significance of the 
translator’s role as a reader who tends to interpret the source text in line with their previous 
knowledge and experience, which are inevitably influenced by their ideology and beliefs. In 
line with this proposition, the meaning of a text can be determined by the translator’s 
understanding as a reader of the source text, which gives the translator more freedom in 
forming the target text without any “restrictions” imposed by the notion of loyalty to the source 
text or the intention of the author (Schäffner, 1998b: 238). The role of patronage, represented 
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by Orient Net which published the Arabic translation of Alloush’s interview, in determining 
the outcome of the translation process proves to be vital. 
The influence of ideology during the Syrian revolution has also been manifested through 
translations produced by pro-Assad media organisations, such as al-Manar. Al-Manar’s 
interventions in the translations of various articles are manifestations of an ideological conflict 
between Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah and the Saudis. Hezbollah follows a hard-line Shiite 
ideology and adheres to the orders of al-Walī al-Faqīh (the Guardian Jurist) based in Iran, 
whereas the Saudis adopt a hard-line Salafist Sunni ideology. The entire Syrian war is said to 
be an aspect of this ideological conflict. Al-Manar’s work is consistent with a proposition 
expressed by Lefèvere (1992a). Lefèvere (ibid: 10) emphasises the necessity to analyse 
translation “in connection with power and patronage, ideology and poetics” in an attempt to 
expose the constant efforts devoted by patrons to use translation to promote their ideology and 
undermine the other’s. Translation can be used as part of a strategy to “maintain” specific 
cultures and identities and “deal with what lies outside their boundaries” (ibid). 
This study has demonstrated that media outlets often employed the strategy of subheading – 
one of the extra-textual strategies pointed out by Bani (2006: 43). Information that goes 
beyond the actual text is offered in a bid to assist the reader in comprehending the information 
embedded in the text. The source content is contextualised in line with the media outlet’s 
agendas and goals. Through this strategy, the editor is able to refer to certain concepts that 
would stay unrecognisable if not stated in a prime position. 
The interventions made by the translators in many of the examples presented in Chapter 7 
exposed the influence of ideology on the translators’ performance. Irrespective of whether 
they came in the form of deliberate manipulation of the source text, they highlighted the key 
role of ideology in determining the outcome of the translation process during the Syrian 
revolution and the subsequent armed conflict between the revolutionary and Islamist factions, 
and the pro-Assad forces backed by their allied Shiite militias. This has also been done by 
preferring certain TL equivalents that served the ideological agenda of the translator and/or 
the patron represented by the publishing media outlet to others. 
 
8.3.4 Media and Translation: Main Findings 
This section aims to draw conclusions from the theoretical discussions in Chapter Five and 
the data analysis carried out in Section 7.5 of Chapter Seven, centred on strategies and 
techniques employed by media outlets to influence and shape the outcome of the translation 
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process. Although the translation process may go unnoticed and remain absent in an area 
where the supreme concern is to deliver news to the audience, it involves procedures that may 
affect the content and style of translated news items. Before a political statement, interview, 
or article reaches the target audience, i.e. the audience speaking a different language from the 
language of the media material, it often goes through a long and complicated chain of textual 
transformations between two or more languages. These transformations are a result of a set of 
processes that include initial editing, summarisation, translation into the target language, 
further editing, transferring into a media outlet, adaptation to the publisher’s textual style, and 
shortening to fit in the space allocated for it by the publisher (Schäffner and Bassnett, 2010: 
9). 
The role of the media in manipulating and influencing the translation of political discourse 
during the Syrian revolution, politically and ideologically, has been traced through the 
translations produced by pro-regime media outlets of political articles and reports, primarily 
published in Western newspapers. These media outlets included, but were not restricted to, 
Syria Now, Sama TV, and JB News. They employed strategies and procedures identified by 
Loupaki (2010), often utilised by translators of discourse that contained ideological elements 
related to conflict. The first is reproducing ideological conflict in the target text; the second is 
erasing ideological conflict in the target text, and the third is introducing new conflicts in the 
target text. These strategies are aimed at increasing, toning down, or eliminating ideological 
content and elements related to conflict in the target text. 
Pro-Assad media outlets utilised three tools of manipulation primarily pointed out by Gambier 
(2006): hyperbole, understatement, and framing. First, ‘hyperbole’ is defined by Gambier 
(2006) as “a rhetorical device used to highlight, intensify, and amplify selected elements of 
the image of reality,” which are often aimed at persuading the audience in a communicative 
environment. Second, ‘understatement’ is often used by translators to “intentionally make a 
situation seem less important than it really is” (Literary Devices, 2015). Finally, ‘framing’ is 
widely employed in news production and translation as a tool of manipulation to provide 
“frames of reference, or highly stereotyped representations of specific situations, to make the 
event accessible to the public” (Gambier, 2006: 11). These devices have been employed by 
pro-regime media outlets publishing translated political articles related to the Syrian conflict 
to promote a Shiite ideological agenda and/or achieve pro-regime political goals, urging the 
reader to adopt the media outlet’s political and ideological views. 
Both techniques of ‘managing’ and ‘monitoring’ primarily identified by Hatim and Mason 
(1990) and Shunnaq (1992) can be observed in the translated articles published by pro-Assad 
media outlets such as Syria Now, Sama TV, and JB News. The technique of ‘managing’ was 
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widely utilised by media outlets as an act of steering to employ stories and news items that 
tackled the Syrian conflict in the service of a pro-Assad political agenda. Indirect quotations 
were used to provide additional space to transform the original message. The use of reporting 
verbs like claimed, regretted, alleged, and confirmed also reflected the personal stance and 
opinion of the reporter/translator (ibid: 107). In other cases, media outlets employed 
‘monitoring’ as a technique whereby the message embedded in the source text was maintained, 
avoiding major changes to the translation (Shunnaq, 1992: 36). Pro-regime media outlets 
implemented the aforementioned strategies and techniques through following a set of 
procedures pointed out by Gambier (2006) and Bani (2006), mainly substitution, omission 
(cutting), addition, and re-organisation.  
An overall overview of the translations provided by pro-regime media outlets shows that the 
translated texts have been fundamentally recontextualised and syntactically and semantically 
transformed during the translation process. The translated reports have undergone a 
comprehensive process of recontextualisation, as noted by Schäffner and Bassnett (2010). 
Most target readers do not have access to the full article in its original version (the source text) 
due to obvious linguistic boundaries; they can only read a few quotes and extracts selected 
carefully and intentionally by the media outlet to be included in the reports. Therefore, it is 
not possible for target readers to know how much information the publishing media outlet has 
excluded. They do not have the privilege to read the original content in full to find out the 
missing sections in the target texts. This process of selection, proposed by Shunnaq (1994: 
112) and others, is in line with a set of standards and principles imposed by pro-regime media 
outlets to serve Shiite ideological agendas to be consistent with pro-Assad political views. 
 
8.3.5 Translation and Narration of Conflict: Main Findings 
This section aims to draw conclusions from the theoretical discussions in Chapter Six and the 
data analysis carried out in Section 7.6 of Chapter Seven, centred on the manifestation of rival 
narratives in translation. The main function of translation is to facilitate communication across 
linguistic boundaries. It has therefore become an imperative aspect of the conflict, needed by 
opponents and disputing parties in order to legitimise and promote their descriptions of the 
conflict, while undermining the narratives adopted by rival parties. Competing popular 
narratives produced by the revolutionary and pro-regime forces during the Syrian conflict 
represent a typical example of discursive dispute at all political, ideological, and social levels 
at the time of the Arab Spring. Translation has proved to be an integral part of the Syrian 
conflict, playing a vital role in describing, shaping, and unfolding its events. 
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This study has attempted to apply narrative theory on the discursive dispute during the Syrian 
revolution, examining the way translation operates in this environment of conflicting 
narratives. It has presented representative examples that highlighted the role of translation in 
shaping conflicting narratives during the revolution in light of the various types and features 
of narrativity. It has also implemented the concept of framing on the data corpus, examining 
the different modes of narrative framing in translation. 
The narrativity of the Syrian revolution is frequently manifested in a series of banners 
produced and carried by a group of civil activists from the Syrian city of Kafranbel. The 
writings on these banners represent the demands of the Syrian revolution, reflecting anti-
Assad revolutionary views stemming back to the early days of the uprising in March, 2011. 
Arabic, English, and sometimes other languages, such as Russian and Turkish, have also been 
used to criticise standpoints and stances adopted by various international, regional, and local 
parties regarding the Syrian conflict.  
The significance of these banners is that they express the Syrian revolutionary discourse, 
constituting a rich multi-lingual record of the intellectual aspect of the revolution. They reflect 
the attitudes taken by anti-Assad protestors towards the events of the Syrian uprising over five 
years of conflict. The English banners are not exact translations of the Arabic ones. Rather, 
they are meant to address an English-speaking audience in the West, thus expressing ideas and 
conveying messages that concern this particular audience. However, while both types of 
banners (English and Arabic) are manifestations of the same revolutionary discourse, they are 
merely formed, worded, presented, and employed differently to fulfil certain agendas in line 
with the interests of the Syrian revolution.  
The themes and wordings chosen for the English banners are meant to interest an English-
speaking audience, attracting their attention to the Syrian cause. Narratives that are 
particularly significant and meaningful for the Americans and Europeans are framed 
differently to fulfil the agenda and objectives of the discourse producer (the Kafranbel 
activists). They generally mark certain events that have made a difference in public life, thus 
influencing the cultural and political awareness of these nations. The narratives chosen for the 
Arabic version of the Kafranbel banners have the same quality. Each version of the banners 
addresses its respective audience using a language they understand and narratives they are 
familiar with. The aim has always been to legitimise the revolution, and attract international 
and local support for the revolution. 
The data analysis reveals the employment of ‘temporal and spatial framing’ in the Kafranbel 
banners. The protestors of Kafranbel utilised this form of framing, choosing specific texts that 
depict a certain narrative, and placing them in new temporal and spatial environments. The 
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audience is thus encouraged to make a connection between this narrative and others that may 
be more up-to-date even though its events actually belong to different temporal settings or 
take place in a different geographical area (Baker, 2006: 112). In addition to this, many of the 
features of narrativity introduced in Chapter Six have manifested themselves in the banners, 
such as ‘narrative accrual’ and ‘causal emplotment’. These features enabled the Kafranbel 
activists to promote their revolutionary approach while circulating the anti-Assad narrative, 
thus appealing for more international support for the Syrian revolution. 
Al-Manar has also employed various aspects of framing to promote the pro-Assad version of 
the narrative of the Syrian conflict. Al-Manar has frequently implemented ‘selective 
appropriation’, pointed out by Baker (2006), by using procedures of omission and addition 
during the translation process. This has resulted in a diversion of the message embedded in 
the source version of the narrative in an attempt by the media outlet to follow a Shiite ideology 
and fulfil a pro-Assad agenda. Furthermore, the use of ‘frame ambiguity’ has been aimed at 
legitimising the Assad army’s actions in the context of the Syrian conflict. The details of the 
narrative embedded in the source texts are thus re-framed and re-arranged to suit the agenda 
of al-Manar. Some of the al-Manar translated reports represent examples of ‘conceptual 
narratives’, suggested by Somers and Gibson (1994: 62-3). 
The data analysis has shown that the pro-revolutionary media outlet Sasa Post has utilised a 
prominent aspect of framing, identified by Baker (2006: 122) as ‘framing by labelling’. The 
six stories presented in the report primarily published by The Guardian (Mahmood, 2015), 
thereafter translated into Arabic by Sasa Post (Mar 2015), can serve as examples of 
‘ontological narratives’. These examples bring about the question of rival systems of naming, 
proposed by Baker (2006: 123), who admits that this proves to be challenging in translation. 
Competing parties and communities adopted different names for an entity, situation, 
geographical area, and so on. This was done in order to promote their own narratives to 
legitimise social and political claims, refuting and undermining opposing claims (ibid: 124). 
Baker (ibid) suggests that adopting a name in this context automatically implies a denial of 
the other, subsequently undermining the other’s narratives and claims. 
 
8.4 Evaluation and Contribution to the Field of Knowledge 
This thesis contributes to the field of knowledge in a number of ways: 
1- The study provides a succinct account of the Arab Spring, drawing together a range 
of sources and perspectives. Chapter One is intended to simply offer a political 
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background to the study, providing necessary information which can enable the reader 
to understand the historical and political framework of the data corpus. Adding to this, 
it thoroughly investigates the political aspects of the Arab Spring. It gives a 
comprehensive account of the political situation prior to the revolutions, covering 
many relevant areas that concern researchers of political science, such as democracy 
in the Arab thought, Arab civil society, full and liberalised democracy, Islam and 
democracy, and state of human rights in the Arab World. The discussion goes on to 
identify the main factors that actually led to the outbreak of the revolutions. This 
chapter constitutes a comprehensive study that combines all the Arab revolutions 
together, providing reasons, factors, and a rich record of the proceedings of the Arab 
Spring. 
2- The study contributes to the field of Linguistics. Chapter Two looks into the language 
of the revolution. The significance of the study as well as the results in this respect lie 
in three main factors. First, it demonstrates how language can serve as a tool of 
profound change, developing from the level of words to the level of action, generating 
a new political reality in the Arab World. Second, it establishes a link between all the 
Arab revolutions offering examples from different Arab countries. Third, it 
investigates the different genres of revolutionary discourse, such as humour, chants, 
banners, online discourse, and so on. 
3- The study significantly contributes to the field of Translation Studies (see Chapters 3-
7). It attempts to implement key theories on original data derived from the Arab 
Spring. The translation of the political discourse communicated during the Arab 
Spring has not been studied at the PhD level before. This study has identified this gap 
and has sought to assess the translations of political texts produced on Arab Spring-
related issues.  
4- This research builds on existing literature by extending the scope of investigation to 
cover four main areas pertaining to translation of political discourse: political 
discourse analysis, the influence of ideology, strategies and techniques utilities by 
media outlets, and narrative theory. This is the first study that has analysed original 
data from all these four different perspectives. 
5- This research draws conclusions from a large volume of data (11 data sources falling 
into 6 different categories – see Section 7.2), with varied genres of political discourse. 
This involves samples of political speeches, political articles, interviews, videos, 
banners, and slogans chanted during demonstrations, as well as their respective 
translations. The data used as examples in Chapters 2-6 are derived from the discourse 
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communicated during the Arab Spring and its aftermath. The data corpus analysed in 
Chapter Seven is exclusively taken from the Syrian revolution and the subsequent 
conflict. 
6- The data analysis chapter of this study analyses original data from the Syrian conflict. 
Most of the political discourse analysed has been produced recently. This means that 
researchers have not yet tackled this topic in depth at PhD level. It deals with a conflict 
that is still ongoing, developing and unfolding before our very eyes. Therefore, the 
results reached may have an impact on the literature of the conflict at various levels, 
adding to the interpretation of the conflict. They enable the interested audience to have 
a better understanding of the ideologies, political views, and narratives of competing 
parties. This study provides the reader with an insight into the way these views, 
ideologies, and narratives are manifested in the translations produced by media outlets 
and translation agencies during the Syrian conflict.  
 
8.5 Limitations of the Study 
This study has contributed to the fields of Political Science, Linguistics, and Translation 
Studies in a number of ways, as illustrated in the previous section. However, there are a few 
limitations to the study. First, critical discourse analysis constituted an important part of the 
theoretical framework of this study. Researchers conducting a critical discourse analysis take 
upon themselves to support the oppressed against the oppressor. In line with this 
understanding of the mission of Critical Discourse Analysis, this study has taken the side of 
the protestors against the Arab regimes. Although the primary focus was on disclosing the 
manipulations carried out by pro-regime media outlets during the translation process, the study 
has equally highlighted the influence of ideological and political views on translators/patrons 
affiliated to both parties: the revolutionary forces and the ruling elites. This study does not 
claim complete objectivity when it comes to the description of some situations. The pro-
revolutionary views of the researcher are manifested through adopting certain names of some 
events. For example, the label “revolutions” has been adopted as descriptions of the uprisings 
of the Arab Spring, while the label “regimes” was used to refer to some Arab governments. 
The personal views of the researcher can sometimes be observed throughout the discussions. 
The selection of certain examples as representative samples for analysis, while excluding 
others, can also be criticised as being governed by the agenda of the researcher. This is in fact 
one of the main shortcomings of Critical Discourse Analysis in general. 
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Second, this study has established a link between the five Arab revolutions of the Arab Spring, 
despite the notable differences between these revolutions at various levels. In the first six 
chapters, the study attempted to implement the theories on examples derived from all the five 
revolutions, without dealing with the fact that each revolution has specific and unique features. 
What would work for one revolution, may not work for another. Some revolutions turned into 
armed conflicts where ideology played a major role, such as in Libya, Yemen, and Syria. 
Others, on the other hand, remained peaceful and actually succeeded in establishing and 
achieving demands of democracy, political change, and human rights. The revolution in 
Tunisia is an example. The 25th Revolution in Egypt was completely reversed and was faced 
by a counter-revolution led by the army and pro-regime elites. In order to balance the broad 
scope of earlier chapters with a specific and detailed case-study, the data analysis chapter was 
devoted to investigating the translation of political discourse communicated during the Syrian 
revolution alone.  
 
8.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
As mentioned in the introduction, this study has pursued personal research in the field of 
translation of political discourse undertaken at the MA level (Haj Omar, 2011), as well as in 
the form of published articles (Haj Omar, 2015b). It also incorporates past efforts in 
investigating the translation of conflicts and the role of narrative theory in explaining 
transformations in translation during conflict (Haj Omar, 2015a). I aim to continue these 
endeavours by undertaking future research into the influence of ideology on the translation of 
the political discourse adopted by Islamic State (IS). In addition to this, further research can 
be performed into the role of the Egyptian media in manipulating the translation of political 
discourse following the coup led by Gen. al-Sisi. This can look into the role of patronage and 
censorship practised by the al-Sisi regime in producing translations that are consistent with 
pro-al-Sisi political views. They are aimed at legitimising the regime’s actions, and 
demonising its opponents including the Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6 Youth Movement 
and other civil society movements and political opposition parties. This research looks at four 
different approaches to text and translation: political discourse analysis, ideological discourse 
analysis, strategies and techniques employed in translated media discourse, and narrative 
theory. In further research work, I would be interested to examine how these different 
theoretical approaches might be more closely integrated with one another than was possible 
in this thesis, with a view perhaps to producing a single overarching of the areas in question.  
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8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has given a general summary of this thesis, presenting the key findings and 
general results. The findings were categorised into five groups of results which emerged from 
the thematic approaches to analysis developed in Chapters 2-6, and then applied to data from 
the Syrian revolution in Chapter 7. The chapter also highlighted the significance of the results 
and the contribution of the study to the field of knowledge. It was noted that this study has 
contributed to the fields of Political Science, Linguistics, and Translation Studies. The 
limitations of the study were also discussed, and recommendations were put forward for 
further research. 
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